RULING NO. 2
(Contempt of Court Application)
A. INTRODUCTION
1. Before the Court is a Notice of Motion Application dated 6th March 2026, brought by the Petitioner, Linus Lokawa Miinyan, seeking to cite the 1st Respondent, the County Assembly Service Board of Turkana (hereinafter 'the Board'), and the 2nd Respondent, Hon. Charles Lokioto Ewoi, the Chairperson of the Board, for contempt of the conservatory orders issued by this Court on 26th February 2026 in ELRC Petition No. E001 of 2026. The Application is supported by the Affidavit of the Petitioner sworn on 6th March 2026. The Respondents oppose the Application by way of a Replying Affidavit sworn by the 2nd Respondent, Hon. Charles Lokioto Ewoi, on behalf of the Respondents. I have read and considered all the material placed before me.
2. The Application seeks, in summary, the following orders: a declaration that the letter dated 27th February 2026, Ref: CAT/CASB/VOL.3/002/2026, and all fresh disciplinary proceedings, suspension directions, and access prohibitions issued pursuant thereto, are null and void and in contempt of this Court's orders; citation of the 2nd Respondent and such Board members as participated in the impugned decision for contempt; committal to civil jail for a term not exceeding six months and/or imposition of a fine; and costs on an indemnity basis.
B. BACKGROUND
3. The factual substratum of this Application is largely uncontroverted. On 18th June 2014, the Petitioner was appointed as the Clerk of the County Assembly of Turkana on permanent and pensionable terms following a competitive process. By operation of law, he is also the statutory Secretary to the Board.
4. In January 2026, the Respondents suspended the Petitioner, caused the publication of Kenya Gazette Notice No. 937, Vol. CXXVIII, No. 14, dated 23rd January 2026, appointing John Ekonit Komol as Acting Clerk, and commenced disciplinary proceedings against the Petitioner. The Petitioner challenged these actions by filing ELRC Petition No. E001 of 2026 together with a Notice of Motion for conservatory orders dated 25th January 2026.
5. The Application for conservatory orders was heard on 10th February 2026, with all parties represented by Counsel. On 26th February 2026, this Court delivered a comprehensive Ruling granting conservatory orders in the Petitioner's favour. The formal orders, as perfected and sealed, were as follows:
(i) A conservatory order suspending the operation and implementation of Kenya Gazette Notice No. 937, Vol. CXXVIII,No. 14, dated 23rd January 2026, appointing John Ekonit Komol as Acting Clerk of the County Assembly of Turkana.
(ii) A temporary injunction restraining the Interested Party from assuming, occupying, or exercising the functions of Acting Clerk of the County Assembly of Turkana.
(iii) An order restoring the Petitioner's access to his office, official systems, staff, and facilities, and restraining the Respondents from interfering with or obstructing such access pending the hearing and determination of the Petition.
(iv) A conservatory order restraining the Respondents, their officers, servants, and agents from harassing, intimidating, threatening, or otherwise interfering with the Petitioner's performance of his statutory duties as Clerk of the County Assembly of Turkana.
(v) Costs to abide the outcome of the Petition.
6. The Ruling was delivered in open court on 26th February 2026 in the presence of Counsel for all parties. The Respondents, through their Counsel, had full, actual, and complete knowledge of the terms and effect of each order. Out of an abundance of caution, the sealed Court Order was additionally served upon the Respondents through their official email addresses.
7. On 27th February 2026, the very next day, the 2nd Respondent, acting as Chairperson of the Board, issued a letter under reference CAT/CASB/VOL.3/002/2026 addressed to the Petitioner. That letter is the genesis of the present contempt application. Its contents are material and must be examined with some care.
8. The letter opens with an unequivocal acknowledgement of this Court's orders. It states, in terms, that the Employment and Labour Relations Court issued interim orders in Petition No. E001 of 2026 'which halted the earlier disciplinary proceedings and restored your access to office pending determination of the Petition.' The letter then proceeds, in the selfsame document, to resolve as follows:
a) To institute fresh disciplinary proceedings against the Petitioner, independent of and without reliance upon any prior committee processes or resolutions subject to judicial challenge.
b) To anchor such fresh proceedings on statutory obligations under the Constitution and relevant public finance, governance, and integrity legislation.
c) Pursuant to Section 43 of the Conflict of Interest Act No. 11 of 2025, to suspend the Petitioner from the exercise of the functions of the Office of Clerk pending conclusion of the fresh disciplinary proceedings.
7. Under a section headed 'A. SUSPENSION DIRECTIONS,' the letter directed the Petitioner, with immediate effect, to refrain from exercising the powers and functions of the Office of Clerk; not to access Assembly premises except with prior written authorization of the Board Chairperson; and to remain available to participate in the disciplinary process as required. Fresh charges were also forwarded, including allegations of breach of fiduciary duty, failure to safeguard public funds, persistent non-compliance with statutory remittance obligations, failure to provide professional advice, acting without Board authorization in personnel matters, and conflict of interest in financial administration.
C. THE PETITIONER'S CASE
8. The Petitioner's case in support of the contempt application rests on three pillars. First, that the orders of 26th February 2026 were valid, subsisting, and known to the Respondents at the time the letter of 27th February 2026 was issued. Second, that the letter of 27th February 2026, on its face, violates those orders in that it suspends the Petitioner, bars him from his office, and institutes fresh disciplinary proceedings, all acts squarely prohibited by the conservatory and restraining orders of this Court. Third, that the violation was willful and deliberate, as demonstrated by the letter's own acknowledgement of the orders immediately before proceeding to violate them.
9. The Petitioner submits that the characterization of the new proceedings as 'fresh' and as grounded in a different statutory provision, Section 43 of the Conflict of Interest Act No. 11 of 2025, is a legally transparent stratagem that provides no protection against a finding of contempt. The orders of 26th February 2026 are broad and comprehensive in their protective scope, and any act that removes the Petitioner from office, bars his access, or prevents him from discharging his statutory duties as Clerk falls within the proscribed conduct regardless of the statutory label attached to it.
10. The Petitioner further contends that if the Respondents genuinely believed that a new statutory basis warranted fresh adverse action, the proper and constitutional course was to apply to this Court to vary or discharge the conservatory orders. Their unilateral action, he submits, constitutes a calculated evasion of judicial authority that, if countenanced, would render court orders a nullity and fundamentally undermine the rule of law.
D. THE RESPONDENTS' CASE
11. The Respondents, through the Replying Affidavit of the 2nd Respondent sworn on their behalf, resist the Application on several grounds, which I now set out fully and fairly.
12. First, the Respondents aver that the application for contempt is misconceived, misleading, and an abuse of the process of this Honourable Court. They assert that upon delivery of the Ruling on 26th February 2026, the Board took deliberate steps to ensure full compliance with the Court's orders, specifically: the impugned Gazette Notice was not implemented; the Interested Party did not assume the office of Acting Clerk; and the Petitioner's access to his office was restored.
13. Second, the Respondents contend that the conservatory orders of 26th February 2026 were specifically directed at halting the earlier disciplinary process which is the subject of the Petition, that is, the process that the Petition challenges as procedurally and substantively flawed. They argue that the Court did not issue any order restraining the Board from exercising its statutory mandate, nor did it prohibit the institution of fresh and lawful disciplinary proceedings, nor grant the Petitioner immunity from all administrative oversight proceedings by the Board.
14. Third, the Respondents maintain that the letter of 27th February 2026 was issued in good faith, in full cognizance of the Court's orders, and expressly affirms compliance with those orders. They assert that the Board resolved, after careful consideration of the implications of the Ruling, to initiate a fresh and independent disciplinary process that is wholly distinct from the earlier proceedings challenged in the Petition: it does not rely on any Ad Hoc Committee report or prior impugned resolutions and is grounded strictly in constitutional and statutory principles.
15. Fourth, the Respondents assert that the Board has a statutory mandate to exercise disciplinary control and administrative oversight over the County Assembly Service and acts, in doing so, as a quasi-judicial body with a statutory obligation to act whenever issues of governance, accountability, and integrity arise. They contend that the matters under consideration concern grave issues of public interest touching on financial accountability, management of public funds, statutory compliance, and institutional governance, and that the Board cannot lawfully ignore such matters. They submit that unless these issues are addressed, the County Assembly Service faces real risk of institutional instability and the continued exposure of public resources to harm.
16. Fifth, the Respondents deny that the Petitioner's allegation of willful disobedience is supported by evidence. They aver that contempt requires proof of deliberate disobedience of a clear and unambiguous order, and that no such proof has been demonstrated. They contend that the Petitioner has deliberately misinterpreted and expanded the scope of the Court’s orders beyond their plain meaning in order to shield himself from lawful inquiry, and that his reliance on technicalities cannot cure or extinguish the grave governance and accountability concerns that he has refused to address.
17. Sixth, the Respondents urge the Court to dismiss the Application and set aside the interim orders to allow the County Assembly to function while the Petition is heard and determined on its merits. They aver that the continued operation of the interim orders has left the County Assembly without a substantive Clerk or Secretary to the Board, thereby paralyzing its functions and adversely affecting staff welfare and the residents who depend on the Assembly to discharge its mandate.
E. ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION
18. I have considered the submissions of the parties with care. The singular issue for determination is whether the conduct of the Respondents, as embodied in the letter of 27th February 2026, constitutes contempt of the orders of this Court issued on 26th February 2026. I shall address the Respondents' arguments systematically.
(i) The Applicable Legal Framework
19. The jurisdiction of this Court to punish for contempt is both inherent and constitutional. It is rooted in the imperative that the rule of law be upheld and that the authority and dignity of the Court be protected. As the Court of Appeal of Kenya stated in Econet Wireless Kenya Ltd v Minister for Information & Communication of Kenya & Another [2005] eKLR, the administration of justice requires that parties comply with court orders, and non-compliance strikes at the very foundation of the judicial system. Article 159(2)(e) of the Constitution of Kenya 2010 commands that justice be administered without undue regard to procedural technicalities, but it does not sanction the circumvention of lawful court orders under the guise of invoking statutory mandates.
20. The elements of civil contempt in Kenya are now well settled. In Geoffrey Mwangi Kariuki v Mary Wanjiku Kariuki & Another [2014] eKLR, the Court of Appeal restated the three conjunctive requirements that must be established: (a) the existence of a valid and subsisting court order; (b) knowledge of the order by the alleged contemnor; and (c) willful and deliberate disobedience of the order. The standard of proof, though the proceedings are civil in origin, is proof beyond reasonable doubt, given the quasi-criminal character of contempt and the serious consequences that may follow: see also Republic v Kenya National Examination Council & Another ex,parte Gathenji & 6 Others [1997] eKLR and Nyamogo & Nyamogo Advocates v Kenya Posts & Telecommunications Corporation [2001] eKLR.
21. I shall apply these elements to the facts of the present case.
(ii) First Element: Valid and Subsisting Court Orders
22. The orders of 26th February 2026 were issued by a court of competent jurisdiction, in open court, on 26th February 2026. They were formally perfected and sealed. They have not been varied, discharged, suspended, or appealed against by the Respondents. Their validity and subsistence are beyond question and, indeed, are not disputed by the Respondents themselves. The Respondents' Replying Affidavit expressly states that they 'fully acknowledge, respect, and remain bound by the authority of this Honourable Court.' The first element is satisfied.
(iii) Second Element: Knowledge of the Orders
23. The Respondents' Counsel was present in court when the Ruling was delivered on 26th February 2026 and had participated in the oral hearing on 10th February 2026. Knowledge of a court order communicated to Counsel is, in law, knowledge imputed to the client: Muchanga Investments Ltd v Safaris Unlimited (Africa) Ltd & 2 Others [2009] eKLR. In any event, the sealed order was additionally served upon the Respondents through their official email addresses.
24. But the Respondents have gone further than constructive knowledge. The letter of 27th February 2026, the very instrument of the alleged contempt, opens with an express, specific, and verbatim acknowledgement of this Court's orders. A party that simultaneously acknowledges a court order and violates it in the same document cannot, on any conceivable legal or factual basis, claim ignorance of those orders. The second element is satisfied to the highest possible degree of certainty.
(iv) Third Element: Willful and Deliberate Disobedience
25. It is on the third element that the Respondents concentrate their defence, and I shall address it with the care it deserves. The Respondents advance two primary arguments: first, that the orders of 26th February 2026 were specifically directed at the earlier impugned disciplinary process and did not restrain the Board from exercising its statutory mandate afresh; and second, that the letter of 27th February 2026 was issued in good faith, and that the initiation of a lawful and independent disciplinary process does not amount to contempt.
26. I am unable to accept either argument. I shall explain why.
27. On the first argument, the supposed limitation of the orders to the 'earlier' proceedings, I must examine the terms of the orders as issued. Order (iii) directed the immediate restoration of the Petitioner's access to his office, official systems, staff, and facilities and restrained the Respondents from interfering with or obstructing his access. Order (iv) restrained the Respondents from harassing, intimidating, threatening, or otherwise interfering with the Petitioner's performance of his statutory duties as Clerk of the County Assembly of Turkana. These orders are drafted in broad, unqualified, and prospective terms. They do not limit their protective reach to the 'initial process.' They protect the Petitioner's office, his access, and his performance of statutory duties, comprehensively and without qualification as to the source or statutory basis of any threatened interference.
28. The cardinal rule of construction of court orders is that they must be given their natural and ordinary meaning, read in the context of the judgment or ruling from which they derive: Giella v Cassman Brown & Company Ltd [1973] EA 358. Where the language of an order is clear and unambiguous, as it is here, a party seeking to construe it narrowly in order to justify non-compliance must demonstrate that the narrow construction is compelled by the terms of the order itself, not merely convenient for the party. No such demonstration has been made here. The orders on their face were designed to preserve the status quo comprehensively, to protect the Petitioner's office and the performance of his statutory duties, pending the determination of the Petition. The Respondents' attempt to confine their reach to the earlier Ad Hoc Committee process is inconsistent with the plain and unambiguous language of the orders.
29. On the second argument, good faith and the statutory mandate, the Respondents submit that the Board has an inalienable statutory obligation to exercise disciplinary oversight and that the matters of public finance and institutional governance it seeks to address are of manifest gravity. I have no doubt that the Board possesses, as a matter of law, a general statutory mandate to exercise disciplinary control over the County Assembly Service. That mandate is not in issue in these contempt proceedings. What is in issue is whether that mandate could lawfully be exercised in a manner that contravenes extant orders of this Court. The answer is plainly in the negative.
30. It is a foundational principle of the rule of law that no statutory power, however broad, can be exercised so as to override, circumvent, or render nugatory a subsisting order of a court of competent jurisdiction: see Nairobi Metropolitan Services Informal Settlements & Others v The County Government of Nairobi & Others [2021] eKLR. A party who considers that supervening circumstances, including a new statutory basis for action, justify a departure from the terms of a court order has one lawful option: to apply to the court for a variation or discharge of that order. The Respondents did not do so. Instead, on the very day following the delivery of the Ruling, they issued a letter that, on its face, suspended the Petitioner and barred him from his office. That they believed themselves to be acting lawfully or in the public interest provides no legal defence to contempt: the belief, however sincerely held, does not displace the duty of compliance. As Diplock LJ stated in Hadkinson v Hadkinson [1952] 2 All ER 567, in terms long approved and adopted by Kenyan courts, it is the plain and unqualified obligation of every person against whom a court order is made to obey it unless and until that order is discharged.
31. The Respondents' argument that the new proceedings are 'fresh' and 'independent' and grounded in a different statutory provision (Section 43 of the Conflict of Interest Act No. 11 of 2025) is, in my judgment, the most transparently circular argument advanced before me. The contemptuous character of an act does not depend on the label attached to it or the statutory provision invoked to justify it. It depends on its practical effect. The practical effect of the letter of 27th February 2026, whether framed as arising under the earlier process or under Section 43 of the Conflict of Interest Act, is precisely identical: the Petitioner is suspended, barred from his office, prohibited from accessing the premises, and prevented from discharging his statutory duties. That is, word for word, what the orders of 26th February 2026 were designed to prevent. A rose by any other name smells as sweet; a contempt by any other statutory label is contempt still.
32. I further observe that the manner in which this contempt was perpetrated is an aggravating factor. This is not a case of inadvertent breach or good faith misunderstanding of an ambiguous order. The letter of 27th February 2026 opens by acknowledging the Court's orders and, without pausing for breath, proceeds in the very same document to issue directions that are the antithesis of those orders. This studied simultaneity, acknowledgement and violation in a single instrument, bespeaks not confusion but consciousness, not inadvertence but intent. It is conduct that is corrosive of the rule of law and corrosive of public confidence in the efficacy of judicial orders. Courts cannot function if their orders are treated as inconveniences to be noted and immediately circumvented.
33. I am alive to the Respondents' submission that the County Assembly has been paralyzed by the interim orders and that staff welfare and the discharge of the Assembly's constitutional mandate have been prejudiced. These are concerns that this Court does not take lightly. The proper avenue for ventilating those concerns was, and remains, an application to vary or discharge the conservatory orders, which application would be heard and considered on its merits. What is not available to any party, public body or private litigant, is unilateral self-help in the form of ignoring subsisting court orders. To permit a public body to override court orders on the basis of its own assessment of public interest would be to substitute executive judgment for judicial authority, a substitution the Constitution of Kenya 2010 does not permit.
34. I also note with concern the suggestion in the Respondents' affidavit that the Petitioner is using technical arguments and procedural manoeuvres to evade accountability. This characterization is not only uncharitable but legally inapposite. The right to seek the enforcement of court orders is not a technical manoeuvre; it is the exercise of a constitutional right and lies at the heart of access to justice under Article 48 of the Constitution. That the Petitioner invokes the authority of this Court to give effect to its own orders is not an abuse of process; it is precisely what the rule of law requires.
35. For all the foregoing reasons, I find, beyond reasonable doubt, that the 1st Respondent, acting through its Board and through the 2nd Respondent, its Chairperson, committed contempt of the orders of this Court of 26th February 2026 by issuing the letter of 27th February 2026, Ref: CAT/CASB/VOL.3/002/2026, and by implementing the suspension directions, access prohibitions, and fresh disciplinary proceedings contained therein and flowing therefrom.
F. RELIEF AND ORDERS
36. Having found contempt established, I turn to the question of appropriate relief. The primary purpose of the court's contempt jurisdiction in civil proceedings is coercive and remedial, not punitive: the paramount object is to secure compliance with the Court's orders and to restore the position that those orders were designed to protect. Imprisonment and fines, though available, are measures of last resort: see Econet Wireless Kenya Ltd (supra) and Ahmed Nassir Abdullahi v Ahmed Ali Sirat & Another [2010] eKLR.
37. In the circumstances, I consider it appropriate, at this stage, to afford the Respondents a final and unambiguous opportunity to purge the contempt through immediate and unconditional compliance with the orders of 26th February 2026. The purging of contempt requires positive and demonstrable action, not mere verbal assurances.
38. Should the Respondents fail, refuse, or neglect to comply fully with the orders set out below within the time specified, the Petitioner shall be at liberty to apply to this Court for committal orders and such further sanctions as the Court may deem appropriate, including imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months and/or the imposition of such fines as the Court shall determine.
Consequently, and for the reasons set out herein, the Court makes the following Orders:
i. The 1st Respondent, the County Assembly Service Board of Turkana, and the 2nd Respondent, Hon. Charles Lokioto Ewoi, its Chairperson, are hereby found to have committed contempt of the orders of this Court issued on 26th February 2026 in ELRC Petition No. E001 of 2026, by issuing the letter of 27th February 2026, Ref: CAT/CASB/VOL.3/002/2026, and implementing the suspension directions, access prohibitions, and fresh disciplinary proceedings contained therein.
ii. The letter dated 27th February 2026, Ref: CAT/CASB/VOL.3/002/2026, together with all suspension directions, access prohibitions, and all fresh disciplinary proceedings initiated pursuant thereto or in furtherance thereof, whether styled under Section 43 of the Conflict of Interest Act No. 11 of 2025 or under any other statutory provision, are hereby declared null and void and of no legal effect whatsoever, being in direct violation and contempt of the orders of this Court.
iii. The Respondents, their officers, servants, agents, and all persons acting upon their instructions are hereby directed to, within twenty-four (24) hours of the service of this Ruling upon them, restore the Petitioner to the full, unobstructed, and unconditional exercise of his office as Clerk of the County Assembly of Turkana, including full access to his office, official systems, staff, records, and all facilities of the County Assembly of Turkana, pending the hearing and determination of the Petition.
iv. The Respondents are further directed to, within the same twenty-four (24) hour period, formally rescind and withdraw the letter of 27th February 2026, all suspension directions and access prohibitions issued thereunder, and all communications consequential thereon, and to furnish this Court with written confirmation of such rescission within forty-eight (48) hours of service of this Ruling.
v. The conservatory orders issued on 26th February 2026 in ELRC Petition No. E001 of 2026 remain in full force and effect and are hereby affirmed and reinforced. Any further act of non-compliance with those orders, or with the orders made herein, will result in immediate committal proceedings.
vi. The 2nd Respondent, Hon. Charles Lokioto Ewoi, and all such officers and members of the 1st Respondent's Board as participated in and/or authorized the decisions embodied in the letter of 27th February 2026 are hereby warned in the most unambiguous terms that any further breach of the orders of this Court will result in their committal to civil jail for a term not exceeding six months and/or the imposition of such fines as the Court may determine, without further indulgence.
vii. The costs of and incidental to this Application shall be borne by the 1st and 2nd Respondents, jointly and severally, on a full indemnity basis, to be agreed or taxed.
It is so ordered.
DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED
ON THIS 23RD DAY OF JULY 2026
(Contempt of Court Application)
A. INTRODUCTION
1. Before the Court is a Notice of Motion Application dated 6th March 2026, brought by the Petitioner, Linus Lokawa Miinyan, seeking to cite the 1st Respondent, the County Assembly Service Board of Turkana (hereinafter 'the Board'), and the 2nd Respondent, Hon. Charles Lokioto Ewoi, the Chairperson of the Board, for contempt of the conservatory orders issued by this Court on 26th February 2026 in ELRC Petition No. E001 of 2026. The Application is supported by the Affidavit of the Petitioner sworn on 6th March 2026. The Respondents oppose the Application by way of a Replying Affidavit sworn by the 2nd Respondent, Hon. Charles Lokioto Ewoi, on behalf of the Respondents. I have read and considered all the material placed before me.
2. The Application seeks, in summary, the following orders: a declaration that the letter dated 27th February 2026, Ref: CAT/CASB/VOL.3/002/2026, and all fresh disciplinary proceedings, suspension directions, and access prohibitions issued pursuant thereto, are null and void and in contempt of this Court's orders; citation of the 2nd Respondent and such Board members as participated in the impugned decision for contempt; committal to civil jail for a term not exceeding six months and/or imposition of a fine; and costs on an indemnity basis.
B. BACKGROUND
3. The factual substratum of this Application is largely uncontroverted. On 18th June 2014, the Petitioner was appointed as the Clerk of the County Assembly of Turkana on permanent and pensionable terms following a competitive process. By operation of law, he is also the statutory Secretary to the Board.
4. In January 2026, the Respondents suspended the Petitioner, caused the publication of Kenya Gazette Notice No. 937, Vol. CXXVIII, No. 14, dated 23rd January 2026, appointing John Ekonit Komol as Acting Clerk, and commenced disciplinary proceedings against the Petitioner. The Petitioner challenged these actions by filing ELRC Petition No. E001 of 2026 together with a Notice of Motion for conservatory orders dated 25th January 2026.
5. The Application for conservatory orders was heard on 10th February 2026, with all parties represented by Counsel. On 26th February 2026, this Court delivered a comprehensive Ruling granting conservatory orders in the Petitioner's favour. The formal orders, as perfected and sealed, were as follows:
(i) A conservatory order suspending the operation and implementation of Kenya Gazette Notice No. 937, Vol. CXXVIII,No. 14, dated 23rd January 2026, appointing John Ekonit Komol as Acting Clerk of the County Assembly of Turkana.
(ii) A temporary injunction restraining the Interested Party from assuming, occupying, or exercising the functions of Acting Clerk of the County Assembly of Turkana.
(iii) An order restoring the Petitioner's access to his office, official systems, staff, and facilities, and restraining the Respondents from interfering with or obstructing such access pending the hearing and determination of the Petition.
(iv) A conservatory order restraining the Respondents, their officers, servants, and agents from harassing, intimidating, threatening, or otherwise interfering with the Petitioner's performance of his statutory duties as Clerk of the County Assembly of Turkana.
(v) Costs to abide the outcome of the Petition.
6. The Ruling was delivered in open court on 26th February 2026 in the presence of Counsel for all parties. The Respondents, through their Counsel, had full, actual, and complete knowledge of the terms and effect of each order. Out of an abundance of caution, the sealed Court Order was additionally served upon the Respondents through their official email addresses.
7. On 27th February 2026, the very next day, the 2nd Respondent, acting as Chairperson of the Board, issued a letter under reference CAT/CASB/VOL.3/002/2026 addressed to the Petitioner. That letter is the genesis of the present contempt application. Its contents are material and must be examined with some care.
8. The letter opens with an unequivocal acknowledgement of this Court's orders. It states, in terms, that the Employment and Labour Relations Court issued interim orders in Petition No. E001 of 2026 'which halted the earlier disciplinary proceedings and restored your access to office pending determination of the Petition.' The letter then proceeds, in the selfsame document, to resolve as follows:
a) To institute fresh disciplinary proceedings against the Petitioner, independent of and without reliance upon any prior committee processes or resolutions subject to judicial challenge.
b) To anchor such fresh proceedings on statutory obligations under the Constitution and relevant public finance, governance, and integrity legislation.
c) Pursuant to Section 43 of the Conflict of Interest Act No. 11 of 2025, to suspend the Petitioner from the exercise of the functions of the Office of Clerk pending conclusion of the fresh disciplinary proceedings.
7. Under a section headed 'A. SUSPENSION DIRECTIONS,' the letter directed the Petitioner, with immediate effect, to refrain from exercising the powers and functions of the Office of Clerk; not to access Assembly premises except with prior written authorization of the Board Chairperson; and to remain available to participate in the disciplinary process as required. Fresh charges were also forwarded, including allegations of breach of fiduciary duty, failure to safeguard public funds, persistent non-compliance with statutory remittance obligations, failure to provide professional advice, acting without Board authorization in personnel matters, and conflict of interest in financial administration.
C. THE PETITIONER'S CASE
8. The Petitioner's case in support of the contempt application rests on three pillars. First, that the orders of 26th February 2026 were valid, subsisting, and known to the Respondents at the time the letter of 27th February 2026 was issued. Second, that the letter of 27th February 2026, on its face, violates those orders in that it suspends the Petitioner, bars him from his office, and institutes fresh disciplinary proceedings, all acts squarely prohibited by the conservatory and restraining orders of this Court. Third, that the violation was willful and deliberate, as demonstrated by the letter's own acknowledgement of the orders immediately before proceeding to violate them.
9. The Petitioner submits that the characterization of the new proceedings as 'fresh' and as grounded in a different statutory provision, Section 43 of the Conflict of Interest Act No. 11 of 2025, is a legally transparent stratagem that provides no protection against a finding of contempt. The orders of 26th February 2026 are broad and comprehensive in their protective scope, and any act that removes the Petitioner from office, bars his access, or prevents him from discharging his statutory duties as Clerk falls within the proscribed conduct regardless of the statutory label attached to it.
10. The Petitioner further contends that if the Respondents genuinely believed that a new statutory basis warranted fresh adverse action, the proper and constitutional course was to apply to this Court to vary or discharge the conservatory orders. Their unilateral action, he submits, constitutes a calculated evasion of judicial authority that, if countenanced, would render court orders a nullity and fundamentally undermine the rule of law.
D. THE RESPONDENTS' CASE
11. The Respondents, through the Replying Affidavit of the 2nd Respondent sworn on their behalf, resist the Application on several grounds, which I now set out fully and fairly.
12. First, the Respondents aver that the application for contempt is misconceived, misleading, and an abuse of the process of this Honourable Court. They assert that upon delivery of the Ruling on 26th February 2026, the Board took deliberate steps to ensure full compliance with the Court's orders, specifically: the impugned Gazette Notice was not implemented; the Interested Party did not assume the office of Acting Clerk; and the Petitioner's access to his office was restored.
13. Second, the Respondents contend that the conservatory orders of 26th February 2026 were specifically directed at halting the earlier disciplinary process which is the subject of the Petition, that is, the process that the Petition challenges as procedurally and substantively flawed. They argue that the Court did not issue any order restraining the Board from exercising its statutory mandate, nor did it prohibit the institution of fresh and lawful disciplinary proceedings, nor grant the Petitioner immunity from all administrative oversight proceedings by the Board.
14. Third, the Respondents maintain that the letter of 27th February 2026 was issued in good faith, in full cognizance of the Court's orders, and expressly affirms compliance with those orders. They assert that the Board resolved, after careful consideration of the implications of the Ruling, to initiate a fresh and independent disciplinary process that is wholly distinct from the earlier proceedings challenged in the Petition: it does not rely on any Ad Hoc Committee report or prior impugned resolutions and is grounded strictly in constitutional and statutory principles.
15. Fourth, the Respondents assert that the Board has a statutory mandate to exercise disciplinary control and administrative oversight over the County Assembly Service and acts, in doing so, as a quasi-judicial body with a statutory obligation to act whenever issues of governance, accountability, and integrity arise. They contend that the matters under consideration concern grave issues of public interest touching on financial accountability, management of public funds, statutory compliance, and institutional governance, and that the Board cannot lawfully ignore such matters. They submit that unless these issues are addressed, the County Assembly Service faces real risk of institutional instability and the continued exposure of public resources to harm.
16. Fifth, the Respondents deny that the Petitioner's allegation of willful disobedience is supported by evidence. They aver that contempt requires proof of deliberate disobedience of a clear and unambiguous order, and that no such proof has been demonstrated. They contend that the Petitioner has deliberately misinterpreted and expanded the scope of the Court’s orders beyond their plain meaning in order to shield himself from lawful inquiry, and that his reliance on technicalities cannot cure or extinguish the grave governance and accountability concerns that he has refused to address.
17. Sixth, the Respondents urge the Court to dismiss the Application and set aside the interim orders to allow the County Assembly to function while the Petition is heard and determined on its merits. They aver that the continued operation of the interim orders has left the County Assembly without a substantive Clerk or Secretary to the Board, thereby paralyzing its functions and adversely affecting staff welfare and the residents who depend on the Assembly to discharge its mandate.
E. ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION
18. I have considered the submissions of the parties with care. The singular issue for determination is whether the conduct of the Respondents, as embodied in the letter of 27th February 2026, constitutes contempt of the orders of this Court issued on 26th February 2026. I shall address the Respondents' arguments systematically.
(i) The Applicable Legal Framework
19. The jurisdiction of this Court to punish for contempt is both inherent and constitutional. It is rooted in the imperative that the rule of law be upheld and that the authority and dignity of the Court be protected. As the Court of Appeal of Kenya stated in Econet Wireless Kenya Ltd v Minister for Information & Communication of Kenya & Another [2005] eKLR, the administration of justice requires that parties comply with court orders, and non-compliance strikes at the very foundation of the judicial system. Article 159(2)(e) of the Constitution of Kenya 2010 commands that justice be administered without undue regard to procedural technicalities, but it does not sanction the circumvention of lawful court orders under the guise of invoking statutory mandates.
20. The elements of civil contempt in Kenya are now well settled. In Geoffrey Mwangi Kariuki v Mary Wanjiku Kariuki & Another [2014] eKLR, the Court of Appeal restated the three conjunctive requirements that must be established: (a) the existence of a valid and subsisting court order; (b) knowledge of the order by the alleged contemnor; and (c) willful and deliberate disobedience of the order. The standard of proof, though the proceedings are civil in origin, is proof beyond reasonable doubt, given the quasi-criminal character of contempt and the serious consequences that may follow: see also Republic v Kenya National Examination Council & Another ex,parte Gathenji & 6 Others [1997] eKLR and Nyamogo & Nyamogo Advocates v Kenya Posts & Telecommunications Corporation [2001] eKLR.
21. I shall apply these elements to the facts of the present case.
(ii) First Element: Valid and Subsisting Court Orders
22. The orders of 26th February 2026 were issued by a court of competent jurisdiction, in open court, on 26th February 2026. They were formally perfected and sealed. They have not been varied, discharged, suspended, or appealed against by the Respondents. Their validity and subsistence are beyond question and, indeed, are not disputed by the Respondents themselves. The Respondents' Replying Affidavit expressly states that they 'fully acknowledge, respect, and remain bound by the authority of this Honourable Court.' The first element is satisfied.
(iii) Second Element: Knowledge of the Orders
23. The Respondents' Counsel was present in court when the Ruling was delivered on 26th February 2026 and had participated in the oral hearing on 10th February 2026. Knowledge of a court order communicated to Counsel is, in law, knowledge imputed to the client: Muchanga Investments Ltd v Safaris Unlimited (Africa) Ltd & 2 Others [2009] eKLR. In any event, the sealed order was additionally served upon the Respondents through their official email addresses.
24. But the Respondents have gone further than constructive knowledge. The letter of 27th February 2026, the very instrument of the alleged contempt, opens with an express, specific, and verbatim acknowledgement of this Court's orders. A party that simultaneously acknowledges a court order and violates it in the same document cannot, on any conceivable legal or factual basis, claim ignorance of those orders. The second element is satisfied to the highest possible degree of certainty.
(iv) Third Element: Willful and Deliberate Disobedience
25. It is on the third element that the Respondents concentrate their defence, and I shall address it with the care it deserves. The Respondents advance two primary arguments: first, that the orders of 26th February 2026 were specifically directed at the earlier impugned disciplinary process and did not restrain the Board from exercising its statutory mandate afresh; and second, that the letter of 27th February 2026 was issued in good faith, and that the initiation of a lawful and independent disciplinary process does not amount to contempt.
26. I am unable to accept either argument. I shall explain why.
27. On the first argument, the supposed limitation of the orders to the 'earlier' proceedings, I must examine the terms of the orders as issued. Order (iii) directed the immediate restoration of the Petitioner's access to his office, official systems, staff, and facilities and restrained the Respondents from interfering with or obstructing his access. Order (iv) restrained the Respondents from harassing, intimidating, threatening, or otherwise interfering with the Petitioner's performance of his statutory duties as Clerk of the County Assembly of Turkana. These orders are drafted in broad, unqualified, and prospective terms. They do not limit their protective reach to the 'initial process.' They protect the Petitioner's office, his access, and his performance of statutory duties, comprehensively and without qualification as to the source or statutory basis of any threatened interference.
28. The cardinal rule of construction of court orders is that they must be given their natural and ordinary meaning, read in the context of the judgment or ruling from which they derive: Giella v Cassman Brown & Company Ltd [1973] EA 358. Where the language of an order is clear and unambiguous, as it is here, a party seeking to construe it narrowly in order to justify non-compliance must demonstrate that the narrow construction is compelled by the terms of the order itself, not merely convenient for the party. No such demonstration has been made here. The orders on their face were designed to preserve the status quo comprehensively, to protect the Petitioner's office and the performance of his statutory duties, pending the determination of the Petition. The Respondents' attempt to confine their reach to the earlier Ad Hoc Committee process is inconsistent with the plain and unambiguous language of the orders.
29. On the second argument, good faith and the statutory mandate, the Respondents submit that the Board has an inalienable statutory obligation to exercise disciplinary oversight and that the matters of public finance and institutional governance it seeks to address are of manifest gravity. I have no doubt that the Board possesses, as a matter of law, a general statutory mandate to exercise disciplinary control over the County Assembly Service. That mandate is not in issue in these contempt proceedings. What is in issue is whether that mandate could lawfully be exercised in a manner that contravenes extant orders of this Court. The answer is plainly in the negative.
30. It is a foundational principle of the rule of law that no statutory power, however broad, can be exercised so as to override, circumvent, or render nugatory a subsisting order of a court of competent jurisdiction: see Nairobi Metropolitan Services Informal Settlements & Others v The County Government of Nairobi & Others [2021] eKLR. A party who considers that supervening circumstances, including a new statutory basis for action, justify a departure from the terms of a court order has one lawful option: to apply to the court for a variation or discharge of that order. The Respondents did not do so. Instead, on the very day following the delivery of the Ruling, they issued a letter that, on its face, suspended the Petitioner and barred him from his office. That they believed themselves to be acting lawfully or in the public interest provides no legal defence to contempt: the belief, however sincerely held, does not displace the duty of compliance. As Diplock LJ stated in Hadkinson v Hadkinson [1952] 2 All ER 567, in terms long approved and adopted by Kenyan courts, it is the plain and unqualified obligation of every person against whom a court order is made to obey it unless and until that order is discharged.
31. The Respondents' argument that the new proceedings are 'fresh' and 'independent' and grounded in a different statutory provision (Section 43 of the Conflict of Interest Act No. 11 of 2025) is, in my judgment, the most transparently circular argument advanced before me. The contemptuous character of an act does not depend on the label attached to it or the statutory provision invoked to justify it. It depends on its practical effect. The practical effect of the letter of 27th February 2026, whether framed as arising under the earlier process or under Section 43 of the Conflict of Interest Act, is precisely identical: the Petitioner is suspended, barred from his office, prohibited from accessing the premises, and prevented from discharging his statutory duties. That is, word for word, what the orders of 26th February 2026 were designed to prevent. A rose by any other name smells as sweet; a contempt by any other statutory label is contempt still.
32. I further observe that the manner in which this contempt was perpetrated is an aggravating factor. This is not a case of inadvertent breach or good faith misunderstanding of an ambiguous order. The letter of 27th February 2026 opens by acknowledging the Court's orders and, without pausing for breath, proceeds in the very same document to issue directions that are the antithesis of those orders. This studied simultaneity, acknowledgement and violation in a single instrument, bespeaks not confusion but consciousness, not inadvertence but intent. It is conduct that is corrosive of the rule of law and corrosive of public confidence in the efficacy of judicial orders. Courts cannot function if their orders are treated as inconveniences to be noted and immediately circumvented.
33. I am alive to the Respondents' submission that the County Assembly has been paralyzed by the interim orders and that staff welfare and the discharge of the Assembly's constitutional mandate have been prejudiced. These are concerns that this Court does not take lightly. The proper avenue for ventilating those concerns was, and remains, an application to vary or discharge the conservatory orders, which application would be heard and considered on its merits. What is not available to any party, public body or private litigant, is unilateral self-help in the form of ignoring subsisting court orders. To permit a public body to override court orders on the basis of its own assessment of public interest would be to substitute executive judgment for judicial authority, a substitution the Constitution of Kenya 2010 does not permit.
34. I also note with concern the suggestion in the Respondents' affidavit that the Petitioner is using technical arguments and procedural manoeuvres to evade accountability. This characterization is not only uncharitable but legally inapposite. The right to seek the enforcement of court orders is not a technical manoeuvre; it is the exercise of a constitutional right and lies at the heart of access to justice under Article 48 of the Constitution. That the Petitioner invokes the authority of this Court to give effect to its own orders is not an abuse of process; it is precisely what the rule of law requires.
35. For all the foregoing reasons, I find, beyond reasonable doubt, that the 1st Respondent, acting through its Board and through the 2nd Respondent, its Chairperson, committed contempt of the orders of this Court of 26th February 2026 by issuing the letter of 27th February 2026, Ref: CAT/CASB/VOL.3/002/2026, and by implementing the suspension directions, access prohibitions, and fresh disciplinary proceedings contained therein and flowing therefrom.
F. RELIEF AND ORDERS
36. Having found contempt established, I turn to the question of appropriate relief. The primary purpose of the court's contempt jurisdiction in civil proceedings is coercive and remedial, not punitive: the paramount object is to secure compliance with the Court's orders and to restore the position that those orders were designed to protect. Imprisonment and fines, though available, are measures of last resort: see Econet Wireless Kenya Ltd (supra) and Ahmed Nassir Abdullahi v Ahmed Ali Sirat & Another [2010] eKLR.
37. In the circumstances, I consider it appropriate, at this stage, to afford the Respondents a final and unambiguous opportunity to purge the contempt through immediate and unconditional compliance with the orders of 26th February 2026. The purging of contempt requires positive and demonstrable action, not mere verbal assurances.
38. Should the Respondents fail, refuse, or neglect to comply fully with the orders set out below within the time specified, the Petitioner shall be at liberty to apply to this Court for committal orders and such further sanctions as the Court may deem appropriate, including imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months and/or the imposition of such fines as the Court shall determine.
Consequently, and for the reasons set out herein, the Court makes the following Orders:
i. The 1st Respondent, the County Assembly Service Board of Turkana, and the 2nd Respondent, Hon. Charles Lokioto Ewoi, its Chairperson, are hereby found to have committed contempt of the orders of this Court issued on 26th February 2026 in ELRC Petition No. E001 of 2026, by issuing the letter of 27th February 2026, Ref: CAT/CASB/VOL.3/002/2026, and implementing the suspension directions, access prohibitions, and fresh disciplinary proceedings contained therein.
ii. The letter dated 27th February 2026, Ref: CAT/CASB/VOL.3/002/2026, together with all suspension directions, access prohibitions, and all fresh disciplinary proceedings initiated pursuant thereto or in furtherance thereof, whether styled under Section 43 of the Conflict of Interest Act No. 11 of 2025 or under any other statutory provision, are hereby declared null and void and of no legal effect whatsoever, being in direct violation and contempt of the orders of this Court.
iii. The Respondents, their officers, servants, agents, and all persons acting upon their instructions are hereby directed to, within twenty-four (24) hours of the service of this Ruling upon them, restore the Petitioner to the full, unobstructed, and unconditional exercise of his office as Clerk of the County Assembly of Turkana, including full access to his office, official systems, staff, records, and all facilities of the County Assembly of Turkana, pending the hearing and determination of the Petition.
iv. The Respondents are further directed to, within the same twenty-four (24) hour period, formally rescind and withdraw the letter of 27th February 2026, all suspension directions and access prohibitions issued thereunder, and all communications consequential thereon, and to furnish this Court with written confirmation of such rescission within forty-eight (48) hours of service of this Ruling.
v. The conservatory orders issued on 26th February 2026 in ELRC Petition No. E001 of 2026 remain in full force and effect and are hereby affirmed and reinforced. Any further act of non-compliance with those orders, or with the orders made herein, will result in immediate committal proceedings.
vi. The 2nd Respondent, Hon. Charles Lokioto Ewoi, and all such officers and members of the 1st Respondent's Board as participated in and/or authorized the decisions embodied in the letter of 27th February 2026 are hereby warned in the most unambiguous terms that any further breach of the orders of this Court will result in their committal to civil jail for a term not exceeding six months and/or the imposition of such fines as the Court may determine, without further indulgence.
vii. The costs of and incidental to this Application shall be borne by the 1st and 2nd Respondents, jointly and severally, on a full indemnity basis, to be agreed or taxed.
It is so ordered.
DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED
ON THIS 23RD DAY OF JULY 2026