Background
1. There are two applications and a preliminary objection pending before this Court. The application dated 30th May 2025, which seeks my recusal from hearing these proceedings takes precedence and shall be determined first, as it challenges the continued adjudication of the matter by this Court.
Analysis and Determination
2. The application is premised on allegations of gross misconduct and incompetence on the part of the Court. It is opposed by way of a replying affidavit sworn by the defendant/respondent.
3. From the supporting affidavit, it is evident that the applicant takes issue with this Court’s refusal to grant interim orders in two earlier applications filed under certificates of urgency, dated 12th December 2024 and 20th May 2025, respectively.
4. The grievance centers on this Court’s finding that the said applications did not disclose sufficient urgency to warrant ex parte interim relief. Instead, the Court issued directions requiring the parties to file and serve submissions within specific timelines, with a view to expediting the hearing of the substantive applications. It is notable that the said directions have not been complied with to date.
5. Having considered the applications, the Court’s refusal to grant interim relief was informed by the need to avoid interfering with lawful regulatory confirmation processes relating to the source of funds deposited into an account, as mandated under applicable financial laws. The Court found no sufficient justification to issue interim orders that would jeopardize the ongoing regulatory scrutiny and, instead, prioritized the expeditious and fair hearing of the applications on merits.
6. It must be emphasized that the mere fact that a party is dissatisfied with a judicial decision does not, without more, amount to a valid ground for recusal. The threshold for recusal is deliberately high and for good reason.
7. The applicant takes issue with what he describes as the “insistence of this Court to sit on the matter.” This objection is, with respect, legally misconceived. It is a fundamental principle of law that a judge has not only a right but also a duty to hear and determine all matters allocated to them, unless disqualified for a cause recognized in law. This principle was authoritatively affirmed by the Supreme Court in Shollei & another v Judicial Service Commission & another [2018] KESC 42 (KLR).
8. The Supreme Court has also cautioned against the improper use of recusal applications as a forum-shopping tactic. In Shollei & Another (supra) , the Court cited with approval the observations of Mason J in JRL ex parte CJL (1986) 161 CLR 342 , where he emphasized:
“it is equally important the judicial officers discharge their duty to sit and do not by acceding too readily to suggestion of appearance of bias encourage parties to believe that by seeking the disqualification of a judge, they will have their case tried by someone thought to be more likely to decide the case in their favour.”
9. In the present case, no evidence has been adduced to show that this Court has any personal interest in the matter, nor has the applicant established any reasonable apprehension of bias that would justify disqualification. The sweeping allegations of gross misconduct and incompetence are equally unsubstantiated and amount to a mere expression of dissatisfaction with prior rulings, which is not a legitimate basis for recusal.
10. The allegations raised fall far short of the legal threshold required to justify recusal. They are founded on the applicant’s disagreement with the Court’s discretionary decisions, which are properly subject to appeal, not disqualification.
Final Orders:
a) The Notice of Motion dated 30th May 2025 seeking the recusal of this Court is hereby dismissed.
b) Costs of the application shall be in the cause.
It is so ordered.
DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED IN NAIROBI
THIS 17th DAY OF JULY 2025.
F. MUGAMBI
JUDGE
1. There are two applications and a preliminary objection pending before this Court. The application dated 30th May 2025, which seeks my recusal from hearing these proceedings takes precedence and shall be determined first, as it challenges the continued adjudication of the matter by this Court.
Analysis and Determination
2. The application is premised on allegations of gross misconduct and incompetence on the part of the Court. It is opposed by way of a replying affidavit sworn by the defendant/respondent.
3. From the supporting affidavit, it is evident that the applicant takes issue with this Court’s refusal to grant interim orders in two earlier applications filed under certificates of urgency, dated 12th December 2024 and 20th May 2025, respectively.
4. The grievance centers on this Court’s finding that the said applications did not disclose sufficient urgency to warrant ex parte interim relief. Instead, the Court issued directions requiring the parties to file and serve submissions within specific timelines, with a view to expediting the hearing of the substantive applications. It is notable that the said directions have not been complied with to date.
5. Having considered the applications, the Court’s refusal to grant interim relief was informed by the need to avoid interfering with lawful regulatory confirmation processes relating to the source of funds deposited into an account, as mandated under applicable financial laws. The Court found no sufficient justification to issue interim orders that would jeopardize the ongoing regulatory scrutiny and, instead, prioritized the expeditious and fair hearing of the applications on merits.
6. It must be emphasized that the mere fact that a party is dissatisfied with a judicial decision does not, without more, amount to a valid ground for recusal. The threshold for recusal is deliberately high and for good reason.
7. The applicant takes issue with what he describes as the “insistence of this Court to sit on the matter.” This objection is, with respect, legally misconceived. It is a fundamental principle of law that a judge has not only a right but also a duty to hear and determine all matters allocated to them, unless disqualified for a cause recognized in law. This principle was authoritatively affirmed by the Supreme Court in Shollei & another v Judicial Service Commission & another [2018] KESC 42 (KLR).
8. The Supreme Court has also cautioned against the improper use of recusal applications as a forum-shopping tactic. In Shollei & Another (supra) , the Court cited with approval the observations of Mason J in JRL ex parte CJL (1986) 161 CLR 342 , where he emphasized:
“it is equally important the judicial officers discharge their duty to sit and do not by acceding too readily to suggestion of appearance of bias encourage parties to believe that by seeking the disqualification of a judge, they will have their case tried by someone thought to be more likely to decide the case in their favour.”
9. In the present case, no evidence has been adduced to show that this Court has any personal interest in the matter, nor has the applicant established any reasonable apprehension of bias that would justify disqualification. The sweeping allegations of gross misconduct and incompetence are equally unsubstantiated and amount to a mere expression of dissatisfaction with prior rulings, which is not a legitimate basis for recusal.
10. The allegations raised fall far short of the legal threshold required to justify recusal. They are founded on the applicant’s disagreement with the Court’s discretionary decisions, which are properly subject to appeal, not disqualification.
Final Orders:
a) The Notice of Motion dated 30th May 2025 seeking the recusal of this Court is hereby dismissed.
b) Costs of the application shall be in the cause.
It is so ordered.
DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED IN NAIROBI
THIS 17th DAY OF JULY 2025.
F. MUGAMBI
JUDGE