Background
1. The reading of the record shows on 15th December 2020 Jennifer Imbukwa Ojango and Marcus Gurvey Ojango petitioned for Grant of letters of administration intestate of the estate in the matter of the estate of Leornard Indiazi Ojango who died on 9th February 2020. In the affidavits filed in Court the deceased intestate and left the following surviving him:
Names Relationship
Rina Ayuma Indiazi Widow
Benjamin Isiche Ojango Son
Jenipher Imbukwa Ojango Nephew
Marcus Gurvey Ojango Nephew
2. The assets survived of the deceased are indicated as follows:
(a) L.P West Bunyore/Ebusikhale/2323
(b) L.P West Bunyore/Ebusikhale/2324
(c) L.P West Bunyore/Ebusikhale/2325
(d) L.P West Bunyore/Ebusikhale/2326
3. Thereafter on 17th March 2021 the Court issued the grant of letters administration intestate with the following declarations. That:
BE IT KNOWN that on the............day of.........2021 letters of Administration intestate of all the estate of LEONARD INDIAZI OJANGO deceased late of EBUSIKHALE SUB-LOCATION who died domiciled in Kenya on which by law devolves to and vests in his/her personal representative were granted by this Court to JENIPHER IMBUKWA & MARCUS GURVEY OJANGO having undertaken faithfully to administer such estate according to law and to render a just and true account thereof whenever required by law so to do. ISSUED by the Principal Magistrate's Court/through the registry at Vihiga this 17th day of March 2021.
4. The proceedings did not stop there, the petition was filed by the Administrators for issuance of certificate of confirmation of grant in the matter of estate of the deceased which was duly issued and confirmed on 18th January 2022 with the following details on distribution matrix under Section 29 of the Law of Succession Act as construed with Section 71 of the same Act:
Names Description of Property Share
Rina Ayuma Indiazi
Benjamin Isiche Ojango
Jenipher Imbukwa Ojango
Marcus Gurvey Ojango L.P West
Bunyore/Ebusikhale/2323 Equal share
Rina Ayuma Indiazi
Benjamin Isiche Ojango
Jenipher Imbukwa Ojango L.P West
Bunyore/Ebusikhale/2324 Equal share
Marcus Gurvey Ojango
Rina Ayuma Indiazi
Benjamin Isiche Ojango
Jenipher Imbukwa Ojango
Marcus Gurvey Ojango L.P West
Bunyore/Ebusikhale/2325 Equal share
Rina Ayuma Indiazi
Benjamin Isiche Ojango
Jenipher Imbukwa Ojango
Marcus Gurvey Ojango L.P West
Bunyore/Ebusikhale/2326 Equal share
Rina Ayuma Indiazi
Benjamin Isiche Ojango
Jenipher Imbukwa Ojango
Marcus Gurvey Ojango L.P West
Bunyore/Ebusikhale/2324 Equal share
5. In the Court expectation a final decree had been rendered to deliver the scheme of distribution to the beneficiaries who fall within the identification hierarchy define under Section 29 of the Law of Succession Act to inherit the land of their late father as outlined in the law. It is the Law in Kenya that by 6 months the entire estate ought to have been shared out within 6 months and the estate liquidate by discharging the Administrators. That did not happen if the impugned ruling by the learned Magistrate dated 30th January 2025 is anything to go by where she pronounced herself as follows:
a. In this case, it is clear that the Petitioners herein did not rank in priority to the objectors/Applicants. In fact, Rina Ayuma Indiazi being a widow of the deceased ranked in priority to the Petitioners who were niece and nephew to the deceased. In the affidavit in support of the petition, the Petitioners did not even disclose their relation with the deceased and the fact that the deceased had a surviving wife and four children. Similarly, in the summons for confirmation of grant the deceased's widow, objector and his sibling though provided for they were the beneficiaries/dependants of the deceased only. The Petitioners went ahead and instituted this succession proceedings without obtaining consent of the immediate dependants that is the widow, objector and his siblings.
b. It is clear that the Petitioners could only lawfully petition for grant upon receiving a consent from the widow, objector and his siblings, or upon citation having notified the widow, objector and his siblings of their intention to petition for grant in respect of the deceased's estate. This must be so because Part VI Rule 26(1) of the Probate and Administration Rules on the other hand provides that: "Letters of administration shall not be granted to any Applicant without notice of every other person entitled in the same degree as or in priority to the
Applicant."
c. In either case, the Petitioners were obliged to disclose not only their relationship with the deceased but also the names and addresses of all surviving widow and children of the deceased. It is clear that in this case the Petitioners included the names of the immediate beneficiaries but did not specify their relation to the deceased for reasons known to themselves. It is therefore clear based on the evidence before me that the Petitioners did not disclose all the material required to have been disclosed and they were not the right persons to have petitioned for grant in the circumstances.
d. Section 52 of the Act provides that: "Any person who, in an application for representation, wilfully or recklessly makes a statement which is false in any material particular shall be guilty of an offence and liable to a fine not exceeding ten thousand shillings or to a term of imprisonment not exceeding one year or to both such fine and imprisonment."
e. In the foregoing premises and based on the above stated reasons, the Court finds the objector/Applicant is deserving of orders sought. Consequently, the Court allows the summons for revocation or annulment of grant dated 17th May, 2024 and I proceed to make the following orders:-
i. An order is issued that the grant of letters of administration issued to Jenipher Imbukwa Ojango and Marcus Gurvey Ojango confirmed on 25th November, 2021 is hereby revoked and or annulled.
ii. An order is issued that all subsequent activities on land parcel No. West Bunyore/Ebusikhale/2323 after issue of grant based on confirmed grant is declared null and void since the said grant did not include the right and or all the deceased dependants and or beneficiaries.
iii. An order is issued that land parcels Nos. West
Bunyore/Ebusikhale/2323, 2324, 2325 and 2326 revert to late Leonard Indiazi Ojango (deceased).
iv. An order is issued that Rina Ayuma Indiazi (widow) and the Applicant Benjamin Isiche Ojango is appointed as the Administrators of the estate of late Leonard Indiazi Ojango (deceased) in place of Jenipher Imbukwa Ojango and Marcus Gurvey Ojango who are Administrators but not beneficiaries.
v. This being a family matter, each party shall bear its own costs.
vi. Any aggrieved party is at liberty to move Superior Court within (30) days from the date of this ruling.
6. These declarations form the subject matter of this appeal.
A. INTRODUCTION
7. This is a first appeal brought under Section 50(1) of the Law of Succession Act, Cap 160 (Laws of Kenya), against the Ruling of the Honourable J. A. Agonda, Principal Magistrate, delivered at Vihiga on 30th January 2025 in Succession Cause No. E032 of 2021, in the matter of the estate of Leonard Indiazi Ojango (Deceased).
8. The Appellants were the Petitioners and, until the impugned Ruling, the Administrators of that estate. The Respondent is a son of the deceased. By the Ruling the trial Court revoked the grant of letters of administration made to the Appellants, declared void certain dealings undertaken under it, ordered that four parcels of land revert to the deceased, and appointed the Respondent and the deceased's widow as Administrator in place of the Appellants.
9. The Appellants do not, in this appeal, challenge the revocation of the grant nor do they challenge their replacement as Administrators. Their complaint is confined to the consequential orders touching on the four parcels of land. Their case, put at its highest and as they themselves formulate it in their Written Submissions, is that a succession Court sitting under the Law of Succession Act has no jurisdiction to cancel registered titles, to direct the reversion of land already transmitted, or otherwise to determine proprietary interests in registered land, that jurisdiction being reserved by Article 162(2)(b) of the Constitution to the Environment and Land Court.
10. That is the single question upon which this appeal turns. It is an important one, and it recurs with some frequency in the succession Courts of this Republic.
B. THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW
11. Leonard Indiazi Ojango died intestate on 10th February 2020.
12. The Appellants, who are the deceased's niece and nephew, petitioned for a grant of letters of administration intestate in respect of his estate. It is common ground that a grant was made to them, that it was confirmed on 25th November 2021, and that a certificate of confirmation of grant issued on 18th January 2022.
13. The free estate was said to comprise four parcels of land: West Bunyore/Ebusikhale/2323, 2324, 2325 and 2326. These are subdivisions of an original parcel, West Bunyore/Ebusikhale/2009. Following confirmation, transmission was effected and titles were issued to the beneficiaries named in the certificate on or about 16th November 2023.
14. On 22nd March 2024 the Appellants took out a Chamber Summons under Section 48 of the Act and Rules 49, 63 and 73 of the Probate and Administration Rules, seeking amendment of the grant, the consolidation of parcels 2324, 2325 and 2326 into a single parcel, the closure of the registers of 2325 and 2326, and the redistribution of the consolidated parcel equally among what they described as three "houses" - the first comprising Rina Ayuma Indiazi and the Respondent, the second comprising the two Appellants, and the third comprising Livingstone Isiche Ojango.
15. On 17th May 2024 the Respondent took out a Summons for Revocation or Annulment of Grant under Rules 44 and 73 of the Probate and Administration Rules and Section 76 of the Act. He sought four substantive orders: revocation of the confirmed grant; a declaration that all subsequent activities on parcel 2323 undertaken after the issue of the grant be declared null and void; an order that parcels 2323, 2324, 2325 and 2326 revert to the late Leonard Indiazi Ojango; and his own appointment as Administrator in place of the Appellants.
16. In his supporting affidavit the Respondent deposed that the deceased was survived by a widow, Rina Ayuma Indiazi, and four children, himself, Joyce Ayoti Indiazi, Sarah Namuleli Indiazi and Daisy Atelo; that the Appellants are cousins and neither beneficiaries nor dependants; that the cause had been filed without the knowledge of the immediate family; and that the four parcels belonged to the deceased, who was the registered proprietor.
17. The Appellants opposed the summons by a Replying Affidavit sworn on 10th September 2024. Their answer was, in substance, historical. They deposed that parcel West Bunyore/Ebusikhale/2009 had originally been held in equal one-third shares by the deceased, by Livingstone Isiche Ojango and by Dan Ojango (the Appellants' late father); that in or about 1998 the deceased fraudulently procured the registration of the whole parcel in his sole name after cancelling the names of the other two co-owners; that this was achieved by means of a forged power of attorney and forged transfer instruments; that a forensic examination by the Directorate of Criminal Investigations concluded that the signature attributed to Dan Ojango was in fact that of the deceased; and that the deceased had recorded a statement admitting the irregular transfer and undertaking to reverse it. They further deposed that before petitioning they had taken out citation proceedings in Vihiga Citation Cause No. 113 of 2020 citing the Respondent and the widow to accept or refuse letters of administration, that the cause had been gazetted on 12th February 2021, and that no objection had been lodged.
18. Both parties were represented and both filed written submissions. The trial Court heard the two applications together.
C. THE IMPUGNED RULING
19. The learned Principal Magistrate framed the issue as whether the Applicant (the present Respondent) was entitled to the orders sought. She set out sections 76, 66 and 51(2) of the Act and Rule 26(1) of the Probate and Administration Rules.
20. Her findings, in summary, were these. The Appellants did not rank in priority under Section 66 of the Act; the widow, being a surviving spouse, ranked ahead of a niece and a nephew. In the affidavit in support of the petition the Appellants did not disclose their relationship to the deceased, nor the fact that the deceased had left a surviving wife and four children, as section 51(2)(d) and (g) of the Act required. Rule 26(1) forbids the grant of letters of administration to an Applicant without notice to every other person entitled in the same degree or in priority. The Appellants had proceeded without the consent of the widow and the children, and without citation. They were therefore not the proper persons to have petitioned, and the material required to be disclosed had not been disclosed.
21. The learned Magistrate accordingly allowed the summons and made six orders: (i) revocation and annulment of the confirmed grant; (ii) a declaration that all subsequent activities on parcel West Bunyore/Ebusikhale/2323 after the issue of the grant are null and void; (iii) an order that parcels 2323, 2324, 2325 and 2326 revert to the late Leonard Indiazi Ojango (deceased); (iv) the appointment of Rina Ayuma Indiazi and the Respondent as Administrators in place of the Appellants; (v) that each party bear its own costs, the matter being a family one; and (vi) liberty to any aggrieved party to move the Superior Court within thirty days.
22. It is convenient to record here what the record shows happened next. A fresh grant was made to the Respondent and the widow on 30th
January 2025. On 6th February 2025 they took out a Summons for Confirmation supported by an affidavit under Section 71(3) of the Act, together with a Consent on Distribution signed by Joyce Ayoti Indiazi, Sarah Namuleli Indiazi and Daisy Atelo. The succession cause therefore remains alive and unconfirmed before the trial Court.
D. THE APPEAL
23. The Memorandum of Appeal raises five grounds, which may be compressed as follows:
a. That in directing the cancellation of titles 2323, 2324, 2325 and 2326 and their reversion to the deceased, the trial Court acted contrary to sections 13 and 26 of the Environment and Land Court
Act and section 9 of the Magistrates' Courts Act;
b. That in so directing where no party had pleaded for such relief, the Court departed from the principle that it is bound by the parties' pleadings;
c. That the learned Magistrate misdirected herself in determining the question of title to the four parcels while sitting on a succession cause;
d. That she erred in determining a question regarding title to property whose value exceeded her pecuniary jurisdiction under Section 7 of the Magistrates' Courts Act; and
e. That the Ruling was made without jurisdiction, equity or fairness and has occasioned a grave miscarriage of justice.
24. The prayers are that the decision of 30th January 2025 be set aside, quashed and/or varied in so far as it directed the cancellation of the titles and their reversion to the late Leonard Indiazi Ojango, and that the costs of the appeal and of the succession cause be provided for.
25. In their Written Submissions dated 14th July 2026 the Appellants rely on Owners of the Motor Vessel "Lillian S" v Caltex Oil (Kenya) Ltd [1989]
KLR 1 and Samuel Kamau Macharia & another v Kenya Commercial Bank Ltd & 2 others [2012] eKLR for the proposition that jurisdiction is everything and cannot be assumed; on Article 162(2)(b) of the Constitution and section 13 of the Environment and Land Court Act, No. 19 of 2011; on In re Estate of Alice Mumbua Mutua (Deceased) [2017] eKLR and In re Estate of Stone Kathuli Muinde (Deceased) [2016] eKLR for the proposition that a probate Court lacks jurisdiction to determine contested questions of ownership; and on Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission & another v Stephen Mutinda Mule & 3 others [2014] eKLR for the proposition that parties and Courts alike are bound by the pleadings.
26. The Respondent, by Written Submissions dated 15th July 2026, resists the appeal on three bases: that it is premature, the succession cause being unconcluded and no fresh grant having been confirmed; that the Appellants have instituted parallel proceedings before the Environment and Land Court over the same parcels and thereby abused the process of the Court; and that the trial Court acted within the jurisdiction conferred by sections 47 and 76 of the Act and Rule 73 of the Rules, the impugned orders being consequential and restitutionary rather than adjudicative of title. He relies on Speaker of the National Assembly v James Njenga Karume [1992] eKLR and Muchanga Investments Limited v Safaris Unlimited (Africa) Limited & 2 others [2009] eKLR, and he distinguishes Stone Kathuli Muinde.
E. THE DUTY OF THIS COURT ON A FIRST APPEAL
27. On a first appeal this Court is under a duty to reconsider the evidence, to evaluate it and to draw its own conclusions, while remembering that it neither saw nor heard the witnesses and making proper allowance for that: Selle & another v Associated Motor Boat Company Limited & Others [1968] EA 123; Peters v Sunday Post Limited [1958] EA 424.
28. That caution has limited application here. The two applications below were determined on affidavit evidence and written submissions alone. No witness was called and no question of demeanour arose. In such a case this Court is in as good a position as the trial Court to assess the material, and I approach the record accordingly.
29. I must also keep in mind a discipline that the Appellants themselves urge upon me. An appellate Court is confined to the grounds set out in the memorandum of appeal. The Appellants have not appealed against the revocation of the grant, against the findings of non-disclosure under Section 51(2) of the Act, against the finding that they did not rank in priority under section 66, or against their replacement as Administrators. Those findings and orders are not before me and they stand.
F. PRELIMINARY MATTERS
30. Four preliminary matters require disposal before I come to the merits.
31. The competence and timeliness of the appeal. Section 50(1) of the Act provides that an appeal shall lie to the High Court in respect of any order or decree made by a Subordinate Court in respect of any estate, and that the decision of the High Court on such appeal shall be final. The Section prescribes no period within which such an appeal is to be brought, and Section 79G of the Civil Procedure Act does not apply of its own force to succession appeals; the requirement is that the appeal be lodged without unreasonable delay. The Ruling was delivered on 30th January 2025 and gave liberty to move this Court within thirty days. The Memorandum of Appeal is dated in October 2025, some eight months later, and no application for enlargement of time appears on the record. That is a matter that would have required explanation had it been raised. It was not raised by the Respondent, who has instead met the appeal on other preliminary grounds and on the merits, and no prejudice from the delay has been asserted. Given the conclusion I have reached on the substance, it is unnecessary to determine the point, and I decline to dispose of the appeal upon a ground on which the parties have not been heard. I record the matter only so that it is not thought to have escaped notice.
32. The capacity of the 1st Appellant. The Memorandum of Appeal describes Marcus Gurvey Ojango as suing "for and on behalf of the estate of Dan Mwanga Ochango (deceased)". No grant of representation in respect of that estate has been exhibited. It is settled that a person has no capacity to sue on behalf of the estate of a deceased person before a grant is made to him: Trouistik Union International & Another v Jane Mbeyu & another [1993] eKLR. Before the trial Court the 1st Appellant appeared in his own name as a Petitioner, and it is in that capacity that he is properly before me. The added description in the title of the appeal is surplusage and I disregard it. Nothing turns on it, but the point is not merely formal: it signals that the Appellants' real grievance concerns a claim vested in another estate altogether, to which I return at paragraphs 61 to 68 below.
33. Whether the appeal is premature: I do not accept this submission. The Ruling of 30th January 2025 finally determined the Summons for Revocation dated 17th May 2024. It revoked a confirmed grant, annulled dealings, ordered reversion of four parcels and removed the Appellants from office. Those are not interlocutory directions; they are final determinations of the rights the summons put in issue, and Section 50(1) of the Act gives an appeal against "any order or decree" made in respect of an estate. Speaker of the National Assembly v James Njenga Karume [1992] eKLR is not in point. That decision addresses a litigant who bypasses a statutory mechanism of redress and comes to Court instead. Here the Appellants have invoked the very mechanism the statute provides - an appeal. A party aggrieved by a revocation order is not obliged to await the confirmation of a fresh grant before challenging it. The objection fails.
34. Whether the Appellants have abused the process of the Court. The Respondent asserts that the Appellants have instituted parallel proceedings before the Environment and Land Court concerning the same parcels. The assertion is made from the bar in submissions. No pleading, no case number and no certificate of urgency from any such proceeding has been placed before me, and there is no affidavit deposing to their existence. A finding of abuse of process is a serious one and it must be founded on evidence, not on assertion: see Muchanga Investments Limited v Safaris Unlimited (Africa) Limited & 2 others [2009] eKLR, in which the Court of Appeal described abuse of process as the improper use of the judicial process to harass, oppress or annoy. I decline to make such a finding on this record. I add, because it matters to the disposition, that proceedings in the Environment and Land Court raising a claim adverse to the estate would not necessarily be an abuse at all. They may be the only proper forum for such a claim.
Litigating the right question in the right Court is not forum shopping.
G. ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION
35. Stripped to essentials, the following issues arise:
a. Whether the succession Court had jurisdiction to make the consequential orders complained of, namely the declaration of nullity in respect of dealings on parcel 2323 and the order that parcels 2323, 2324, 2325 and 2326 revert to the deceased;
b. Whether those orders were made without any supporting pleading;
c. Whether the trial Court exceeded its pecuniary jurisdiction;
d. Whether the Ruling occasioned a miscarriage of justice;
e. What the Appellants' substantive claim in truth is, and in which Court it belongs; and
f. What orders, including as to costs, ought to issue.
H. ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION
Issue (a): Jurisdiction to make the consequential orders
36. I begin, as the Appellants rightly urge, with jurisdiction. Owners of the Motor Vessel "Lillian S" v Caltex Oil (Kenya) Ltd [1989] KLR 1 remains the locus classicus: jurisdiction is everything, and without it a Court has no power to make one more step. In Samuel Kamau Macharia & another v Kenya Commercial Bank Ltd & 2 others [2012] eKLR the Supreme Court confirmed that a Court's jurisdiction flows from the Constitution or from legislation, and that no Court may arrogate to itself jurisdiction exceeding that conferred upon it by law. I accept both propositions without qualification.
37. The jurisdiction of the succession Court: Section 47 of the Act provides that the Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any application and determine any dispute under the Act "and to pronounce such decrees and make such orders therein as may be expedient". Section 48, as amended by Section 23 of the Magistrates' Courts Act, 2015, extends that jurisdiction to magistrates' Courts within their pecuniary limits, including the power to revoke grants made by themselves. Rule 73 of the Probate and Administration Rules preserves the inherent power of the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of its process.
38. Section 76 sets out the grounds upon which a grant, whether or not confirmed, may be revoked or annulled. The learned Magistrate found grounds under paragraphs (a) and (b) - defective proceedings and concealment from the Court of something material - and that finding is unchallenged. As a reminder to the Appellants the decision of the trial Court was well within the scope of the provision of Section 76 of the Act:
A grant of representation, whether or not confirmed, may at any time be revoked or annulled if the Court decides, either on application by any interested party or of its own motion—(a)that the proceedings to obtain the grant were defective in substance;(b)that the grant was obtained fraudulently by the making of a false statement or by the concealment from the Court of something material to the case;(c)that the grant was obtained by means of an untrue allegation of a fact essential in point of law to justify the grant notwithstanding that the allegation was made in ignorance or inadvertently;(d)that the person to whom the grant was made has failed, after due notice and without reasonable cause either-(i)to apply for confirmation of the grant within one year from the date thereof, or such longer period as the Court order or allow; or(ii)to proceed diligently with the administration of the estate; or(iii)to produce to the Court, within the time prescribed, any such inventory or account of administration as is required by the provisions of paragraphs (e) and (g) of Section 83 or has produced any such inventory or account which is false in any material particular; or(e)that the grant has become useless and inoperative through subsequent circumstances.
39. The Learned Magistrate in exercising judicial discretion and jurisdiction revisited the doctrine of nullity in Kenya’s Law of Succession Act both on procedure and substantive protocols to interrogate quietly disquieting judicial trend where the validation of decrees in favour of some parties or litigants to administer the estate of the deceased despite explicit statutory provisions. The learned Magistrate examined how the doctrine anchored in the foundational provisions of Section 66 providing safeguards on jurisdiction integrity by asserting that no adjudication on the intestate of the deceased can stand in absence of a proper, legal, and appropriate Administrator being appointed by the Court in consonant with the statute. The provisions of Section 76 of the Law of Succession Act in its letter, spirit and the ghost is implicit that nullity is not a procedural formality but a jurisdictional imperative. One has to got to understand that proceedings involving a deceased individual within the premised of Section 76 as read with Section 66 cumulatively when there is probative evidence a nullity of those defective proceedings is a keystone of procedural and substantive justice. As primary doctrine of law, the doctrine of nullity posits that acts or decisions undertaken without essential jurisdiction or involving procedural infirmities are void ab initio and devoid of legal effect. Once declared a nullity as the learned Magistrate did in her ruling dated 30th January 2025 such proceedings are deemed never to have existed in the eyes of the law, incapable of conferring rights imposing obligations, or producing enforceable consequences. In my considered view, what was initiated by Jenipher Ojango and Marcus Ojango in exclusion of the widow or spouse of the deceased to petition for grant of letters of administration falls within the doctrine of futility, closely associated with the legal maxim Lex NonCogit Ad Inutilia which implies – ‘that the law does not compel the performance of useless acts’. The Appellants appeal if allowed will create a doctrinal inconsistency which lies in the judicial tendency to retrospectively validate proceedings involving parties to a succession cause at the time of adjudication had no legal personality or locus standi, and if this Court was to accede to such validation without a statutory basis it would be to stretch the legal fiction of party identity beyond its legitimate scope and may risk the converting a mere procedural laps into distortion of the law.
40. The approach adopted by the Trial Court cannot be faulted that proceedings which were void and a nullity within the Law of Succession Act should have been preserved for judicial indulgence by the ELC Court. The jurisdiction of the Environment and Land Court is provided for in Article 162(2)(b) of the Constitution with its enabling statute enacted by Parliament to establish a Court with the status of the High Court to hear and determine disputes relating to the environment and the use, occupation and title to land being, Environment and Land Court Act, No. 19 of 2011 in which Section 13(2)(a) confers jurisdiction over disputes relating to, among other things, title, tenure and boundaries. Likewise, Section 9 of the Magistrates' Courts Act, 2015 confers a corresponding but limited jurisdiction on Magistrates' Courts in environment and land matters, subject to gazettement and to pecuniary limits. On this point no submissions addressed Section 26 of
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1. The reading of the record shows on 15th December 2020 Jennifer Imbukwa Ojango and Marcus Gurvey Ojango petitioned for Grant of letters of administration intestate of the estate in the matter of the estate of Leornard Indiazi Ojango who died on 9th February 2020. In the affidavits filed in Court the deceased intestate and left the following surviving him:
Names Relationship
Rina Ayuma Indiazi Widow
Benjamin Isiche Ojango Son
Jenipher Imbukwa Ojango Nephew
Marcus Gurvey Ojango Nephew
2. The assets survived of the deceased are indicated as follows:
(a) L.P West Bunyore/Ebusikhale/2323
(b) L.P West Bunyore/Ebusikhale/2324
(c) L.P West Bunyore/Ebusikhale/2325
(d) L.P West Bunyore/Ebusikhale/2326
3. Thereafter on 17th March 2021 the Court issued the grant of letters administration intestate with the following declarations. That:
BE IT KNOWN that on the............day of.........2021 letters of Administration intestate of all the estate of LEONARD INDIAZI OJANGO deceased late of EBUSIKHALE SUB-LOCATION who died domiciled in Kenya on which by law devolves to and vests in his/her personal representative were granted by this Court to JENIPHER IMBUKWA & MARCUS GURVEY OJANGO having undertaken faithfully to administer such estate according to law and to render a just and true account thereof whenever required by law so to do. ISSUED by the Principal Magistrate's Court/through the registry at Vihiga this 17th day of March 2021.
4. The proceedings did not stop there, the petition was filed by the Administrators for issuance of certificate of confirmation of grant in the matter of estate of the deceased which was duly issued and confirmed on 18th January 2022 with the following details on distribution matrix under Section 29 of the Law of Succession Act as construed with Section 71 of the same Act:
Names Description of Property Share
Rina Ayuma Indiazi
Benjamin Isiche Ojango
Jenipher Imbukwa Ojango
Marcus Gurvey Ojango L.P West
Bunyore/Ebusikhale/2323 Equal share
Rina Ayuma Indiazi
Benjamin Isiche Ojango
Jenipher Imbukwa Ojango L.P West
Bunyore/Ebusikhale/2324 Equal share
Marcus Gurvey Ojango
Rina Ayuma Indiazi
Benjamin Isiche Ojango
Jenipher Imbukwa Ojango
Marcus Gurvey Ojango L.P West
Bunyore/Ebusikhale/2325 Equal share
Rina Ayuma Indiazi
Benjamin Isiche Ojango
Jenipher Imbukwa Ojango
Marcus Gurvey Ojango L.P West
Bunyore/Ebusikhale/2326 Equal share
Rina Ayuma Indiazi
Benjamin Isiche Ojango
Jenipher Imbukwa Ojango
Marcus Gurvey Ojango L.P West
Bunyore/Ebusikhale/2324 Equal share
5. In the Court expectation a final decree had been rendered to deliver the scheme of distribution to the beneficiaries who fall within the identification hierarchy define under Section 29 of the Law of Succession Act to inherit the land of their late father as outlined in the law. It is the Law in Kenya that by 6 months the entire estate ought to have been shared out within 6 months and the estate liquidate by discharging the Administrators. That did not happen if the impugned ruling by the learned Magistrate dated 30th January 2025 is anything to go by where she pronounced herself as follows:
a. In this case, it is clear that the Petitioners herein did not rank in priority to the objectors/Applicants. In fact, Rina Ayuma Indiazi being a widow of the deceased ranked in priority to the Petitioners who were niece and nephew to the deceased. In the affidavit in support of the petition, the Petitioners did not even disclose their relation with the deceased and the fact that the deceased had a surviving wife and four children. Similarly, in the summons for confirmation of grant the deceased's widow, objector and his sibling though provided for they were the beneficiaries/dependants of the deceased only. The Petitioners went ahead and instituted this succession proceedings without obtaining consent of the immediate dependants that is the widow, objector and his siblings.
b. It is clear that the Petitioners could only lawfully petition for grant upon receiving a consent from the widow, objector and his siblings, or upon citation having notified the widow, objector and his siblings of their intention to petition for grant in respect of the deceased's estate. This must be so because Part VI Rule 26(1) of the Probate and Administration Rules on the other hand provides that: "Letters of administration shall not be granted to any Applicant without notice of every other person entitled in the same degree as or in priority to the
Applicant."
c. In either case, the Petitioners were obliged to disclose not only their relationship with the deceased but also the names and addresses of all surviving widow and children of the deceased. It is clear that in this case the Petitioners included the names of the immediate beneficiaries but did not specify their relation to the deceased for reasons known to themselves. It is therefore clear based on the evidence before me that the Petitioners did not disclose all the material required to have been disclosed and they were not the right persons to have petitioned for grant in the circumstances.
d. Section 52 of the Act provides that: "Any person who, in an application for representation, wilfully or recklessly makes a statement which is false in any material particular shall be guilty of an offence and liable to a fine not exceeding ten thousand shillings or to a term of imprisonment not exceeding one year or to both such fine and imprisonment."
e. In the foregoing premises and based on the above stated reasons, the Court finds the objector/Applicant is deserving of orders sought. Consequently, the Court allows the summons for revocation or annulment of grant dated 17th May, 2024 and I proceed to make the following orders:-
i. An order is issued that the grant of letters of administration issued to Jenipher Imbukwa Ojango and Marcus Gurvey Ojango confirmed on 25th November, 2021 is hereby revoked and or annulled.
ii. An order is issued that all subsequent activities on land parcel No. West Bunyore/Ebusikhale/2323 after issue of grant based on confirmed grant is declared null and void since the said grant did not include the right and or all the deceased dependants and or beneficiaries.
iii. An order is issued that land parcels Nos. West
Bunyore/Ebusikhale/2323, 2324, 2325 and 2326 revert to late Leonard Indiazi Ojango (deceased).
iv. An order is issued that Rina Ayuma Indiazi (widow) and the Applicant Benjamin Isiche Ojango is appointed as the Administrators of the estate of late Leonard Indiazi Ojango (deceased) in place of Jenipher Imbukwa Ojango and Marcus Gurvey Ojango who are Administrators but not beneficiaries.
v. This being a family matter, each party shall bear its own costs.
vi. Any aggrieved party is at liberty to move Superior Court within (30) days from the date of this ruling.
6. These declarations form the subject matter of this appeal.
A. INTRODUCTION
7. This is a first appeal brought under Section 50(1) of the Law of Succession Act, Cap 160 (Laws of Kenya), against the Ruling of the Honourable J. A. Agonda, Principal Magistrate, delivered at Vihiga on 30th January 2025 in Succession Cause No. E032 of 2021, in the matter of the estate of Leonard Indiazi Ojango (Deceased).
8. The Appellants were the Petitioners and, until the impugned Ruling, the Administrators of that estate. The Respondent is a son of the deceased. By the Ruling the trial Court revoked the grant of letters of administration made to the Appellants, declared void certain dealings undertaken under it, ordered that four parcels of land revert to the deceased, and appointed the Respondent and the deceased's widow as Administrator in place of the Appellants.
9. The Appellants do not, in this appeal, challenge the revocation of the grant nor do they challenge their replacement as Administrators. Their complaint is confined to the consequential orders touching on the four parcels of land. Their case, put at its highest and as they themselves formulate it in their Written Submissions, is that a succession Court sitting under the Law of Succession Act has no jurisdiction to cancel registered titles, to direct the reversion of land already transmitted, or otherwise to determine proprietary interests in registered land, that jurisdiction being reserved by Article 162(2)(b) of the Constitution to the Environment and Land Court.
10. That is the single question upon which this appeal turns. It is an important one, and it recurs with some frequency in the succession Courts of this Republic.
B. THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW
11. Leonard Indiazi Ojango died intestate on 10th February 2020.
12. The Appellants, who are the deceased's niece and nephew, petitioned for a grant of letters of administration intestate in respect of his estate. It is common ground that a grant was made to them, that it was confirmed on 25th November 2021, and that a certificate of confirmation of grant issued on 18th January 2022.
13. The free estate was said to comprise four parcels of land: West Bunyore/Ebusikhale/2323, 2324, 2325 and 2326. These are subdivisions of an original parcel, West Bunyore/Ebusikhale/2009. Following confirmation, transmission was effected and titles were issued to the beneficiaries named in the certificate on or about 16th November 2023.
14. On 22nd March 2024 the Appellants took out a Chamber Summons under Section 48 of the Act and Rules 49, 63 and 73 of the Probate and Administration Rules, seeking amendment of the grant, the consolidation of parcels 2324, 2325 and 2326 into a single parcel, the closure of the registers of 2325 and 2326, and the redistribution of the consolidated parcel equally among what they described as three "houses" - the first comprising Rina Ayuma Indiazi and the Respondent, the second comprising the two Appellants, and the third comprising Livingstone Isiche Ojango.
15. On 17th May 2024 the Respondent took out a Summons for Revocation or Annulment of Grant under Rules 44 and 73 of the Probate and Administration Rules and Section 76 of the Act. He sought four substantive orders: revocation of the confirmed grant; a declaration that all subsequent activities on parcel 2323 undertaken after the issue of the grant be declared null and void; an order that parcels 2323, 2324, 2325 and 2326 revert to the late Leonard Indiazi Ojango; and his own appointment as Administrator in place of the Appellants.
16. In his supporting affidavit the Respondent deposed that the deceased was survived by a widow, Rina Ayuma Indiazi, and four children, himself, Joyce Ayoti Indiazi, Sarah Namuleli Indiazi and Daisy Atelo; that the Appellants are cousins and neither beneficiaries nor dependants; that the cause had been filed without the knowledge of the immediate family; and that the four parcels belonged to the deceased, who was the registered proprietor.
17. The Appellants opposed the summons by a Replying Affidavit sworn on 10th September 2024. Their answer was, in substance, historical. They deposed that parcel West Bunyore/Ebusikhale/2009 had originally been held in equal one-third shares by the deceased, by Livingstone Isiche Ojango and by Dan Ojango (the Appellants' late father); that in or about 1998 the deceased fraudulently procured the registration of the whole parcel in his sole name after cancelling the names of the other two co-owners; that this was achieved by means of a forged power of attorney and forged transfer instruments; that a forensic examination by the Directorate of Criminal Investigations concluded that the signature attributed to Dan Ojango was in fact that of the deceased; and that the deceased had recorded a statement admitting the irregular transfer and undertaking to reverse it. They further deposed that before petitioning they had taken out citation proceedings in Vihiga Citation Cause No. 113 of 2020 citing the Respondent and the widow to accept or refuse letters of administration, that the cause had been gazetted on 12th February 2021, and that no objection had been lodged.
18. Both parties were represented and both filed written submissions. The trial Court heard the two applications together.
C. THE IMPUGNED RULING
19. The learned Principal Magistrate framed the issue as whether the Applicant (the present Respondent) was entitled to the orders sought. She set out sections 76, 66 and 51(2) of the Act and Rule 26(1) of the Probate and Administration Rules.
20. Her findings, in summary, were these. The Appellants did not rank in priority under Section 66 of the Act; the widow, being a surviving spouse, ranked ahead of a niece and a nephew. In the affidavit in support of the petition the Appellants did not disclose their relationship to the deceased, nor the fact that the deceased had left a surviving wife and four children, as section 51(2)(d) and (g) of the Act required. Rule 26(1) forbids the grant of letters of administration to an Applicant without notice to every other person entitled in the same degree or in priority. The Appellants had proceeded without the consent of the widow and the children, and without citation. They were therefore not the proper persons to have petitioned, and the material required to be disclosed had not been disclosed.
21. The learned Magistrate accordingly allowed the summons and made six orders: (i) revocation and annulment of the confirmed grant; (ii) a declaration that all subsequent activities on parcel West Bunyore/Ebusikhale/2323 after the issue of the grant are null and void; (iii) an order that parcels 2323, 2324, 2325 and 2326 revert to the late Leonard Indiazi Ojango (deceased); (iv) the appointment of Rina Ayuma Indiazi and the Respondent as Administrators in place of the Appellants; (v) that each party bear its own costs, the matter being a family one; and (vi) liberty to any aggrieved party to move the Superior Court within thirty days.
22. It is convenient to record here what the record shows happened next. A fresh grant was made to the Respondent and the widow on 30th
January 2025. On 6th February 2025 they took out a Summons for Confirmation supported by an affidavit under Section 71(3) of the Act, together with a Consent on Distribution signed by Joyce Ayoti Indiazi, Sarah Namuleli Indiazi and Daisy Atelo. The succession cause therefore remains alive and unconfirmed before the trial Court.
D. THE APPEAL
23. The Memorandum of Appeal raises five grounds, which may be compressed as follows:
a. That in directing the cancellation of titles 2323, 2324, 2325 and 2326 and their reversion to the deceased, the trial Court acted contrary to sections 13 and 26 of the Environment and Land Court
Act and section 9 of the Magistrates' Courts Act;
b. That in so directing where no party had pleaded for such relief, the Court departed from the principle that it is bound by the parties' pleadings;
c. That the learned Magistrate misdirected herself in determining the question of title to the four parcels while sitting on a succession cause;
d. That she erred in determining a question regarding title to property whose value exceeded her pecuniary jurisdiction under Section 7 of the Magistrates' Courts Act; and
e. That the Ruling was made without jurisdiction, equity or fairness and has occasioned a grave miscarriage of justice.
24. The prayers are that the decision of 30th January 2025 be set aside, quashed and/or varied in so far as it directed the cancellation of the titles and their reversion to the late Leonard Indiazi Ojango, and that the costs of the appeal and of the succession cause be provided for.
25. In their Written Submissions dated 14th July 2026 the Appellants rely on Owners of the Motor Vessel "Lillian S" v Caltex Oil (Kenya) Ltd [1989]
KLR 1 and Samuel Kamau Macharia & another v Kenya Commercial Bank Ltd & 2 others [2012] eKLR for the proposition that jurisdiction is everything and cannot be assumed; on Article 162(2)(b) of the Constitution and section 13 of the Environment and Land Court Act, No. 19 of 2011; on In re Estate of Alice Mumbua Mutua (Deceased) [2017] eKLR and In re Estate of Stone Kathuli Muinde (Deceased) [2016] eKLR for the proposition that a probate Court lacks jurisdiction to determine contested questions of ownership; and on Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission & another v Stephen Mutinda Mule & 3 others [2014] eKLR for the proposition that parties and Courts alike are bound by the pleadings.
26. The Respondent, by Written Submissions dated 15th July 2026, resists the appeal on three bases: that it is premature, the succession cause being unconcluded and no fresh grant having been confirmed; that the Appellants have instituted parallel proceedings before the Environment and Land Court over the same parcels and thereby abused the process of the Court; and that the trial Court acted within the jurisdiction conferred by sections 47 and 76 of the Act and Rule 73 of the Rules, the impugned orders being consequential and restitutionary rather than adjudicative of title. He relies on Speaker of the National Assembly v James Njenga Karume [1992] eKLR and Muchanga Investments Limited v Safaris Unlimited (Africa) Limited & 2 others [2009] eKLR, and he distinguishes Stone Kathuli Muinde.
E. THE DUTY OF THIS COURT ON A FIRST APPEAL
27. On a first appeal this Court is under a duty to reconsider the evidence, to evaluate it and to draw its own conclusions, while remembering that it neither saw nor heard the witnesses and making proper allowance for that: Selle & another v Associated Motor Boat Company Limited & Others [1968] EA 123; Peters v Sunday Post Limited [1958] EA 424.
28. That caution has limited application here. The two applications below were determined on affidavit evidence and written submissions alone. No witness was called and no question of demeanour arose. In such a case this Court is in as good a position as the trial Court to assess the material, and I approach the record accordingly.
29. I must also keep in mind a discipline that the Appellants themselves urge upon me. An appellate Court is confined to the grounds set out in the memorandum of appeal. The Appellants have not appealed against the revocation of the grant, against the findings of non-disclosure under Section 51(2) of the Act, against the finding that they did not rank in priority under section 66, or against their replacement as Administrators. Those findings and orders are not before me and they stand.
F. PRELIMINARY MATTERS
30. Four preliminary matters require disposal before I come to the merits.
31. The competence and timeliness of the appeal. Section 50(1) of the Act provides that an appeal shall lie to the High Court in respect of any order or decree made by a Subordinate Court in respect of any estate, and that the decision of the High Court on such appeal shall be final. The Section prescribes no period within which such an appeal is to be brought, and Section 79G of the Civil Procedure Act does not apply of its own force to succession appeals; the requirement is that the appeal be lodged without unreasonable delay. The Ruling was delivered on 30th January 2025 and gave liberty to move this Court within thirty days. The Memorandum of Appeal is dated in October 2025, some eight months later, and no application for enlargement of time appears on the record. That is a matter that would have required explanation had it been raised. It was not raised by the Respondent, who has instead met the appeal on other preliminary grounds and on the merits, and no prejudice from the delay has been asserted. Given the conclusion I have reached on the substance, it is unnecessary to determine the point, and I decline to dispose of the appeal upon a ground on which the parties have not been heard. I record the matter only so that it is not thought to have escaped notice.
32. The capacity of the 1st Appellant. The Memorandum of Appeal describes Marcus Gurvey Ojango as suing "for and on behalf of the estate of Dan Mwanga Ochango (deceased)". No grant of representation in respect of that estate has been exhibited. It is settled that a person has no capacity to sue on behalf of the estate of a deceased person before a grant is made to him: Trouistik Union International & Another v Jane Mbeyu & another [1993] eKLR. Before the trial Court the 1st Appellant appeared in his own name as a Petitioner, and it is in that capacity that he is properly before me. The added description in the title of the appeal is surplusage and I disregard it. Nothing turns on it, but the point is not merely formal: it signals that the Appellants' real grievance concerns a claim vested in another estate altogether, to which I return at paragraphs 61 to 68 below.
33. Whether the appeal is premature: I do not accept this submission. The Ruling of 30th January 2025 finally determined the Summons for Revocation dated 17th May 2024. It revoked a confirmed grant, annulled dealings, ordered reversion of four parcels and removed the Appellants from office. Those are not interlocutory directions; they are final determinations of the rights the summons put in issue, and Section 50(1) of the Act gives an appeal against "any order or decree" made in respect of an estate. Speaker of the National Assembly v James Njenga Karume [1992] eKLR is not in point. That decision addresses a litigant who bypasses a statutory mechanism of redress and comes to Court instead. Here the Appellants have invoked the very mechanism the statute provides - an appeal. A party aggrieved by a revocation order is not obliged to await the confirmation of a fresh grant before challenging it. The objection fails.
34. Whether the Appellants have abused the process of the Court. The Respondent asserts that the Appellants have instituted parallel proceedings before the Environment and Land Court concerning the same parcels. The assertion is made from the bar in submissions. No pleading, no case number and no certificate of urgency from any such proceeding has been placed before me, and there is no affidavit deposing to their existence. A finding of abuse of process is a serious one and it must be founded on evidence, not on assertion: see Muchanga Investments Limited v Safaris Unlimited (Africa) Limited & 2 others [2009] eKLR, in which the Court of Appeal described abuse of process as the improper use of the judicial process to harass, oppress or annoy. I decline to make such a finding on this record. I add, because it matters to the disposition, that proceedings in the Environment and Land Court raising a claim adverse to the estate would not necessarily be an abuse at all. They may be the only proper forum for such a claim.
Litigating the right question in the right Court is not forum shopping.
G. ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION
35. Stripped to essentials, the following issues arise:
a. Whether the succession Court had jurisdiction to make the consequential orders complained of, namely the declaration of nullity in respect of dealings on parcel 2323 and the order that parcels 2323, 2324, 2325 and 2326 revert to the deceased;
b. Whether those orders were made without any supporting pleading;
c. Whether the trial Court exceeded its pecuniary jurisdiction;
d. Whether the Ruling occasioned a miscarriage of justice;
e. What the Appellants' substantive claim in truth is, and in which Court it belongs; and
f. What orders, including as to costs, ought to issue.
H. ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION
Issue (a): Jurisdiction to make the consequential orders
36. I begin, as the Appellants rightly urge, with jurisdiction. Owners of the Motor Vessel "Lillian S" v Caltex Oil (Kenya) Ltd [1989] KLR 1 remains the locus classicus: jurisdiction is everything, and without it a Court has no power to make one more step. In Samuel Kamau Macharia & another v Kenya Commercial Bank Ltd & 2 others [2012] eKLR the Supreme Court confirmed that a Court's jurisdiction flows from the Constitution or from legislation, and that no Court may arrogate to itself jurisdiction exceeding that conferred upon it by law. I accept both propositions without qualification.
37. The jurisdiction of the succession Court: Section 47 of the Act provides that the Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any application and determine any dispute under the Act "and to pronounce such decrees and make such orders therein as may be expedient". Section 48, as amended by Section 23 of the Magistrates' Courts Act, 2015, extends that jurisdiction to magistrates' Courts within their pecuniary limits, including the power to revoke grants made by themselves. Rule 73 of the Probate and Administration Rules preserves the inherent power of the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of its process.
38. Section 76 sets out the grounds upon which a grant, whether or not confirmed, may be revoked or annulled. The learned Magistrate found grounds under paragraphs (a) and (b) - defective proceedings and concealment from the Court of something material - and that finding is unchallenged. As a reminder to the Appellants the decision of the trial Court was well within the scope of the provision of Section 76 of the Act:
A grant of representation, whether or not confirmed, may at any time be revoked or annulled if the Court decides, either on application by any interested party or of its own motion—(a)that the proceedings to obtain the grant were defective in substance;(b)that the grant was obtained fraudulently by the making of a false statement or by the concealment from the Court of something material to the case;(c)that the grant was obtained by means of an untrue allegation of a fact essential in point of law to justify the grant notwithstanding that the allegation was made in ignorance or inadvertently;(d)that the person to whom the grant was made has failed, after due notice and without reasonable cause either-(i)to apply for confirmation of the grant within one year from the date thereof, or such longer period as the Court order or allow; or(ii)to proceed diligently with the administration of the estate; or(iii)to produce to the Court, within the time prescribed, any such inventory or account of administration as is required by the provisions of paragraphs (e) and (g) of Section 83 or has produced any such inventory or account which is false in any material particular; or(e)that the grant has become useless and inoperative through subsequent circumstances.
39. The Learned Magistrate in exercising judicial discretion and jurisdiction revisited the doctrine of nullity in Kenya’s Law of Succession Act both on procedure and substantive protocols to interrogate quietly disquieting judicial trend where the validation of decrees in favour of some parties or litigants to administer the estate of the deceased despite explicit statutory provisions. The learned Magistrate examined how the doctrine anchored in the foundational provisions of Section 66 providing safeguards on jurisdiction integrity by asserting that no adjudication on the intestate of the deceased can stand in absence of a proper, legal, and appropriate Administrator being appointed by the Court in consonant with the statute. The provisions of Section 76 of the Law of Succession Act in its letter, spirit and the ghost is implicit that nullity is not a procedural formality but a jurisdictional imperative. One has to got to understand that proceedings involving a deceased individual within the premised of Section 76 as read with Section 66 cumulatively when there is probative evidence a nullity of those defective proceedings is a keystone of procedural and substantive justice. As primary doctrine of law, the doctrine of nullity posits that acts or decisions undertaken without essential jurisdiction or involving procedural infirmities are void ab initio and devoid of legal effect. Once declared a nullity as the learned Magistrate did in her ruling dated 30th January 2025 such proceedings are deemed never to have existed in the eyes of the law, incapable of conferring rights imposing obligations, or producing enforceable consequences. In my considered view, what was initiated by Jenipher Ojango and Marcus Ojango in exclusion of the widow or spouse of the deceased to petition for grant of letters of administration falls within the doctrine of futility, closely associated with the legal maxim Lex NonCogit Ad Inutilia which implies – ‘that the law does not compel the performance of useless acts’. The Appellants appeal if allowed will create a doctrinal inconsistency which lies in the judicial tendency to retrospectively validate proceedings involving parties to a succession cause at the time of adjudication had no legal personality or locus standi, and if this Court was to accede to such validation without a statutory basis it would be to stretch the legal fiction of party identity beyond its legitimate scope and may risk the converting a mere procedural laps into distortion of the law.
40. The approach adopted by the Trial Court cannot be faulted that proceedings which were void and a nullity within the Law of Succession Act should have been preserved for judicial indulgence by the ELC Court. The jurisdiction of the Environment and Land Court is provided for in Article 162(2)(b) of the Constitution with its enabling statute enacted by Parliament to establish a Court with the status of the High Court to hear and determine disputes relating to the environment and the use, occupation and title to land being, Environment and Land Court Act, No. 19 of 2011 in which Section 13(2)(a) confers jurisdiction over disputes relating to, among other things, title, tenure and boundaries. Likewise, Section 9 of the Magistrates' Courts Act, 2015 confers a corresponding but limited jurisdiction on Magistrates' Courts in environment and land matters, subject to gazettement and to pecuniary limits. On this point no submissions addressed Section 26 of
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