1. The applicant that is before this court for determination is the one dated 17th July 2025 wherein the applicant is seeking;
1) An Order of Certiorari do issue, directed at bringing into this Honourable Court and quashing the entire decision of the Sports Disputes Tribunal rendered on the 14th day of July 2025 in SDTSC No. E051 of 2025, Phanice Apiyo Shisia vs Kenya Karate Federation & 2 Others, including all consequential orders, directives, and actions arising therefrom.
2) An Order of Prohibition do issue, directed at the Respondent, prohibiting it by itself, its servants, agents, or any other person acting under its authority, from enforcing, implementing, or in any way giving effect to the impugned decision rendered on the 14th day of July 2025 in SDTSC No. E051 of 2025, Phanice Apiyo Shisia vs Kenya Karate Federation & 2 Others, or from taking any further steps aimed at altering the national team selection or interfering with the Applicant’s technical and administrative processes in relation to the UFAK 2025 African Karate Championship or any other subsequent competitions, arising from the said impugned decision.
3) The Court be at liberty to make such further and other orders as it deems fit to meet the ends of justice.
4) The costs of this Application and the proceedings herein be awarded to the Applicant, as the Respondent’s and 1st Interested Party’s actions have necessitated the institution of these proceedings.
2. The application is supported by the Supporting and the Supplementary Affidavits of James M. Gikonyo. It is his case that, the 1st Interested Party approached the Tribunal prematurely, without exhausting the Dispute Resolution Commission (DRC) established under Article 62 of the Applicant’s Constitution.
3. The DRC, being a functional, accessible, and specialized mechanism, was the proper forum for initial resolution of the grievance. The invocation of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction without first engaging this internal forum offends the principle of exhaustion and undermines the legislative intent behind Article 62.
4. While the Applicant recognizes that the exhaustion requirement is not absolute, and that Section 9(4) of the Fair Administrative Action Act allows courts or tribunals to assume jurisdiction in exceptional circumstances, as restated in William Odhiambo Ramogi & 3 Others v Attorney General & 4 Others [2020] eKLR, the threshold for invoking such exception has not been met in this case.
5. The Court in that matter held that:
“…the first principle is that the High Court may in exceptional circumstances consider, and determine that the exhaustion requirement would not serve the values enshrined in the Constitution or law… The second principle is that the jurisdiction of the courts to consider valid grievances from parties who lack adequate audience before the forum created by statute or who may not have the quality of audience before the forum which is proportionate to the interests the party wishes to advance in a suit must not be ousted.”
6. According to him, the Tribunal erred in finding that the Dispute Resolution Commission (DRC) was non-existent or unassembled. He argues that the Tribunal’s statement that the Commissions “seem to speak to the future” and that it was “unwise to let an important Commission such as the DRC await competition before being assembled” was factually incorrect and unsupported by the evidence.
7. The Applicant’s Dispute Resolution Commission was not prospective, theoretical, or dormant. It was duly established, operational, and competent at the material time, as evidenced by public communications, athlete forums, and internal structures disclosed to the Tribunal.
8. He argues that the Tribunal wrongly held that the DRC’s operationalization in April 2025 fell short of expectations for a functional internal dispute resolution mechanism, despite clear evidence that the Federation’s current leadership only assumed office in late 2024 and promptly operationalized the DRC within months.
9. The 1st Interested Party neither pleaded nor demonstrated that the DRC was inaccessible, biased, or ineffective, nor did she attempt to engage with the internal mechanism before directly approaching the Tribunal.
10. The Applicant submits that the Doctrine of Exhaustion is constitutionally anchored under Article 159(2)(c) of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010, which obligates courts to promote alternative forms of dispute resolution, including reconciliation, mediation, arbitration, and traditional dispute resolution mechanisms. In line with this constitutional imperative, the Kenya Karate Federation established the Dispute Resolution Commission as its internal forum for resolving disputes arising under its Constitution.
11. He invites court to be guided by the case of William Odhiambo Ramogi & 3 Others v Attorney General & 4 Others [2020] eKLR, where the Court held:
“The exhaustion doctrine serves the purpose of ensuring that there is a postponement of judicial consideration of matters to ensure that a party is, first of all, diligent in the protection of his own interest within the mechanisms in place for resolution outside the Courts. This encourages alternative dispute resolution mechanisms in line with Article 159 of the Constitution.”
12. I tis argued that the 1st Interested Party, sidestepped the functional, affordable, and impartial DRC, contrary to the principle of exhaustion as recognized in Kenyan jurisprudence. Similarly, in Speaker of the National Assembly v Karume [1992] KLR 21, the Court of Appeal stated:
“Where there is a clear procedure for redress of any particular grievance prescribed by the Constitution or an Act of Parliament, that procedure should be strictly followed.”
13. The DRC, established under the 1st Applicant’s Constitution, was properly constituted, operational, and capable of handling athlete disputes efficiently and fairly.
14. The Tribunal wrongfully intruded into the technical domain of the Federation’s Coaches Commission, undermining their professional judgment and expertise in athlete selection. The inclusion order ignores the multi-stage selection process, continuous technical assessments, and the strategic planning required for team performance at continental championships.
15. The Tribunal did not order the substitution of any athlete in the finalized national team but instead directed the addition of the 1st Interested Party to the existing team. This directive disregards the established team quotas, which had been capped at a total of 28 athletes, now improperly increased to 29.
16. The Tribunal treated the Kenya Open Championship as the conclusive final selection event, disregarding the uncontroverted evidence that it was a preliminary scouting event, whose primary purpose was to identify athletes for inclusion in the provisional national team pool.
17. The Tribunal further erred by failing to appreciate that the 1st Interested Party was not uniquely affected, as she was not the only medalist excluded from the final national team. Other athletes, including Tyson Mboya, Vincent Mboya, and Joshua Macharia, etc despite securing podium finishes at the Kenya Open, were similarly excluded after failing to meet the final selection threshold during the comprehensive post-event evaluations.
18. The Tribunal erred by failing to consider that prior international performance, experience, and strategic wild card inclusion were valid, established selection criteria recognized within competitive sports, including Karate. This was exemplified by the selection of Mr. Daniel Auru to the Provisional National Team, whose prior international representation and proven performance justified his inclusion over recent domestic medalists.
19. The Tribunal fundamentally erred in its assumption that Mr. Daniel Auru was not part of the national provisional team, using this mistaken belief to undermine the integrity of the Federation’s selection process.
20. It is regrettable that the Tribunal, without basis, reached the conclusion that Mr. Auru was introduced as a new athlete outside the provisional pool. This finding is both factually incorrect and procedurally unfair. The Tribunal unlawfully substituted its own judgment for that of the Coaches Commission and selection bodies, despite lacking technical expertise.
21. He argues that implementing the Tribunal’s decision will materially prejudice Kenya’s national sports interests, disrupt ongoing team preparations, and compromise the integrity and cohesion of the national team ahead of an imminent international competition.
22. It is argued that the Tribunal’s directive compelling the inclusion of the 1st Interested Party in the national team was irrational, unreasonable, and procedurally flawed for the following reasons:
a) The 1st Interested Party did not satisfy the established, multi-factor selection criteria governing national team inclusion.
b) The decision ignored mandatory competition quotas, technical requirements, and the carefully structured team composition essential for performance and strategic balance.
c) The Tribunal’s order mandates the addition of an athlete who holds no technical or strategic role within the national team, thereby misallocating limited resources, disrupting final preparations, and undermining the effectiveness of Team Kenya for the UFAK 2025 African Karate Championship scheduled for 20th to 28th July 2025.
23. The decision to include the 1st Interested Party at that late stage imposed an unbudgeted financial burden on the Federation, which is a non-profit body responsible for prudent management of public and private sponsorship funds. No consideration was given as to who would bear the additional costs arising from the Tribunal’s directive, thereby exposing the Federation to financial strain and misallocation of its limited resources.
24. He argues that The 1st Interested Party’s failure to meet the final selection threshold does not, in itself, constitute discrimination, nor was any differential treatment shown when compared to similarly situated athletes.
25. The Tribunal erred in failing to appreciate that the 1st Interested Party was not replaced by Mr. Daniel Auru or any specific athlete; rather, her exclusion resulted from the implementation of the established multi-factor selection criteria, under which she ranked lowest during the final evaluations.
26. Upon discovery of the administrative error leading to her provisional inclusion, the Federation was compelled to correct the oversight in compliance with the competition’s strict quota limits and selection standards.
27. The Order issued by the Tribunal is an impossible one to implement, as the budget for the UFAK 2025 African Karate Championship team has already been set, finalized, and approved by the relevant government authorities.
28. It is in the interest of justice, fairness, and the proper administration of sports governance that the application be allowed, so as to uphold the integrity of the Federation’s selection process, protect the rights of all athletes involved, and ensure that decisions are made in accordance with established rules and procedures.
29. The assertion that new athletes were introduced outside the provisional list is factually incorrect and was not supported by the evidence before the Tribunal. All final team members, including Mr. Daniel Auru, were part of the original provisional team list dated 25th April 2025.
30. Reliance is placed in Republic v Kenya Pipeline Company Limited; Director of Criminal Investigations & another (Interested Parties); Exparte Francis Amina Juma [2019] eKLR, which cites the decision in R v Barnet London Borough Council ex p Nilish Shah [1983] 1 All ER 226 (HL), it is settled law that an administrative or executive authority entrusted with discretion must exercise that discretion reasonably and within the bounds of legality.
31. Reliance is placed in Kenya National Examination Council v Republic Ex Parte Geoffrey Gathenji Njoroge & 9 Others [1997] KECA 58 (KLR), where the Court of Appeal held that:
“…the High Court would not be entitled to order the Council, when carrying out the process of marking the examination papers, to award any particular mark to any particular candidate. That duty or function lies wholly within the province of the Council and no court has any right to interfere.”
32. In the present case, no evidence has been adduced to show that the Coaches Commission acted arbitrarily, unreasonably, or contrary to the Federation’s Constitution.
33. It is its case that by ordering the 1st Interested Party’s inclusion, the Tribunal overlooked that her reinstatement would necessarily exclude another athlete, who was not a party to the proceedings contrary to Article 50 of the Constitution and natural justice principles amounting to a procedural impropriety, but the Tribunal ignored it entirely.
34. The Tribunal’s actions have disrupted the rights and legitimate expectations of athletes already selected in accordance with lawful and fair processes. These non-party athletes, whose inclusion was challenged indirectly through the claim, were never notified, joined, or invited to defend their positions, violating the basic tenets of natural justice and the constitutional guarantee of a fair hearing.
35. The Tribunal’s reasoning that requiring affected athletes to be joined would “clog the justice system” does not override constitutional guarantees. Efficiency cannot justify denial of procedural fairness. As established in Republic v Kenya Pipeline Company Ltd; Director of Criminal Investigations & Another (Interested Parties); Ex-Parte Francis Amina Juma [2019] eKLR, decisions must comply with both legality and procedural fairness, irrespective of administrative inconvenience.
36. The Secretary General argues that the 1st Interested Party selectively advances only her own interests, while disregarding the rights of other athletes, whose team positions were directly prejudiced by the Tribunal’s orders.
37. He argues further that Ms. Wambui Mwangi only filed the application seeking leave as a procedural intervention due to the urgency of the matter, and solely to assist Ms. Wachira on the instructions of Ms. Wachira, who was temporarily unavailable. This procedural assistance does not in any way amount to a conflict of interest.
38. Without prejudice to the foregoing, it is argued that Ms. Wambui Mwangi was never intended to testify as a witness, and her position as an athlete in the national team is wholly unrelated to the issues before this Honourable Court. No conflict of interest arises in law or fact. This Honourable Court is solely concerned with assessing whether the Respondents’ actions met the constitutional and legal thresholds of procedural fairness, reasonableness, and respect for the rights of all affected parties. It is his case that without prejudice to the above, the registration process is locked and the process put to rest.
The 1st interested party’s case;
39. According to her that the Application is an abuse of the court process, fatally defective, and aimed solely at circumventing a lawful, reasoned, and procedurally sound decision rendered by the Respondent on 14th July 2025 in SDTSC No. E051 of 2025, the subject of these proceedings.
40. It is her case that the Ruling declared that her exclusion from the travelling team for the 2025 UFAK African Karate Championship was procedurally unfair, devoid of justification, and consequently ordered her reinstatement.
41. She argues that the Secretary General, appeared and confirmed to the Tribunal that the Federation had received an invitation letter for her to travel and that her visa processing was underway.The Tribunal granted both parties the opportunity to file pleadings, responses, affidavits, and submissions. The hearing proceeded virtually where oral arguments were made and the Respondent rendered its ruling the same day due to the urgency of the matter.
42. According to her, there existed no publicly available or objectively verifiable criteria that was applied in her removal from the final travelling team. She argues that she was not provided with any individual assessment scores, feedback, or technical justification and the coaches’ rationale has remained vague and unsubstantiated throughout.
43. It is further her case that she qualified for the national team following the Kenya Open Championship held from 15th to 16th March 2025, where she emerged Gold Medalist in the Kumite Female +68kg category. The Applicant has a binding mechanism for team selection as demonstrated in the letter dated 25th April 2025 that constituted the National Provisional Team where my name featured based on merit.
44. She is concerned that the Coaches Commission upon whose recommendation she was dropped never published, shared, or relied on a pre-existing, codified, or approved selection criteria, nor was she subjected to a fair technical evaluation.
45. She believes that The Federation’s decision was arbitrary and reactive, triggered by the need to accommodate another athlete, Mr. Daniel Auru, who had not qualified. According to her the Dispute Resolution Commission within the Federation which the Applicant now seeks to sanctify was not functional at the time of the Complaint.
46. She argues that on or about 7th July 2025, she contacted Mr. Dennis Masibu Wandati, a member of the Commission, who informed her that the body had not been operationalized nor convened to hear any dispute leaving her with no internal remedy.
47. It is her case that even assuming the Commission had been functional, the matter was urgent, time-sensitive, and involved her right to participate in international competition whose deadlines were imminent. The Respondent rightly found that it would have been futile, prejudicial and unjust to await internal resolution mechanisms.
48. It is further her case that the general principle of exhaustion of internal mechanisms is not absolute. Courts and Tribunals have consistently held that where internal mechanisms are inaccessible, ineffective, or would occasion prejudice, they may be bypassed. The Respondent considered these exceptions in its Ruling and rightly assumed jurisdiction.
49. She argues that the Advocate for the Applicant, Ms. Wambui Mwangi, is not only acting in this matter but is also an athlete and a named participant in the travelling team and therefore stands to benefit directly from my exclusion. According to her, personal interest in the outcome of these proceedings raises serious ethical and conflict-of-interest concerns.
The 4th Interested Party’s Case;
50. He supports the Application. He argues that the insertion of his was made by the Coaches’ Commission based on merit and performance, and not due to his role in the Athletes’ Commission, which has no influence or authority over athlete selection for international competitions. It is his case that the Sports Disputes Tribunal dated 14th July 2025 in SDTSC No. E051 of 2025, adversely affected him without affording him a fair hearing and should be stayed or invalidated.
51. He argues that he has been a dedicated member of the national Karate team since 2018, who has consistently represented the country at various international competitions based on merit and performance. He has participated in the international tournaments, among others in 2018,2019 and 2024.
52. He argues that he was duly named in both the National Provisional Team 2025 as per the letter dated 25th April 2025 and in the final travelling list of athletes selected to represent Kenya at the upcoming African Karate Championship in Abuja, Nigeria. He argues that being in the Male Kumite under-67kg category, which is entirely different in both gender and weight class from that of the 1st Interested Party, Phanice Shisia, he is not in direct competition with her for any team slot.
53. He argues that the inclusion of his name in the team is being falsely used as having been in replacement of the 1st Interested Party. He takes great exception to the contents of paragraph 30 of the 1st Interested Party’s affidavit before the Sports Tribunal, which alleges that he was selected because of his position in the Athletes’ Commission.
54. This allegation is false, defamatory, and malicious. It undermines his professional standing as a committed and disciplined athlete. He should have been granted the opportunity to respond to such serious and misleading accusations before any decision was made against him. The allegations made against him before the Sports Tribunal are unsubstantiated and irrelevant to the Petitioner’s grievance. They have caused him unwarranted reputational damage and psychological distress.
55. The allegations made by the 1st Interested Party against him ought to have been the subject of an evidentiary hearing, in which he as the subject of the allegations, would have been given an opportunity to rebut the same.
56. According to him the failure to do so renders the decision of the Sports Tribunal procedurally flawed and contrary to the principles of natural justice and the Constitution, particularly the right to be heard. This is especially serious given that the intended consequence of the 1st Interested Party’s complaint was to have him removed from a position in the national team for which he had been duly selected.
The 3rd Interested Party Case
57. The 3rd Interested Party supports the Application.
58. According to him the Tribunal fundamentally erred in its finding that the Coaches Commission failed to conduct a transparent and criteria-based selection process. He submits that unlike in Khaaliqa Nimji v Kenya Squash Racquets Association [2018] KESDT 10 (KLR), where the sports body ignored its own published criteria, in this case, the Coaches Commission strictly adhered to the Federation’s established and approved selection criteria.
59. The process was not only technically sound but also objectively verifiable through assessment sheets, ranking data, and documented evaluations, all of which the Tribunal failed to properly consider.
60. Article 10 of the Applicant’s Constitution expressly mandates that:
“The systems and procedures that are set up within the Federation shall be implemented consistently without bias or discrimination. In this regard, the selection of the Kenya national teams and the technical personnel for the teams shall be done in good time and transparently using fair criteria; and that the criteria for authorization and registration of sportspersons and sportspersons' representatives shall be codified, transparent and fair.”
61. He submits that the Coaches Commission’s actions complied fully with this constitutional obligation, conducting the selection in a transparent, fair, and performance-based manner. By disregarding this framework and substituting its own judgment for the technical discretion of the Coaches Commission, the Tribunal not only misapprehended the factual matrix but also improperly interfered with the specialized autonomy guaranteed by the Federation’s Constitution. The finding of bias and lack of transparency was therefore legally and factually incorrect and should be set aside.
62. In Kabras Sugar RFC v Kenya Rugby Union; Derrick Ashiundu (Interested Party) [2021] KESDT 387 (KLR), the Tribunal reaffirmed that it will not interfere with the exercise of discretion by a Page 1 of 2decision-making body unless satisfied that the body misdirected itself and arrived at a wrong decision, or that its exercise of discretion was manifestly unreasonable, leading to injustice.
63. It is his case that the Coaches Commission exercised its technical discretion transparently and in strict adherence to the Federation’s constitutional mandate and established criteria. No evidence was placed before the Tribunal to show that the Commission misdirected itself, acted unreasonably, or breached any procedural fairness standards.
64. The Tribunal, therefore, erred by improperly substituting its own judgment for that of the Commission, contrary to the principles set out in PIL Kenya Ltd vs Oppong [2009] KLR 442, as adopted in the Kabras Sugar RFC decision. This unwarranted interference undermined the technical autonomy of the Commission, resulting in an unjustifiable distortion of the lawful selection process.
65. In conclusion, the 3rd Interested Party respectfully submits that the Tribunal misapprehended the factual and procedural context of the selection process, unjustifiably interfered with the technical discretion vested exclusively in the Coaches Commission, and thereby undermined the integrity of a lawful, merit-based, and transparent process.
Analysis and determination;
Upon perusing the application, the court finds the issue for determination is whether the application has merit or not.
66. In order to succeed, the applicant has to satisfy the court that its case falls within the principles as enunciated in the case of Pastoli vs. Kabale District Local Government Council and Others [2008] 2 EA 300 as follows:
“In order to succeed in an application for judicial review, the applicant has to show that the decision or act complained of is tainted with illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety...
Illegality is when the decision-making authority commits an error of law in the process of taking or making the act, the subject of the complaint. Acting without jurisdiction or ultra vires, or contrary to the provisions of a law or its principles are instances of illegality. It is, for example, illegality, where a Chief Administrative Officer of a District interdicts a public servant on the direction of the District Executive Committee, when the powers to do so are vested by law in the District Service Commission...
Irrationality is when there is such gross unreasonableness in the decision taken or act done, that no reasonable authority, addressing itself to the facts and the law before it, would have made such a decision. Such a decision is usually in defiance of logic and acceptable moral standards...
Procedural Impropriety is when there is a failure to act fairly on the part of the decision-making authority in the process of taking a decision. The unfairness may be in non-observance of the Rules of Natural Justice or to act with procedural fairness towards one to be affected by the decision. It may also involve failure to adhere and observe procedural rules expressly laid down in a statute or legislative Instrument by which such authority exercises jurisdiction to make a decision.”
67. Upon considering the application and the supporting evidence this court has established that the Kenya Karate Federation was registered by the Sports registrar in Nairobi on 4th March 2021 as set out in the registration certificate number 314 of 4th March 2021.
68. The applicant has proven that on 11th April 2025 the Secretary General of Kenya Karate Federation set up a dispute resolution commission in line with to Article 47 of the Kenya Karate Federation’s Constitution comprised of a chairman and two members.
69. The court has looked at the mandate of the said alternative dispute resolution commission, which involves the receiving and hearing of disputes investigation, decision-making, and recommendation upon receipt of complaints.
70. Article 62 of the Karate Federation Constitution also provides for alternative dispute resolution. The court has looked at the constitution and noted that it categorically provides that all disputes between the parties touching on any provisions of the constitution shall be resolved through the internal mechanisms among the affected parties and the parties cannot reach an amicable settlement.
71. It stipulates that disputes shall thereafter be referred to the sports dispute Tribunal. It is not in dispute that the sports dispute tribunal rendered the impugned ruling on the 14th July 2025.
72. The court finds that the tribunal acted ultra vires when it proceeded to interrogate and address a host of issues, inter alia the mode of communication adopted by the dispute resolution committee for notifying stakeholders of the existence of the dispute, when it went ahead to interrogate the communication channels, when it went ahead to observe that it appears that the current internal dispute resolution mechanism falls short of the expectation of a properly set up DRM as part of the dispute resolution.
73. It is this court’s finding that the fact that the Internal Dispute Resolution Commission was operationalized in April 2025 does not mean that it is incapable of resolving disputes. Indeed ,the Secretary General confirms in his Supporting Affidavit that the Applicant’s Dispute Resolution Commission was not prospective, theoretical, or dormant.
74. He further confirms on oath that it was duly established, operational, and competent at the material time, as evidenced by public communications, athlete forums, and internal structures disclosed to the Tribunal.
75. He went further in his supplementary Affidavit to point out that the DRC was never given the opportunity to address the dispute, as the 1st Interested Party deliberately bypassed it, opting to file a claim before the Respondent prematurely. He further argued that the Federation’s commitment to resolving the dispute internally is evidenced by its prompt response to her initial inquiry, prior to any external filing.
76. The upshot of the foregoing that the Tribunal ignored the doctrine of exhaustion. In the case of Mombasa High Court Constitutional Petition No. 159 of 2018 consolidated with Constitutional Petition No. 201 of 2019 (2020) eKLR the court elaborately dealt with the doctrine of exhaustion as follows: -
“52. The question of exhaustion of administrative remedies arises when a litigant, aggrieved by an agency's action, seeks redress from a Court of law on an action without pursuing available remedi
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1) An Order of Certiorari do issue, directed at bringing into this Honourable Court and quashing the entire decision of the Sports Disputes Tribunal rendered on the 14th day of July 2025 in SDTSC No. E051 of 2025, Phanice Apiyo Shisia vs Kenya Karate Federation & 2 Others, including all consequential orders, directives, and actions arising therefrom.
2) An Order of Prohibition do issue, directed at the Respondent, prohibiting it by itself, its servants, agents, or any other person acting under its authority, from enforcing, implementing, or in any way giving effect to the impugned decision rendered on the 14th day of July 2025 in SDTSC No. E051 of 2025, Phanice Apiyo Shisia vs Kenya Karate Federation & 2 Others, or from taking any further steps aimed at altering the national team selection or interfering with the Applicant’s technical and administrative processes in relation to the UFAK 2025 African Karate Championship or any other subsequent competitions, arising from the said impugned decision.
3) The Court be at liberty to make such further and other orders as it deems fit to meet the ends of justice.
4) The costs of this Application and the proceedings herein be awarded to the Applicant, as the Respondent’s and 1st Interested Party’s actions have necessitated the institution of these proceedings.
2. The application is supported by the Supporting and the Supplementary Affidavits of James M. Gikonyo. It is his case that, the 1st Interested Party approached the Tribunal prematurely, without exhausting the Dispute Resolution Commission (DRC) established under Article 62 of the Applicant’s Constitution.
3. The DRC, being a functional, accessible, and specialized mechanism, was the proper forum for initial resolution of the grievance. The invocation of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction without first engaging this internal forum offends the principle of exhaustion and undermines the legislative intent behind Article 62.
4. While the Applicant recognizes that the exhaustion requirement is not absolute, and that Section 9(4) of the Fair Administrative Action Act allows courts or tribunals to assume jurisdiction in exceptional circumstances, as restated in William Odhiambo Ramogi & 3 Others v Attorney General & 4 Others [2020] eKLR, the threshold for invoking such exception has not been met in this case.
5. The Court in that matter held that:
“…the first principle is that the High Court may in exceptional circumstances consider, and determine that the exhaustion requirement would not serve the values enshrined in the Constitution or law… The second principle is that the jurisdiction of the courts to consider valid grievances from parties who lack adequate audience before the forum created by statute or who may not have the quality of audience before the forum which is proportionate to the interests the party wishes to advance in a suit must not be ousted.”
6. According to him, the Tribunal erred in finding that the Dispute Resolution Commission (DRC) was non-existent or unassembled. He argues that the Tribunal’s statement that the Commissions “seem to speak to the future” and that it was “unwise to let an important Commission such as the DRC await competition before being assembled” was factually incorrect and unsupported by the evidence.
7. The Applicant’s Dispute Resolution Commission was not prospective, theoretical, or dormant. It was duly established, operational, and competent at the material time, as evidenced by public communications, athlete forums, and internal structures disclosed to the Tribunal.
8. He argues that the Tribunal wrongly held that the DRC’s operationalization in April 2025 fell short of expectations for a functional internal dispute resolution mechanism, despite clear evidence that the Federation’s current leadership only assumed office in late 2024 and promptly operationalized the DRC within months.
9. The 1st Interested Party neither pleaded nor demonstrated that the DRC was inaccessible, biased, or ineffective, nor did she attempt to engage with the internal mechanism before directly approaching the Tribunal.
10. The Applicant submits that the Doctrine of Exhaustion is constitutionally anchored under Article 159(2)(c) of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010, which obligates courts to promote alternative forms of dispute resolution, including reconciliation, mediation, arbitration, and traditional dispute resolution mechanisms. In line with this constitutional imperative, the Kenya Karate Federation established the Dispute Resolution Commission as its internal forum for resolving disputes arising under its Constitution.
11. He invites court to be guided by the case of William Odhiambo Ramogi & 3 Others v Attorney General & 4 Others [2020] eKLR, where the Court held:
“The exhaustion doctrine serves the purpose of ensuring that there is a postponement of judicial consideration of matters to ensure that a party is, first of all, diligent in the protection of his own interest within the mechanisms in place for resolution outside the Courts. This encourages alternative dispute resolution mechanisms in line with Article 159 of the Constitution.”
12. I tis argued that the 1st Interested Party, sidestepped the functional, affordable, and impartial DRC, contrary to the principle of exhaustion as recognized in Kenyan jurisprudence. Similarly, in Speaker of the National Assembly v Karume [1992] KLR 21, the Court of Appeal stated:
“Where there is a clear procedure for redress of any particular grievance prescribed by the Constitution or an Act of Parliament, that procedure should be strictly followed.”
13. The DRC, established under the 1st Applicant’s Constitution, was properly constituted, operational, and capable of handling athlete disputes efficiently and fairly.
14. The Tribunal wrongfully intruded into the technical domain of the Federation’s Coaches Commission, undermining their professional judgment and expertise in athlete selection. The inclusion order ignores the multi-stage selection process, continuous technical assessments, and the strategic planning required for team performance at continental championships.
15. The Tribunal did not order the substitution of any athlete in the finalized national team but instead directed the addition of the 1st Interested Party to the existing team. This directive disregards the established team quotas, which had been capped at a total of 28 athletes, now improperly increased to 29.
16. The Tribunal treated the Kenya Open Championship as the conclusive final selection event, disregarding the uncontroverted evidence that it was a preliminary scouting event, whose primary purpose was to identify athletes for inclusion in the provisional national team pool.
17. The Tribunal further erred by failing to appreciate that the 1st Interested Party was not uniquely affected, as she was not the only medalist excluded from the final national team. Other athletes, including Tyson Mboya, Vincent Mboya, and Joshua Macharia, etc despite securing podium finishes at the Kenya Open, were similarly excluded after failing to meet the final selection threshold during the comprehensive post-event evaluations.
18. The Tribunal erred by failing to consider that prior international performance, experience, and strategic wild card inclusion were valid, established selection criteria recognized within competitive sports, including Karate. This was exemplified by the selection of Mr. Daniel Auru to the Provisional National Team, whose prior international representation and proven performance justified his inclusion over recent domestic medalists.
19. The Tribunal fundamentally erred in its assumption that Mr. Daniel Auru was not part of the national provisional team, using this mistaken belief to undermine the integrity of the Federation’s selection process.
20. It is regrettable that the Tribunal, without basis, reached the conclusion that Mr. Auru was introduced as a new athlete outside the provisional pool. This finding is both factually incorrect and procedurally unfair. The Tribunal unlawfully substituted its own judgment for that of the Coaches Commission and selection bodies, despite lacking technical expertise.
21. He argues that implementing the Tribunal’s decision will materially prejudice Kenya’s national sports interests, disrupt ongoing team preparations, and compromise the integrity and cohesion of the national team ahead of an imminent international competition.
22. It is argued that the Tribunal’s directive compelling the inclusion of the 1st Interested Party in the national team was irrational, unreasonable, and procedurally flawed for the following reasons:
a) The 1st Interested Party did not satisfy the established, multi-factor selection criteria governing national team inclusion.
b) The decision ignored mandatory competition quotas, technical requirements, and the carefully structured team composition essential for performance and strategic balance.
c) The Tribunal’s order mandates the addition of an athlete who holds no technical or strategic role within the national team, thereby misallocating limited resources, disrupting final preparations, and undermining the effectiveness of Team Kenya for the UFAK 2025 African Karate Championship scheduled for 20th to 28th July 2025.
23. The decision to include the 1st Interested Party at that late stage imposed an unbudgeted financial burden on the Federation, which is a non-profit body responsible for prudent management of public and private sponsorship funds. No consideration was given as to who would bear the additional costs arising from the Tribunal’s directive, thereby exposing the Federation to financial strain and misallocation of its limited resources.
24. He argues that The 1st Interested Party’s failure to meet the final selection threshold does not, in itself, constitute discrimination, nor was any differential treatment shown when compared to similarly situated athletes.
25. The Tribunal erred in failing to appreciate that the 1st Interested Party was not replaced by Mr. Daniel Auru or any specific athlete; rather, her exclusion resulted from the implementation of the established multi-factor selection criteria, under which she ranked lowest during the final evaluations.
26. Upon discovery of the administrative error leading to her provisional inclusion, the Federation was compelled to correct the oversight in compliance with the competition’s strict quota limits and selection standards.
27. The Order issued by the Tribunal is an impossible one to implement, as the budget for the UFAK 2025 African Karate Championship team has already been set, finalized, and approved by the relevant government authorities.
28. It is in the interest of justice, fairness, and the proper administration of sports governance that the application be allowed, so as to uphold the integrity of the Federation’s selection process, protect the rights of all athletes involved, and ensure that decisions are made in accordance with established rules and procedures.
29. The assertion that new athletes were introduced outside the provisional list is factually incorrect and was not supported by the evidence before the Tribunal. All final team members, including Mr. Daniel Auru, were part of the original provisional team list dated 25th April 2025.
30. Reliance is placed in Republic v Kenya Pipeline Company Limited; Director of Criminal Investigations & another (Interested Parties); Exparte Francis Amina Juma [2019] eKLR, which cites the decision in R v Barnet London Borough Council ex p Nilish Shah [1983] 1 All ER 226 (HL), it is settled law that an administrative or executive authority entrusted with discretion must exercise that discretion reasonably and within the bounds of legality.
31. Reliance is placed in Kenya National Examination Council v Republic Ex Parte Geoffrey Gathenji Njoroge & 9 Others [1997] KECA 58 (KLR), where the Court of Appeal held that:
“…the High Court would not be entitled to order the Council, when carrying out the process of marking the examination papers, to award any particular mark to any particular candidate. That duty or function lies wholly within the province of the Council and no court has any right to interfere.”
32. In the present case, no evidence has been adduced to show that the Coaches Commission acted arbitrarily, unreasonably, or contrary to the Federation’s Constitution.
33. It is its case that by ordering the 1st Interested Party’s inclusion, the Tribunal overlooked that her reinstatement would necessarily exclude another athlete, who was not a party to the proceedings contrary to Article 50 of the Constitution and natural justice principles amounting to a procedural impropriety, but the Tribunal ignored it entirely.
34. The Tribunal’s actions have disrupted the rights and legitimate expectations of athletes already selected in accordance with lawful and fair processes. These non-party athletes, whose inclusion was challenged indirectly through the claim, were never notified, joined, or invited to defend their positions, violating the basic tenets of natural justice and the constitutional guarantee of a fair hearing.
35. The Tribunal’s reasoning that requiring affected athletes to be joined would “clog the justice system” does not override constitutional guarantees. Efficiency cannot justify denial of procedural fairness. As established in Republic v Kenya Pipeline Company Ltd; Director of Criminal Investigations & Another (Interested Parties); Ex-Parte Francis Amina Juma [2019] eKLR, decisions must comply with both legality and procedural fairness, irrespective of administrative inconvenience.
36. The Secretary General argues that the 1st Interested Party selectively advances only her own interests, while disregarding the rights of other athletes, whose team positions were directly prejudiced by the Tribunal’s orders.
37. He argues further that Ms. Wambui Mwangi only filed the application seeking leave as a procedural intervention due to the urgency of the matter, and solely to assist Ms. Wachira on the instructions of Ms. Wachira, who was temporarily unavailable. This procedural assistance does not in any way amount to a conflict of interest.
38. Without prejudice to the foregoing, it is argued that Ms. Wambui Mwangi was never intended to testify as a witness, and her position as an athlete in the national team is wholly unrelated to the issues before this Honourable Court. No conflict of interest arises in law or fact. This Honourable Court is solely concerned with assessing whether the Respondents’ actions met the constitutional and legal thresholds of procedural fairness, reasonableness, and respect for the rights of all affected parties. It is his case that without prejudice to the above, the registration process is locked and the process put to rest.
The 1st interested party’s case;
39. According to her that the Application is an abuse of the court process, fatally defective, and aimed solely at circumventing a lawful, reasoned, and procedurally sound decision rendered by the Respondent on 14th July 2025 in SDTSC No. E051 of 2025, the subject of these proceedings.
40. It is her case that the Ruling declared that her exclusion from the travelling team for the 2025 UFAK African Karate Championship was procedurally unfair, devoid of justification, and consequently ordered her reinstatement.
41. She argues that the Secretary General, appeared and confirmed to the Tribunal that the Federation had received an invitation letter for her to travel and that her visa processing was underway.The Tribunal granted both parties the opportunity to file pleadings, responses, affidavits, and submissions. The hearing proceeded virtually where oral arguments were made and the Respondent rendered its ruling the same day due to the urgency of the matter.
42. According to her, there existed no publicly available or objectively verifiable criteria that was applied in her removal from the final travelling team. She argues that she was not provided with any individual assessment scores, feedback, or technical justification and the coaches’ rationale has remained vague and unsubstantiated throughout.
43. It is further her case that she qualified for the national team following the Kenya Open Championship held from 15th to 16th March 2025, where she emerged Gold Medalist in the Kumite Female +68kg category. The Applicant has a binding mechanism for team selection as demonstrated in the letter dated 25th April 2025 that constituted the National Provisional Team where my name featured based on merit.
44. She is concerned that the Coaches Commission upon whose recommendation she was dropped never published, shared, or relied on a pre-existing, codified, or approved selection criteria, nor was she subjected to a fair technical evaluation.
45. She believes that The Federation’s decision was arbitrary and reactive, triggered by the need to accommodate another athlete, Mr. Daniel Auru, who had not qualified. According to her the Dispute Resolution Commission within the Federation which the Applicant now seeks to sanctify was not functional at the time of the Complaint.
46. She argues that on or about 7th July 2025, she contacted Mr. Dennis Masibu Wandati, a member of the Commission, who informed her that the body had not been operationalized nor convened to hear any dispute leaving her with no internal remedy.
47. It is her case that even assuming the Commission had been functional, the matter was urgent, time-sensitive, and involved her right to participate in international competition whose deadlines were imminent. The Respondent rightly found that it would have been futile, prejudicial and unjust to await internal resolution mechanisms.
48. It is further her case that the general principle of exhaustion of internal mechanisms is not absolute. Courts and Tribunals have consistently held that where internal mechanisms are inaccessible, ineffective, or would occasion prejudice, they may be bypassed. The Respondent considered these exceptions in its Ruling and rightly assumed jurisdiction.
49. She argues that the Advocate for the Applicant, Ms. Wambui Mwangi, is not only acting in this matter but is also an athlete and a named participant in the travelling team and therefore stands to benefit directly from my exclusion. According to her, personal interest in the outcome of these proceedings raises serious ethical and conflict-of-interest concerns.
The 4th Interested Party’s Case;
50. He supports the Application. He argues that the insertion of his was made by the Coaches’ Commission based on merit and performance, and not due to his role in the Athletes’ Commission, which has no influence or authority over athlete selection for international competitions. It is his case that the Sports Disputes Tribunal dated 14th July 2025 in SDTSC No. E051 of 2025, adversely affected him without affording him a fair hearing and should be stayed or invalidated.
51. He argues that he has been a dedicated member of the national Karate team since 2018, who has consistently represented the country at various international competitions based on merit and performance. He has participated in the international tournaments, among others in 2018,2019 and 2024.
52. He argues that he was duly named in both the National Provisional Team 2025 as per the letter dated 25th April 2025 and in the final travelling list of athletes selected to represent Kenya at the upcoming African Karate Championship in Abuja, Nigeria. He argues that being in the Male Kumite under-67kg category, which is entirely different in both gender and weight class from that of the 1st Interested Party, Phanice Shisia, he is not in direct competition with her for any team slot.
53. He argues that the inclusion of his name in the team is being falsely used as having been in replacement of the 1st Interested Party. He takes great exception to the contents of paragraph 30 of the 1st Interested Party’s affidavit before the Sports Tribunal, which alleges that he was selected because of his position in the Athletes’ Commission.
54. This allegation is false, defamatory, and malicious. It undermines his professional standing as a committed and disciplined athlete. He should have been granted the opportunity to respond to such serious and misleading accusations before any decision was made against him. The allegations made against him before the Sports Tribunal are unsubstantiated and irrelevant to the Petitioner’s grievance. They have caused him unwarranted reputational damage and psychological distress.
55. The allegations made by the 1st Interested Party against him ought to have been the subject of an evidentiary hearing, in which he as the subject of the allegations, would have been given an opportunity to rebut the same.
56. According to him the failure to do so renders the decision of the Sports Tribunal procedurally flawed and contrary to the principles of natural justice and the Constitution, particularly the right to be heard. This is especially serious given that the intended consequence of the 1st Interested Party’s complaint was to have him removed from a position in the national team for which he had been duly selected.
The 3rd Interested Party Case
57. The 3rd Interested Party supports the Application.
58. According to him the Tribunal fundamentally erred in its finding that the Coaches Commission failed to conduct a transparent and criteria-based selection process. He submits that unlike in Khaaliqa Nimji v Kenya Squash Racquets Association [2018] KESDT 10 (KLR), where the sports body ignored its own published criteria, in this case, the Coaches Commission strictly adhered to the Federation’s established and approved selection criteria.
59. The process was not only technically sound but also objectively verifiable through assessment sheets, ranking data, and documented evaluations, all of which the Tribunal failed to properly consider.
60. Article 10 of the Applicant’s Constitution expressly mandates that:
“The systems and procedures that are set up within the Federation shall be implemented consistently without bias or discrimination. In this regard, the selection of the Kenya national teams and the technical personnel for the teams shall be done in good time and transparently using fair criteria; and that the criteria for authorization and registration of sportspersons and sportspersons' representatives shall be codified, transparent and fair.”
61. He submits that the Coaches Commission’s actions complied fully with this constitutional obligation, conducting the selection in a transparent, fair, and performance-based manner. By disregarding this framework and substituting its own judgment for the technical discretion of the Coaches Commission, the Tribunal not only misapprehended the factual matrix but also improperly interfered with the specialized autonomy guaranteed by the Federation’s Constitution. The finding of bias and lack of transparency was therefore legally and factually incorrect and should be set aside.
62. In Kabras Sugar RFC v Kenya Rugby Union; Derrick Ashiundu (Interested Party) [2021] KESDT 387 (KLR), the Tribunal reaffirmed that it will not interfere with the exercise of discretion by a Page 1 of 2decision-making body unless satisfied that the body misdirected itself and arrived at a wrong decision, or that its exercise of discretion was manifestly unreasonable, leading to injustice.
63. It is his case that the Coaches Commission exercised its technical discretion transparently and in strict adherence to the Federation’s constitutional mandate and established criteria. No evidence was placed before the Tribunal to show that the Commission misdirected itself, acted unreasonably, or breached any procedural fairness standards.
64. The Tribunal, therefore, erred by improperly substituting its own judgment for that of the Commission, contrary to the principles set out in PIL Kenya Ltd vs Oppong [2009] KLR 442, as adopted in the Kabras Sugar RFC decision. This unwarranted interference undermined the technical autonomy of the Commission, resulting in an unjustifiable distortion of the lawful selection process.
65. In conclusion, the 3rd Interested Party respectfully submits that the Tribunal misapprehended the factual and procedural context of the selection process, unjustifiably interfered with the technical discretion vested exclusively in the Coaches Commission, and thereby undermined the integrity of a lawful, merit-based, and transparent process.
Analysis and determination;
Upon perusing the application, the court finds the issue for determination is whether the application has merit or not.
66. In order to succeed, the applicant has to satisfy the court that its case falls within the principles as enunciated in the case of Pastoli vs. Kabale District Local Government Council and Others [2008] 2 EA 300 as follows:
“In order to succeed in an application for judicial review, the applicant has to show that the decision or act complained of is tainted with illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety...
Illegality is when the decision-making authority commits an error of law in the process of taking or making the act, the subject of the complaint. Acting without jurisdiction or ultra vires, or contrary to the provisions of a law or its principles are instances of illegality. It is, for example, illegality, where a Chief Administrative Officer of a District interdicts a public servant on the direction of the District Executive Committee, when the powers to do so are vested by law in the District Service Commission...
Irrationality is when there is such gross unreasonableness in the decision taken or act done, that no reasonable authority, addressing itself to the facts and the law before it, would have made such a decision. Such a decision is usually in defiance of logic and acceptable moral standards...
Procedural Impropriety is when there is a failure to act fairly on the part of the decision-making authority in the process of taking a decision. The unfairness may be in non-observance of the Rules of Natural Justice or to act with procedural fairness towards one to be affected by the decision. It may also involve failure to adhere and observe procedural rules expressly laid down in a statute or legislative Instrument by which such authority exercises jurisdiction to make a decision.”
67. Upon considering the application and the supporting evidence this court has established that the Kenya Karate Federation was registered by the Sports registrar in Nairobi on 4th March 2021 as set out in the registration certificate number 314 of 4th March 2021.
68. The applicant has proven that on 11th April 2025 the Secretary General of Kenya Karate Federation set up a dispute resolution commission in line with to Article 47 of the Kenya Karate Federation’s Constitution comprised of a chairman and two members.
69. The court has looked at the mandate of the said alternative dispute resolution commission, which involves the receiving and hearing of disputes investigation, decision-making, and recommendation upon receipt of complaints.
70. Article 62 of the Karate Federation Constitution also provides for alternative dispute resolution. The court has looked at the constitution and noted that it categorically provides that all disputes between the parties touching on any provisions of the constitution shall be resolved through the internal mechanisms among the affected parties and the parties cannot reach an amicable settlement.
71. It stipulates that disputes shall thereafter be referred to the sports dispute Tribunal. It is not in dispute that the sports dispute tribunal rendered the impugned ruling on the 14th July 2025.
72. The court finds that the tribunal acted ultra vires when it proceeded to interrogate and address a host of issues, inter alia the mode of communication adopted by the dispute resolution committee for notifying stakeholders of the existence of the dispute, when it went ahead to interrogate the communication channels, when it went ahead to observe that it appears that the current internal dispute resolution mechanism falls short of the expectation of a properly set up DRM as part of the dispute resolution.
73. It is this court’s finding that the fact that the Internal Dispute Resolution Commission was operationalized in April 2025 does not mean that it is incapable of resolving disputes. Indeed ,the Secretary General confirms in his Supporting Affidavit that the Applicant’s Dispute Resolution Commission was not prospective, theoretical, or dormant.
74. He further confirms on oath that it was duly established, operational, and competent at the material time, as evidenced by public communications, athlete forums, and internal structures disclosed to the Tribunal.
75. He went further in his supplementary Affidavit to point out that the DRC was never given the opportunity to address the dispute, as the 1st Interested Party deliberately bypassed it, opting to file a claim before the Respondent prematurely. He further argued that the Federation’s commitment to resolving the dispute internally is evidenced by its prompt response to her initial inquiry, prior to any external filing.
76. The upshot of the foregoing that the Tribunal ignored the doctrine of exhaustion. In the case of Mombasa High Court Constitutional Petition No. 159 of 2018 consolidated with Constitutional Petition No. 201 of 2019 (2020) eKLR the court elaborately dealt with the doctrine of exhaustion as follows: -
“52. The question of exhaustion of administrative remedies arises when a litigant, aggrieved by an agency's action, seeks redress from a Court of law on an action without pursuing available remedi
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