(Being an Appeal against the judgment and decree of Hon. Joy Mutimba, Resident Magistrate at Msambweni Law delivered on 12/1/2024 in Civil Suit No. E088 of 2022)
JUDGMENT
1. This appeal was filed through a memorandum dated 24/1/2024. The record of appeal is dated 24/3/2024 even as the court filing stamp bears a date of 20/1/2024. That must be a mistake.
2. This appeal seeks to challenge the judgment of the learned trial magistrate delivered on 12/1/2024 both on liability and assessment of damages. The appellant suing as the Administrator and Legal representative of the estate of Rashid Omar (deceased) filed suit for compensation against the defendant in a plaint dated 29/9/2022 in a claim for special damages and general damages under the Law Reform Act (Cap. 26) Laws of Kenya for the estate of the deceased and under the Fatal Accidents Act (Cap. 32) Laws of Kenya for the dependents.
3. It was the appellant’s case before the trial court that her deceased husband met his death as a result of negligence on the part of the driver of the respondent’s motor vehicle registration number KCV 247T Toyota Hiace on 23/6/2021 at around 1230 Hours along the Likoni-Ukunda road at Tiwi Sokoni area. The deceased was at the time riding motor cycle registration number KMCV 809Z, Haojin together with his family as pillion passengers, along the said road when the respondent’s motor vehicle also driven on the said road and place lost control and hit, knocked and/or ran over the deceased thereby causing him fatal injuries from which he succumbed. As a result, the appellant lost the family support of the deceased and incurred special damages of KShs 47,050/=.
4. It was the appellant’s case that the deceased aged 44 years was her husband and they had three children all minors at the time of his death. That he was earning KShs 1,000/= per day as a “boda boda” rider and the family had lost his support through the accident.
5. The case was defended by the respondent through a statement of defence dated 5/10/2022. He denied the appellant’s claim in toto and put her to strict proof. He further pleaded negligence and contribution on the part of the deceased. He also pleaded fraud on the part of the appellant, alleging that the deceased was never involved in the alleged accident and that and all documents filed in court in support of the claim were fake.
6. The appellant Zuhura Juma Ngao, testified in the case as PW 1. She adopted her witness statement dated 29/9/2022 which basically rehashed her pleadings in the plaint. She produced as exhibits the various documents listed in her list filed in court alongside her plaint.
7. PW 2, PC Kevin Muriungi of Diani traffic police department produced the police abstract issued in respect of the accident. He said he was not the investigating officer and he did not carry the police file in respect of the case. He had just been asked a few minutes before to attend the court and produce the police abstract.
8. The respondent did not offer any evidence at the trial despite being accorded several adjournments to make witnesses available.
9. After trial the learned trial magistrate found on the issue of liability that the same had not been proved and dismissed the case. But went ahead to assess damages.
10. The appellant was dissatisfied with that decision and now appeals to this court on the following grounds:
a. the learned magistrate erred in law and in fact by holding that the appellant failed to prove his case on a balance of probabilities despite the appellant having tendered evidence of the eye witness (PW 1) who testified to the circumstances as she was present when the accident occurred.
b. the learned magistrate erred in law and in fact by holding that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor does not apply in this case.
c. the learned magistrate erred in law and in fact by raising the standard of proof beyond balance of probability thereby dismissing the suit.
d. the learned trial magistrate erred in law and in fact by failing to appreciate the law as regards duty of care by drivers upon other road users.
e. the learned trial magistrate erred in law and in fact by failing to award the appellant damages as recommended under the Law Reform Act (Cap. 26) Laws of Kenya and the Fatal Accidents Act (Cap. 32) Laws of Kenya which were claimed and proved by the appellant.
f. the learned trial magistrate erred in law and in fact by computing damages which were inordinately low in the circumstances as to represent an erroneous estimate of the damage suffered by the deceased’s estate and dependents.
g. the learned trial magistrate erred in law by failing to critically analyze the evidence and submissions on liability and quantum together with the authorities submitted by the parties consequently coming to a wrong conclusion on the same.
h. the learned trial magistrate erred in law and in fact by writing a judgment that was at variance with the pleadings, against the weight of evidence and contrary to the principles as established by precedent.
11. The appellant did not make any prayer at the end of his memorandum of appeal but being dissatisfied with the trial court’s judgment, it is presumed that she wishes this court to allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the trial court delivered on 12/1/2024 and enter judgment in favour of the appellant.
12. The appeal was canvassed by way of written submissions filed by learned counsels for both parties.
13. In spite of the eight grounds of appeal enumerated in the memorandum, learned counsel for the appellant ended up submitting on two issues only.
14. First, that in view of the learned magistrate’s finding that there was no evidence of how the accident occurred, she ought to have apportioned liability in the ratio of 50:50. Learned counsel supported this submission with the case of Hussein Omar Farah v Lento Agencies [2006] KECA 388 (KLR) where upon considering various decisions in cases involving road traffic accidents where it was not possible to determine who of the two drivers was to blame, the Court of Appeal held each driver equally to blame.
15. The second issue was that, on the proposed award of damages, the learned trial magistrate applied the wrong rate of multiplicand under the Regulation of Wages (General) (Amendment) Order 2018 by adopting the minimum wage for a driver of a light machine based in Kwale as KShs 13,431/= instead of KShs 15,383.45 since the accident occurred in 2021 and the deceased was living in Mombasa.
16. Learned counsel for the respondent on his part submitted that the learned magistrate was correct on finding that the case had not been proved on a balance of probability and in dismissing it.
17. Learned counsel submitted that the appellant failed to prove negligence on the part of the respondents even as their pleadings remained unsupported by evidence. He relied on section 107 of the Evidence Act (Cap. 80) Laws of Kenya and the cases of Joseph Wabukho Mbayi v Frida Lwile Onyango [2019] eKLR and Kenya Power and Lighting Company Limited v Nathan Karanja Gachoka & another [2016] eKLR. In the latter case the High Court in considering uncontroverted evidence said:
“I am of the opinion that uncontroverted evidence must bring out the fault and negligence of a defendant, and that a court should not take it truthful without interrogation for the reason only that it is uncontroverted. A plaintiff must prove its case too upon a balance of probability whether the evidence is unchallenged or not’’
18. I have considered the record of appeal, the grounds of appeal and the submissions by learned counsels for the parties.
19. This being a first appeal, the duty of this court is to examine, re-evaluate, re-analyze and re-consider the evidence and draw its own conclusions, bearing in mind that it did not see witnesses testifying and therefore give due allowance for that. This is the position as held in Selle & another vs. Associated Motor Boat Co. Ltd & others [1968] E.A at page 126 on a first appeal from the High Court to the Court of Appeal that:
“An appeal to this Court from a trial by the High Court is by way of retrial and the principles upon which this Court acts in such an appeal are well settled. Briefly put they are that this Court must reconsider the evidence, evaluate it itself and draw its own conclusions though it should always bear in mind that it has neither seen nor heard the witnesses and should make due allowance in this respect. In particular, this court is not bound necessarily to follow the trial judge’s findings of fact if it appears either that he has clearly failed on some point to take account of particular circumstances or probabilities materially to estimate the evidence or if the impression based on the demeanor of a witness is inconsistent with the evidence in the case generally (Abdul Hameed Saif v Ali Mohamed Sholan (1955), 22 E.A.C.A. 270)”.
20. The learned trial magistrate found that no doubt that the accident occurred as supported by the police abstract produced by PW 2 and the evidence of PW 1 as the deceased’s widow. She was also satisfied that the respondent was the owner of the accident vehicle as per the copy of records produced as exhibit and the police abstract.
21. The learned magistrate however found that negligence had not been established against the respondent as the court could not determine that there was a breach of the duty of care on the part of the respondent.
22. Indeed, it is an intrigue how the plaintiff pleaded that the deceased was a boda boda rider and was at the time ferrying family members and the police abstract went ahead to list Zuhura Juma, the appellant herein, as one of the pillion passengers and yet, not in her written statement or her testimony in court did she did make the slightest indication of her being involved in the accident. That issue was apparently not put to her by her advocate in examination in chief or even by the respondent’s advocate in cross-examination.
23. Intriguing as it is, the respondent never turned up to discount the evidence of the police abstract that indeed the accident did occur and was reported at the police station or even that as issued, the police abstract was correct in the information captured.
24. Besides the police abstract, there are other medical documents which show that the deceased was taken to hospital having been involved in a road traffic accident and that he later died from the injuries sustained.
25. On a balance of probability, on the basis of that uncontroverted evidence, I find that indeed the accident occurred and the deceased was involved.
26. In civil proceedings, proof of an issue is on a balance of probabilities and not beyond a reasonable doubt as in criminal cases. The standard of proof on a balance of probabilities has been explained in various decisions. Justice Mativo (as he then was) in Hellen Wangari Wangechi v Carumera Muthini Gathua [2005] eKLR referred to the decision of Lord Denning in Miller v Minister of Pensions [1942] 2 ALL ER 372 which states that:
“The … (standard of proof) … is well settled. It must carry a reasonable degree of probability…If the evidence is such that the tribunal can say ‘we think it more probable than not’ the burden is discharged, but if the probabilities are equal, it is not.”
27. In the case of Re H (minors) sexual abuse; standard of proof {1996} AC 563 The House of Lords laid down a series of guiding principles on standard of proof as follows:
a) Where the matters in issue are facts, the standard of proof required in non-criminal proceedings is the preponderance of probability, usually referred to as the balance of probability.
b) The balance of probability standard means that the Court must be satisfied that the event in question is more likely than not to have occurred.
c) The balance of probability standard is a flexible standard. This means that when assessing this probability, the Court will assume that some things are inherently more likely than others.”
28. In the present case the fact of the accident occurring between the motorcycle and the Toyota matatu was not challenged and so it cannot be that neither of the drivers was to blame.
29. The accident occurred between the deceased as a motor-cyclist and the driver as the driver of the Toyota Hiace matatu. There is no evidence at all of how the accident occurred. Under those circumstances, I must go by the Court of Appeal’s holding in Hussein Omar Farah v Lento Agencies [2006] KECA 388 (KLR) that both drivers (the motor cyclist and the driver in this case) must be held equally to blame for the accident. I therefore set aside the learned trial magistrate’s finding that negligence had not been proved and apportion liability in the ratio of 50:50.
30. On the issue of assessment of damages, in their submissions, learned counsels for both parties largely agreed with the learned trial magistrate’s proposed award of damages, the only issue they addressed being the multiplicand or sum applicable as income to be applied for the appellant and the method of assessment to adopt, whether multiplicand/multiplier or global sum approach, for the respondent.
31. Learned counsel for the appellant largely agreed with the proposed award of damages by the learned trial magistrate but submitted that the learned trial magistrate applied the wrong rate of multiplicand under the Regulation of Wages (General) (Amendment) Order 2018 by adopting the minimum wage for a driver of a light machine based in Kwale as KShs 13,431/= instead of KShs 15,383.45 since the accident occurred in 2021 and the deceased was living in Mombasa. However, I have considered the evidence available by way of the permit for burial which shows that the deceased’s place of residence was Simkumbe sub-location in Matuga Sub-County which is within Kwale County and not Mombasa as submitted by learned counsel. There was no new Wages Order from 2018 until 2022 and therefore the learned magistrate was correct to apply the 2018 Order.
32. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the court should have used the global sum approach rather than the multiplier/multiplicand approach. However, in their submissions before the trial court, they proposed the multiplier/multiplicand approach. They have not appealed against the decision of the learned trial magistrate.
33. Assessment of damages is at the discretion of the trial court and this court will not interfere with the proposed assessment of damages awarded by the trial court unless it is satisfied that the award was based on some wrong principle or is so manifestly excessive or inadequate that a wrong principle may be inferred as was held in Kemfro Africa Limited t/a “Meru Express Services (1976)” & another v Lubia & another (No 2) [1985] KECA 137 (KLR).
34. I have considered the submissions by learned counsels and I find that the learned trial magistrate was correct in her approach. There was evidence by PW 1 that the deceased was a boda-boda rider and indeed he died while riding his motor cycle. He therefore had an income that can be used to assess the loss arising from his death. I will therefore not interfere with the assessment of damages as proposed by the learned magistrate.
35. Having apportioned liability in the ratio of 50:50, the damages assessed by the trial court will be subjected to that ratio making the award of damages to the plaintiff KShs 557,480/=.
36. Consequently, the judgment of the trial court is substituted with a judgment entered in favour of the appellant in the sum of KShs 557,480/= together with costs.
37. Orders accordingly.
Dated, signed and delivered at Kwale on the Virtual Platform, Teams this 5th day of March 2025.
ANDAYI W. F.
JUDGE
In the presence of:
Otieno for the Appellant.
Ndolo for the Respondent.
Johnson: Court Assistant.
JUDGMENT
1. This appeal was filed through a memorandum dated 24/1/2024. The record of appeal is dated 24/3/2024 even as the court filing stamp bears a date of 20/1/2024. That must be a mistake.
2. This appeal seeks to challenge the judgment of the learned trial magistrate delivered on 12/1/2024 both on liability and assessment of damages. The appellant suing as the Administrator and Legal representative of the estate of Rashid Omar (deceased) filed suit for compensation against the defendant in a plaint dated 29/9/2022 in a claim for special damages and general damages under the Law Reform Act (Cap. 26) Laws of Kenya for the estate of the deceased and under the Fatal Accidents Act (Cap. 32) Laws of Kenya for the dependents.
3. It was the appellant’s case before the trial court that her deceased husband met his death as a result of negligence on the part of the driver of the respondent’s motor vehicle registration number KCV 247T Toyota Hiace on 23/6/2021 at around 1230 Hours along the Likoni-Ukunda road at Tiwi Sokoni area. The deceased was at the time riding motor cycle registration number KMCV 809Z, Haojin together with his family as pillion passengers, along the said road when the respondent’s motor vehicle also driven on the said road and place lost control and hit, knocked and/or ran over the deceased thereby causing him fatal injuries from which he succumbed. As a result, the appellant lost the family support of the deceased and incurred special damages of KShs 47,050/=.
4. It was the appellant’s case that the deceased aged 44 years was her husband and they had three children all minors at the time of his death. That he was earning KShs 1,000/= per day as a “boda boda” rider and the family had lost his support through the accident.
5. The case was defended by the respondent through a statement of defence dated 5/10/2022. He denied the appellant’s claim in toto and put her to strict proof. He further pleaded negligence and contribution on the part of the deceased. He also pleaded fraud on the part of the appellant, alleging that the deceased was never involved in the alleged accident and that and all documents filed in court in support of the claim were fake.
6. The appellant Zuhura Juma Ngao, testified in the case as PW 1. She adopted her witness statement dated 29/9/2022 which basically rehashed her pleadings in the plaint. She produced as exhibits the various documents listed in her list filed in court alongside her plaint.
7. PW 2, PC Kevin Muriungi of Diani traffic police department produced the police abstract issued in respect of the accident. He said he was not the investigating officer and he did not carry the police file in respect of the case. He had just been asked a few minutes before to attend the court and produce the police abstract.
8. The respondent did not offer any evidence at the trial despite being accorded several adjournments to make witnesses available.
9. After trial the learned trial magistrate found on the issue of liability that the same had not been proved and dismissed the case. But went ahead to assess damages.
10. The appellant was dissatisfied with that decision and now appeals to this court on the following grounds:
a. the learned magistrate erred in law and in fact by holding that the appellant failed to prove his case on a balance of probabilities despite the appellant having tendered evidence of the eye witness (PW 1) who testified to the circumstances as she was present when the accident occurred.
b. the learned magistrate erred in law and in fact by holding that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor does not apply in this case.
c. the learned magistrate erred in law and in fact by raising the standard of proof beyond balance of probability thereby dismissing the suit.
d. the learned trial magistrate erred in law and in fact by failing to appreciate the law as regards duty of care by drivers upon other road users.
e. the learned trial magistrate erred in law and in fact by failing to award the appellant damages as recommended under the Law Reform Act (Cap. 26) Laws of Kenya and the Fatal Accidents Act (Cap. 32) Laws of Kenya which were claimed and proved by the appellant.
f. the learned trial magistrate erred in law and in fact by computing damages which were inordinately low in the circumstances as to represent an erroneous estimate of the damage suffered by the deceased’s estate and dependents.
g. the learned trial magistrate erred in law by failing to critically analyze the evidence and submissions on liability and quantum together with the authorities submitted by the parties consequently coming to a wrong conclusion on the same.
h. the learned trial magistrate erred in law and in fact by writing a judgment that was at variance with the pleadings, against the weight of evidence and contrary to the principles as established by precedent.
11. The appellant did not make any prayer at the end of his memorandum of appeal but being dissatisfied with the trial court’s judgment, it is presumed that she wishes this court to allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the trial court delivered on 12/1/2024 and enter judgment in favour of the appellant.
12. The appeal was canvassed by way of written submissions filed by learned counsels for both parties.
13. In spite of the eight grounds of appeal enumerated in the memorandum, learned counsel for the appellant ended up submitting on two issues only.
14. First, that in view of the learned magistrate’s finding that there was no evidence of how the accident occurred, she ought to have apportioned liability in the ratio of 50:50. Learned counsel supported this submission with the case of Hussein Omar Farah v Lento Agencies [2006] KECA 388 (KLR) where upon considering various decisions in cases involving road traffic accidents where it was not possible to determine who of the two drivers was to blame, the Court of Appeal held each driver equally to blame.
15. The second issue was that, on the proposed award of damages, the learned trial magistrate applied the wrong rate of multiplicand under the Regulation of Wages (General) (Amendment) Order 2018 by adopting the minimum wage for a driver of a light machine based in Kwale as KShs 13,431/= instead of KShs 15,383.45 since the accident occurred in 2021 and the deceased was living in Mombasa.
16. Learned counsel for the respondent on his part submitted that the learned magistrate was correct on finding that the case had not been proved on a balance of probability and in dismissing it.
17. Learned counsel submitted that the appellant failed to prove negligence on the part of the respondents even as their pleadings remained unsupported by evidence. He relied on section 107 of the Evidence Act (Cap. 80) Laws of Kenya and the cases of Joseph Wabukho Mbayi v Frida Lwile Onyango [2019] eKLR and Kenya Power and Lighting Company Limited v Nathan Karanja Gachoka & another [2016] eKLR. In the latter case the High Court in considering uncontroverted evidence said:
“I am of the opinion that uncontroverted evidence must bring out the fault and negligence of a defendant, and that a court should not take it truthful without interrogation for the reason only that it is uncontroverted. A plaintiff must prove its case too upon a balance of probability whether the evidence is unchallenged or not’’
18. I have considered the record of appeal, the grounds of appeal and the submissions by learned counsels for the parties.
19. This being a first appeal, the duty of this court is to examine, re-evaluate, re-analyze and re-consider the evidence and draw its own conclusions, bearing in mind that it did not see witnesses testifying and therefore give due allowance for that. This is the position as held in Selle & another vs. Associated Motor Boat Co. Ltd & others [1968] E.A at page 126 on a first appeal from the High Court to the Court of Appeal that:
“An appeal to this Court from a trial by the High Court is by way of retrial and the principles upon which this Court acts in such an appeal are well settled. Briefly put they are that this Court must reconsider the evidence, evaluate it itself and draw its own conclusions though it should always bear in mind that it has neither seen nor heard the witnesses and should make due allowance in this respect. In particular, this court is not bound necessarily to follow the trial judge’s findings of fact if it appears either that he has clearly failed on some point to take account of particular circumstances or probabilities materially to estimate the evidence or if the impression based on the demeanor of a witness is inconsistent with the evidence in the case generally (Abdul Hameed Saif v Ali Mohamed Sholan (1955), 22 E.A.C.A. 270)”.
20. The learned trial magistrate found that no doubt that the accident occurred as supported by the police abstract produced by PW 2 and the evidence of PW 1 as the deceased’s widow. She was also satisfied that the respondent was the owner of the accident vehicle as per the copy of records produced as exhibit and the police abstract.
21. The learned magistrate however found that negligence had not been established against the respondent as the court could not determine that there was a breach of the duty of care on the part of the respondent.
22. Indeed, it is an intrigue how the plaintiff pleaded that the deceased was a boda boda rider and was at the time ferrying family members and the police abstract went ahead to list Zuhura Juma, the appellant herein, as one of the pillion passengers and yet, not in her written statement or her testimony in court did she did make the slightest indication of her being involved in the accident. That issue was apparently not put to her by her advocate in examination in chief or even by the respondent’s advocate in cross-examination.
23. Intriguing as it is, the respondent never turned up to discount the evidence of the police abstract that indeed the accident did occur and was reported at the police station or even that as issued, the police abstract was correct in the information captured.
24. Besides the police abstract, there are other medical documents which show that the deceased was taken to hospital having been involved in a road traffic accident and that he later died from the injuries sustained.
25. On a balance of probability, on the basis of that uncontroverted evidence, I find that indeed the accident occurred and the deceased was involved.
26. In civil proceedings, proof of an issue is on a balance of probabilities and not beyond a reasonable doubt as in criminal cases. The standard of proof on a balance of probabilities has been explained in various decisions. Justice Mativo (as he then was) in Hellen Wangari Wangechi v Carumera Muthini Gathua [2005] eKLR referred to the decision of Lord Denning in Miller v Minister of Pensions [1942] 2 ALL ER 372 which states that:
“The … (standard of proof) … is well settled. It must carry a reasonable degree of probability…If the evidence is such that the tribunal can say ‘we think it more probable than not’ the burden is discharged, but if the probabilities are equal, it is not.”
27. In the case of Re H (minors) sexual abuse; standard of proof {1996} AC 563 The House of Lords laid down a series of guiding principles on standard of proof as follows:
a) Where the matters in issue are facts, the standard of proof required in non-criminal proceedings is the preponderance of probability, usually referred to as the balance of probability.
b) The balance of probability standard means that the Court must be satisfied that the event in question is more likely than not to have occurred.
c) The balance of probability standard is a flexible standard. This means that when assessing this probability, the Court will assume that some things are inherently more likely than others.”
28. In the present case the fact of the accident occurring between the motorcycle and the Toyota matatu was not challenged and so it cannot be that neither of the drivers was to blame.
29. The accident occurred between the deceased as a motor-cyclist and the driver as the driver of the Toyota Hiace matatu. There is no evidence at all of how the accident occurred. Under those circumstances, I must go by the Court of Appeal’s holding in Hussein Omar Farah v Lento Agencies [2006] KECA 388 (KLR) that both drivers (the motor cyclist and the driver in this case) must be held equally to blame for the accident. I therefore set aside the learned trial magistrate’s finding that negligence had not been proved and apportion liability in the ratio of 50:50.
30. On the issue of assessment of damages, in their submissions, learned counsels for both parties largely agreed with the learned trial magistrate’s proposed award of damages, the only issue they addressed being the multiplicand or sum applicable as income to be applied for the appellant and the method of assessment to adopt, whether multiplicand/multiplier or global sum approach, for the respondent.
31. Learned counsel for the appellant largely agreed with the proposed award of damages by the learned trial magistrate but submitted that the learned trial magistrate applied the wrong rate of multiplicand under the Regulation of Wages (General) (Amendment) Order 2018 by adopting the minimum wage for a driver of a light machine based in Kwale as KShs 13,431/= instead of KShs 15,383.45 since the accident occurred in 2021 and the deceased was living in Mombasa. However, I have considered the evidence available by way of the permit for burial which shows that the deceased’s place of residence was Simkumbe sub-location in Matuga Sub-County which is within Kwale County and not Mombasa as submitted by learned counsel. There was no new Wages Order from 2018 until 2022 and therefore the learned magistrate was correct to apply the 2018 Order.
32. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the court should have used the global sum approach rather than the multiplier/multiplicand approach. However, in their submissions before the trial court, they proposed the multiplier/multiplicand approach. They have not appealed against the decision of the learned trial magistrate.
33. Assessment of damages is at the discretion of the trial court and this court will not interfere with the proposed assessment of damages awarded by the trial court unless it is satisfied that the award was based on some wrong principle or is so manifestly excessive or inadequate that a wrong principle may be inferred as was held in Kemfro Africa Limited t/a “Meru Express Services (1976)” & another v Lubia & another (No 2) [1985] KECA 137 (KLR).
34. I have considered the submissions by learned counsels and I find that the learned trial magistrate was correct in her approach. There was evidence by PW 1 that the deceased was a boda-boda rider and indeed he died while riding his motor cycle. He therefore had an income that can be used to assess the loss arising from his death. I will therefore not interfere with the assessment of damages as proposed by the learned magistrate.
35. Having apportioned liability in the ratio of 50:50, the damages assessed by the trial court will be subjected to that ratio making the award of damages to the plaintiff KShs 557,480/=.
36. Consequently, the judgment of the trial court is substituted with a judgment entered in favour of the appellant in the sum of KShs 557,480/= together with costs.
37. Orders accordingly.
Dated, signed and delivered at Kwale on the Virtual Platform, Teams this 5th day of March 2025.
ANDAYI W. F.
JUDGE
In the presence of:
Otieno for the Appellant.
Ndolo for the Respondent.
Johnson: Court Assistant.