Introduction
1. The Petitioner in the Petition dated 15th May 2025 challenges the 1st Respondent’s summons to her to attend a disciplinary hearing scheduled for 16th May 2025.
2. This summons emanated from a complaint addressed to her by the Respondent in its letter dated 7th May 2025.
3. The Petitioner protests that the disciplinary proceedings were instituted improperly as there are no laid down disciplinary rules and guidelines to guide the process thus contends that the proceedings are a threat to her constitutional right to a fair trial and a fair administrative action.
4. In answer to the Petition, the Respondent filed a Notice of Preliminary Objection challenging this Court’s jurisdiction as well as a Notice of Motion Application to strike out the instant Petition.
5. Subsequently, the Petitioner also went ahead and filed a Notice of Motion application seeking conservatory orders and citing the 1st Respondent and its Disciplinary Committee members for contempt of Court. The three applications are the subject of the instant ruling.
Petitioner’s Application
6. The Petitioner in her Notice of Motion application dated 20th May 2025 seeks orders that:
i. Spent.
ii. Pending the hearing and determination of this Application a conservatory order do issue staying and suspending any further implementation by any person(s) of the decision of the UDA Party Disciplinary Committee dated 16th May, 2025 expelling the Petitioner herein as member of the UDA Party and/ or a nominated senator.
iii. Pending the hearing and determination of this Application, a conservatory order be issued reinstating the status quo ante obtaining on the 15th May, 2025 when this Court issued Orders barring the 1st Respondent from conducting the impugned disciplinary hearing of 16th May, 2025.
iv. Pending the hearing and determination of this Petition, a conservatory order do issue staying and suspending any further implementation by any person(s) of the decision of the UDA Party Disciplinary Committee dated 16th May, 2025 expelling the Petitioner herein as member of the UDA Party and/or a nominated senator.
v. Pending hearing and determination of this Petition, a conservatory order be issued reinstating the status quo ante obtaining on the 15th May, 2025 when this Court issued Orders barring the 1st Respondent from conducting the impugned disciplinary hearing of 16th May, 2025.
vi. This Court be pleased to set aside and/or quash the decision of the 1st Respondent issued on 16th May, 2025 on account of it being in contempt of this Court's Order issued on 15th May, 2025.
vii. The Court do cite the following persons for being in Contempt of a Court Order issued on the 15th May, 2025 and the orders therein.
a) UNITED DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE
b) CHARLES NJENGA
c) MR PAUL KARUGA
d) FATUMA AHMED ALI
e) GEORGIADIS MAJIMBO
f) CAROLYNE MULONDO BOSCO
g) HASSAN OMAR HASSAN
h) CECILY MBARIREMR. CHARLES NJENG
i) MR. PAUL KARUGA
j) MR. GEORGIADIS MAJIMBO
k) DR. FATUMA AHMED ALI
l) MS. CAROLYNE MULONDO BOSCO
viii. In an order of committal to civil jail be made against:
a) CHARLES NJENGA
b) MR PAUL KARUGA
c) FATUMA AHMED ALI
d) GEORGIADIS MAJIMBO
e) CAROLYNE MULONDO BOSCO
f) HASSAN OMAR HASSAN
g) CECILY MBARIREMR. CHARLES NJENG
h) MR. PAUL KARUGA
i) DR. FATUMA AHMED ALI
j) MR. GEORGIADIS MAJIMBO
k) MS. CAROLYNE MULONDO BOSCO
for such period as this Court may deem fit and just in that they have blatantly disobeyed and frustrated the express Orders made herein by this Court on 15th May, 2025.
ix. In the alternative to (7) and (8) above, the Court do impose appropriate fine penalties to the persons listed in (6) and (7) above for being in Contempt of a Court Order issued on the 15th May, 2025 and the Orders therein.
x. This Court do issue any other orders it may deem just, fit and fair in the circumstances.
xi. Cost of this Application be in the cause.
7. The application is supported by the Petitioner’s affidavit, sworn on even date and the grounds on the face of the application.
8. The Petitioner avers that this Court on 15th May 2025 issued conservatory orders restraining the 1st Respondent from proceeding with the disciplinary hearing scheduled for 16th May 2025.These orders were served on the 1st Respondent on 16th May 2025 and the said hearing was suspended in the presence of the Petitioner.
9. The Petitioner asserts that without her knowledge or her Advocate’s knowledge, the 1st Respondent secretly proceeded with the hearing on the same date and rendered a Ruling, dismissing her as a member of the UDA Party and as nominated Senator. The Petitioner decries that this pronouncement was made in contravention of the conservatory order in place hence was in contempt of Court.
10. The Petitioner further depones that the impugned decision was swiftly conveyed to the 1st Respondent’s National Executive Committee who then ratified the decision on 19th May 2025.
11. Furthermore, the decision was communicated to the Speaker of the Senate, the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) and the Registrar of Political Parties. Equally, she informs that the 1st Respondent has proceeded to nominate another member although that is yet to be actualized.
12. The Petitioner on this premise contends that there is great need for the orders sought to be issued failing which IEBC and the Speaker of the Senate will proceed to swear in another member. The Petitioner further urges the Court to cite the cited persons for contempt. She is apprehensive that if these orders are not issued, this Petition will be rendered futile and become a mere academic exercise.
Respondents’ Case
13. These parties’ response to this application are not in the Court file or Court Online Platform (CTS).
1st Respondent’s Preliminary Objection
14. In reaction to the Petition the 1st Respondent filed its Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 20th May 2025 on the premise that:
i. The jurisdiction of this Court has been improperly invoked since it’s expressly ousted by dint of Section 40 of the Political Parties Act, which mandates that a dispute as enunciated herein, be referred to the Political Parties Disputes Tribunal in the first instance. Accordingly, this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the instant Petition and connected applications.
ii. The Petition violates the provisions of Section 9 (2) of the Fair Administrative Action Act, since the High Court is precluded from reviewing an administrative action or decision unless the internal mechanisms for appeal or review and all remedies available under any other written law are first exhausted.
iii. The Petition herein offends the doctrine of exhaustion, hence is irredeemably defective, null and void ab initio for breach of mandatory legal procedure.
iv. The instant Petition is glaringly incompetent, an abuse of the due process of court, having been lodged in outright disregard of express provisions of the law.
v. It is in the interest of proper administration of justice that the Petitioner approaches the legally prescribed judicial forum in the event of any valid grievance, of which none is discernible in this instance.
1st Respondent’s Application
15. The 1st Respondent filed its Notice of Motion application dated 26th May 2025 and seeks orders that:
i. Pending the hearing and determination of this Application herein the Court be pleased to set aside the orders issued ex parte on 21st May, 2025.
ii. This Court be pleased to strike out the Petitioner’s application dated on 20th May, 2025.
iii. The Court be pleased to strike out the entire Petition herein, dated 15th May, 2025 and all attendant applications and consequential orders thereto.
iv. Costs of and incidental to this application be provided for.
v. The Court be at liberty to grant such further or other reliefs that may be just and expedient.
16. The application is supported by Hon. Hassan Omar’s affidavit, sworn on even date and the grounds on the face of the application. He avers that the Petition and application are tainted with numerous anomalies and irregularities thus ought to be struck out.
17. He avers that the Petitioner has since the onset lodged various applications dated 15th, 19th and 20th May 2025. Vide the application dated 20th May 2025, the Petitioner was issued with ex parte orders dated 21st May 2025.
18. He claims that these orders were procured through misleading information, fundamental disclosure and concealment of crucial material. Moreover, he asserts that the Court never pronounced itself on the pending application dated 19th May 2025 and the purported notice of withdrawal. As such, he argues that the Petitioner ought not to have commenced a similar application.
19. He informs that the Petitioner subsequent to filing the application dated 20th May 2025, filed simultaneously Complaint No. E006 of 2025: Gloria Magoma Orwoba vs United Democratic Alliance on 21st May 2025 before the Political Parties Disputes Tribunal. He asserts that the Petitioner having filed multiple suits over the same subject matter in different forums is guilty of forum shopping which is an abuse of the Court process.
20. Furthermore, he states that the Petitioner has failed to disclose that there were two other separate complaints against her before the 1st Respondent’s Disciplinary Committee being, summons by the UDA Disciplinary Committee Ref UDA/7/DISP/25 dated 7th May 2025 and UDA Disciplinary Complaint No. 2 of 2025: Festus Omwamba & Henry Muriithi vs Hon. Gloria Orwoba.
21. It is additionally alleged that although the Petition is filed in the Constitutional & Human Rights Division in Nairobi, on its face is addressed to the Kisumu High Court Constitutional & Human Rights Division hence this Court lacks territorial and administrative jurisdiction.
22. He depones as well that the Petitioner in her application added the 2nd to 8th alleged contemnors yet these parties were not in the original Petition and neither did she seek leave of the Court to amend the Petition. He stresses therefore that the Petitioner seeks to arbitrarily maneuver the judicial process contrary to the dictates of justice. On this premise, he urges that the relief sought herein should be granted.
Petitioner’s Case
23. In reaction to the 1st Respondent’s application, the Petitioner filed a Replying Affidavit sworn on 30th May 2025.
24. To commence with, the Petitioner avers that the Application is an afterthought, frivolous and incompetent lacking in merit so should be dismissed. The Petitioner asserts that striking out of a suit is draconian and offensive to the provisions of Article 159(2)(d) of the Constitution.
25. According to the Petitioner, the Application is a delay tactic so as to defeat the timely dispensation of the contempt application and the Petition since the 1st Respondent is yet to file a substantive response to the Petition. In addition, it is noted that the 1st Respondent failed to comply with this Court’s orders issued on 15th May 2025.
26. With reference to the Application dated 19th May 2025, the Petitioner avers that the Court declined to entertain the Application on account of failure to seek leave before addition of parties thus the Application was rejected. The Petitioner subsequently withdrew this Application vide her Notice of Withdrawal dated 20th May 2025.She stresses that nothing prevents her from withdrawing an application or filing a new one.
27. She further argues that the 1st Respondent is estopped from denying existence of its own decision dated 16th May 2025 that is now subject of an appeal before the Tribunal. She contends that this Court has supervisory power to call the file from the Tribunal so as to hear and determine both issues together, in the event that the issues raised in both are intertwined.
2nd Respondent’s Case
28. The 2nd Respondent’s response and submissions in relation to the Petitioner’s and 1st Respondent’s case are not in the Court file or Court Online Platform (CTS).
Petitioner’s Submissions
29. The Petitioner through Mabeya and Mabeya Advocates filed submissions dated 31st July 2025. Counsel identified the issues for determination as: contempt of court, sub judice and Section 40(1) of the Political Parties Act and Application for conservatory orders and the opponent application to strike out.
30. On the first issue, Counsel submitted that the 1st Respondent was guilty of contempt in light of the issued Court orders. Counsel added that the disciplinary committee ought not to have on their own accord interpreted the Court order, instead should have approached this Court. Counsel pointed out that the 1st Respondent was personally served with the Court Orders as evidenced in the affidavit of service. It is noted that the 1st Respondent proceeded to suspend the hearing as a result of the Court orders.
31. Counsel stated that a court order is not a mere suggestion or an opinion or a point of view. It is a directive that is issued after much thought and with circumspection. It must therefore be complied with and it is in the interest of every person that this remains the case. To buttress this point reliance was placed in Johnson Vs Grant, 1923 SC 78 where it was held that:
“The law does not exist to protect the personal dignity of the judiciary nor the private rights of parties or litigants. It is not the dignity of the court which is offended. It is the fundamental supremacy of the law which is challenged.”
32. Similar reliance was placed in Hadkinson V. Hadkinson [1952] 2 ALL ER 567 at page 567, at 569 – 570.
33. In light of this, Counsel submitted that where this Court finds that the 1st Respondent and the alleged contemnors are in contempt, then their application and preliminary objection, ought not to be heard until they purge the contempt. Counsel stressed that one cannot seek to set aside the same orders he is in contempt of and thus this Court should not entertain the 1st Respondent until then.
34. Furthermore, Counsel added that the 1st Respondent had not controverted the contempt of Court Application. Reliance was placed in Kennedy Otieno Odiyo & 12 Others v. Kenya Electricity Generating Company Limited [2010] eKLR where it was held that:
“The respondents only filed grounds of opposition to the application reproduced elsewhere in this ruling. Grounds of opposition addresses only issues of law and no more. The grounds of opposition aforesaid are basically general averments and in no way respond to the issues raised by the applicant in its supporting affidavit. Thus, what was deposed to was not countered nor rebutted by the respondents. It must be taken to be true. In the absence of the replying affidavit rebutting the averments in the applicant’s supporting affidavit, means that the respondents have no claim against the applicant’’.
35. Counsel further submitted that in addition to violating the cited constitutional rights, the 1st Respondent was in breach of Article 103(1) and 104 (1) of the Constitution which provide the threshold for removal of a member of Parliament. As such, being a constitutional office, Counsel submitted that the Petitioner’s ouster ought to be carried in a procedural and fair manner that upholds her rights.
36. On the second issue, Counsel submitted that for a preliminary objection to succeed, a party must only rely on pure points of law as affirmed in Mukisa Biscuit Manufactures Limited vs West End Distributors Limited (1969) EA. Counsel stated that in this matter much needs to be ascertained based on the opposing position taken by the parties, and that any reference to any affidavit or even prayers cannot be done within the context of a Preliminary Objection.
37. Reliance was placed in Cyrus Mucebiu Irungu vs Martha Wanjiru Irungu & Another [2022]eKLR where it was held that:
“I agree with the submission by counsel for the plaintiff that the issue of sub-judice does require the ascertaining of facts or probing of evidence in the two earlier suits mentioned by the 1st defendant which this honorable court is not privy to. It therefore follows that the issue of sub-judice is not a pure point of law capable of being considered as a preliminary objection properly raised and does not meet the litmus test of what in law amounts to a preliminary objection.” In the present case, it is not in doubt that this court is not privy to the alleged proceedings before the Lower Court or if the same has abated or stand dismissed as has been alleged by the Respondent.”
38. Like dependence was placed in Kenya National Commission on Human Rights vs Attorney General, Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission & 16 Others (Interested Parties) (2020) eKLR, Henry Wanyama Khaemba –Vs- Standard Chartered Bank LTD & Another (2014) eKLR and George Kamau Kimani & 4 Others Vs County Government of Trans Nzoia & Another (2014) eKLR.
39. Counsel contended that the Preliminary Objection in this case is misguided as, a plea of sub judice can only be raised in the subsequent suit and not in a previous suit. In this matter, Counsel stressed that the Petition had been filed prior to the Tribunal’s case.
40. Counsel submitted moreover that this Court has the power to call the file from the Tribunal so as to hear and determine both issues together in the event that the issues raised in both are intertwined. Reliance was placed in Republic v Chief Magistrate’s Court at Milimani Law Courts; Director of Public Prosecutions & 2 others (Interested Parties); Exparte Applicant Pravin Galot [2020] eKLR where it was held that:
“There is a clear distinction between supervisory jurisdiction, judicial review jurisdiction and appellate jurisdiction. Supervisory jurisdiction refers to the power of superior courts of general superintendence over all subordinate courts. Through supervisory jurisdiction, superior courts aim to keep subordinate courts within their prescribed sphere, and prevent usurpation. In order to exercise such control, the power is conferred on superior courts to issue the necessary and appropriate writs.”
41. On conservatory orders, Counsel submitted that this Court had on 21st May 2025 issued conservatory orders suspending the implementation of the decision of the 1st Respondent’s Disciplinary Committee dated 16th May 2025 expelling the Petitioner herein as member of the party and a nominated Senator.
42. Counsel averred that soon after the 1st Respondent having failed to file a response in the application, went on to file its application, seeking to suspend the orders and strike out both the application and the Petition. Counsel submitted that the Application to strike out is unmerited and is not a substitute to of a Replying Affidavit.
43. In sum, Counsel submitted that the Petitioner had demonstrated a prima facie case with a likelihood of success and that in the absence of the conservatory orders she was likely to suffer prejudice. Reliance was placed in Centre for Rights Education and Awareness and 7 Others –v- The Attorney General [HCCP No. 16 of 2011] where it was held that:
“At this stage, a party seeking a conservatory order only requires to demonstrate that he has a prima facie case with a likelihood of success and that unless the court grants the conservatory order, there is real danger that he will suffer prejudice as a result of the violation or threatened violation of the Constitution”.
44. Additional dependence was placed in Daniel Mugendi –v- Kenyatta University [2013] eKLR, SIM –v-Robinson [1892] 12 LR 665 and the Spiliada [1987] AC 460.
1st Respondent’s Submissions
45. The 1st Respondent’s through Adrian Kamotho Njenga and Company Advocates filed submissions dated 18th July 2025. Counsel sought to discuss whether the 1st Respondent’s Notice of Preliminary Objection is merited; whether the orders issued on 21st May, 2025 ought to be set aside and whether the Petition and all attendant applications should be struck out.
46. On the first issue, Counsel relying in Mukisa Biscuit Manufacturing Co. Ltd submitted that the objection was a pure point of law as challenges this Court’s jurisdiction by virtue of the doctrine of exhaustion. Counsel submitted that this suit is in breach of Section 40(1) and (2) Political Parties Act and Section 9(2) of the Fair Administrative Action Act.
47. Counsel stated that the key contention in this matter is the Petitioner’s challenge to the 1st Respondent’s disciplinary proceedings against her. Counsel stressed that this dispute is between a member of a political party and a political party thus the same falls under the disputes specified under Section 40(1) of the Political Parties Act. As such is required to be presented to the Tribunal under Section 40(2) of the Act. Counsel stressed that instead of utilizing this mechanism, the Petitioner proceeded to file the instant Petition failing to exhaust the provided mechanisms.
48. To buttress this point reliance was placed in Geoffrey Muthinja & another v Samuel Muguna Henry & 1756 others (2015) eKLR where it was held that:
“It is imperative that where a dispute resolution mechanism exists outside courts, the same be exhausted before the jurisdiction of the courts is invoked. Courts ought to be the fora of last resort and not the first port of call the moment a storm brews within churches, as is bound to happen. The exhaustion doctrine is a sound one and serves the purpose of ensuring that there is a postponement of judicial consideration of matters to ensure that a party is first of all diligent in the protection of his own interest within the mechanisms in place for resolution outside of courts. This accords with Article 159 of the Constitution which commands Courts to encourage alternative means of dispute resolution.”
49. Like dependence was placed in Narok County Council v TransMara County Council, (2000) 1 EA 161 and Speaker of the National Assembly v Karume (2008) 1 KLR.
50. On this premise, Counsel relying in the opine in Owners of Motor Vessel ‘Lillian S’ v Caltex Oil (Kenya) Limited (1989) eKLR submitted that this Court does not have the requisite jurisdiction to entertain this matter. Comparable reliance was placed in Kalpana H Rawal & 2 others vs Judicial Service Commission & 2 others [2016] eKLR and Cleophas Malala & another v Speaker of the Senate & 2 others; Stewart Madzayo & another (Interested Parties) [2021] eKLR.
51. Turning to the second issue, Counsel submitted that under Rule 25 of the Constitution of Kenya (Protection of Rights and Fundamental Freedoms) Practice and Procedure Rules, 2013, this Court can set aside its Orders. Additional reliance was placed in CMC Holdings Ltd vs. Nzioki [2004] KLR 173 where it was held that:
“In an application for setting aside ex parte judgement, the Court exercises its discretion in allowing or rejecting the same. That discretion must be exercised upon reasons and must be exercised judiciously…In law the discretion that a court of law has, in deciding whether or not to set aside ex parte order was meant to ensure that a litigant does not suffer injustice or hardship.”
52. Additional dependence was placed in Uhuru Highway Development Limited v Central Bank of Kenya & 2 others CIVIL APPEAL NO. 126 OF 1995 [1995] eKLR.
53. Counsel recapping the averments in the 1st Respondent’s replying affidavit submitted that the Petitioner had failed to disclose salient information before the Court including the existence of the two pending complaints against her. Considering this, Counsel submitted that the Petitioner’s application dated 21st May, 2025 was flawed and that the ex parte conservatory orders were obtained irregularly through non- disclosure of all the relevant facts pertaining the issues herein. Accordingly, Counsel urged that the same be set aside.
54. Turning to the third issue, Counsel submitted that in view of the foregoing the Petition and the attendant applications constitute an abuse of the Court process and so should be struck out. Counsel highlighted that the Petitioner had maliciously dragged the parties before Court while blatantly disregarding the existing mechanisms. To buttress this point reliance was placed in Kenya Section of the International Commission of Jurists v Attorney-General and 2 others [2012] eKLR where it was held that:
“The concept of “abuse of the process of the Court: bears no fixed meaning, but has to do with the motives behind the guilty party’s actions: and with a perceived attempt to maneuver the Court’s jurisdiction in a manner incompatible with the goals of justice (emphasis added). The bottom line in the case of abuse of Court process is that, it “appears so hopeless that it plainly and obviously discloses no reasonable cause of action and is so weak as to be beyond redemption...” [D. T. Dobbie & Company (Kenya) Ltd. V. Muchina [1982] KLR 1 – per Madan, JA at p.9]. Beyond that threshold, lies an unlimited range of conduct by a party that may more clearly point to an instance of abuse of Court process.”
Analysis and Determination
55. It is my considered view that the issues that arise for determination are:
i. Whether the 1st Respondent is guilty of contempt of Court.
ii. Whether the Petition offends the doctrine of exhaustion.
iii. Whether the 1st Respondent’s application has met the threshold for striking out of the Petitioners’ Petition and attendant Applications.
1st issue- Whether the 1st Respondent is guilty of contempt of Court.
56. The law governing contempt of Court proceedings in Kenya was explicated in Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance v Cabinet Secretary for Devolution and Planning & 3 others [2017] KEHC 8755 (KLR) as follows:
“According to Black's Law Dictionary;
" Contempt is a disregard of, disobedience to, the rules, or orders of a legislative or judicial body, or an interruption of its proceedings by disorderly behavior or insolent language, in its presence or so near thereto as to disturb the proceedings or to impair the respect due to such a body."
In Halsbury's Laws of England it is stated:-
"It was the plain and unqualified obligation of every person against or in respect of whom an order was made by a court of competent jurisdiction to obey it unless and until it was discharged and disobedience of such an order would as a general rule result in the person disobeying it being in contempt and punishable by committal or attachment ..............an application to court by him not being entertained until he had purged his contempt"
In book The Law of Contempt learned authors Nigel Lowe & Brenda Sufrin state a follows:-
"Coercive orders made by the courts should be obeyed and undertakings formally given to the courts should be honoured unless and until they are set aside. Furthermore it is generally no answer to an action for contempt that the order disobeyed or the undertaking broken should not have been made or accepted in the first place. The proper course if it is sought to challenge the order or undertaking is to apply to have it set aside."
In Econet Wireless Kenya Ltd vs Minister for Information & Communication of Kenya & Another[11]Ibrahim J (as he then was) stated as follows:-
"It is essential for the maintenance of the Rule of Law and order that the authority and the dignity of our Courts are upheld at all times. The Court will not condone deliberate disobedience of its orders and will not shy away from its responsibility to deal firmly with proved contemnors. It is the plain and unqualified obligation of every person against or in respect of whom, an order is made by Court of competent jurisdiction, to obey it unless and until that order is discharged. The uncompromising nature of this obligation is shown by the fact that it extends even to cases where the person affected by an order believes it to be irregular or void."
Rule of law makes it incumbent for all persons, without exception to respect court orders at all times. The whole purpose of litigation as a process of judicial administration is lost if court orders are not complied with. A party who knows f an order whether null or valid, regular or irregular cannot be permitted to disobey it.[12] It would be most dangerous to hold that suitors or their solicitors could themselves judge whether an order was null or valid; whether it was regular or irregular.[13]There is need to emphasize that the principle of law is that the whole essence of litigation as a process of judicial administration is lost if orders issued by court through the set judicial process in the normal functioning of courts are not complied with in full by those targeted and / or called upon to give due compliance / effect. A State organ or agency or person legally and duty bound to give due compliance must do so. Court orders cannot be issued in vain.
It cannot be disputed that an order of the court has to be respected by the parties who are bound by it. Therefore every effort must be made to implement the order of the court and not to disobey the same. It is not up to that party to choose whether to comply or not to comply with such an order. The order must be complied with in totality, in all circumstances by the party concerned, subject to the party’s right to challenge the order in issue, in such a lawful way as the law permits.
The purpose of this is simple. It is to protect the sanctity of the courts of judicature, which is well envisaged in the Constitution; sustain the confidence in the third arm of government so that all the people who feel aggrieved by government, its agencies or private persons can have a place to run to for a neutral determination. To disregard court orders therefore, among others in my view, is by implication, to set the precedent that people should not believe in the courts. This is wrong because it puts persons in our country on a collision course with no remedy thus creating a medium in which they descend into anarchy by resorting to taking the law into their hands. This is in utter disregard of the democratic and good governance principles and val
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1. The Petitioner in the Petition dated 15th May 2025 challenges the 1st Respondent’s summons to her to attend a disciplinary hearing scheduled for 16th May 2025.
2. This summons emanated from a complaint addressed to her by the Respondent in its letter dated 7th May 2025.
3. The Petitioner protests that the disciplinary proceedings were instituted improperly as there are no laid down disciplinary rules and guidelines to guide the process thus contends that the proceedings are a threat to her constitutional right to a fair trial and a fair administrative action.
4. In answer to the Petition, the Respondent filed a Notice of Preliminary Objection challenging this Court’s jurisdiction as well as a Notice of Motion Application to strike out the instant Petition.
5. Subsequently, the Petitioner also went ahead and filed a Notice of Motion application seeking conservatory orders and citing the 1st Respondent and its Disciplinary Committee members for contempt of Court. The three applications are the subject of the instant ruling.
Petitioner’s Application
6. The Petitioner in her Notice of Motion application dated 20th May 2025 seeks orders that:
i. Spent.
ii. Pending the hearing and determination of this Application a conservatory order do issue staying and suspending any further implementation by any person(s) of the decision of the UDA Party Disciplinary Committee dated 16th May, 2025 expelling the Petitioner herein as member of the UDA Party and/ or a nominated senator.
iii. Pending the hearing and determination of this Application, a conservatory order be issued reinstating the status quo ante obtaining on the 15th May, 2025 when this Court issued Orders barring the 1st Respondent from conducting the impugned disciplinary hearing of 16th May, 2025.
iv. Pending the hearing and determination of this Petition, a conservatory order do issue staying and suspending any further implementation by any person(s) of the decision of the UDA Party Disciplinary Committee dated 16th May, 2025 expelling the Petitioner herein as member of the UDA Party and/or a nominated senator.
v. Pending hearing and determination of this Petition, a conservatory order be issued reinstating the status quo ante obtaining on the 15th May, 2025 when this Court issued Orders barring the 1st Respondent from conducting the impugned disciplinary hearing of 16th May, 2025.
vi. This Court be pleased to set aside and/or quash the decision of the 1st Respondent issued on 16th May, 2025 on account of it being in contempt of this Court's Order issued on 15th May, 2025.
vii. The Court do cite the following persons for being in Contempt of a Court Order issued on the 15th May, 2025 and the orders therein.
a) UNITED DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE
b) CHARLES NJENGA
c) MR PAUL KARUGA
d) FATUMA AHMED ALI
e) GEORGIADIS MAJIMBO
f) CAROLYNE MULONDO BOSCO
g) HASSAN OMAR HASSAN
h) CECILY MBARIREMR. CHARLES NJENG
i) MR. PAUL KARUGA
j) MR. GEORGIADIS MAJIMBO
k) DR. FATUMA AHMED ALI
l) MS. CAROLYNE MULONDO BOSCO
viii. In an order of committal to civil jail be made against:
a) CHARLES NJENGA
b) MR PAUL KARUGA
c) FATUMA AHMED ALI
d) GEORGIADIS MAJIMBO
e) CAROLYNE MULONDO BOSCO
f) HASSAN OMAR HASSAN
g) CECILY MBARIREMR. CHARLES NJENG
h) MR. PAUL KARUGA
i) DR. FATUMA AHMED ALI
j) MR. GEORGIADIS MAJIMBO
k) MS. CAROLYNE MULONDO BOSCO
for such period as this Court may deem fit and just in that they have blatantly disobeyed and frustrated the express Orders made herein by this Court on 15th May, 2025.
ix. In the alternative to (7) and (8) above, the Court do impose appropriate fine penalties to the persons listed in (6) and (7) above for being in Contempt of a Court Order issued on the 15th May, 2025 and the Orders therein.
x. This Court do issue any other orders it may deem just, fit and fair in the circumstances.
xi. Cost of this Application be in the cause.
7. The application is supported by the Petitioner’s affidavit, sworn on even date and the grounds on the face of the application.
8. The Petitioner avers that this Court on 15th May 2025 issued conservatory orders restraining the 1st Respondent from proceeding with the disciplinary hearing scheduled for 16th May 2025.These orders were served on the 1st Respondent on 16th May 2025 and the said hearing was suspended in the presence of the Petitioner.
9. The Petitioner asserts that without her knowledge or her Advocate’s knowledge, the 1st Respondent secretly proceeded with the hearing on the same date and rendered a Ruling, dismissing her as a member of the UDA Party and as nominated Senator. The Petitioner decries that this pronouncement was made in contravention of the conservatory order in place hence was in contempt of Court.
10. The Petitioner further depones that the impugned decision was swiftly conveyed to the 1st Respondent’s National Executive Committee who then ratified the decision on 19th May 2025.
11. Furthermore, the decision was communicated to the Speaker of the Senate, the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) and the Registrar of Political Parties. Equally, she informs that the 1st Respondent has proceeded to nominate another member although that is yet to be actualized.
12. The Petitioner on this premise contends that there is great need for the orders sought to be issued failing which IEBC and the Speaker of the Senate will proceed to swear in another member. The Petitioner further urges the Court to cite the cited persons for contempt. She is apprehensive that if these orders are not issued, this Petition will be rendered futile and become a mere academic exercise.
Respondents’ Case
13. These parties’ response to this application are not in the Court file or Court Online Platform (CTS).
1st Respondent’s Preliminary Objection
14. In reaction to the Petition the 1st Respondent filed its Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 20th May 2025 on the premise that:
i. The jurisdiction of this Court has been improperly invoked since it’s expressly ousted by dint of Section 40 of the Political Parties Act, which mandates that a dispute as enunciated herein, be referred to the Political Parties Disputes Tribunal in the first instance. Accordingly, this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the instant Petition and connected applications.
ii. The Petition violates the provisions of Section 9 (2) of the Fair Administrative Action Act, since the High Court is precluded from reviewing an administrative action or decision unless the internal mechanisms for appeal or review and all remedies available under any other written law are first exhausted.
iii. The Petition herein offends the doctrine of exhaustion, hence is irredeemably defective, null and void ab initio for breach of mandatory legal procedure.
iv. The instant Petition is glaringly incompetent, an abuse of the due process of court, having been lodged in outright disregard of express provisions of the law.
v. It is in the interest of proper administration of justice that the Petitioner approaches the legally prescribed judicial forum in the event of any valid grievance, of which none is discernible in this instance.
1st Respondent’s Application
15. The 1st Respondent filed its Notice of Motion application dated 26th May 2025 and seeks orders that:
i. Pending the hearing and determination of this Application herein the Court be pleased to set aside the orders issued ex parte on 21st May, 2025.
ii. This Court be pleased to strike out the Petitioner’s application dated on 20th May, 2025.
iii. The Court be pleased to strike out the entire Petition herein, dated 15th May, 2025 and all attendant applications and consequential orders thereto.
iv. Costs of and incidental to this application be provided for.
v. The Court be at liberty to grant such further or other reliefs that may be just and expedient.
16. The application is supported by Hon. Hassan Omar’s affidavit, sworn on even date and the grounds on the face of the application. He avers that the Petition and application are tainted with numerous anomalies and irregularities thus ought to be struck out.
17. He avers that the Petitioner has since the onset lodged various applications dated 15th, 19th and 20th May 2025. Vide the application dated 20th May 2025, the Petitioner was issued with ex parte orders dated 21st May 2025.
18. He claims that these orders were procured through misleading information, fundamental disclosure and concealment of crucial material. Moreover, he asserts that the Court never pronounced itself on the pending application dated 19th May 2025 and the purported notice of withdrawal. As such, he argues that the Petitioner ought not to have commenced a similar application.
19. He informs that the Petitioner subsequent to filing the application dated 20th May 2025, filed simultaneously Complaint No. E006 of 2025: Gloria Magoma Orwoba vs United Democratic Alliance on 21st May 2025 before the Political Parties Disputes Tribunal. He asserts that the Petitioner having filed multiple suits over the same subject matter in different forums is guilty of forum shopping which is an abuse of the Court process.
20. Furthermore, he states that the Petitioner has failed to disclose that there were two other separate complaints against her before the 1st Respondent’s Disciplinary Committee being, summons by the UDA Disciplinary Committee Ref UDA/7/DISP/25 dated 7th May 2025 and UDA Disciplinary Complaint No. 2 of 2025: Festus Omwamba & Henry Muriithi vs Hon. Gloria Orwoba.
21. It is additionally alleged that although the Petition is filed in the Constitutional & Human Rights Division in Nairobi, on its face is addressed to the Kisumu High Court Constitutional & Human Rights Division hence this Court lacks territorial and administrative jurisdiction.
22. He depones as well that the Petitioner in her application added the 2nd to 8th alleged contemnors yet these parties were not in the original Petition and neither did she seek leave of the Court to amend the Petition. He stresses therefore that the Petitioner seeks to arbitrarily maneuver the judicial process contrary to the dictates of justice. On this premise, he urges that the relief sought herein should be granted.
Petitioner’s Case
23. In reaction to the 1st Respondent’s application, the Petitioner filed a Replying Affidavit sworn on 30th May 2025.
24. To commence with, the Petitioner avers that the Application is an afterthought, frivolous and incompetent lacking in merit so should be dismissed. The Petitioner asserts that striking out of a suit is draconian and offensive to the provisions of Article 159(2)(d) of the Constitution.
25. According to the Petitioner, the Application is a delay tactic so as to defeat the timely dispensation of the contempt application and the Petition since the 1st Respondent is yet to file a substantive response to the Petition. In addition, it is noted that the 1st Respondent failed to comply with this Court’s orders issued on 15th May 2025.
26. With reference to the Application dated 19th May 2025, the Petitioner avers that the Court declined to entertain the Application on account of failure to seek leave before addition of parties thus the Application was rejected. The Petitioner subsequently withdrew this Application vide her Notice of Withdrawal dated 20th May 2025.She stresses that nothing prevents her from withdrawing an application or filing a new one.
27. She further argues that the 1st Respondent is estopped from denying existence of its own decision dated 16th May 2025 that is now subject of an appeal before the Tribunal. She contends that this Court has supervisory power to call the file from the Tribunal so as to hear and determine both issues together, in the event that the issues raised in both are intertwined.
2nd Respondent’s Case
28. The 2nd Respondent’s response and submissions in relation to the Petitioner’s and 1st Respondent’s case are not in the Court file or Court Online Platform (CTS).
Petitioner’s Submissions
29. The Petitioner through Mabeya and Mabeya Advocates filed submissions dated 31st July 2025. Counsel identified the issues for determination as: contempt of court, sub judice and Section 40(1) of the Political Parties Act and Application for conservatory orders and the opponent application to strike out.
30. On the first issue, Counsel submitted that the 1st Respondent was guilty of contempt in light of the issued Court orders. Counsel added that the disciplinary committee ought not to have on their own accord interpreted the Court order, instead should have approached this Court. Counsel pointed out that the 1st Respondent was personally served with the Court Orders as evidenced in the affidavit of service. It is noted that the 1st Respondent proceeded to suspend the hearing as a result of the Court orders.
31. Counsel stated that a court order is not a mere suggestion or an opinion or a point of view. It is a directive that is issued after much thought and with circumspection. It must therefore be complied with and it is in the interest of every person that this remains the case. To buttress this point reliance was placed in Johnson Vs Grant, 1923 SC 78 where it was held that:
“The law does not exist to protect the personal dignity of the judiciary nor the private rights of parties or litigants. It is not the dignity of the court which is offended. It is the fundamental supremacy of the law which is challenged.”
32. Similar reliance was placed in Hadkinson V. Hadkinson [1952] 2 ALL ER 567 at page 567, at 569 – 570.
33. In light of this, Counsel submitted that where this Court finds that the 1st Respondent and the alleged contemnors are in contempt, then their application and preliminary objection, ought not to be heard until they purge the contempt. Counsel stressed that one cannot seek to set aside the same orders he is in contempt of and thus this Court should not entertain the 1st Respondent until then.
34. Furthermore, Counsel added that the 1st Respondent had not controverted the contempt of Court Application. Reliance was placed in Kennedy Otieno Odiyo & 12 Others v. Kenya Electricity Generating Company Limited [2010] eKLR where it was held that:
“The respondents only filed grounds of opposition to the application reproduced elsewhere in this ruling. Grounds of opposition addresses only issues of law and no more. The grounds of opposition aforesaid are basically general averments and in no way respond to the issues raised by the applicant in its supporting affidavit. Thus, what was deposed to was not countered nor rebutted by the respondents. It must be taken to be true. In the absence of the replying affidavit rebutting the averments in the applicant’s supporting affidavit, means that the respondents have no claim against the applicant’’.
35. Counsel further submitted that in addition to violating the cited constitutional rights, the 1st Respondent was in breach of Article 103(1) and 104 (1) of the Constitution which provide the threshold for removal of a member of Parliament. As such, being a constitutional office, Counsel submitted that the Petitioner’s ouster ought to be carried in a procedural and fair manner that upholds her rights.
36. On the second issue, Counsel submitted that for a preliminary objection to succeed, a party must only rely on pure points of law as affirmed in Mukisa Biscuit Manufactures Limited vs West End Distributors Limited (1969) EA. Counsel stated that in this matter much needs to be ascertained based on the opposing position taken by the parties, and that any reference to any affidavit or even prayers cannot be done within the context of a Preliminary Objection.
37. Reliance was placed in Cyrus Mucebiu Irungu vs Martha Wanjiru Irungu & Another [2022]eKLR where it was held that:
“I agree with the submission by counsel for the plaintiff that the issue of sub-judice does require the ascertaining of facts or probing of evidence in the two earlier suits mentioned by the 1st defendant which this honorable court is not privy to. It therefore follows that the issue of sub-judice is not a pure point of law capable of being considered as a preliminary objection properly raised and does not meet the litmus test of what in law amounts to a preliminary objection.” In the present case, it is not in doubt that this court is not privy to the alleged proceedings before the Lower Court or if the same has abated or stand dismissed as has been alleged by the Respondent.”
38. Like dependence was placed in Kenya National Commission on Human Rights vs Attorney General, Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission & 16 Others (Interested Parties) (2020) eKLR, Henry Wanyama Khaemba –Vs- Standard Chartered Bank LTD & Another (2014) eKLR and George Kamau Kimani & 4 Others Vs County Government of Trans Nzoia & Another (2014) eKLR.
39. Counsel contended that the Preliminary Objection in this case is misguided as, a plea of sub judice can only be raised in the subsequent suit and not in a previous suit. In this matter, Counsel stressed that the Petition had been filed prior to the Tribunal’s case.
40. Counsel submitted moreover that this Court has the power to call the file from the Tribunal so as to hear and determine both issues together in the event that the issues raised in both are intertwined. Reliance was placed in Republic v Chief Magistrate’s Court at Milimani Law Courts; Director of Public Prosecutions & 2 others (Interested Parties); Exparte Applicant Pravin Galot [2020] eKLR where it was held that:
“There is a clear distinction between supervisory jurisdiction, judicial review jurisdiction and appellate jurisdiction. Supervisory jurisdiction refers to the power of superior courts of general superintendence over all subordinate courts. Through supervisory jurisdiction, superior courts aim to keep subordinate courts within their prescribed sphere, and prevent usurpation. In order to exercise such control, the power is conferred on superior courts to issue the necessary and appropriate writs.”
41. On conservatory orders, Counsel submitted that this Court had on 21st May 2025 issued conservatory orders suspending the implementation of the decision of the 1st Respondent’s Disciplinary Committee dated 16th May 2025 expelling the Petitioner herein as member of the party and a nominated Senator.
42. Counsel averred that soon after the 1st Respondent having failed to file a response in the application, went on to file its application, seeking to suspend the orders and strike out both the application and the Petition. Counsel submitted that the Application to strike out is unmerited and is not a substitute to of a Replying Affidavit.
43. In sum, Counsel submitted that the Petitioner had demonstrated a prima facie case with a likelihood of success and that in the absence of the conservatory orders she was likely to suffer prejudice. Reliance was placed in Centre for Rights Education and Awareness and 7 Others –v- The Attorney General [HCCP No. 16 of 2011] where it was held that:
“At this stage, a party seeking a conservatory order only requires to demonstrate that he has a prima facie case with a likelihood of success and that unless the court grants the conservatory order, there is real danger that he will suffer prejudice as a result of the violation or threatened violation of the Constitution”.
44. Additional dependence was placed in Daniel Mugendi –v- Kenyatta University [2013] eKLR, SIM –v-Robinson [1892] 12 LR 665 and the Spiliada [1987] AC 460.
1st Respondent’s Submissions
45. The 1st Respondent’s through Adrian Kamotho Njenga and Company Advocates filed submissions dated 18th July 2025. Counsel sought to discuss whether the 1st Respondent’s Notice of Preliminary Objection is merited; whether the orders issued on 21st May, 2025 ought to be set aside and whether the Petition and all attendant applications should be struck out.
46. On the first issue, Counsel relying in Mukisa Biscuit Manufacturing Co. Ltd submitted that the objection was a pure point of law as challenges this Court’s jurisdiction by virtue of the doctrine of exhaustion. Counsel submitted that this suit is in breach of Section 40(1) and (2) Political Parties Act and Section 9(2) of the Fair Administrative Action Act.
47. Counsel stated that the key contention in this matter is the Petitioner’s challenge to the 1st Respondent’s disciplinary proceedings against her. Counsel stressed that this dispute is between a member of a political party and a political party thus the same falls under the disputes specified under Section 40(1) of the Political Parties Act. As such is required to be presented to the Tribunal under Section 40(2) of the Act. Counsel stressed that instead of utilizing this mechanism, the Petitioner proceeded to file the instant Petition failing to exhaust the provided mechanisms.
48. To buttress this point reliance was placed in Geoffrey Muthinja & another v Samuel Muguna Henry & 1756 others (2015) eKLR where it was held that:
“It is imperative that where a dispute resolution mechanism exists outside courts, the same be exhausted before the jurisdiction of the courts is invoked. Courts ought to be the fora of last resort and not the first port of call the moment a storm brews within churches, as is bound to happen. The exhaustion doctrine is a sound one and serves the purpose of ensuring that there is a postponement of judicial consideration of matters to ensure that a party is first of all diligent in the protection of his own interest within the mechanisms in place for resolution outside of courts. This accords with Article 159 of the Constitution which commands Courts to encourage alternative means of dispute resolution.”
49. Like dependence was placed in Narok County Council v TransMara County Council, (2000) 1 EA 161 and Speaker of the National Assembly v Karume (2008) 1 KLR.
50. On this premise, Counsel relying in the opine in Owners of Motor Vessel ‘Lillian S’ v Caltex Oil (Kenya) Limited (1989) eKLR submitted that this Court does not have the requisite jurisdiction to entertain this matter. Comparable reliance was placed in Kalpana H Rawal & 2 others vs Judicial Service Commission & 2 others [2016] eKLR and Cleophas Malala & another v Speaker of the Senate & 2 others; Stewart Madzayo & another (Interested Parties) [2021] eKLR.
51. Turning to the second issue, Counsel submitted that under Rule 25 of the Constitution of Kenya (Protection of Rights and Fundamental Freedoms) Practice and Procedure Rules, 2013, this Court can set aside its Orders. Additional reliance was placed in CMC Holdings Ltd vs. Nzioki [2004] KLR 173 where it was held that:
“In an application for setting aside ex parte judgement, the Court exercises its discretion in allowing or rejecting the same. That discretion must be exercised upon reasons and must be exercised judiciously…In law the discretion that a court of law has, in deciding whether or not to set aside ex parte order was meant to ensure that a litigant does not suffer injustice or hardship.”
52. Additional dependence was placed in Uhuru Highway Development Limited v Central Bank of Kenya & 2 others CIVIL APPEAL NO. 126 OF 1995 [1995] eKLR.
53. Counsel recapping the averments in the 1st Respondent’s replying affidavit submitted that the Petitioner had failed to disclose salient information before the Court including the existence of the two pending complaints against her. Considering this, Counsel submitted that the Petitioner’s application dated 21st May, 2025 was flawed and that the ex parte conservatory orders were obtained irregularly through non- disclosure of all the relevant facts pertaining the issues herein. Accordingly, Counsel urged that the same be set aside.
54. Turning to the third issue, Counsel submitted that in view of the foregoing the Petition and the attendant applications constitute an abuse of the Court process and so should be struck out. Counsel highlighted that the Petitioner had maliciously dragged the parties before Court while blatantly disregarding the existing mechanisms. To buttress this point reliance was placed in Kenya Section of the International Commission of Jurists v Attorney-General and 2 others [2012] eKLR where it was held that:
“The concept of “abuse of the process of the Court: bears no fixed meaning, but has to do with the motives behind the guilty party’s actions: and with a perceived attempt to maneuver the Court’s jurisdiction in a manner incompatible with the goals of justice (emphasis added). The bottom line in the case of abuse of Court process is that, it “appears so hopeless that it plainly and obviously discloses no reasonable cause of action and is so weak as to be beyond redemption...” [D. T. Dobbie & Company (Kenya) Ltd. V. Muchina [1982] KLR 1 – per Madan, JA at p.9]. Beyond that threshold, lies an unlimited range of conduct by a party that may more clearly point to an instance of abuse of Court process.”
Analysis and Determination
55. It is my considered view that the issues that arise for determination are:
i. Whether the 1st Respondent is guilty of contempt of Court.
ii. Whether the Petition offends the doctrine of exhaustion.
iii. Whether the 1st Respondent’s application has met the threshold for striking out of the Petitioners’ Petition and attendant Applications.
1st issue- Whether the 1st Respondent is guilty of contempt of Court.
56. The law governing contempt of Court proceedings in Kenya was explicated in Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance v Cabinet Secretary for Devolution and Planning & 3 others [2017] KEHC 8755 (KLR) as follows:
“According to Black's Law Dictionary;
" Contempt is a disregard of, disobedience to, the rules, or orders of a legislative or judicial body, or an interruption of its proceedings by disorderly behavior or insolent language, in its presence or so near thereto as to disturb the proceedings or to impair the respect due to such a body."
In Halsbury's Laws of England it is stated:-
"It was the plain and unqualified obligation of every person against or in respect of whom an order was made by a court of competent jurisdiction to obey it unless and until it was discharged and disobedience of such an order would as a general rule result in the person disobeying it being in contempt and punishable by committal or attachment ..............an application to court by him not being entertained until he had purged his contempt"
In book The Law of Contempt learned authors Nigel Lowe & Brenda Sufrin state a follows:-
"Coercive orders made by the courts should be obeyed and undertakings formally given to the courts should be honoured unless and until they are set aside. Furthermore it is generally no answer to an action for contempt that the order disobeyed or the undertaking broken should not have been made or accepted in the first place. The proper course if it is sought to challenge the order or undertaking is to apply to have it set aside."
In Econet Wireless Kenya Ltd vs Minister for Information & Communication of Kenya & Another[11]Ibrahim J (as he then was) stated as follows:-
"It is essential for the maintenance of the Rule of Law and order that the authority and the dignity of our Courts are upheld at all times. The Court will not condone deliberate disobedience of its orders and will not shy away from its responsibility to deal firmly with proved contemnors. It is the plain and unqualified obligation of every person against or in respect of whom, an order is made by Court of competent jurisdiction, to obey it unless and until that order is discharged. The uncompromising nature of this obligation is shown by the fact that it extends even to cases where the person affected by an order believes it to be irregular or void."
Rule of law makes it incumbent for all persons, without exception to respect court orders at all times. The whole purpose of litigation as a process of judicial administration is lost if court orders are not complied with. A party who knows f an order whether null or valid, regular or irregular cannot be permitted to disobey it.[12] It would be most dangerous to hold that suitors or their solicitors could themselves judge whether an order was null or valid; whether it was regular or irregular.[13]There is need to emphasize that the principle of law is that the whole essence of litigation as a process of judicial administration is lost if orders issued by court through the set judicial process in the normal functioning of courts are not complied with in full by those targeted and / or called upon to give due compliance / effect. A State organ or agency or person legally and duty bound to give due compliance must do so. Court orders cannot be issued in vain.
It cannot be disputed that an order of the court has to be respected by the parties who are bound by it. Therefore every effort must be made to implement the order of the court and not to disobey the same. It is not up to that party to choose whether to comply or not to comply with such an order. The order must be complied with in totality, in all circumstances by the party concerned, subject to the party’s right to challenge the order in issue, in such a lawful way as the law permits.
The purpose of this is simple. It is to protect the sanctity of the courts of judicature, which is well envisaged in the Constitution; sustain the confidence in the third arm of government so that all the people who feel aggrieved by government, its agencies or private persons can have a place to run to for a neutral determination. To disregard court orders therefore, among others in my view, is by implication, to set the precedent that people should not believe in the courts. This is wrong because it puts persons in our country on a collision course with no remedy thus creating a medium in which they descend into anarchy by resorting to taking the law into their hands. This is in utter disregard of the democratic and good governance principles and val
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