Introduction
1. The Plaintiff/Applicant, York House Properties Limited, has moved the Court by the Notice of Motion dated 10th June 2026 seeking, principally, an order pursuant to section 70(d) of the Land Registration Act, 2012 for the removal of the inhibition registered against L.R. No. 209/11866, Nairobi.
2. The application is supported by the affidavit of Kush Bharat Bhardwaj sworn on 10th June 2026.
3. The application is premised on the assertion that the inhibition was registered pursuant to an order made in HCCC No. 695 of 2001, now HCCOMM No. 333 of 2005, to preserve the status quo pending determination of the dispute concerning the property. The Applicant contends that the dispute was subsequently resolved by a consent entered into by the parties on 29th June 2007 and that, consequently, there is no longer any justification for maintaining the inhibition.
4. The sole issue for determination is whether the Applicant has placed before the Court sufficient evidence to warrant cancellation of the inhibition under section 70(d) of the Land Registration Act.
5. Section 70 of the Land Registration Act provides for the cancellation of an inhibition, including “by a consequent order of the court.” The Court must therefore be satisfied that the circumstances relied upon constitute a proper basis for bringing the inhibition to an end.
6. The Applicant's case turns substantially on the alleged consent of 29th June 2007. The deponent states that the parties entered into a consent on that date and refers the Court to the document exhibited as “KBB 6”. However, the document exhibited as “KBB 6” does not constitute a consent order of the Court. It is a letter addressed to the Deputy Registrar and, at its highest, signifies the parties' intention to enter into or have a consent recorded. It does not demonstrate that the alleged consent was ever adopted or recorded by the Court as an order.
7. To succeed in the application, the Applicant is not merely required to demonstrate that the parties contemplated settling the dispute. It must establish the fact upon which it relies to justify the removal of a subsisting court-ordered inhibition. If the inhibition was imposed by an order of the Court, evidence that the parties intended to compromise the proceedings does not, without more, demonstrate that the order giving rise to the inhibition has ceased to have effect.
8. A copy of the alleged consent order, duly adopted or recorded by the Court, would have provided direct and sufficient evidence of the alleged settlement. None has been exhibited. Neither has the Applicant exhibited an order marking the suit as settled or otherwise varying or discharging the order pursuant to which the inhibition was registered.
9. In the circumstances, the Court cannot infer, merely from correspondence expressing an intention to settle, that a subsisting order of the Court has thereby been discharged.
10. I have considered the Applicant's reliance on Flora N. Wasike v Destimo Wamboko [1985] KECA 149 (KLR). The principle that a duly entered consent judgment or order has contractual effect and may only be set aside on recognised grounds is not in dispute. But that principle presupposes the existence of a consent judgment or order.
11. Here, the Applicant has not proved that the alleged consent was ever adopted by the Court as an order. The Court is consequently left with an affidavit assertion that a consent was entered into on 29th June 2007 and correspondence which, at best, only evidences an intention to have the matter dealt with by consent.
12. I therefore find that the Applicant has failed to establish the factual basis upon which the Court can properly exercise its power under section 70(d) of the Land Registration Act.
13. The Notice of Motion dated 10th June 2026 is accordingly dismissed, with no orders as to costs.
14. The Applicant is, however, at liberty to file a fresh application, supported by proper evidence.
15. It is so ordered
DATED, SIGNED, AND DELIVERED AT NAIROBI
THIS 17TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER 2026
HON. MR. JUSTICE MOSES ADO
Judge of the High Court
In the Presence of:
Moses C/A
……………… for the Applicant
……………for the Respondent
1. The Plaintiff/Applicant, York House Properties Limited, has moved the Court by the Notice of Motion dated 10th June 2026 seeking, principally, an order pursuant to section 70(d) of the Land Registration Act, 2012 for the removal of the inhibition registered against L.R. No. 209/11866, Nairobi.
2. The application is supported by the affidavit of Kush Bharat Bhardwaj sworn on 10th June 2026.
3. The application is premised on the assertion that the inhibition was registered pursuant to an order made in HCCC No. 695 of 2001, now HCCOMM No. 333 of 2005, to preserve the status quo pending determination of the dispute concerning the property. The Applicant contends that the dispute was subsequently resolved by a consent entered into by the parties on 29th June 2007 and that, consequently, there is no longer any justification for maintaining the inhibition.
4. The sole issue for determination is whether the Applicant has placed before the Court sufficient evidence to warrant cancellation of the inhibition under section 70(d) of the Land Registration Act.
5. Section 70 of the Land Registration Act provides for the cancellation of an inhibition, including “by a consequent order of the court.” The Court must therefore be satisfied that the circumstances relied upon constitute a proper basis for bringing the inhibition to an end.
6. The Applicant's case turns substantially on the alleged consent of 29th June 2007. The deponent states that the parties entered into a consent on that date and refers the Court to the document exhibited as “KBB 6”. However, the document exhibited as “KBB 6” does not constitute a consent order of the Court. It is a letter addressed to the Deputy Registrar and, at its highest, signifies the parties' intention to enter into or have a consent recorded. It does not demonstrate that the alleged consent was ever adopted or recorded by the Court as an order.
7. To succeed in the application, the Applicant is not merely required to demonstrate that the parties contemplated settling the dispute. It must establish the fact upon which it relies to justify the removal of a subsisting court-ordered inhibition. If the inhibition was imposed by an order of the Court, evidence that the parties intended to compromise the proceedings does not, without more, demonstrate that the order giving rise to the inhibition has ceased to have effect.
8. A copy of the alleged consent order, duly adopted or recorded by the Court, would have provided direct and sufficient evidence of the alleged settlement. None has been exhibited. Neither has the Applicant exhibited an order marking the suit as settled or otherwise varying or discharging the order pursuant to which the inhibition was registered.
9. In the circumstances, the Court cannot infer, merely from correspondence expressing an intention to settle, that a subsisting order of the Court has thereby been discharged.
10. I have considered the Applicant's reliance on Flora N. Wasike v Destimo Wamboko [1985] KECA 149 (KLR). The principle that a duly entered consent judgment or order has contractual effect and may only be set aside on recognised grounds is not in dispute. But that principle presupposes the existence of a consent judgment or order.
11. Here, the Applicant has not proved that the alleged consent was ever adopted by the Court as an order. The Court is consequently left with an affidavit assertion that a consent was entered into on 29th June 2007 and correspondence which, at best, only evidences an intention to have the matter dealt with by consent.
12. I therefore find that the Applicant has failed to establish the factual basis upon which the Court can properly exercise its power under section 70(d) of the Land Registration Act.
13. The Notice of Motion dated 10th June 2026 is accordingly dismissed, with no orders as to costs.
14. The Applicant is, however, at liberty to file a fresh application, supported by proper evidence.
15. It is so ordered
DATED, SIGNED, AND DELIVERED AT NAIROBI
THIS 17TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER 2026
HON. MR. JUSTICE MOSES ADO
Judge of the High Court
In the Presence of:
Moses C/A
……………… for the Applicant
……………for the Respondent