1. The Originating motion dated 4 th November, 2025 brought under the provisions of the Fair Administrative Action Act, 2015 and Rules 2024 seeks the following reliefs:
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ii. spent
iii. THAT the impugned part of the Ruling by the 1st Respondent given on 14/10/2025 in SDTSC/E060/2025 - Nairobi County between NORAH NJERI ONGWENYI -VS- ROYAL NAIROBI GOLF CLUB (hereinafter referred to as the Ruling) be brought before this Court for nullification/quashing.
iv. THAT a Declaration do issue that the 1st Respondent lacks the jurisdiction to hear the dispute between the Applicant and Interested Party as filed before the 1st Respondent.
v. THAT any other orders that meet the ends of justice do issue.
vi. THAT costs of this Application and/or Suit and interest be provided for .
2. The Originating Motion is predicated on the grounds set out on the face thereof and supported by an affidavit sworn by Jacob Omondi.
3. The applicant is a body corporate registered under the Companies Act, 2015 operating as a Private Members Golf Club. The 1st Respondent is a Tribunal established under the Sports Act, 2013, while the the 2nd Respondent is the Chief Administrator of the Judiciary an office established under Article 161(2)(c) of the Constitution of Kenya. The Interested Party is an adult of sound mind and a Member of the Applicant herein.
4. From the grounds and supporting affidavit together with annextures, the applicant’s case is that the Interested Party had filed an Amended Statement of Claim dated 06/08/2025 before the 1st Respondent seeking orders inter alia:
i. A declaration that the procedure adopted by the Ladies Committee scheduled for selection of the Ladies team to represent the Applicant Club in Nairobi District Golf Tournaments violated the Interested Party’s constitutional rights to equal protection by due process and the rule of law guaranteed to the Interested Party by provisions of Article 27(1) of the Constitution.
ii. That exclusion of the Interested Party from the eligible team selection, exclusive training for selected team representatives and denials of the team uniform breached the Interested Party’s contract of membership of the Applicant Club and thereby violated the Interested Party’s membership rights to participate in the league and her membership right to offer herself for selection by the committee club as a member of the team to represent the Applicant Club and to fully in participate in the programs of the club as a member.
iii. The procedure adopted by the Ladies Committee to select the ladies golf team to represent the Applicant Club at the Nairobi District Golf league matches, distribution of team uniform and selective training for some few lady members by the club violated the Interested Party’s constitutional rights to hear presentations by members of the committee in support of their candidates decision and against the Interested Party and denied the Interested Party her rights to make her and unconstitutionally dismissed the Interested Party’s case for selection without a hearing in violation of provisions of Article 50 (1) of the Constitution.
iv. General damages for violation of Interested Party’s fundamental constitutional rights to equal protection under the rule of law, as guaranteed by Articles 50 and 27(1) of the Constitution.
5. According to the applicant, it filed a Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 25/08/2025 (the P.O) challenging the complaint lodged by the interested party herein, contending that:
i. The suit is ill advised, prejudicing and an abuse of the Honourable Tribunal’s process.
ii. The Honourable Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to hear the Suit herein by virtue of Section 58 of the Sports Act,2013 (the Act):
2.1 the Claimant has not quoted or demonstrated nor relied on a specific provision or rule allowing her to Appeal to this Honourable Tribunal (by virtue of Section 58 (a) of the Act);
2.2 there is no Agreement between the Parties to refer the dispute or any dispute to this Honourable Tribunal (by virtue of Section 58(b) of the Act)
iii. THAT it is trite that only the High Court and courts of similar status currently have jurisdiction to hear and determine matters of alleged violation(s) of fundamental rights and freedoms in the Bill of Rights.
iv. The Suit raises constitutional issues and seeks constitutional reliefs of which this Honourable Tribunal lacks jurisdiction to determine.
v. The Suit is an abuse of process, scandalous, frivolous, vexatious and must be struck out/dismissed with costs.
6. That the said Preliminary Objection was canvassed vide written submissions and, in its decision, the Sports Disputes Tribunal dismissed the preliminary objection on the ground that some of the issues raised were sports related and not necessarily constitutional violations.
7. The applicant asserts that the 1st Respondent lacked jurisdiction to entertain the complaint filed by the interested party, and that the 1 st respondent’s jurisdiction stems from Section 58 of the Sports Act, 2013. That the dispute did not constitute an appeal against decisions made by national sports organizations or umbrella national sports organizations or a sports-related dispute that parties to the dispute agree to refer to the tribunal or an appeal from decisions of the Registrar under the Sports Act.
8. The applicant avers that the 1 st respondent’s decision was not authorized by the empowering statutory provision; was in excess of jurisdiction or power conferred under written law; is unfair; was materially influenced by an error of law; failed to take into account relevant considerations; is Irrational; and is taken or made in abuse of power.
9. It further asserts that the issues the Interested Party purports to raise are overtaken by events because: the Interested Party misrepresented material facts concealing and failing to disclose that the purported grievances of the Claimant had been amicably addressed through a Mediation Committee established vide the Respondent’s Board resolution of 20/05/2025; that following six meetings in which the Claimant participated, raising issues which were addressed and way forward established and already implemented; that the Claimant has not expressed dissatisfaction with the aforesaid resolutions or their consensual implementation but rather seeks a rehearing in an abuse of the 1st Respondent’s time and resources;that the Claimant is faulted for forum shopping hereby and that the issues raised having been resolved and way forward implemented, the same are overtaken by events.
10. The applicant filed a further affidavit sworn on 15 th December, 2025 by Jacob Omondi in response to the interested party’s grounds of opposition and replying affidavit both dated 2/12/2025 reiterating the depositions in support of the application and the grounds adding that: the 1st Respondent lacked jurisdiction because: the Applicant is not a national sports organization; the Applicant is not an Umbrella National Sports Organisation;the Applicant had not made a disciplinary decision; the Applicant had not made any decision on selection to any National team; the Applicant did not agree to refer to the tribunal alleged dispute or any dispute whatsoever and that there was no impugned decision of the Registrar under the Sports Act in issue herewith
11. The applicant maintained that it is not a Sports Club Registered under Section 46 of the Sports Act; that it is a body corporate registered under the Companies Act, 2015 operating as a Private Members Golf Club, which fact the Interested Party being a member is well aware of and that she malafides purports to misrepresent to/mislead this Honourable Court.
12. That to the contrary, registering the Applicant as a sports organisation/Club under the Sports Act would be a violation of the Section 47 of the Act and that just like other institutions/entities such as schools and churches whose membership participate in various sporting activities despite a distinct core mandate, the Applicant’s members participate in other sporting activities besides golf such as swimming, squash, gym etc, and other social activities, the core feature being that it is for members only and for invited friends/guests.
13. It is asserted that in fact, the bodies registered and responsible for the running of the discipline of Golf and related competitions in Kenya, is the Kenya Golf Union (KGU) and the Kenya Ladies Golf Union (KLGU) (specifically for Lady Golfers), a fact the Interested Party is well aware of being a handicapped golfer that pays an Annual Subscription fee to these Bodies.
14. That further and contrary to the requirements in the 2nd Schedule regarding constitution of sports organisations under the Sports Act; and that whereas the Applicant being a Private Members Club, the Applicant does not have or run national or branch or sub branch offices;it does not conduct elections every two years at national or branch or sub branch offices; The Applicant is not obligated to subscribe to any Court of Arbitration for Sports policies and rules which conform with requirements set out in Sports Disputes Tribunal policy and rules for sports disputes resolution; The Applicant does not have the mandate to make selection of the Kenyan team and the technical personnel; The Applicant does not have the mandate to register sportspersons and sportspersons’ representatives nationally or at any branch or sub branch of any sports organisation.
15. That this Court has the jurisdiction to address the grievance herewith under the Fair Administrative Action Act, when a quasi-judicial body purports to act ultra vires, and or without jurisdiction
16. That the Interested Party did not raise any issue of public interest, that her concern is personal and hinged on her non-selection to represent the Applicant’s team.
17. That no prejudice or injustice shall befall the Respondents and Interested Party.
The Interested Party’s replying affidavit and grounds of opposition
18. Opposing the originating motion, the interested party filed grounds of opposition and replying affidavit both dated 2 nd December, 2025. The replying affidavit is sworn by the interested party Norah Njeri Ongwenyi,
19. According to the interested party, the assertion by the applicant that the respondent had no jurisdiction to entertain the dispute between her and the applicant herein is without basis. That the applicant misconceives section 46 (1)(2)(4) and (5) of the Sports Act as read with paragraph (f) of the second Schedule to the Act. That the applicant is seeking to relitigate matters which were competently determined by the specialized Tribunal which was clothed with jurisdiction to entertain.
20. The interested party contends that the interested party raised legitimate questions of being excluded from the team selection process, which is a sports dispute falling within the jurisdiction of the Sports Tribunal hence judicial review would undermine the integrity of the dispute resolution process established by the Sports Act.
21. According to the interested party, although the dispute was addressed through mediation, it was not fully resolved hence only the Tribunal could competently entertain the dispute.
22. That no irreparable harm would occur to the applicant as the interested party’s rights to fair treatment and participation in club activities was paramount and should not be compromised by the applicant’s attempts to evade accountability. That the Tribunal’s decision is essential to upholding the principles of fairness and justice within the club’s governance.
23. It was contended that the applicant’s allegation that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction has no legitimate basis in view of section 46 of the Sports Act and the second schedule to the Sports Act which sets out, matters to be provided for in the constitution of spots organizations at paragraph (f).
24. Further, that the interested party’s claims before the Tribunal are grounded in her constitutional rights including the right tom equal protection of the law, due process and the rule of law guaranteed under Article 27 (1) of the Constitution and that the Tribunal’s jurisdiction encompasses the protection of these rights hence the applicant’s challenge undermines the legal framework designed to uphold them.
25. It was further contended that the matters at hand concern serious and significant public interest, in ensuring that sports governance is conducted transparently and fairly and that the adjudication of sports disputes by the Tribunal is crucial for maintaining the integrity of sports organizations and that any attempt to undermine the process should be viewed with skepticism.
26. That there is no urgency in the matter herein and that no prejudice will be occasioned to the applicant if the decision of the Tribunal is left to stand.
27. The interested party urged this court to dismiss the originating motion with costs and allow the Tribunal to proceed and conclude the dispute fairly and justly.
28. The grounds of opposition were also replicated in the replying affidavit sworn by the interested party on 2 nd November, 2025.
Submissions
29. The parties filed written submissions to canvass the originating motion.
The applicant’s submissions
30. In its written submissions dated 15th December, 2025, the applicant framed the following issues for determination and submitted on the same.
i. Whether the Sports Disputes Tribunal had jurisdiction under Section 58 of the Sports Act, 2013 to entertain and retain the dispute in SDTSC/E060/2025, having regard to the nature of the Applicant and the subject matter of the claim.
ii. Whether the Applicant falls within the category of a national sports organization or umbrella national sports organization contemplated under the Sports Act, 2013, so as to clothe the Tribunal with jurisdiction.
iii. Whether the Sports Disputes Tribunal acted ultra vires, in excess of its statutory mandate, or in error of law and their conduct was tainted by unreasonableness, irrationality, procedural unfairness, or abuse of power, contrary to the Fair Administrative Action Act.
iv. Whether the dispute before the Tribunal had been overtaken by events, having been resolved through mediation and implemented, thereby rendering the proceedings an abuse of process.
v. Costs of the Suit
31. On whether the Sports Disputes Tribunal had jurisdiction under Section 58 of the Sports Act, 2013, the applicant submitted reciting the principle of law that jurisdiction is everything and a Court or Tribunal acting without jurisdiction acts in vain, as was settled in the seminal locus classicus case of Owners of the Motor Vessel “Lillian S” v Caltex Oil (Kenya) Ltd [1989] KLR 1.
32. It was reiterated that the jurisdiction of the Sports Disputes Tribunal is strictly confined to Section 58 of the Sports Act, 2013 . Counsel for the applicant further relied on the Supreme Court decision in in Samuel Kamau Macharia & Another v Kenya Commercial Bank Ltd & 2 Others [2012] eKLR where the apex Court highlighted that “ a court or tribunal’s jurisdiction flows from either the Constitution or statute, and cannot be expanded by judicial craft or sympathy.”
33. It was reiterated that the jurisdiction of 1 st Respondent is expressly stated and stems from Section 58 of the Sports Act, 2013 as reproduced in this Judgment and, according to the applicant, the dispute before the 1 st Respondent was neither: an appeal from a decision of a national sports organization; an appeal from the Registrar under the Sports Act; nor a sports-related dispute consensually referred to the Tribunal.
34. Further, that the prayers sought before 1 st Respondent do not fall within the ambits of Section 58 most especially because – (a) this Claim is not an Appeal to any decision by the Applicant - the Interested Party does not state in its pleadings it is such nor can it be implied to be such from the pleadings or at all; the Interested Party has not demonstrated a Sporting Contract nor any Contract, whatsoever, between the Parties conferring jurisdiction to 1 st Respondent, as required under Section 58 (b) ( supra ) or at all. There is nothing specified or expressed to that effect nor can it be implied, and neither does Interested Party in her pleadings claim that any such Agreement exists. The Interested Party has not stated what part, or any articles of the Applicant’s Articles of Association or Rules that specifically, expressly or impliedly confers jurisdiction to 1 st Respondent to hear the Claim whereof.
35. Further reliance was placed on the case of Republic v Rent Restriction Tribunal Ex-parte: Mayfair Bakeries Limited & another [1982] KEHC 10 (KLR) as cited in Mokaya v Football Kenya Federation & 20 others (Tribunal Case E022 & E028 of 2023 (Consolidated)) [2024] KESDT 93 (KLR) (6 February 2024) (Decision) where the Court stated as follows with regards to the Jurisdiction of the Tribunals;
“Testing whether a statute has conferred jurisdiction on an inferior court or a tribunal... the wording must be strictly construed: it must in fact be an express conferment and not a matter of implication and that a Tribunal is a creature of statute and has only such jurisdiction as has been specifically conferred upon it by the statute. Therefore, where the language of an Act is clear and explicit the court must give effect to it whatever may be the consequences for in that case the words of the statute speak the intention of the legislature. Further, each statute has to be interpreted on the basis of its own language for words derive their colour and content from their context and secondly, the object of the legislation is a paramount consideration."
36. It was submitted that the 1 st Respondent cannot assume jurisdiction where the statutory preconditions under Section 58 have not been met, and that any decision made in excess thereof is null and void.
37. The applicant submitted that the 1 st Respondent therefore erred in law by retaining a dispute that fell wholly outside its statutory mandate.
38. On the second issue of whether the Applicant is a national sports organization or umbrella national sports organization under the Sports Act, 2013 , it was submitted that the Applicant is a Private Members’ Club incorporated under the Companies Act, 2015 , and not registered as a sports organization under Sections 46 and 47 of the Sports Act .
39. That participation in sporting activities alone does not clothe the Applicant an entity with the legal status of a sports organization and that therefore the absence of a written consent giving the 1 st Respondent jurisdiction, deprives the 1 st Respondent of competence to entertain the dispute.
40. Further submission was that it is judicially noticed that the national sports organization that runs the discipline of golf is the Kenya Golf Union (KGU) , and Kenya Ladies Golfer Union ( KLGU ) specifically in respect to Lady Golfers and that therefore, the 1 st Respondent and Interested Party’s assumption that the Applicant was a sports organization, despite uncontested evidence to the contrary, constituted a fundamental misdirection in law and a jurisdictional error.
41. On the third issue of whether the Tribunal acted ultra vires , in excess of its mandate, or in a manner that was unreasonable, irrational, procedurally unfair, or an abuse of power, it was submitted that where a tribunal lacks jurisdiction, any further step taken is ipso facto ultra vires . Reliance was placed on English case of Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147 , where the House of Lords held that a decision tainted by jurisdictional error is a nullity.
42. In the instant case, it was contended that the Tribunal erred by purporting to sever or split the claim into “sports-related” and “constitutional” components. Relying on the case of Republic v National Land Commission Ex parte Sound Equipment Ltd [2016] eKLR, it was submitted that in the above case, the Court held that a tribunal cannot arrogate jurisdiction by recharacterizing or severing claims.
43. Additionally, that claims alleging violations of Articles 27 and 50 of the Constitution fall squarely within the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 165. Reliance was placed on United States International University (USIU) v Attorney General [2012] eKLR , where the Court is said to have affirmed that constitutional interpretation and enforcement lie exclusively with the superior courts.
44. The applicant also relied on Royal Media Services Ltd v Attorney General & 6 others [2015] eKLR where Mumbi J (as she then was, faced with a similar issue and in determining whether the HIV/AIDS Tribunal had the requisite jurisdiction to hear a dispute of violation of a constitutional right and freedom, stated:
“….. I hereby declare that only the High Court and courts of similar status currently have jurisdiction to hear and determine matters of violation of fundamental rights and freedoms in the Bill of Rights .
(b) I hereby declare that in the absence of legislation enacted by Parliament to give subordinate courts original jurisdiction to hear and determine matters of denial, violation and infringement of right or fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights, subordinate courts and tribunals, including, the 2nd respondent, do not have jurisdiction to hear and determine matters arising from the Bill of Rights .”
45. The applicant submitted that under Section 7 of the Fair Administrative Action Act ( Cap 7L ), this Court is mandated to review decisions that are unreasonable, irrational, or procedurally unfair and that in the instant case, the Tribunal’s decision meets all these thresholds.
46. On the fourth issue of whether this Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine the present Judicial Review Application, it was submitted that the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the present Judicial Review proceedings is firmly anchored in the Constitution, statute, and settled jurisprudence.
47. The applicant cited Articles 165(6) and (7) of the Constitution on supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court over Tribunals and relied on Republic v Karisa Chengo & 2 Others [2017] eKLR , where the Supreme Court is said to have affirmed that tribunals created by statute fall squarely within the supervisory remit of the High Court under Article 165.
48. It was submitted that Section 7 of the Fair Administrative Action Act ( Cap 7L ), expressly empowers this Court to review administrative and quasi-judicial actions where the decision-maker-acted without jurisdiction or in excess of authority; committed an error of law; acted unreasonably or irrationally; violated principles of procedural fairness; or abused power; and that the impugned Ruling by the Sports Disputes Tribunal is challenged on precisely these grounds, thereby properly invoking this Court’s jurisdiction.
49. The applicant relied on Suchan Investment Ltd v Ministry of National Heritage & Culture [2016] eKLR , where the Court of Appeal is said to have held that judicial review is the primary mechanism through which the High Court exercises constitutional supervision over administrative bodies.
50. On whether jurisdiction of this Court is ousted by Statute or Doctrine of Exhaustion, it was submitted that the doctrine of exhaustion does not apply where the impugned body lacked jurisdiction and that it is settled law that where jurisdiction is in issue, the High Court must intervene at the earliest opportunity. The applicant relied on Republic v National Land Commission ex parte Sound Equipment Ltd [2016] eKLR , where the High Court is said to have held that the existence of an alternative forum does not oust the Court’s jurisdiction where the impugned body acted ultra vires , which position was affirmed by the Court of Appeal in Geoffrey Muthinja & Another v Samuel Muguna Henry & 1756 Others [2015] eKLR, and later clarified in Republic v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission ex parte National Super Alliance (NASA) [2017] eKLR .
51. It was submitted that where a Tribunal acts without jurisdiction, there is nothing to exhaust and that therefore, this Court is properly seized of jurisdiction to intervene.
52. On the fifth issue of whether the dispute was overtaken by events and amounted to an abuse of process, it was submitted that the Applicant had demonstrated that the dispute had been amicably resolved through Mediation, participated by the Interested Party and fully implemented. The applicant relied on Muchanga Investments Ltd v Safaris Unlimited (Africa) Ltd & 2 Others [2009] eKLR , where ethe Court of Appeal is said to have held that abuse of process includes instituting proceedings where no legitimate purpose is served, or where matters have already been settled. A similar position is said to have been taken in John Florence Maritime Services Ltd v Cabinet Secretary for Transport & Infrastructure & 3 Others [2015] eKLR , where the Court, according to the applicant, affirmed its duty to prevent forum shopping and re-litigation of resolved disputes.
53. The applicant therefore argued that the the continuation of the Tribunal proceedings was oppressive, wasteful and an abuse of the Tribunal’s process.
54. On costs of the suit, it was submitted that it is trite that costs do follow the event and that this Application was caused by the unfair violations by the Respondents and Interested Party hence the application should be allowed with costs payable by the interested party to the applicant.
The interested party’s submissions
55. In the written submissions dated 11 th December, 2025, the interested party reiterates her grounds of opposition and depositions in her replying affidavit, both dated 2 nd December, 2025. She maintains that the Tribunal had jurisdiction to entertain the dispute and that the applicant is asking this court to usurp the statutory mandate of the Tribunal. She submits that the originating motion is fundamentally flawed, incompetent and an abuse of court process.
56. That judicial review is concerned with decision making process and not the merits of the decision, citing the case of R v Chief Registrar of the Judiciary Exparte Riley Services Ltd [2015] e KLR.
57. The interested party’s counsel submitted that as has been held before, judicial review should not be used as a vehicle to substitute the Court’s own views for those of specialized Tribunal or to determine the merits of the decision of the tribunal by way of a second appeal on the substantive issues already determined by the tribunal was held in Kadamas v Municipality of Kisumu [1986] KLR 495.
58. That the mere fact that the applicant disagrees with the decision of the Tribunal does not provide it with valid grounds for the extraordinary remedy of judicial review, as the proper process was observed and that the matter was already conclusively determined by the specialized tribunal.
59. According to the interested party, the applicant wants this court to step beyond its mandate and interfere in a sphere where the law has already provided for a mechanism for recourse. That the Sports Act only allows the Sports Disputes Tribunal to review its own decisions. Further, that in sports disputes, the Sports Act only allows for appeals against decisions of the Sports Disputes Tribunal to the Court of Arbitration for Sports, not this Court.
60. It is therefore submitted that this application is intended to circumvent the established statutory appellate frameworks governing sports disputes in Kenya and inappropriately invites this court to usurp the exclusive jurisdiction and mandate bestowed upon the Sports Disputes Tribunal and the Court of Arbitration for Sports by the Sports Act and relevant legal instruments. The interested party urged this court to find the application to be incompetent and an abuse of court process
61. On the applicant’s contention that the Sports Disputes Tribunal lacked the necessary jurisdiction to entertain the dispute filed by the interested party against the applicant herein, it was submitted relying on Owners of Motor Vessel Lilian S v Caltex Oil Kenya Limited case where the Court of Appeal held that jurisdiction was paramount, without it, a court or tribunal must desist from proceedings with the matter and that jurisdiction may be conferred expressly by the statute or by the Constitution,
62. According to the interested party, the Sports Disputes Tribunal derives its jurisdiction from sections 55 to 59 of the Sports Act, 2013 which sections empower the Tribunal to adjudicate matters concerning sports governance, team selections and participation issues. Reliance was placed on Republic v SDT & another exparte Football Federation of Kenya & another [2017]e KLR where it is said that the High Court recognized the SDT as the appropriate specialized forum for resolving sports disputes. Further reliance was placed on Geoffrey Muthinja & another v Samuel Henry & 1756 others [2015] e KLR where the Court of Appeal is said to have emphasized the necessity for partis to exhaust specialized dispute resolution mechanisms before seeking recourse to the regular courts.
63. She maintained that legal authorities collectively confirm that the SDT possesses the primary jurisdiction over the types of sports related disputes raised by the interested party herein. Therefore, the interested party argues that the applicant’s contention that the SDT lacked jurisdiction in the matter, disregards the mandatory framework, noting that section 58 of the Sports Act empowers the Tribunal to handle disputes arising from sports organizations.
64. According to the interested party, section 46(1)-(5) of the Sports Act requ
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i. spent
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iii. THAT the impugned part of the Ruling by the 1st Respondent given on 14/10/2025 in SDTSC/E060/2025 - Nairobi County between NORAH NJERI ONGWENYI -VS- ROYAL NAIROBI GOLF CLUB (hereinafter referred to as the Ruling) be brought before this Court for nullification/quashing.
iv. THAT a Declaration do issue that the 1st Respondent lacks the jurisdiction to hear the dispute between the Applicant and Interested Party as filed before the 1st Respondent.
v. THAT any other orders that meet the ends of justice do issue.
vi. THAT costs of this Application and/or Suit and interest be provided for .
2. The Originating Motion is predicated on the grounds set out on the face thereof and supported by an affidavit sworn by Jacob Omondi.
3. The applicant is a body corporate registered under the Companies Act, 2015 operating as a Private Members Golf Club. The 1st Respondent is a Tribunal established under the Sports Act, 2013, while the the 2nd Respondent is the Chief Administrator of the Judiciary an office established under Article 161(2)(c) of the Constitution of Kenya. The Interested Party is an adult of sound mind and a Member of the Applicant herein.
4. From the grounds and supporting affidavit together with annextures, the applicant’s case is that the Interested Party had filed an Amended Statement of Claim dated 06/08/2025 before the 1st Respondent seeking orders inter alia:
i. A declaration that the procedure adopted by the Ladies Committee scheduled for selection of the Ladies team to represent the Applicant Club in Nairobi District Golf Tournaments violated the Interested Party’s constitutional rights to equal protection by due process and the rule of law guaranteed to the Interested Party by provisions of Article 27(1) of the Constitution.
ii. That exclusion of the Interested Party from the eligible team selection, exclusive training for selected team representatives and denials of the team uniform breached the Interested Party’s contract of membership of the Applicant Club and thereby violated the Interested Party’s membership rights to participate in the league and her membership right to offer herself for selection by the committee club as a member of the team to represent the Applicant Club and to fully in participate in the programs of the club as a member.
iii. The procedure adopted by the Ladies Committee to select the ladies golf team to represent the Applicant Club at the Nairobi District Golf league matches, distribution of team uniform and selective training for some few lady members by the club violated the Interested Party’s constitutional rights to hear presentations by members of the committee in support of their candidates decision and against the Interested Party and denied the Interested Party her rights to make her and unconstitutionally dismissed the Interested Party’s case for selection without a hearing in violation of provisions of Article 50 (1) of the Constitution.
iv. General damages for violation of Interested Party’s fundamental constitutional rights to equal protection under the rule of law, as guaranteed by Articles 50 and 27(1) of the Constitution.
5. According to the applicant, it filed a Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 25/08/2025 (the P.O) challenging the complaint lodged by the interested party herein, contending that:
i. The suit is ill advised, prejudicing and an abuse of the Honourable Tribunal’s process.
ii. The Honourable Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to hear the Suit herein by virtue of Section 58 of the Sports Act,2013 (the Act):
2.1 the Claimant has not quoted or demonstrated nor relied on a specific provision or rule allowing her to Appeal to this Honourable Tribunal (by virtue of Section 58 (a) of the Act);
2.2 there is no Agreement between the Parties to refer the dispute or any dispute to this Honourable Tribunal (by virtue of Section 58(b) of the Act)
iii. THAT it is trite that only the High Court and courts of similar status currently have jurisdiction to hear and determine matters of alleged violation(s) of fundamental rights and freedoms in the Bill of Rights.
iv. The Suit raises constitutional issues and seeks constitutional reliefs of which this Honourable Tribunal lacks jurisdiction to determine.
v. The Suit is an abuse of process, scandalous, frivolous, vexatious and must be struck out/dismissed with costs.
6. That the said Preliminary Objection was canvassed vide written submissions and, in its decision, the Sports Disputes Tribunal dismissed the preliminary objection on the ground that some of the issues raised were sports related and not necessarily constitutional violations.
7. The applicant asserts that the 1st Respondent lacked jurisdiction to entertain the complaint filed by the interested party, and that the 1 st respondent’s jurisdiction stems from Section 58 of the Sports Act, 2013. That the dispute did not constitute an appeal against decisions made by national sports organizations or umbrella national sports organizations or a sports-related dispute that parties to the dispute agree to refer to the tribunal or an appeal from decisions of the Registrar under the Sports Act.
8. The applicant avers that the 1 st respondent’s decision was not authorized by the empowering statutory provision; was in excess of jurisdiction or power conferred under written law; is unfair; was materially influenced by an error of law; failed to take into account relevant considerations; is Irrational; and is taken or made in abuse of power.
9. It further asserts that the issues the Interested Party purports to raise are overtaken by events because: the Interested Party misrepresented material facts concealing and failing to disclose that the purported grievances of the Claimant had been amicably addressed through a Mediation Committee established vide the Respondent’s Board resolution of 20/05/2025; that following six meetings in which the Claimant participated, raising issues which were addressed and way forward established and already implemented; that the Claimant has not expressed dissatisfaction with the aforesaid resolutions or their consensual implementation but rather seeks a rehearing in an abuse of the 1st Respondent’s time and resources;that the Claimant is faulted for forum shopping hereby and that the issues raised having been resolved and way forward implemented, the same are overtaken by events.
10. The applicant filed a further affidavit sworn on 15 th December, 2025 by Jacob Omondi in response to the interested party’s grounds of opposition and replying affidavit both dated 2/12/2025 reiterating the depositions in support of the application and the grounds adding that: the 1st Respondent lacked jurisdiction because: the Applicant is not a national sports organization; the Applicant is not an Umbrella National Sports Organisation;the Applicant had not made a disciplinary decision; the Applicant had not made any decision on selection to any National team; the Applicant did not agree to refer to the tribunal alleged dispute or any dispute whatsoever and that there was no impugned decision of the Registrar under the Sports Act in issue herewith
11. The applicant maintained that it is not a Sports Club Registered under Section 46 of the Sports Act; that it is a body corporate registered under the Companies Act, 2015 operating as a Private Members Golf Club, which fact the Interested Party being a member is well aware of and that she malafides purports to misrepresent to/mislead this Honourable Court.
12. That to the contrary, registering the Applicant as a sports organisation/Club under the Sports Act would be a violation of the Section 47 of the Act and that just like other institutions/entities such as schools and churches whose membership participate in various sporting activities despite a distinct core mandate, the Applicant’s members participate in other sporting activities besides golf such as swimming, squash, gym etc, and other social activities, the core feature being that it is for members only and for invited friends/guests.
13. It is asserted that in fact, the bodies registered and responsible for the running of the discipline of Golf and related competitions in Kenya, is the Kenya Golf Union (KGU) and the Kenya Ladies Golf Union (KLGU) (specifically for Lady Golfers), a fact the Interested Party is well aware of being a handicapped golfer that pays an Annual Subscription fee to these Bodies.
14. That further and contrary to the requirements in the 2nd Schedule regarding constitution of sports organisations under the Sports Act; and that whereas the Applicant being a Private Members Club, the Applicant does not have or run national or branch or sub branch offices;it does not conduct elections every two years at national or branch or sub branch offices; The Applicant is not obligated to subscribe to any Court of Arbitration for Sports policies and rules which conform with requirements set out in Sports Disputes Tribunal policy and rules for sports disputes resolution; The Applicant does not have the mandate to make selection of the Kenyan team and the technical personnel; The Applicant does not have the mandate to register sportspersons and sportspersons’ representatives nationally or at any branch or sub branch of any sports organisation.
15. That this Court has the jurisdiction to address the grievance herewith under the Fair Administrative Action Act, when a quasi-judicial body purports to act ultra vires, and or without jurisdiction
16. That the Interested Party did not raise any issue of public interest, that her concern is personal and hinged on her non-selection to represent the Applicant’s team.
17. That no prejudice or injustice shall befall the Respondents and Interested Party.
The Interested Party’s replying affidavit and grounds of opposition
18. Opposing the originating motion, the interested party filed grounds of opposition and replying affidavit both dated 2 nd December, 2025. The replying affidavit is sworn by the interested party Norah Njeri Ongwenyi,
19. According to the interested party, the assertion by the applicant that the respondent had no jurisdiction to entertain the dispute between her and the applicant herein is without basis. That the applicant misconceives section 46 (1)(2)(4) and (5) of the Sports Act as read with paragraph (f) of the second Schedule to the Act. That the applicant is seeking to relitigate matters which were competently determined by the specialized Tribunal which was clothed with jurisdiction to entertain.
20. The interested party contends that the interested party raised legitimate questions of being excluded from the team selection process, which is a sports dispute falling within the jurisdiction of the Sports Tribunal hence judicial review would undermine the integrity of the dispute resolution process established by the Sports Act.
21. According to the interested party, although the dispute was addressed through mediation, it was not fully resolved hence only the Tribunal could competently entertain the dispute.
22. That no irreparable harm would occur to the applicant as the interested party’s rights to fair treatment and participation in club activities was paramount and should not be compromised by the applicant’s attempts to evade accountability. That the Tribunal’s decision is essential to upholding the principles of fairness and justice within the club’s governance.
23. It was contended that the applicant’s allegation that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction has no legitimate basis in view of section 46 of the Sports Act and the second schedule to the Sports Act which sets out, matters to be provided for in the constitution of spots organizations at paragraph (f).
24. Further, that the interested party’s claims before the Tribunal are grounded in her constitutional rights including the right tom equal protection of the law, due process and the rule of law guaranteed under Article 27 (1) of the Constitution and that the Tribunal’s jurisdiction encompasses the protection of these rights hence the applicant’s challenge undermines the legal framework designed to uphold them.
25. It was further contended that the matters at hand concern serious and significant public interest, in ensuring that sports governance is conducted transparently and fairly and that the adjudication of sports disputes by the Tribunal is crucial for maintaining the integrity of sports organizations and that any attempt to undermine the process should be viewed with skepticism.
26. That there is no urgency in the matter herein and that no prejudice will be occasioned to the applicant if the decision of the Tribunal is left to stand.
27. The interested party urged this court to dismiss the originating motion with costs and allow the Tribunal to proceed and conclude the dispute fairly and justly.
28. The grounds of opposition were also replicated in the replying affidavit sworn by the interested party on 2 nd November, 2025.
Submissions
29. The parties filed written submissions to canvass the originating motion.
The applicant’s submissions
30. In its written submissions dated 15th December, 2025, the applicant framed the following issues for determination and submitted on the same.
i. Whether the Sports Disputes Tribunal had jurisdiction under Section 58 of the Sports Act, 2013 to entertain and retain the dispute in SDTSC/E060/2025, having regard to the nature of the Applicant and the subject matter of the claim.
ii. Whether the Applicant falls within the category of a national sports organization or umbrella national sports organization contemplated under the Sports Act, 2013, so as to clothe the Tribunal with jurisdiction.
iii. Whether the Sports Disputes Tribunal acted ultra vires, in excess of its statutory mandate, or in error of law and their conduct was tainted by unreasonableness, irrationality, procedural unfairness, or abuse of power, contrary to the Fair Administrative Action Act.
iv. Whether the dispute before the Tribunal had been overtaken by events, having been resolved through mediation and implemented, thereby rendering the proceedings an abuse of process.
v. Costs of the Suit
31. On whether the Sports Disputes Tribunal had jurisdiction under Section 58 of the Sports Act, 2013, the applicant submitted reciting the principle of law that jurisdiction is everything and a Court or Tribunal acting without jurisdiction acts in vain, as was settled in the seminal locus classicus case of Owners of the Motor Vessel “Lillian S” v Caltex Oil (Kenya) Ltd [1989] KLR 1.
32. It was reiterated that the jurisdiction of the Sports Disputes Tribunal is strictly confined to Section 58 of the Sports Act, 2013 . Counsel for the applicant further relied on the Supreme Court decision in in Samuel Kamau Macharia & Another v Kenya Commercial Bank Ltd & 2 Others [2012] eKLR where the apex Court highlighted that “ a court or tribunal’s jurisdiction flows from either the Constitution or statute, and cannot be expanded by judicial craft or sympathy.”
33. It was reiterated that the jurisdiction of 1 st Respondent is expressly stated and stems from Section 58 of the Sports Act, 2013 as reproduced in this Judgment and, according to the applicant, the dispute before the 1 st Respondent was neither: an appeal from a decision of a national sports organization; an appeal from the Registrar under the Sports Act; nor a sports-related dispute consensually referred to the Tribunal.
34. Further, that the prayers sought before 1 st Respondent do not fall within the ambits of Section 58 most especially because – (a) this Claim is not an Appeal to any decision by the Applicant - the Interested Party does not state in its pleadings it is such nor can it be implied to be such from the pleadings or at all; the Interested Party has not demonstrated a Sporting Contract nor any Contract, whatsoever, between the Parties conferring jurisdiction to 1 st Respondent, as required under Section 58 (b) ( supra ) or at all. There is nothing specified or expressed to that effect nor can it be implied, and neither does Interested Party in her pleadings claim that any such Agreement exists. The Interested Party has not stated what part, or any articles of the Applicant’s Articles of Association or Rules that specifically, expressly or impliedly confers jurisdiction to 1 st Respondent to hear the Claim whereof.
35. Further reliance was placed on the case of Republic v Rent Restriction Tribunal Ex-parte: Mayfair Bakeries Limited & another [1982] KEHC 10 (KLR) as cited in Mokaya v Football Kenya Federation & 20 others (Tribunal Case E022 & E028 of 2023 (Consolidated)) [2024] KESDT 93 (KLR) (6 February 2024) (Decision) where the Court stated as follows with regards to the Jurisdiction of the Tribunals;
“Testing whether a statute has conferred jurisdiction on an inferior court or a tribunal... the wording must be strictly construed: it must in fact be an express conferment and not a matter of implication and that a Tribunal is a creature of statute and has only such jurisdiction as has been specifically conferred upon it by the statute. Therefore, where the language of an Act is clear and explicit the court must give effect to it whatever may be the consequences for in that case the words of the statute speak the intention of the legislature. Further, each statute has to be interpreted on the basis of its own language for words derive their colour and content from their context and secondly, the object of the legislation is a paramount consideration."
36. It was submitted that the 1 st Respondent cannot assume jurisdiction where the statutory preconditions under Section 58 have not been met, and that any decision made in excess thereof is null and void.
37. The applicant submitted that the 1 st Respondent therefore erred in law by retaining a dispute that fell wholly outside its statutory mandate.
38. On the second issue of whether the Applicant is a national sports organization or umbrella national sports organization under the Sports Act, 2013 , it was submitted that the Applicant is a Private Members’ Club incorporated under the Companies Act, 2015 , and not registered as a sports organization under Sections 46 and 47 of the Sports Act .
39. That participation in sporting activities alone does not clothe the Applicant an entity with the legal status of a sports organization and that therefore the absence of a written consent giving the 1 st Respondent jurisdiction, deprives the 1 st Respondent of competence to entertain the dispute.
40. Further submission was that it is judicially noticed that the national sports organization that runs the discipline of golf is the Kenya Golf Union (KGU) , and Kenya Ladies Golfer Union ( KLGU ) specifically in respect to Lady Golfers and that therefore, the 1 st Respondent and Interested Party’s assumption that the Applicant was a sports organization, despite uncontested evidence to the contrary, constituted a fundamental misdirection in law and a jurisdictional error.
41. On the third issue of whether the Tribunal acted ultra vires , in excess of its mandate, or in a manner that was unreasonable, irrational, procedurally unfair, or an abuse of power, it was submitted that where a tribunal lacks jurisdiction, any further step taken is ipso facto ultra vires . Reliance was placed on English case of Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147 , where the House of Lords held that a decision tainted by jurisdictional error is a nullity.
42. In the instant case, it was contended that the Tribunal erred by purporting to sever or split the claim into “sports-related” and “constitutional” components. Relying on the case of Republic v National Land Commission Ex parte Sound Equipment Ltd [2016] eKLR, it was submitted that in the above case, the Court held that a tribunal cannot arrogate jurisdiction by recharacterizing or severing claims.
43. Additionally, that claims alleging violations of Articles 27 and 50 of the Constitution fall squarely within the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 165. Reliance was placed on United States International University (USIU) v Attorney General [2012] eKLR , where the Court is said to have affirmed that constitutional interpretation and enforcement lie exclusively with the superior courts.
44. The applicant also relied on Royal Media Services Ltd v Attorney General & 6 others [2015] eKLR where Mumbi J (as she then was, faced with a similar issue and in determining whether the HIV/AIDS Tribunal had the requisite jurisdiction to hear a dispute of violation of a constitutional right and freedom, stated:
“….. I hereby declare that only the High Court and courts of similar status currently have jurisdiction to hear and determine matters of violation of fundamental rights and freedoms in the Bill of Rights .
(b) I hereby declare that in the absence of legislation enacted by Parliament to give subordinate courts original jurisdiction to hear and determine matters of denial, violation and infringement of right or fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights, subordinate courts and tribunals, including, the 2nd respondent, do not have jurisdiction to hear and determine matters arising from the Bill of Rights .”
45. The applicant submitted that under Section 7 of the Fair Administrative Action Act ( Cap 7L ), this Court is mandated to review decisions that are unreasonable, irrational, or procedurally unfair and that in the instant case, the Tribunal’s decision meets all these thresholds.
46. On the fourth issue of whether this Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine the present Judicial Review Application, it was submitted that the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the present Judicial Review proceedings is firmly anchored in the Constitution, statute, and settled jurisprudence.
47. The applicant cited Articles 165(6) and (7) of the Constitution on supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court over Tribunals and relied on Republic v Karisa Chengo & 2 Others [2017] eKLR , where the Supreme Court is said to have affirmed that tribunals created by statute fall squarely within the supervisory remit of the High Court under Article 165.
48. It was submitted that Section 7 of the Fair Administrative Action Act ( Cap 7L ), expressly empowers this Court to review administrative and quasi-judicial actions where the decision-maker-acted without jurisdiction or in excess of authority; committed an error of law; acted unreasonably or irrationally; violated principles of procedural fairness; or abused power; and that the impugned Ruling by the Sports Disputes Tribunal is challenged on precisely these grounds, thereby properly invoking this Court’s jurisdiction.
49. The applicant relied on Suchan Investment Ltd v Ministry of National Heritage & Culture [2016] eKLR , where the Court of Appeal is said to have held that judicial review is the primary mechanism through which the High Court exercises constitutional supervision over administrative bodies.
50. On whether jurisdiction of this Court is ousted by Statute or Doctrine of Exhaustion, it was submitted that the doctrine of exhaustion does not apply where the impugned body lacked jurisdiction and that it is settled law that where jurisdiction is in issue, the High Court must intervene at the earliest opportunity. The applicant relied on Republic v National Land Commission ex parte Sound Equipment Ltd [2016] eKLR , where the High Court is said to have held that the existence of an alternative forum does not oust the Court’s jurisdiction where the impugned body acted ultra vires , which position was affirmed by the Court of Appeal in Geoffrey Muthinja & Another v Samuel Muguna Henry & 1756 Others [2015] eKLR, and later clarified in Republic v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission ex parte National Super Alliance (NASA) [2017] eKLR .
51. It was submitted that where a Tribunal acts without jurisdiction, there is nothing to exhaust and that therefore, this Court is properly seized of jurisdiction to intervene.
52. On the fifth issue of whether the dispute was overtaken by events and amounted to an abuse of process, it was submitted that the Applicant had demonstrated that the dispute had been amicably resolved through Mediation, participated by the Interested Party and fully implemented. The applicant relied on Muchanga Investments Ltd v Safaris Unlimited (Africa) Ltd & 2 Others [2009] eKLR , where ethe Court of Appeal is said to have held that abuse of process includes instituting proceedings where no legitimate purpose is served, or where matters have already been settled. A similar position is said to have been taken in John Florence Maritime Services Ltd v Cabinet Secretary for Transport & Infrastructure & 3 Others [2015] eKLR , where the Court, according to the applicant, affirmed its duty to prevent forum shopping and re-litigation of resolved disputes.
53. The applicant therefore argued that the the continuation of the Tribunal proceedings was oppressive, wasteful and an abuse of the Tribunal’s process.
54. On costs of the suit, it was submitted that it is trite that costs do follow the event and that this Application was caused by the unfair violations by the Respondents and Interested Party hence the application should be allowed with costs payable by the interested party to the applicant.
The interested party’s submissions
55. In the written submissions dated 11 th December, 2025, the interested party reiterates her grounds of opposition and depositions in her replying affidavit, both dated 2 nd December, 2025. She maintains that the Tribunal had jurisdiction to entertain the dispute and that the applicant is asking this court to usurp the statutory mandate of the Tribunal. She submits that the originating motion is fundamentally flawed, incompetent and an abuse of court process.
56. That judicial review is concerned with decision making process and not the merits of the decision, citing the case of R v Chief Registrar of the Judiciary Exparte Riley Services Ltd [2015] e KLR.
57. The interested party’s counsel submitted that as has been held before, judicial review should not be used as a vehicle to substitute the Court’s own views for those of specialized Tribunal or to determine the merits of the decision of the tribunal by way of a second appeal on the substantive issues already determined by the tribunal was held in Kadamas v Municipality of Kisumu [1986] KLR 495.
58. That the mere fact that the applicant disagrees with the decision of the Tribunal does not provide it with valid grounds for the extraordinary remedy of judicial review, as the proper process was observed and that the matter was already conclusively determined by the specialized tribunal.
59. According to the interested party, the applicant wants this court to step beyond its mandate and interfere in a sphere where the law has already provided for a mechanism for recourse. That the Sports Act only allows the Sports Disputes Tribunal to review its own decisions. Further, that in sports disputes, the Sports Act only allows for appeals against decisions of the Sports Disputes Tribunal to the Court of Arbitration for Sports, not this Court.
60. It is therefore submitted that this application is intended to circumvent the established statutory appellate frameworks governing sports disputes in Kenya and inappropriately invites this court to usurp the exclusive jurisdiction and mandate bestowed upon the Sports Disputes Tribunal and the Court of Arbitration for Sports by the Sports Act and relevant legal instruments. The interested party urged this court to find the application to be incompetent and an abuse of court process
61. On the applicant’s contention that the Sports Disputes Tribunal lacked the necessary jurisdiction to entertain the dispute filed by the interested party against the applicant herein, it was submitted relying on Owners of Motor Vessel Lilian S v Caltex Oil Kenya Limited case where the Court of Appeal held that jurisdiction was paramount, without it, a court or tribunal must desist from proceedings with the matter and that jurisdiction may be conferred expressly by the statute or by the Constitution,
62. According to the interested party, the Sports Disputes Tribunal derives its jurisdiction from sections 55 to 59 of the Sports Act, 2013 which sections empower the Tribunal to adjudicate matters concerning sports governance, team selections and participation issues. Reliance was placed on Republic v SDT & another exparte Football Federation of Kenya & another [2017]e KLR where it is said that the High Court recognized the SDT as the appropriate specialized forum for resolving sports disputes. Further reliance was placed on Geoffrey Muthinja & another v Samuel Henry & 1756 others [2015] e KLR where the Court of Appeal is said to have emphasized the necessity for partis to exhaust specialized dispute resolution mechanisms before seeking recourse to the regular courts.
63. She maintained that legal authorities collectively confirm that the SDT possesses the primary jurisdiction over the types of sports related disputes raised by the interested party herein. Therefore, the interested party argues that the applicant’s contention that the SDT lacked jurisdiction in the matter, disregards the mandatory framework, noting that section 58 of the Sports Act empowers the Tribunal to handle disputes arising from sports organizations.
64. According to the interested party, section 46(1)-(5) of the Sports Act requ
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