'Introduction
1. By a Notice of Motion Application dated 6th September 2025 supported by an affidavit sworn on even date, the Petitioner seeks orders that:
i. Spent.
ii. Spent.
iii. An order be made for the recusal of Honourable Mr Justice Lawrence Mugambi from hearing this matter.
iv. This matter be forwarded to the Presiding Judge of the Constitutional Division for reallocation to another Judge for hearing, and determination and consideration of prayers 5 and 6 of this Application.
v. The Petition dated 28th April, 2025 be fixed for hearing before 17th November, 2025, on the basis of documents filed by the parties.
vi. Pending the hearing and determination of this Petition, a conservatory order be issued suspending the implementation of the decision contained in the Judgment written, and signed by the 4th, 5th and 6th Respondents on 7th April, 2025 in Disciplinary Cause Mis. No 21 of 2022, in the matter of a complaint against Nelson Andayi Havi, and further proceedings in the said matter.
vii. The costs of this Application be provided for.
Petitioner’s Case
2. The Petitioner depones that he filed his Petition dated 28th April 2025 to remedy violation of his fundamental rights in relation to the 2nd Respondent’s decision in Disciplinary Cause Mis. No.21 of 2022 which was signed by the 4th, 5th and 6th Respondents’.
3. The Petitioner alleges that the impugned decision was procured through an elaborate nefarious scheme to slow him down on his call for reforms in the Judiciary, targeting the removal of the Hon. Chief Justice Martha Koome. He claims that the 2nd, 4th, 5th and 6th Respondents are part of this nefarious scheme as also aided by other members of the Judiciary including the Hon. Chief Justice.
4. He notes that the Petition was filed simultaneously with an Application seeking conservatory orders against implementation of this impugned decision by the 2nd Respondent.
5. The Petitioner asserts that on 21st May 2025, he acceded to this Court’s call to abandon the Application for conservatory orders and subsume the Respondents’ Notices of Preliminary Objections in the Petition, so as to expedite hearing of this matter. It is stated that the 2nd, 4th, 5th and 6th Respondents have not filed their substantive responses to the Petition despite the Court’s directions.
6. The Petitioner takes issue with the fact that the Petition has not been heard, four months after its filing owing to the deliberate applications that have been filed by the Respondents’. These applications are said to be aimed at recanting the response to the Petition filed by the 1st Respondent and to hear the 4th, 5th and 6th Respondents’ Notices of Preliminary Objections, instead of the Petition.
7. According to the Petitioner, this Court has failed to facilitate a fair trial of the Petition, to afford him the right to equal protection and equal benefit of the law, afford him an expeditious and efficient determination of the Petition and afford him a fair hearing, all these as envisaged under Articles 10(1)(b) and 2(a) and (c), 25(c), 27(1), 47(3)(b), 50(1) and 159(2)(b) and (e) of the Constitution and Rules 3(4), 5 (a) and (c) and (8) and 16 of The Constitution of Kenya (Protection of Rights and Fundamental Freedoms) Practice and Procedures Rules, 2013.
8. Additionally, he assets that he lodged a complaint with the Judicial Service Commission against the Hon. Chief Justice for appointing Hon. Justice Lawrence Mugambi and two other Judges to hear her own case in Nairobi Const. Ptn. No E083 of 2025, Honourable Lady Justice Martha Karambu Koome v Judicial Service Commission & 4 Others. He notes that he has since sought the recusal of Hon. Justice Lawrence Mugambi and the other two Judges from hearing this matter.
9. Furthermore, the Petitioner avers that he had also initially lodged a complaint before the Judicial Service Commission and the Hon. Chief Justice against delays by Hon. Justice Lawrence Mugambi in the conduct of his proceedings.
10. The Petitioner alleges that he has credible intelligence that the strategy adopted before the 2nd Respondent to frustrate him has also been deployed in this matter and Hon. Justice Lawrence Mugambi conscripted to execute it through delay of hearing of this matter so as to enable the Respondents secure his sentencing on 17th November 2025.
11. In his opinion, Hon. Justice Lawrence Mugambi is biased and conflicted. Further he states that he is apprehensive due to the credible intelligence he has received of Hon. Justice Lawrence Mugambi flip-flopping on his directions towards the expedited hearing of the Petition, at the behest of the Respondents. In fact, he claims that when his Counsel lamented of the delay in this matter before him, he seemed unmoved and stated “the matter will be heard as and when reached, just like many other matters before me”.
12. The Petitioner maintains that in light of the foregoing, he is certain that he will not have a fair hearing before Hon.Justice Lawrence Mugambi as he is not fair, independent and impartial in determination of this matter. For this reason, he avers that it is only just for Hon. Justice Lawrence Mugambi to recuse himself so that the matter can be heard by a fair, independent and impartial Court.
1st Respondent’s Case
13. The 1st Respondent’s response to the Application was made through its written submissions.
2nd Respondent’s Case
14. In response, the 2nd Respondent opposed the Application for recusal in its Grounds of Opposition dated 26th September 2025 on the basis that:
i. The Notice of Motion is incompetent and amounts to an abuse of the Court process.
ii. The Petitioner has not demonstrated any factual or legal basis to support the prayer for recusal of Hon. Mr. Justice Lawrence Mugambi, nor has he met the threshold required for the recusal of a judge under applicable law.
iii. The Notice of Motion as framed and couched, is a transparent attempt at forum shopping which this Court should decline; recusal lies only where a fair-minded and informed observer would apprehend a real possibility of bias, a threshold the Petitioner has not met.
iv. The Notice of Motion, in so far as it seeks conservatory orders staying the implementation of the Tribunal’s judgment of 7th April 2025, is an impermissible re-opening of relief that the Petitioner expressly abandoned on 21st May 2025.
v. Having waived and/or abandoned the prayer for conservatory orders, the Petitioner is estopped from resurrecting the same by way of a fresh application. The current attempt amounts to forum engineering, offends finality and orderly case management, and should be declined as an abuse of process.
vi. Granting conservatory orders at this stage would pre-emptively overturn a lawful disciplinary decision before the main Petition is heard on its merits. In any event, by reason of the Petitioner’s abandonment of conservatory orders on 21st May 2025, the renewed prayer is barred, vexatious, and should be declined.
vii. The Notice of Motion is predicated on factual errors, including the assertion that the 2nd Respondent has not responded to the main Petition, whereas the 2nd Respondent’s Response to the Petition was duly filed and served on all parties on 5th June 2025. The Motion therefore proceeds on a false premise and ought to be dismissed.
3rd Respondent’s Case
15. The 3rd Respondent filed his Replying Affidavit sworn on 17th September 2025.
16. On the onset, the 3rd Respondent states that the Petitioner’s Application is premature, unmerited and unsupported by cogent evidence.
17. He asserts that the Petitioner’s allegations of bias on against the Hon. Justice Lawrence Mugambi and failure to expedite the hearing of this matter are speculative, unmerited and unsupported by any credible evidence. Equally, he states that the accusations of a nefarious scheme are also a scandalous, unsubstantiated by evidence and ought to be struck out as vexatious.
18. He points out that mere dissatisfaction with case management directions does not in any way constitute bias. He adds that the Court’s hearing timelines cannot be unilaterally dictated by a litigant. Considering this, he asserts that the Petitioner has failed to demonstrate the alleged partiality, as required by law.
19. Furthermore, the 3rd Respondent emphasizes that the Petitioner seeks to reinstate the conservatory order Application which he had previously abandoned and now seeks to delay the fair determination of the Petition and pending Applications.
20. The 3rd Respondent depones that the Petitioner in making his claim against the impugned 2nd Respondent’s decision has lost sight of the material fact. This is since the true facts are that, he was convicted for social media misconduct wherein he tarnished the 3rd Respondent’s reputation through his social media insults.
21. Particularly, he depones that on 12th July 2019, the Petitioner on his X platform tweeted ‘Theft is theft! It is no less if committed by a woman. Mercy Wambua is shielding her principal’s, two immediate former Presidents of LSK from liability for plunder of hundreds of millions. Falsely shouting through paid journalists that ‘Nelson Havi assaulted me’ won’t help. POLSK.’ He notes that on 13th July 2021 during an interview at KTN news, the Petitioner uttered other damning allegations. He states that this was the foundation of the complaint before the 2nd Respondent.
22. On this premise, he states that it is scandalous for the Petitioner to claim that his complaint was instigated by third parties without adducing any evidence. He concludes by noting that the hardship being experienced by the Petitioner is as a result of lawful disciplinary proceedings that were undertaken and so his Application lacks merit and ought to be dismissed.
4th, 5th, and 6th Respondents’ Case
23. In like manner, these Respondents’ through the 4th Respondent filed their undated Replying Affidavit.
24. He on an introductory note contends that the Application ought to be dismissed as is lacking in substance and cogent reasons that justify the recusal of Hon. Justice Lawrence Mugambi from hearing this matter.
25. He postulates that the Application contains rants against Hon. Justice Lawrence Mugambi without any reasonable basis. He adds that the Petitioner recklessly attacks other Judges including the Hon. Chief Justice who are not even parties in this suit and thus unable to defend themselves.
26. He claims that the Petitioner’s conduct as exhibited in his Application is consistent with his ploy of intimidating judicial officers and the 2nd Respondent. He notes that the Petitioner also demanded that his matter be heard on priority basis before the 2nd Respondent and Judgment be delivered in a special sitting convened only for his matter.
27. It is further argued that the claims against Hon. Justice Lawrence Mugambi are unfair, reckless and unprofessional as the claims of bias are made without attachment of any evidence to substantiate the claims. He stresses that this kind of behavior erodes the rule of law by compromising the independence of Judges and judicial officers.
28. He further asserts that the ‘nefarious scheme’ claims are preposterous, lies and a grave insult to all the concerned parties and as such should be withdrawn. He in fact, states that he has never met or had any interaction with the Judges and the Hon. Chief Justice. Equally, Hon. Justice Lawrence Mugambi and neither has he ever reached out to him in relation to the cited claims. As such, he maintains that the Petitioner’s allegations are not only false but reckless and malicious.
29. In his opinion, the Petitioner seeks to have Hon. Justice Lawrence Mugambi to recuse himself so as to proclaim on his social media platform that he has won the war against judicial officials and the 4th,5th and 6th Respondent, as he did on 21st July 2025.He notes that at the time he had stepped down after serving 5 years as the Chair of the 2nd Respondent. He states that the Petitioner in his post at the time, maliciously alleged that he had stepped down ‘out of shame after(he) exposed the nefarious activities.’
30. Furthermore, he asserts that the Petitioner if dissatisfied with the 2nd Respondent’s decision ought to appeal the decision as prescribed in the 2nd Respondent’s Rules.
31. He avers that allowing this Application would be setting a dangerous precedent as is an attempt to intimidate any Judge who undertakes to hear the Petitioner’s matter.
32. The 4th Respondent alleges that the timing of this Application is deliberate as is meant to delay the actual determination of this matter and the Respondents Applications, knowing well his Application would take precedence. He asserts that pending Applications raise grave issues of law that ought to be heard before determination of the Petition.
33. That said, he avers that dissatisfaction with Court directions on the disposal of applications or a petition are not grounds for recusal of a Judge. In sum, he argues that the Application should be dismissed.
Petitioner’s Submissions
34. The Petitioner in support of his case, filed submissions dated 10th September 2025. The Petitioner commenced by submitting that Article 10 of the Constitution requires a Judge in application of the law to have integrity, transparency and to be accountable. Likewise, that Article 47 of the Constitution requires a Judge to ensure procedural fairness while Article 73 of the Constitution imposes responsibility on the Judge being in leadership.
35. The Petitioner also noted that Clause 8 of the Judicial Service (Code of Conduct and Ethics) Regulations,2020 requires a Judge to maintain dignity and integrity of Court processes. Reliance was placed in King Woolen Mills Ltd & Another v Standard Chartered Financial Services Ltd & 2 Others [1995] eKLR where it was held that:
“In re appraising the facts as we are entitled to do, and without casting any aspersions on the integrity of the learned judge, we have, bearing in mind the authorities that we have referred to and considered, come to the conclusion that a reasonable and right-minded person sitting in court and having knowledge of all the relevant facts, would have a reasonable suspicion that a fair trial for the appellants would not be possible …”
36. Like dependence was placed in R v Sussex Justices; Ex Parte McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256 and Home Park Caterers v Attorney General & another [2006] eKLR.
37. The Petitioner submitted that Clause 20 of the Judicial Service (Code of Conduct and Ethics) Regulations,2020 mandates a Judge to recuse himself save where, no other Judge can deal with the matter, recusal would lead to miscarriage of justice and where recusal has been considered by a plural bench and determined as unnecessary.
38. The Petitioner pointed out that the Judges in Jan Bonde Nielson v Herman Philupus Steyn & 2 others (2014) eKLR, Pale Kenya Limited v Pauline Ngomi Mwangangi(2021)eKLR and Mwilu v British Broadcasting Corporation(2023)eKLR yielded their files to the Presiding Judge despite their reluctance to order recusal.
39. The Petitioner relying on his averments in his affidavit submitted that his Application meets the test for recusal. Further that as is evident in the law, this matter can be heard by another Judge. He contends that the Hon. Judge in recusing himself will ensure to upholding of ‘justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done’.
1st Respondent’s Submissions
40. The 1st Respondent through B M Musau and Company Advocates filed submissions dated 15th September 2025.
41. Counsel submitted that Regulation 21 of the Judicial Service (Code of Conduct and Ethics) Regulations, 2020 outlines circumstances upon which a Judge is supposed to recuse himself. Reliance was also placed in Philip K. Tunoi & another v Judicial Service Commission & another [2016] KECA 715 (KLR) where the Court of Appeal observed as follows:
“in considering the possibility of bias, it is not the mind of the judge which is considered but the impression given to reasonable people.”
42. Comparable reliance was placed in Porter v. Magill [2002] 1 All ER 465 and Taylor v. Lawrence [2003] QB 528.
43. According to Counsel, the Petitioner’s accusations are political, vague, and unsupported by any probative evidence thus fails to meet the set threshold for recusal of a Judge. It is noted that the judicial oath under Article 160 of the Constitution guarantees independence and impartiality, which must be presumed unless rebutted.
44. Counsel submitted that the Petitioner failed to discharge his burden of proof that a fair-minded and informed observer would find that the Hon. Judge is biased. Further it was argued that the Hon. Judge contrary to the Petitioner’s allegations has a duty to maintain order in Court proceedings so as not to bring confusion in the Court room. As such, Counsel noted that there was no reason offered by the Petitioner why he wanted his matter dealt with ahead of the other matter for the Court to consider.
45. Furthermore, Counsel submitted that the Petitioner in seeking conservatory orders is a mere afterthought as the Petition discloses no prima facie violation of rights. This is because the disciplinary Judgment dated 7th April 2025 was lawfully issued by the 2nd Respondent in accordance with the Advocates Act. Considering this, Counsel argued that the Petition improperly seeks to convert a lawful quasi-judicial process into a constitutional grievance.
3rd Respondent’s Submissions
46. The 3rd Respondent filed submissions dated 30th September 2025 and set out the issues for discussion as: whether the Application has met the required threshold for recusal of a Judge and conservatory orders.
47. On the first issue, Counsel commenced by emphasizing that recusal of a Judge is a serious matter and so should not be used by a party for mere convenience. Reliance was placed in Rai & 3 others v Rai & 4 others [2013] KESC 20 (KLR) where it was noted that:
“In an American case, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 671 F. 3d 1052 (9th Circ. February 7, 2012) it was held that the test for establishing a Judge''s impartiality is the perception of a reasonable person, this being a "well-informed, thoughtful observer who understands all the facts", and who has "examined the record and the law"; and thus, "unsubstantiated suspicion of personal bias or prejudice" will not suffice.
The recusal principle, therefore, with regard to the Supreme Court, must not be invoked but for good cause; and neither is it to be invoked without weighing the merits of such invocation against the constitutional burdens of the Court; and the public interest."
48. Similar dependence was placed in Jan Bonde Nielson (supra), Shollei & another v Judicial Service Commission & another (20181 KESC 42 (KLR), and Simonson -vs- General Motors Corporation U.S.D.C. p.425 R. Supp, 574, 578 (1978).
49. The 3rd Respondent submitted that the Petitioner’s claims of bias and conflict of interest against the Hon. Judge are speculative, unmerited and unsupported by any credible evidence. Likewise, it was pointed out that the Petitioner is relying in hearsay evidence to support his allegations.
50. Furthermore, the 3rd Respondent stressed that a judge has a duty to sit and determine matters assigned to them, unless there exists a compelling reason to recuse. As such, mere dissatisfaction with case management directions does not constitute bias. In addition, it was argued that the Petitioner under Section 107 of the Evidence Act is required to prove the existence of the alleged facts which he had failed to do.
51. On conservatory orders, the 3rd Respondent submitted that the Petitioner had not met the threshold as set out in Munya v Kithinji & 2 Others [2014] KESC 30.
52. The 3rd Respondent submitted that the Petitioner in making this Application improperly invites this Court to micromanage its own administrative and judicial functions contrary to Articles 160 and 165 of the Constitution. Moreover, it was contended that the accusations of a ‘nefarious scheme’ and alleged collusion with judicial officers are at best scandalous, unsupported by evidence, and so should be struck out as vexatious.
Other Parties Submissions
53. The other parties’ submissions are not in the Court file or Court Online Platform (CTS).
Analysis and Determination
54. The issue that arises for determination is:
Whether or not the Petitioner has met the legal threshold for the recusal of the Judge presiding over these proceedings
55. The right to fair hearing is provided for under Article 50 (1) of the Constitution as follows:
Every person has the right to have any dispute that can be resolved by the application of law decided in a fair and public hearing before a court or, if appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or body.
56. This provision forms the constitutional underpinning for fair and objective trials and it is from this principle that numerous legal rules to facilitate balanced justice have sprouted.
57. The Judicial Service (Code of Conduct and Ethics) Regulations, 2020 under the Judicial Service Act (No. 1 of 2011) is case in point. This law provides the manner in which a judicial officer is mandated to carry out their duties.
58. Rule 36 thereof requires that each judicial officer at all times to carry out the duties of the office with impartiality and objectivity, in accordance with Articles 10, 27, 73(2) (b) and 232 of the Constitution. Judges are required to ensure they discharge their duties devoid of favoritism, nepotism, tribalism, cronyism, religious bias, or engage in corrupt or unethical practices. They should:
a) uphold and apply the law;
b) observe fairness and impartiality; and
c) perform the duties of judicial office, including administrative duties impartially, competently, and diligently, without bias.
59. Where there are valid reasons that impartiality of a judge is compromised, the Judge or judicial officer is required to recuse himself or herself. Rule 47 states as follows:
(1) A judicial officer may recuse himself or herself in any proceedings in which his or her impartiality might reasonably be questioned where the judicial officer—
a) is a party to the proceedings;
b) was, or is a material witness in the matter in controversy;
c) has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceedings;
d) has actual bias or prejudice concerning a party;
e) has a personal interest or is in a relationship with a person who has a personal interest in the outcome of the matter;
f) had previously acted as a counsel for a party in the same matter;
g) is precluded from hearing the matter on account of any other sufficient reason; or
h) a member of the judicial officer’s family has economic or other interest in the outcome of the matter in question.
(2) Recusal by a judicial officer shall be based on specific grounds to be recorded in writing as part of the proceedings.
(3) A judicial officer may not recuse himself or herself if—
a) no other judicial officer can deal with the case; or
b) because of urgent circumstances, failure to act could lead to a serious miscarriage of justice.
60. The doctrine of recusal is also recognized by common law. Discussing the test for recusal, the Court in Metropolitan Properties (Fg-C) Ltd Vs. Lannon & Others [1969] 1 QB 577 held as follows:
“Disqualification was imperative even in the absence of a real likelihood of bias if a reasonable man would reasonably suspect bias.”
Acker LJ in R vs Liverpool City Justices, ex parte Topping [1983] 1 WLR 119 elaborated on the test applicable. The Court has to address its mind to the question as to whether a reasonable and fair - minded man sitting in Court and knowing all the relevant facts would have a reasonable suspicion that a fair trial for the applicant was not possible. If the answer is in the affirmative, disqualification will be inevitable.”
61. The Supreme Court in Jasbir Singh Rai & 3 others (supra) echoed as follows:
“[6] Recusal, as a general principle, has been much practised in the history of the East African judiciaries, even though its ethical dimensions have not always been taken into account. The term is thus defined in Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th ed. (2004) [p.1303]:
“Removal of oneself as judge or policy maker in a particular matter, [especially] because of a conflict of interest.”
[7] From this definition, it is evident that the circumstances calling for recusal, for a Judge, are by no means cast in stone. Perception of fairness, of conviction, of moral authority to hear the matter, is the proper test of whether or not the non-participation of the judicial officer is called for. The object in view, in the recusal of a judicial officer, is that justice as between the parties be uncompromised; that the due process of law be realized, and be seen to have had its role; that the profile of the rule of law in the matter in question, be seen to have remained uncompromised.”
62. The Court of Appeal while addressing its mind on the factors to consider in an application for recusal in Philip K. Tunoi & Another (supra) stated as follows:
“In Tumaini v. R. (supra) Mwakasendo J held, rightly in our view, that:
“In considering the possibility of bias, it is not the mind of the judge which is considered but the impression given to reasonable people.……
The House of Lords held in R v. Gough [1993] AC 646 that the test to be applied in all cases of apparent bias was the same, whether being applied by the Judge during the trial or by the Court of Appeal when considering the matter on appeal, namely whether in all the circumstances of the case, there appeared to be a real danger of bias, concerning the member of the tribunal in question so that justice required that the decision should not stand.
The test in R v. Gough was subsequently adjusted by the House of Lords in Porter v Magill [2002] 1 All ER 465 when the House of Lords opined that the words “a real danger” in the test served no useful purpose and accordingly held that –
‘The question is whether the fair minded and informed observer, having considered the facts, would conclude that there was a real possibility that the tribunal was biased.”
63. Congruently, the Court of Appeal in Rawal v Judicial Service Commission & another; Okoiti (Interested Party); International Commission of Jurists & another (Amicus Curiae) [2016] KECA 534 (KLR) while considering another application for recusal opined as follows:
“20. We have anxiously considered this application, the submissions by the parties and the authorities that they have cited. An application for recusal of a judge is a necessary evil. On the one hand it calls into question the fairness of a judge who has sworn to do justice impartially, in accordance with the Constitution without any fear, favour, bias, affection, ill-will, prejudice, political, religious, or other influence. In such applications, the impartiality of the judge is called into question and his independence is impugned. On the other hand, the oath of office notwithstanding, the judge is all too human and above all the Constitution does guarantee all litigants the right to a fair hearing by an independent and impartial judge. When reasonable basis for requesting a judge to recuse himself or herself exists, the application has to be made, unpleasant as it may be. That is the lesser of two evils. The alternative is to risk violating a cardinal guarantee of the Constitution, namely the right to fair trial, upon which the entire judicial edifice is built. Allowing a judge who is reasonably suspected of bias to sit in a matter would be in violation of the constitutional guarantee of a trial by an independent and impartial court. We would, with respect, agree with the Constitutional Court of South Africa when it stated as follows in The President of the Republic of South Africa v. The South African Rugby Football Union & Others, Case CCT16/98:
“ At the very outset we wish to acknowledge that a litigant and her or his counsel who find it necessary to apply for the recusal of a judicial officer has an unenviable task and the propriety of their motives should not lightly be questioned. Where the grounds are reasonable it is counsel''s duty to advance the grounds without fear. On the part of the judge whose recusal is sought there should be a full appreciation of the admonition that she or he should not be unduly sensitive and ought not to regard an application for his [or her] recusal as a personal affront.” [Emphasis added].”
21. An application for recusal of a judge in which actual bias is established on the part of the judge hardly poses any difficulties: the judge must, without more, recuse himself. Such is the situation where a judge is a party to the suit or has a direct financial or proprietary interest in the outcome of the case. In that scenario bias is presumed to exist and the judge is automatically disqualified. The challenge however arises where, like in the present case, the application is founded on appearance of bias attributable to behaviour or conduct of a judge.
22. For quite some time there was contestation in several Commonwealth jurisdictions regarding the proper test to be applied in such case: was it real likelihood of bias or reasonable apprehension of bias by a reasonable person.
23. In R. v. Gough(1993) AC 646, the House of Lords adopted the real danger test, meaning that the question to ask is whether there was a real danger that a fair trial was likely to be denied. The test did not win universal acceptance within the Commonwealth and in Magill v. Porter(2002) 2 AC 357, the House of Lords subsequently modified the test to whether a fair minded and informed observer, having considered the facts, would conclude that there was a real possibility that the judge was biased.
24. The East Africa Court of Justice adopted the same test in Attorney General of Kenya v Prof Anyang’
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1. By a Notice of Motion Application dated 6th September 2025 supported by an affidavit sworn on even date, the Petitioner seeks orders that:
i. Spent.
ii. Spent.
iii. An order be made for the recusal of Honourable Mr Justice Lawrence Mugambi from hearing this matter.
iv. This matter be forwarded to the Presiding Judge of the Constitutional Division for reallocation to another Judge for hearing, and determination and consideration of prayers 5 and 6 of this Application.
v. The Petition dated 28th April, 2025 be fixed for hearing before 17th November, 2025, on the basis of documents filed by the parties.
vi. Pending the hearing and determination of this Petition, a conservatory order be issued suspending the implementation of the decision contained in the Judgment written, and signed by the 4th, 5th and 6th Respondents on 7th April, 2025 in Disciplinary Cause Mis. No 21 of 2022, in the matter of a complaint against Nelson Andayi Havi, and further proceedings in the said matter.
vii. The costs of this Application be provided for.
Petitioner’s Case
2. The Petitioner depones that he filed his Petition dated 28th April 2025 to remedy violation of his fundamental rights in relation to the 2nd Respondent’s decision in Disciplinary Cause Mis. No.21 of 2022 which was signed by the 4th, 5th and 6th Respondents’.
3. The Petitioner alleges that the impugned decision was procured through an elaborate nefarious scheme to slow him down on his call for reforms in the Judiciary, targeting the removal of the Hon. Chief Justice Martha Koome. He claims that the 2nd, 4th, 5th and 6th Respondents are part of this nefarious scheme as also aided by other members of the Judiciary including the Hon. Chief Justice.
4. He notes that the Petition was filed simultaneously with an Application seeking conservatory orders against implementation of this impugned decision by the 2nd Respondent.
5. The Petitioner asserts that on 21st May 2025, he acceded to this Court’s call to abandon the Application for conservatory orders and subsume the Respondents’ Notices of Preliminary Objections in the Petition, so as to expedite hearing of this matter. It is stated that the 2nd, 4th, 5th and 6th Respondents have not filed their substantive responses to the Petition despite the Court’s directions.
6. The Petitioner takes issue with the fact that the Petition has not been heard, four months after its filing owing to the deliberate applications that have been filed by the Respondents’. These applications are said to be aimed at recanting the response to the Petition filed by the 1st Respondent and to hear the 4th, 5th and 6th Respondents’ Notices of Preliminary Objections, instead of the Petition.
7. According to the Petitioner, this Court has failed to facilitate a fair trial of the Petition, to afford him the right to equal protection and equal benefit of the law, afford him an expeditious and efficient determination of the Petition and afford him a fair hearing, all these as envisaged under Articles 10(1)(b) and 2(a) and (c), 25(c), 27(1), 47(3)(b), 50(1) and 159(2)(b) and (e) of the Constitution and Rules 3(4), 5 (a) and (c) and (8) and 16 of The Constitution of Kenya (Protection of Rights and Fundamental Freedoms) Practice and Procedures Rules, 2013.
8. Additionally, he assets that he lodged a complaint with the Judicial Service Commission against the Hon. Chief Justice for appointing Hon. Justice Lawrence Mugambi and two other Judges to hear her own case in Nairobi Const. Ptn. No E083 of 2025, Honourable Lady Justice Martha Karambu Koome v Judicial Service Commission & 4 Others. He notes that he has since sought the recusal of Hon. Justice Lawrence Mugambi and the other two Judges from hearing this matter.
9. Furthermore, the Petitioner avers that he had also initially lodged a complaint before the Judicial Service Commission and the Hon. Chief Justice against delays by Hon. Justice Lawrence Mugambi in the conduct of his proceedings.
10. The Petitioner alleges that he has credible intelligence that the strategy adopted before the 2nd Respondent to frustrate him has also been deployed in this matter and Hon. Justice Lawrence Mugambi conscripted to execute it through delay of hearing of this matter so as to enable the Respondents secure his sentencing on 17th November 2025.
11. In his opinion, Hon. Justice Lawrence Mugambi is biased and conflicted. Further he states that he is apprehensive due to the credible intelligence he has received of Hon. Justice Lawrence Mugambi flip-flopping on his directions towards the expedited hearing of the Petition, at the behest of the Respondents. In fact, he claims that when his Counsel lamented of the delay in this matter before him, he seemed unmoved and stated “the matter will be heard as and when reached, just like many other matters before me”.
12. The Petitioner maintains that in light of the foregoing, he is certain that he will not have a fair hearing before Hon.Justice Lawrence Mugambi as he is not fair, independent and impartial in determination of this matter. For this reason, he avers that it is only just for Hon. Justice Lawrence Mugambi to recuse himself so that the matter can be heard by a fair, independent and impartial Court.
1st Respondent’s Case
13. The 1st Respondent’s response to the Application was made through its written submissions.
2nd Respondent’s Case
14. In response, the 2nd Respondent opposed the Application for recusal in its Grounds of Opposition dated 26th September 2025 on the basis that:
i. The Notice of Motion is incompetent and amounts to an abuse of the Court process.
ii. The Petitioner has not demonstrated any factual or legal basis to support the prayer for recusal of Hon. Mr. Justice Lawrence Mugambi, nor has he met the threshold required for the recusal of a judge under applicable law.
iii. The Notice of Motion as framed and couched, is a transparent attempt at forum shopping which this Court should decline; recusal lies only where a fair-minded and informed observer would apprehend a real possibility of bias, a threshold the Petitioner has not met.
iv. The Notice of Motion, in so far as it seeks conservatory orders staying the implementation of the Tribunal’s judgment of 7th April 2025, is an impermissible re-opening of relief that the Petitioner expressly abandoned on 21st May 2025.
v. Having waived and/or abandoned the prayer for conservatory orders, the Petitioner is estopped from resurrecting the same by way of a fresh application. The current attempt amounts to forum engineering, offends finality and orderly case management, and should be declined as an abuse of process.
vi. Granting conservatory orders at this stage would pre-emptively overturn a lawful disciplinary decision before the main Petition is heard on its merits. In any event, by reason of the Petitioner’s abandonment of conservatory orders on 21st May 2025, the renewed prayer is barred, vexatious, and should be declined.
vii. The Notice of Motion is predicated on factual errors, including the assertion that the 2nd Respondent has not responded to the main Petition, whereas the 2nd Respondent’s Response to the Petition was duly filed and served on all parties on 5th June 2025. The Motion therefore proceeds on a false premise and ought to be dismissed.
3rd Respondent’s Case
15. The 3rd Respondent filed his Replying Affidavit sworn on 17th September 2025.
16. On the onset, the 3rd Respondent states that the Petitioner’s Application is premature, unmerited and unsupported by cogent evidence.
17. He asserts that the Petitioner’s allegations of bias on against the Hon. Justice Lawrence Mugambi and failure to expedite the hearing of this matter are speculative, unmerited and unsupported by any credible evidence. Equally, he states that the accusations of a nefarious scheme are also a scandalous, unsubstantiated by evidence and ought to be struck out as vexatious.
18. He points out that mere dissatisfaction with case management directions does not in any way constitute bias. He adds that the Court’s hearing timelines cannot be unilaterally dictated by a litigant. Considering this, he asserts that the Petitioner has failed to demonstrate the alleged partiality, as required by law.
19. Furthermore, the 3rd Respondent emphasizes that the Petitioner seeks to reinstate the conservatory order Application which he had previously abandoned and now seeks to delay the fair determination of the Petition and pending Applications.
20. The 3rd Respondent depones that the Petitioner in making his claim against the impugned 2nd Respondent’s decision has lost sight of the material fact. This is since the true facts are that, he was convicted for social media misconduct wherein he tarnished the 3rd Respondent’s reputation through his social media insults.
21. Particularly, he depones that on 12th July 2019, the Petitioner on his X platform tweeted ‘Theft is theft! It is no less if committed by a woman. Mercy Wambua is shielding her principal’s, two immediate former Presidents of LSK from liability for plunder of hundreds of millions. Falsely shouting through paid journalists that ‘Nelson Havi assaulted me’ won’t help. POLSK.’ He notes that on 13th July 2021 during an interview at KTN news, the Petitioner uttered other damning allegations. He states that this was the foundation of the complaint before the 2nd Respondent.
22. On this premise, he states that it is scandalous for the Petitioner to claim that his complaint was instigated by third parties without adducing any evidence. He concludes by noting that the hardship being experienced by the Petitioner is as a result of lawful disciplinary proceedings that were undertaken and so his Application lacks merit and ought to be dismissed.
4th, 5th, and 6th Respondents’ Case
23. In like manner, these Respondents’ through the 4th Respondent filed their undated Replying Affidavit.
24. He on an introductory note contends that the Application ought to be dismissed as is lacking in substance and cogent reasons that justify the recusal of Hon. Justice Lawrence Mugambi from hearing this matter.
25. He postulates that the Application contains rants against Hon. Justice Lawrence Mugambi without any reasonable basis. He adds that the Petitioner recklessly attacks other Judges including the Hon. Chief Justice who are not even parties in this suit and thus unable to defend themselves.
26. He claims that the Petitioner’s conduct as exhibited in his Application is consistent with his ploy of intimidating judicial officers and the 2nd Respondent. He notes that the Petitioner also demanded that his matter be heard on priority basis before the 2nd Respondent and Judgment be delivered in a special sitting convened only for his matter.
27. It is further argued that the claims against Hon. Justice Lawrence Mugambi are unfair, reckless and unprofessional as the claims of bias are made without attachment of any evidence to substantiate the claims. He stresses that this kind of behavior erodes the rule of law by compromising the independence of Judges and judicial officers.
28. He further asserts that the ‘nefarious scheme’ claims are preposterous, lies and a grave insult to all the concerned parties and as such should be withdrawn. He in fact, states that he has never met or had any interaction with the Judges and the Hon. Chief Justice. Equally, Hon. Justice Lawrence Mugambi and neither has he ever reached out to him in relation to the cited claims. As such, he maintains that the Petitioner’s allegations are not only false but reckless and malicious.
29. In his opinion, the Petitioner seeks to have Hon. Justice Lawrence Mugambi to recuse himself so as to proclaim on his social media platform that he has won the war against judicial officials and the 4th,5th and 6th Respondent, as he did on 21st July 2025.He notes that at the time he had stepped down after serving 5 years as the Chair of the 2nd Respondent. He states that the Petitioner in his post at the time, maliciously alleged that he had stepped down ‘out of shame after(he) exposed the nefarious activities.’
30. Furthermore, he asserts that the Petitioner if dissatisfied with the 2nd Respondent’s decision ought to appeal the decision as prescribed in the 2nd Respondent’s Rules.
31. He avers that allowing this Application would be setting a dangerous precedent as is an attempt to intimidate any Judge who undertakes to hear the Petitioner’s matter.
32. The 4th Respondent alleges that the timing of this Application is deliberate as is meant to delay the actual determination of this matter and the Respondents Applications, knowing well his Application would take precedence. He asserts that pending Applications raise grave issues of law that ought to be heard before determination of the Petition.
33. That said, he avers that dissatisfaction with Court directions on the disposal of applications or a petition are not grounds for recusal of a Judge. In sum, he argues that the Application should be dismissed.
Petitioner’s Submissions
34. The Petitioner in support of his case, filed submissions dated 10th September 2025. The Petitioner commenced by submitting that Article 10 of the Constitution requires a Judge in application of the law to have integrity, transparency and to be accountable. Likewise, that Article 47 of the Constitution requires a Judge to ensure procedural fairness while Article 73 of the Constitution imposes responsibility on the Judge being in leadership.
35. The Petitioner also noted that Clause 8 of the Judicial Service (Code of Conduct and Ethics) Regulations,2020 requires a Judge to maintain dignity and integrity of Court processes. Reliance was placed in King Woolen Mills Ltd & Another v Standard Chartered Financial Services Ltd & 2 Others [1995] eKLR where it was held that:
“In re appraising the facts as we are entitled to do, and without casting any aspersions on the integrity of the learned judge, we have, bearing in mind the authorities that we have referred to and considered, come to the conclusion that a reasonable and right-minded person sitting in court and having knowledge of all the relevant facts, would have a reasonable suspicion that a fair trial for the appellants would not be possible …”
36. Like dependence was placed in R v Sussex Justices; Ex Parte McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256 and Home Park Caterers v Attorney General & another [2006] eKLR.
37. The Petitioner submitted that Clause 20 of the Judicial Service (Code of Conduct and Ethics) Regulations,2020 mandates a Judge to recuse himself save where, no other Judge can deal with the matter, recusal would lead to miscarriage of justice and where recusal has been considered by a plural bench and determined as unnecessary.
38. The Petitioner pointed out that the Judges in Jan Bonde Nielson v Herman Philupus Steyn & 2 others (2014) eKLR, Pale Kenya Limited v Pauline Ngomi Mwangangi(2021)eKLR and Mwilu v British Broadcasting Corporation(2023)eKLR yielded their files to the Presiding Judge despite their reluctance to order recusal.
39. The Petitioner relying on his averments in his affidavit submitted that his Application meets the test for recusal. Further that as is evident in the law, this matter can be heard by another Judge. He contends that the Hon. Judge in recusing himself will ensure to upholding of ‘justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done’.
1st Respondent’s Submissions
40. The 1st Respondent through B M Musau and Company Advocates filed submissions dated 15th September 2025.
41. Counsel submitted that Regulation 21 of the Judicial Service (Code of Conduct and Ethics) Regulations, 2020 outlines circumstances upon which a Judge is supposed to recuse himself. Reliance was also placed in Philip K. Tunoi & another v Judicial Service Commission & another [2016] KECA 715 (KLR) where the Court of Appeal observed as follows:
“in considering the possibility of bias, it is not the mind of the judge which is considered but the impression given to reasonable people.”
42. Comparable reliance was placed in Porter v. Magill [2002] 1 All ER 465 and Taylor v. Lawrence [2003] QB 528.
43. According to Counsel, the Petitioner’s accusations are political, vague, and unsupported by any probative evidence thus fails to meet the set threshold for recusal of a Judge. It is noted that the judicial oath under Article 160 of the Constitution guarantees independence and impartiality, which must be presumed unless rebutted.
44. Counsel submitted that the Petitioner failed to discharge his burden of proof that a fair-minded and informed observer would find that the Hon. Judge is biased. Further it was argued that the Hon. Judge contrary to the Petitioner’s allegations has a duty to maintain order in Court proceedings so as not to bring confusion in the Court room. As such, Counsel noted that there was no reason offered by the Petitioner why he wanted his matter dealt with ahead of the other matter for the Court to consider.
45. Furthermore, Counsel submitted that the Petitioner in seeking conservatory orders is a mere afterthought as the Petition discloses no prima facie violation of rights. This is because the disciplinary Judgment dated 7th April 2025 was lawfully issued by the 2nd Respondent in accordance with the Advocates Act. Considering this, Counsel argued that the Petition improperly seeks to convert a lawful quasi-judicial process into a constitutional grievance.
3rd Respondent’s Submissions
46. The 3rd Respondent filed submissions dated 30th September 2025 and set out the issues for discussion as: whether the Application has met the required threshold for recusal of a Judge and conservatory orders.
47. On the first issue, Counsel commenced by emphasizing that recusal of a Judge is a serious matter and so should not be used by a party for mere convenience. Reliance was placed in Rai & 3 others v Rai & 4 others [2013] KESC 20 (KLR) where it was noted that:
“In an American case, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 671 F. 3d 1052 (9th Circ. February 7, 2012) it was held that the test for establishing a Judge''s impartiality is the perception of a reasonable person, this being a "well-informed, thoughtful observer who understands all the facts", and who has "examined the record and the law"; and thus, "unsubstantiated suspicion of personal bias or prejudice" will not suffice.
The recusal principle, therefore, with regard to the Supreme Court, must not be invoked but for good cause; and neither is it to be invoked without weighing the merits of such invocation against the constitutional burdens of the Court; and the public interest."
48. Similar dependence was placed in Jan Bonde Nielson (supra), Shollei & another v Judicial Service Commission & another (20181 KESC 42 (KLR), and Simonson -vs- General Motors Corporation U.S.D.C. p.425 R. Supp, 574, 578 (1978).
49. The 3rd Respondent submitted that the Petitioner’s claims of bias and conflict of interest against the Hon. Judge are speculative, unmerited and unsupported by any credible evidence. Likewise, it was pointed out that the Petitioner is relying in hearsay evidence to support his allegations.
50. Furthermore, the 3rd Respondent stressed that a judge has a duty to sit and determine matters assigned to them, unless there exists a compelling reason to recuse. As such, mere dissatisfaction with case management directions does not constitute bias. In addition, it was argued that the Petitioner under Section 107 of the Evidence Act is required to prove the existence of the alleged facts which he had failed to do.
51. On conservatory orders, the 3rd Respondent submitted that the Petitioner had not met the threshold as set out in Munya v Kithinji & 2 Others [2014] KESC 30.
52. The 3rd Respondent submitted that the Petitioner in making this Application improperly invites this Court to micromanage its own administrative and judicial functions contrary to Articles 160 and 165 of the Constitution. Moreover, it was contended that the accusations of a ‘nefarious scheme’ and alleged collusion with judicial officers are at best scandalous, unsupported by evidence, and so should be struck out as vexatious.
Other Parties Submissions
53. The other parties’ submissions are not in the Court file or Court Online Platform (CTS).
Analysis and Determination
54. The issue that arises for determination is:
Whether or not the Petitioner has met the legal threshold for the recusal of the Judge presiding over these proceedings
55. The right to fair hearing is provided for under Article 50 (1) of the Constitution as follows:
Every person has the right to have any dispute that can be resolved by the application of law decided in a fair and public hearing before a court or, if appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or body.
56. This provision forms the constitutional underpinning for fair and objective trials and it is from this principle that numerous legal rules to facilitate balanced justice have sprouted.
57. The Judicial Service (Code of Conduct and Ethics) Regulations, 2020 under the Judicial Service Act (No. 1 of 2011) is case in point. This law provides the manner in which a judicial officer is mandated to carry out their duties.
58. Rule 36 thereof requires that each judicial officer at all times to carry out the duties of the office with impartiality and objectivity, in accordance with Articles 10, 27, 73(2) (b) and 232 of the Constitution. Judges are required to ensure they discharge their duties devoid of favoritism, nepotism, tribalism, cronyism, religious bias, or engage in corrupt or unethical practices. They should:
a) uphold and apply the law;
b) observe fairness and impartiality; and
c) perform the duties of judicial office, including administrative duties impartially, competently, and diligently, without bias.
59. Where there are valid reasons that impartiality of a judge is compromised, the Judge or judicial officer is required to recuse himself or herself. Rule 47 states as follows:
(1) A judicial officer may recuse himself or herself in any proceedings in which his or her impartiality might reasonably be questioned where the judicial officer—
a) is a party to the proceedings;
b) was, or is a material witness in the matter in controversy;
c) has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceedings;
d) has actual bias or prejudice concerning a party;
e) has a personal interest or is in a relationship with a person who has a personal interest in the outcome of the matter;
f) had previously acted as a counsel for a party in the same matter;
g) is precluded from hearing the matter on account of any other sufficient reason; or
h) a member of the judicial officer’s family has economic or other interest in the outcome of the matter in question.
(2) Recusal by a judicial officer shall be based on specific grounds to be recorded in writing as part of the proceedings.
(3) A judicial officer may not recuse himself or herself if—
a) no other judicial officer can deal with the case; or
b) because of urgent circumstances, failure to act could lead to a serious miscarriage of justice.
60. The doctrine of recusal is also recognized by common law. Discussing the test for recusal, the Court in Metropolitan Properties (Fg-C) Ltd Vs. Lannon & Others [1969] 1 QB 577 held as follows:
“Disqualification was imperative even in the absence of a real likelihood of bias if a reasonable man would reasonably suspect bias.”
Acker LJ in R vs Liverpool City Justices, ex parte Topping [1983] 1 WLR 119 elaborated on the test applicable. The Court has to address its mind to the question as to whether a reasonable and fair - minded man sitting in Court and knowing all the relevant facts would have a reasonable suspicion that a fair trial for the applicant was not possible. If the answer is in the affirmative, disqualification will be inevitable.”
61. The Supreme Court in Jasbir Singh Rai & 3 others (supra) echoed as follows:
“[6] Recusal, as a general principle, has been much practised in the history of the East African judiciaries, even though its ethical dimensions have not always been taken into account. The term is thus defined in Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th ed. (2004) [p.1303]:
“Removal of oneself as judge or policy maker in a particular matter, [especially] because of a conflict of interest.”
[7] From this definition, it is evident that the circumstances calling for recusal, for a Judge, are by no means cast in stone. Perception of fairness, of conviction, of moral authority to hear the matter, is the proper test of whether or not the non-participation of the judicial officer is called for. The object in view, in the recusal of a judicial officer, is that justice as between the parties be uncompromised; that the due process of law be realized, and be seen to have had its role; that the profile of the rule of law in the matter in question, be seen to have remained uncompromised.”
62. The Court of Appeal while addressing its mind on the factors to consider in an application for recusal in Philip K. Tunoi & Another (supra) stated as follows:
“In Tumaini v. R. (supra) Mwakasendo J held, rightly in our view, that:
“In considering the possibility of bias, it is not the mind of the judge which is considered but the impression given to reasonable people.……
The House of Lords held in R v. Gough [1993] AC 646 that the test to be applied in all cases of apparent bias was the same, whether being applied by the Judge during the trial or by the Court of Appeal when considering the matter on appeal, namely whether in all the circumstances of the case, there appeared to be a real danger of bias, concerning the member of the tribunal in question so that justice required that the decision should not stand.
The test in R v. Gough was subsequently adjusted by the House of Lords in Porter v Magill [2002] 1 All ER 465 when the House of Lords opined that the words “a real danger” in the test served no useful purpose and accordingly held that –
‘The question is whether the fair minded and informed observer, having considered the facts, would conclude that there was a real possibility that the tribunal was biased.”
63. Congruently, the Court of Appeal in Rawal v Judicial Service Commission & another; Okoiti (Interested Party); International Commission of Jurists & another (Amicus Curiae) [2016] KECA 534 (KLR) while considering another application for recusal opined as follows:
“20. We have anxiously considered this application, the submissions by the parties and the authorities that they have cited. An application for recusal of a judge is a necessary evil. On the one hand it calls into question the fairness of a judge who has sworn to do justice impartially, in accordance with the Constitution without any fear, favour, bias, affection, ill-will, prejudice, political, religious, or other influence. In such applications, the impartiality of the judge is called into question and his independence is impugned. On the other hand, the oath of office notwithstanding, the judge is all too human and above all the Constitution does guarantee all litigants the right to a fair hearing by an independent and impartial judge. When reasonable basis for requesting a judge to recuse himself or herself exists, the application has to be made, unpleasant as it may be. That is the lesser of two evils. The alternative is to risk violating a cardinal guarantee of the Constitution, namely the right to fair trial, upon which the entire judicial edifice is built. Allowing a judge who is reasonably suspected of bias to sit in a matter would be in violation of the constitutional guarantee of a trial by an independent and impartial court. We would, with respect, agree with the Constitutional Court of South Africa when it stated as follows in The President of the Republic of South Africa v. The South African Rugby Football Union & Others, Case CCT16/98:
“ At the very outset we wish to acknowledge that a litigant and her or his counsel who find it necessary to apply for the recusal of a judicial officer has an unenviable task and the propriety of their motives should not lightly be questioned. Where the grounds are reasonable it is counsel''s duty to advance the grounds without fear. On the part of the judge whose recusal is sought there should be a full appreciation of the admonition that she or he should not be unduly sensitive and ought not to regard an application for his [or her] recusal as a personal affront.” [Emphasis added].”
21. An application for recusal of a judge in which actual bias is established on the part of the judge hardly poses any difficulties: the judge must, without more, recuse himself. Such is the situation where a judge is a party to the suit or has a direct financial or proprietary interest in the outcome of the case. In that scenario bias is presumed to exist and the judge is automatically disqualified. The challenge however arises where, like in the present case, the application is founded on appearance of bias attributable to behaviour or conduct of a judge.
22. For quite some time there was contestation in several Commonwealth jurisdictions regarding the proper test to be applied in such case: was it real likelihood of bias or reasonable apprehension of bias by a reasonable person.
23. In R. v. Gough(1993) AC 646, the House of Lords adopted the real danger test, meaning that the question to ask is whether there was a real danger that a fair trial was likely to be denied. The test did not win universal acceptance within the Commonwealth and in Magill v. Porter(2002) 2 AC 357, the House of Lords subsequently modified the test to whether a fair minded and informed observer, having considered the facts, would conclude that there was a real possibility that the judge was biased.
24. The East Africa Court of Justice adopted the same test in Attorney General of Kenya v Prof Anyang’
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