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JudgmentZINGO INVESTMENTS LIMITED VS NATIONAL BANK OF KENYA LIMITED AND KOLLURI VENKATA SABBARAYA KAMASASTRY11 min read

ZINGO INVESTMENTS LIMITED VS NATIONAL BANK OF KENYA LIMITED AND KOLLURI VENKATA SABBARAYA KAMASASTRY

High Court at Milimani High Court · · Peter Mulwa

1. This ruling is in respect of 2 applications dated 1st May 2026 by the Plaintiff and an application dated 5th May 2026 by the 2nd Defendant.
2. The Plaintiff's application is brought under Articles 40 and 159(2) of the Constitution, Sections 3, 3A and 3B of the Civil Procedure Act, Order 8 Rule 3, Order 42 Rule 6 and Order 51 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules. In substance, the Applicant seeks:
i. Pending the hearing of the application and its appeal, an order referring the dispute to court-annexed mediation.
ii. Injunctive orders restraining the Respondents from entering or taking over its business premises, exercising receivership powers, or commencing or proceeding with any realization process over L.R. No. 9363/98, I.R. No. 14628/98 and L.R. No. 209/8628, together with any other property, chattels or debentures offered as security to the 1st Respondent.
iii. Leave to further amend the plaint.
iv. Police assistance in enforcement of the orders, and costs.
3. The application relies on the record and is supported by Robert Njoka's affidavit, a director of the Applicant. He states that after the dismissal of the Applicant’s prior application on 30th April 2026, the Applicant filed an appeal and currently faces a potential takeover of its premises by the 2nd Defendant using receivership powers. He argues that the dispute can be settled through court-annexed mediation and that maintaining the current situation is crucial until mediation or the appeal is resolved. Without this, the Applicant risks irreparable harm and the appeal becoming pointless.
4. The 1st Defendant opposes the application, submitting grounds of opposition dated 2nd May 2026, along with a Replying Affidavit sworn by Paul K. Chelang’a on 22nd May 2026. He claims that the Plaintiff has been in default since the December 20, 2017 consent, which acknowledged an outstanding debt of USD 5,666,000, and has repeatedly made applications to hinder the Bank’s recovery efforts. He emphasizes that the Court previously upheld the Bank’s right to exercise its statutory power of sale after fulfilling the necessary statutory notices, and that several subsequent requests by the Plaintiff for injunctive relief have been dismissed.
5. He also states that recent valuations set the forced-sale values of L.R. No. 209/8628 at Kshs. 61.5 million and L.R. No. 9363/98 at Kshs. 600 million, which are not enough to cover the outstanding debt. He asserts that the Bank has properly issued the required demand and statutory notices. Furthermore, he argues that this is the Plaintiff’s sixth attempt to prevent the statutory power of sale, claiming the application is an abuse of court process, the Plaintiff remains in default, and there is no sufficient basis for the orders requested.
6. The 2nd Defendant also responds to the application in his replying affidavit. He states that he was properly appointed as Receiver and Manager by the 1st Defendant and had taken control of the Plaintiff’s business before the interim orders of 2nd September 2025 restrained him, which he fully obeyed. He argues that the Court’s decision on 30th April 2026 dismissed the Plaintiff’s application, confirmed the legality of his appointment, and upheld the 1st Defendant’s authority, as a secured creditor, to enforce the debentures and appoint a receiver without needing Court approval.
7. He argues that the application seeks to reopen determined matters and effectively appeals the Court's own decision. He claims the April 30, 2026 dismissal is a negative order not stayable under Order 42 Rule 6, with no demonstrated substantial loss, and that the Plaintiff’s appeal is defective due to late Notice of Appeal. He urges the Court to dismiss the application with costs and allow him to resume his duties as Receiver and Manager.
Application dated 5th May 2026
8. The application is brought under Sections 1A, 1B and 3A of the Civil Procedure Act, Orders 40 and 51 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules and the inherent powers of the Court. In substance, it seeks orders compelling the Plaintiff and its directors, employees and agents to grant him unrestricted access to the Plaintiff’s premises at L.R. No. 9363/98 and L.R. No. 209/8628, and to hand over the management and control of the Plaintiff’s business, assets and affairs to him in his capacity as Receiver and Manager. He further seeks to restrain the Plaintiff’s directors from interfering with his management of the company, together with police assistance in enforcing the orders.
9. The application is backed by Kolluri Venkata Subbaraya Kamasastry's affidavit, in which he states that he was appointed Receiver and Manager by the 1st Defendant on August 28, 2025, and assumed control of the Plaintiff’s business on September 1, 2025. However, he withdrew following the interim injunction issued on September 2, 2025. He argues that the injunction ended when the Plaintiff’s application was dismissed on April 30, 2026, which entitled him to resume his role as Receiver and Manager.
10. He claims that when he tried to regain possession, the Plaintiff’s director, Robert Njoka, and staff denied him access despite the Court’s order. He alleges resistance continued even with police present, including a threat with a firearm. The deponent states that this obstruction hinders his receivership duties, risks asset dissipation, and prejudices the 1st Defendant’s debt recovery, justifying the sought orders.
11. The Plaintiff opposes the application via Robert Njoka's affidavit sworn on 21st May 2026. He argues the 30th April 2026 ruling only dismissed the injunction and didn't authorize a forcible takeover. He denies obstructing or threatening the 2nd Defendant and states no structured handover was requested. He claims the Plaintiff remains a going concern likely to suffer substantial loss from a forcible takeover, and the application is premature, an abuse of court process, and prejudicial to the pending appeal. He asks the Court to dismiss the application and let the dispute go to court-annexed mediation.
12. Both applications were heard by way of written submissions.
Analysis and determination
13. I have considered the two applications, the affidavits filed in support and opposition thereto, the parties’ respective submissions and the applicable law. Although several prayers have been sought, the principal issues that arise for determination are:
i. Whether the Plaintiff has established a basis for stay and injunctive relief pending appeal;
ii. Whether the matter should be referred to court-annexed mediation;
iii. Whether leave should be granted to further amend the plaint;
iv. Whether the 2nd Defendant is entitled to the orders sought in the application dated 5th May 2026.
Is the Plaintiff is entitled to stay and injunctive relief pending appeal?
14. The Plaintiff’s application is principally anchored on Order 42 Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules. Under Rule 6(2), an applicant seeking stay pending appeal must demonstrate that substantial loss may result unless stay is granted; that the application has been made without unreasonable delay; and that such security as the Court may order has been furnished.
15. There exists, however, an initial obstacle concerning the Plaintiff’s application. The ruling issued on 30th April 2026 rejected the Plaintiff’s request for an injunction. This dismissal did not mandate any Defendant to undertake any action that is executable. Consequently, it was, in essence, a negative judgment.
16. In Co-operative Bank of Kenya Limited v Banking Insurance & Finance Union (Kenya) [2015] KECA 353 (KLR), the court held that an order dismissing a suit or application is a negative order incapable of execution and, consequently, incapable of being stayed. The position is equally applicable here. There is nothing arising from the dismissal order capable of being stayed under Order 42 Rule 6.
17. More fundamentally, the Plaintiff’s prayer for an injunction substantially seeks the restoration of the very protection that was terminated when this Court dismissed its previous application on 30th April 2026. Based on the available material, that decision determined, among other matters, that the Plaintiff had acknowledged the existence of debt; that the debentures authorized the appointment of a Receiver and Manager upon default; that the appointment of the 2nd Defendant had not been demonstrated to be invalid; and that the Plaintiff had failed to establish a prima facie case warranting interlocutory injunctive relief.
18. This Court cannot, through a new interlocutory application based substantially on the same circumstances, overturn or stay its own determinations solely because the Plaintiff has filed an appeal. Such actions would effectively amount to an appeal over the Court's own decision. The appropriate forum for contesting these findings is the appellate court.
19. I am not convinced that a significant loss has been shown under Order 42 Rule 6. The properties and assets were provided voluntarily as security for commercial facilities. The Plaintiff’s concern that these securities might be realized or that the Receiver and Manager could exercise their powers under the debenture is based on the enforcement of securities after a default. This outcome alone does not prove a substantial loss that would justify restoring the injunction, which the Court has already refused.
20. It follows that the prayers for stay and injunctive relief pending appeal are without merit.
Should the matter be referred to court-annexed mediation?
21. The Plaintiff seeks an order referring the dispute to court-annexed mediation (CAM). However, the record shows that the matter was previously referred to mediation under Article 159(2)(c) of the Constitution and section 59B of the Civil Procedure Act. A mediation report was filed on 19th June 2026, indicating that the Receiver and Manager declined to participate in the mediation proceedings.
22. Mediation is inherently a voluntary process that relies on the parties' good faith participation. Although Article 159(2)(c) of the Constitution encourages the Court to support alternative dispute resolution methods, it cannot force parties to settle when prior attempts have failed due to one party's non-cooperation.
23. Given the circumstances, referring the case to mediation again would be pointless and only cause delays in resolving the pending applications. Therefore, the Plaintiff’s request for court-annexed mediation is denied. The Court will proceed to decide the parties’ applications based on their merits.
Whether leave should be granted to further amend the plaint
24. The Plaintiff additionally seeks leave to further amend its plaint. Order 8 Rule 3(1) of the Civil Procedure Rules provides that:
The court may at any stage of the proceedings, on such terms as to costs or otherwise as may be just and in such manner as it may direct, allow any party to amend his pleadings.
25. The power to grant leave to amend is discretionary, but it must be exercised judiciously.
26. In this case, the Plaintiff has not submitted a draft of the proposed amended plaint, as mandated by Order 8 Rule 5(1) of the Civil Procedure Rules. This omission alone renders the application invalid.
27. In Central Kenya Ltd v Trust Bank Ltd & 5 others [2000] eKLR, the Court held that an amendment application must be accompanied by a draft amendment, and failure to do so renders the application defective.
28. Furthermore, after the Plaintiff filed numerous applications, I believe the issue of amendment is just another attempt to delay resolving the dispute. The Plaintiff has had plenty of chances to amend its pleadings, and this application, made after the dismissal of its injunction request, seems to be a final effort to hinder the Defendants' enforcement rights.
29. I decline to grant leave to amend the plaint. The prayer is accordingly dismissed.
Whether the 2nd Defendant's application dated 5th May 2026 should be granted
30. The 2nd Defendant seeks orders compelling the Plaintiff and its directors, employees and agents to grant him unrestricted access to the Plaintiff's premises and to hand over management and control of the Plaintiff's business, assets and affairs, in his capacity as Receiver and Manager.
31. This Court confirmed the validity of the 2nd Defendant's appointment as Receiver and Manager in its ruling on 30th April 2026. It stated that the 1st Defendant, as a secured creditor, had the right to enforce the debentures and appoint a receiver without Court intervention. Additionally, the Court found that the Plaintiff had not provided any grounds to oppose the appointment.
32. The interim injunction that was in place from 2nd September 2025 lapsed upon the dismissal of the Plaintiff's application on 30th April 2026. The 2nd Defendant is therefore entitled, as a matter of law, to resume his functions as Receiver and Manager.
33. In Gathira v Bank of Baroda (K) Ltd [2014] eKLR, the Court of Appeal determined that a receiver appointed through a debenture acts as an agent of the company and has the right to possess the company's assets to secure the debt. Additionally, the Court emphasized that the company cannot oppose the receiver's entry into possession once the appointment criteria are fulfilled.
34. The 2nd Defendant stated that he tried to re-enter the property but was prevented by the Plaintiff's director, Robert Njoka, and staff, despite police presence. If accurate, this act constitutes contempt of the Court's orders and disrespects the Receiver's lawful authority.
35. The Plaintiff's claim that the April 30, 2026 ruling only rejected the injunction request and did not permit a forcible takeover is misleading. Since the injunction was dismissed, the interim orders restraining the Receiver are lifted. Consequently, the Receiver can continue his lawful duties without obstruction.
36. I find that the 2nd Defendant has established a proper basis for the orders sought. The Plaintiff's continued obstruction of the Receiver is unlawful and cannot be tolerated. The Plaintiff's threat to the Receiver's team, as alleged in the affidavit of Kolluri Venkata Subbaraya Kamasastry, is a matter of grave concern and may be subject to separate contempt proceedings if substantiated.
37. The Plaintiff's claim that a forcible takeover would cause significant harm is unconvincing. Since 2017, the Plaintiff has been in default and has had numerous chances to resolve the debt or suggest an alternative. The Defendants have the right to enforce their security interests, and any loss incurred by the Plaintiff results from its own default.
38. Accordingly, I allow the 2nd Defendant's application in its entirety.
39. For the reasons set out above, this Court makes the following orders:
i. The Plaintiff's Notice of Motion dated 1st May 2026 is hereby dismissed.
ii. The 2nd Defendant's Notice of Motion dated 5th May 2026 is hereby allowed.
iii. An order is hereby issued compelling the Plaintiff, its directors, employees, agents, and any other person acting under its authority, to grant the 2nd Defendant, Kolluri Venkata Subbaraya Kamasastry, as duly appointed Receiver and Manager, unrestricted access to the Plaintiff's premises at L.R. No. 9363/98 and L.R. No. 209/8628, and to hand over to him the management and control of the Plaintiff's business, assets and affairs, including but not limited to all books of account, records, documents, keys, and any other items necessary for the discharge of his duties.
iv. An order is hereby issued restraining the Plaintiff's directors, employees, agents, and any other person acting under its authority from interfering with, obstructing, or impeding the 2nd Defendant in the lawful discharge of his duties as Receiver and Manager of the Plaintiff's business and assets.
v. The Officer Commanding Mwiki Police Station, and/or the Officer Commanding Infinity Police Post and/or the Officer Commanding any police station in close proximity to the Plaintiff’s premises is hereby directed to provide security and police assistance to the 2nd Defendant in the enforcement of these orders, if necessary, and to ensure that the Plaintiff and its directors comply with the orders herein.
vi. The Plaintiff shall pay the costs of both applications to the Defendants.
It is so ordered.
RULING delivered virtually, dated and signed at NAIROBI
This 1st day of September 2026.

PETER M. MULWA
JUDGE

In the presence of:
Mr. Kirimi for Plaintiff/Applicant
Mr. Chege for 1st Defendant
Mr. Tugee for 2nd Defendant
Court Assistant: Sharon

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Delivered
Court rank
High Court

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