1. This suit was commenced by way of the Plaint dated 25/11/2025 filed through Messrs Bizimana Associates Advocates , in which the Plaintiffs sought Judgment against the Defendant for basically, a declaration that the Defendant has breached the Agreement entered into by the parties some time in August 2025 by which the Defendant agreed to advance to the Plaintiffs a loan of Kshs 70,000,000/- repayable over 24 a months period, at 2% interest per month. The Plaintiffs accuse the Defendant of breaching the agreement by, inter alia , advancing only an amount of Kshs 44,161,749, and unilaterally varying the agreed rate of interest to 8%. He also sought a declaration that some terms of the agreement, such as the rate of interest levied, and also penalties and deductions made by the Defendant were exorbitant and unconscionable. He also accuses the Defendant of refusing to provide him with a copy of the Agreement, and for further breaching the terms agreeing on recovering of the loan through, or from proceeds of sale of the Plaintiffs’ two properties L.R. No. 209/6083 and L.R. No. 209/6084 , a transaction which was to be handled by the Defendant’s Advocates, by instead, depositing, without authority, post-dated cheques issued by the Plaintiffs solely as security for repayment. The Plaintiffs thus also sought orders of injunction restraining the Defendants from realizing the loan by selling or disposing the Plaintiffs’ said two properties.
2. Together with the Plaint, the Plaintiffs also filed the Notice of Motion of the same date, 25/11/2025, the subject of this Ruling, seeking a raft of orders crafted as follows:
“1. This application be certified urgent and be heard ex-parte in the first instance owing to the imminent expiry of the Respondent's 15-day statutory demand notice on or about 4th December 2025.
2. Pending the hearing and determination of this application Inter-partes, a temporary injunction do issue restraining the Respondent, whether by itself, its directors, officers, servants, agents, auctioneers or any person acting on its behalf from demanding repayment, advertising, auctioning, selling, disposing of, transferring or in any manner interfering with the Applicants" charged properties (including but not limited to L.R. Nos 209/6083 and 209/6084) or taking any other recovery action in respect of Loan Reference No. SPCL/2025/07/337 a mounting to kesh. 70,000,000/=.
3. In the alternative to prayer 2 above, an order maintaining the status quo be issued as at the date of this application pending the hearing and determination of this application inter- partes.
4. Pending the hearing and determination of the suit, a temporary injunction do issue in terms similar to prayer 2 above
5. In the alternative to prayer 4 above, the status quo as at the date of this application be maintained pending the hearing and determination of the suit
6. The Respondent be directed, within seven (7) days of the order of this Court, to furnish the Applicants with a duly executed copy of the loan agreement and all documents relating to Loan Reference No. SPCL/2025/07/337 amounting to Kesh. 70,000,000, including but not limited to charge instruments, disbursement vouchers, third-party payment instructions and a correct loan statement.
7. The Respondent be compelled to disburse to the Applicants the outstanding balance of the approved loan facility of KES 70,000,000/- (being approximately KES 25,838,251/= or such other sum as the Court may find due) within fourteen (14) days of the order of this Court.
8. The Respondent do pay interest at the rate of 2% per month on the undisbursed loan balance from 22nd August 2025 until the date of full disbursement.
9. The Respondent be restrained from charging interest at any rate exceeding 2% per month (or in the alternative, commercial/court rates) on the loan facility.
10. A declaration that the interest rate of 8% per month and the loan terms imposed by the Respondent in respect of Loan Reference No. SPCL/2025/07/337 of kesh. 70,000,000/- are unconscionable, oppressive, exorbitant, unfair and unreasonable and are accordingly void.
11. Costs of this application be awarded to the Applicants together with interest thereon at court rates.”
3. The Application is supported by the Affidavit sworn on 25/11/2025 by the 1 st Plaintiff, in which he described the Defendant as a licensed microfinance institution, and the facility as the Loan Reference No. SPCL/2025/07/337 , secured by charges registered over the two said properties. He basically repeated the statements made in the Plaint, and deponed that despite persistent requests, the Defendant had failed to furnish him with an executed copy of the loan agreement, and that he was, instead, asked to execute blank triplicate documents at the point of disbursement, to be completed and returned by the Defendant’s credit officer. He reiterated that out of the approved sum of Kshs 70,000,000/-, only a sum of Kshs 44,161,749 /- has in fact been received, disbursed in three tranches, and which is at variance with the figures reflected in the Defendant’s own loan statement. He deponed that the Defendant has since issued a statutory demand notice with a 15-day compliance period expiring on or about 4/12/2025, and that unless restrained, the Defendant shall commence sale or steps towards realization of the charged properties before the dispute as to the true state of the account and the validity of the loan terms is resolved.
4. There are respective Affidavits of Service on record indicating that the Defendant, a company, was duly served with the Application and pleadings, by way of personal delivery at the Defendant’s physical office, and also via email, both on the strength of addresses appearing in the copy of the CR12 exhibited. The Defendant has however, to date, not entered appearance, nor filed any Response to the Application, and neither has it attended any Court session, whether in person or through Counsel. In the circumstances, I treat the Application as unopposed.
5. The Plaintiffs’ Counsel then filed Submissions in which he basically restated the above matters. In arguing the Application, he submitted that the Plaintiffs has established a prima facie case and that he stands to suffer irreparable harm should the charged properties be sold before the dispute is resolved, and that the balance of convenience favours preservation of the properties pending trial.
Determination
6. The one issue for determination in this matter is “ whether, pending the hearing and determination of this suit, a temporary injunction should be issued to restrain the Defendant from taking recovery action against the Plaintiffs’ said properties ”, and, flowing from this, “ which of the further prayers sought are properly grantable at this interlocutory stage ”.
7. The principles that apply in applications for injunctions were well settled in the case of Giella –vs-Cassman Brown and Company Limited, Civil Appeal No. 51 of 1972 , in which it was held that a Plaintiff must establish or demonstrate; ( i ) existence of a prima facie case with a probability of success , ( ii ) that he will suffer irreparable injury which cannot be compensated by damages , and ( iii ) that the balance of convenience tilts in his favour.
8. The Court of Appeal, in the case of Nguruman Limited v Jane Bonde Nielsen and 2 Others NRB CA Civil Appeal No. 77 of 2012 [2014] eKLR, explained the sequential application of the above principles as follows:
“These are the three pillars on which rests the foundation of any order of injunction, interlocutory or permanent. It is established that all the above three conditions and stages are to be applied as separate, distinct and logical hurdles which the Plaintiff is expected to surmount sequentially. (See Kenya Commercial Finance Co. Ltd V. Afraha Education Society [2001] Vol. 1 EA 86 ). If the Plaintiff establishes a prima facie case that alone is not sufficient basis to grant an interlocutory injunction, the court must further be satisfied that the injury the Defendant will suffer, in the event the injunction is not granted, will be irreparable. In other words, if damages recoverable in law is an adequate remedy and the Defendant is capable of paying, no interlocutory order of injunction should normally be granted, however strong the Plaintiffs’ claim may appear at that stage. If prima facie case is not established, then irreparable injury and balance of convenience need no consideration. The existence of a prima facie case does not permit “leap-frogging” by the Plaintiffs to injunction directly without crossing the other hurdles in between.”
9. The first limb that I have to therefore determine is whether the Plaintiffs have established a prima facie case. What constitutes a “ prima facie ” case was discussed in the case of Mrao Ltd vs. First American Bank of Kenya Ltd & 2 Others [2003] KLR 125 , in which the Court of Appeal held as follows:
“It may not be easy to define what is meant by “ prima facie case ”, but at least it must mean one on which a reasonable tribunal, properly directing its mind to the law and the evidence could convict if no explanation is offered by the defence ... The terms “ prima facie ” case, and “ genuine and arguable ” case do not necessarily mean the same thing, for in using another term, namely a sustainable cause of action, the words “ prima facie ” are frequently used to refer to a case which shifts the evidential burden of proof, rather than as giving rise to a legal burden of proof in the manner of considering, which was in relation to the pleadings that had been put forward in the case. It would be in the appellant’s interest to adopt a genuine and arguable case standard rather than one of a prima facie case, the former being the lesser standard of the two ... In civil cases a prima facie case is a case in which on the material presented to the Court a tribunal properly directing itself will conclude that there exists a right which has apparently been infringed by the opposite party to call for an explanation or rebuttal from the latter. A prima facie case is more than an arguable case. It is not sufficient to raise issues but the evidence must show an infringement of a right, and the probability of success of the Plaintiffs’ case upon trial. That is clearly a standard, which is higher than an arguable case.”
12. I also bear in mind, that the Application being unopposed does not relieve this Court of the duty to independently satisfy itself, on the material before it, that the Plaintiffs have met the requisite threshold. This is because, whether or not the Application is controverted, an interlocutory injunction still remains a discretionary equitable remedy to be granted only where the Court is judicially satisfied that the conditions set out in Giella have been met.
13. At this stage therefore, the Court is not called upon to determine conclusively the allegations made by the Plaintiffs, including, whether he was made to only sign blank documents, or whether the loan agreement is invalid, or what amount was actually disbursed. Those matters must await the production of the original documents and the trial of the suit. The Court need only determine whether the Plaintiffs have shown an apparent right requiring protection pending that determination.
14. Applying the above principles to the facts herein, I am satisfied that the Plaintiffs have demonstrated the existence of a prima facie case. The question is not merely whether the Plaintiffs have raised issues deserving investigation at trial, but whether the material placed before Court discloses an apparent right that has been infringed, or is threatened by the Defendant. The Plaintiffs’ assertions are, on the face of it, backed up by the exhibited loan statements said to have been supplied by the Defendant, which there is nothing before Court to contradict. Looking at the statements, there is the apparent discrepancy between the sums the Plaintiffs aver were actually disbursed and the sums reflected in the loan statement. There is also the Plaintiffs’ assertion, which stands unrebutted on this record, that he was never furnished with a copy of the executed loan agreement and was instead, asked to sign blank documents to be completed by the Defendant's credit officer. Unlike a case where a chargor merely resists enforcement of an undisputed facility on undisputed terms, what is put in issue here is whether a validly executed agreement, on ascertained terms, exists at all.
15. In respect to threat of the Plaintiffs suffering “ irreparable harm ” , the subject matter of the threatened recovery action is immovable property (land) put forward as security or collateral. Once sold, the properties may be irretrievably lost, leaving the Plaintiffs with only a claim in damages, which may not restore his original position, more so where the very sum said to be outstanding is itself in dispute. As such, I am satisfied that the threat to sell the properties exposes the Plaintiffs to “ irreparable harm ” which may not be compensated by an award of damages.
16. On “ balance of convenience ” , I consider that the underlying account and the very execution of the loan agreement are genuinely contested, and the charged properties will in any event remain available as security for whatever sum, if any, is ultimately found due. I find that, in these circumstances, the “ balance of convenience ” favours preservation of the “ status quo” pending trial, the Defendant suffering no irremediable prejudice from a short deferral of realization.
17. Turning to the remaining prayers 7-10, I expect the Plaintiffs’ Counsel to be aware of the basic principle of handling interlocutory injunctions, which is that the Court has no mandate, at this stage, to make final determinations. It is settled that in interim applications, such as in this case, the Court should avoid making final determinations on matters of fact made on the basis of the conflicting Affidavit evidence. In affirming this position, the Court of Appeal, in the case of Mbuthia vs Jimba Credit Finance Corporation & Another [1988] KLR 1, guided that:
“………. the correct approach in dealing with an application for an interlocutory injunction is not to decide the issues of fact, but rather to weigh up the relevant strength of each side’s propositions.”
18. I cannot therefore, at this stage, grant orders to compel the Defendant to release monies alleged to be a shortfall of the agreed loan amount, or to fix a rate of interest on the loan, or to declare the loan terms to be unconscionable, or oppressive. These are final substantive reliefs going to the very merits of the suit, resting on contested figures that cannot be resolved on mere Affidavit evidence at an interlocutory stage. They are in fact some of the very final prayers made in the Plaint. If granted now, it would effectively dispose of the entire suit before a trial. That the Application is unopposed does not alter this position, and non-participation by the Defendant is not a licence for this Court to grant final relief that is yet to be tested at trial. As such, determination of prayers 7-10 are left for determination at the trial of the suit.
19. I am however satisfied that prayer 6 seeking an order directing the Defendant to furnish the Plaintiffs with a copy of the executed loan agreement is merited as an ancillary order to aid in the fair disposal of the suit, given that the very existence and/or terms of that agreement are in issue in this case, and such order does not, in any way, determine any right between the parties. The part of prayer 6 seeking the furnishing of documents described as “ including but not limited to charge instruments, disbursement vouchers, third-party payment instructions and a correct loan statement ” is however, ambiguous, speculatory, and vague. That portion of the prayer, I will not therefore grant at this stage.
Final Orders
20. In the premises, the Plaintiffs' Notice of Motion dated 25/11/2025 partially succeeds to the following extent:
i) A temporary injunction is hereby issued restraining the Defendant, whether by itself, its directors, officers, servants, agents, auctioneers, or any person acting on its behalf, from demanding repayment, advertising, auctioning, selling, disposing of, transferring, or in any other manner interfering with the Plaintiffs’ properties, namely L.R. Nos. 209/6083 and 209/6084 , or from taking any other recovery action in respect of Loan Reference No. SPCL/2025/07/337, pending the hearing and determination of this suit.
ii) The Defendant shall, within seven (7) days of being served with this order, furnish the Plaintiffs with a copy of the duly executed loan agreement relating to the said Loan Reference No. SPCL/2025/07/337.
iii) Costs of the Application shall abide by the outcome of the suit.
DELIVERED, DATED AND SIGNED AT NAIROBI THIS 14 TH DAY OF AUGUST 2026
…………………
WANANDA JOHN R. ANURO
JUDGE
Delivered in the presence of:
N/A for all parties
Court Assistant: Amos Boso
2. Together with the Plaint, the Plaintiffs also filed the Notice of Motion of the same date, 25/11/2025, the subject of this Ruling, seeking a raft of orders crafted as follows:
“1. This application be certified urgent and be heard ex-parte in the first instance owing to the imminent expiry of the Respondent's 15-day statutory demand notice on or about 4th December 2025.
2. Pending the hearing and determination of this application Inter-partes, a temporary injunction do issue restraining the Respondent, whether by itself, its directors, officers, servants, agents, auctioneers or any person acting on its behalf from demanding repayment, advertising, auctioning, selling, disposing of, transferring or in any manner interfering with the Applicants" charged properties (including but not limited to L.R. Nos 209/6083 and 209/6084) or taking any other recovery action in respect of Loan Reference No. SPCL/2025/07/337 a mounting to kesh. 70,000,000/=.
3. In the alternative to prayer 2 above, an order maintaining the status quo be issued as at the date of this application pending the hearing and determination of this application inter- partes.
4. Pending the hearing and determination of the suit, a temporary injunction do issue in terms similar to prayer 2 above
5. In the alternative to prayer 4 above, the status quo as at the date of this application be maintained pending the hearing and determination of the suit
6. The Respondent be directed, within seven (7) days of the order of this Court, to furnish the Applicants with a duly executed copy of the loan agreement and all documents relating to Loan Reference No. SPCL/2025/07/337 amounting to Kesh. 70,000,000, including but not limited to charge instruments, disbursement vouchers, third-party payment instructions and a correct loan statement.
7. The Respondent be compelled to disburse to the Applicants the outstanding balance of the approved loan facility of KES 70,000,000/- (being approximately KES 25,838,251/= or such other sum as the Court may find due) within fourteen (14) days of the order of this Court.
8. The Respondent do pay interest at the rate of 2% per month on the undisbursed loan balance from 22nd August 2025 until the date of full disbursement.
9. The Respondent be restrained from charging interest at any rate exceeding 2% per month (or in the alternative, commercial/court rates) on the loan facility.
10. A declaration that the interest rate of 8% per month and the loan terms imposed by the Respondent in respect of Loan Reference No. SPCL/2025/07/337 of kesh. 70,000,000/- are unconscionable, oppressive, exorbitant, unfair and unreasonable and are accordingly void.
11. Costs of this application be awarded to the Applicants together with interest thereon at court rates.”
3. The Application is supported by the Affidavit sworn on 25/11/2025 by the 1 st Plaintiff, in which he described the Defendant as a licensed microfinance institution, and the facility as the Loan Reference No. SPCL/2025/07/337 , secured by charges registered over the two said properties. He basically repeated the statements made in the Plaint, and deponed that despite persistent requests, the Defendant had failed to furnish him with an executed copy of the loan agreement, and that he was, instead, asked to execute blank triplicate documents at the point of disbursement, to be completed and returned by the Defendant’s credit officer. He reiterated that out of the approved sum of Kshs 70,000,000/-, only a sum of Kshs 44,161,749 /- has in fact been received, disbursed in three tranches, and which is at variance with the figures reflected in the Defendant’s own loan statement. He deponed that the Defendant has since issued a statutory demand notice with a 15-day compliance period expiring on or about 4/12/2025, and that unless restrained, the Defendant shall commence sale or steps towards realization of the charged properties before the dispute as to the true state of the account and the validity of the loan terms is resolved.
4. There are respective Affidavits of Service on record indicating that the Defendant, a company, was duly served with the Application and pleadings, by way of personal delivery at the Defendant’s physical office, and also via email, both on the strength of addresses appearing in the copy of the CR12 exhibited. The Defendant has however, to date, not entered appearance, nor filed any Response to the Application, and neither has it attended any Court session, whether in person or through Counsel. In the circumstances, I treat the Application as unopposed.
5. The Plaintiffs’ Counsel then filed Submissions in which he basically restated the above matters. In arguing the Application, he submitted that the Plaintiffs has established a prima facie case and that he stands to suffer irreparable harm should the charged properties be sold before the dispute is resolved, and that the balance of convenience favours preservation of the properties pending trial.
Determination
6. The one issue for determination in this matter is “ whether, pending the hearing and determination of this suit, a temporary injunction should be issued to restrain the Defendant from taking recovery action against the Plaintiffs’ said properties ”, and, flowing from this, “ which of the further prayers sought are properly grantable at this interlocutory stage ”.
7. The principles that apply in applications for injunctions were well settled in the case of Giella –vs-Cassman Brown and Company Limited, Civil Appeal No. 51 of 1972 , in which it was held that a Plaintiff must establish or demonstrate; ( i ) existence of a prima facie case with a probability of success , ( ii ) that he will suffer irreparable injury which cannot be compensated by damages , and ( iii ) that the balance of convenience tilts in his favour.
8. The Court of Appeal, in the case of Nguruman Limited v Jane Bonde Nielsen and 2 Others NRB CA Civil Appeal No. 77 of 2012 [2014] eKLR, explained the sequential application of the above principles as follows:
“These are the three pillars on which rests the foundation of any order of injunction, interlocutory or permanent. It is established that all the above three conditions and stages are to be applied as separate, distinct and logical hurdles which the Plaintiff is expected to surmount sequentially. (See Kenya Commercial Finance Co. Ltd V. Afraha Education Society [2001] Vol. 1 EA 86 ). If the Plaintiff establishes a prima facie case that alone is not sufficient basis to grant an interlocutory injunction, the court must further be satisfied that the injury the Defendant will suffer, in the event the injunction is not granted, will be irreparable. In other words, if damages recoverable in law is an adequate remedy and the Defendant is capable of paying, no interlocutory order of injunction should normally be granted, however strong the Plaintiffs’ claim may appear at that stage. If prima facie case is not established, then irreparable injury and balance of convenience need no consideration. The existence of a prima facie case does not permit “leap-frogging” by the Plaintiffs to injunction directly without crossing the other hurdles in between.”
9. The first limb that I have to therefore determine is whether the Plaintiffs have established a prima facie case. What constitutes a “ prima facie ” case was discussed in the case of Mrao Ltd vs. First American Bank of Kenya Ltd & 2 Others [2003] KLR 125 , in which the Court of Appeal held as follows:
“It may not be easy to define what is meant by “ prima facie case ”, but at least it must mean one on which a reasonable tribunal, properly directing its mind to the law and the evidence could convict if no explanation is offered by the defence ... The terms “ prima facie ” case, and “ genuine and arguable ” case do not necessarily mean the same thing, for in using another term, namely a sustainable cause of action, the words “ prima facie ” are frequently used to refer to a case which shifts the evidential burden of proof, rather than as giving rise to a legal burden of proof in the manner of considering, which was in relation to the pleadings that had been put forward in the case. It would be in the appellant’s interest to adopt a genuine and arguable case standard rather than one of a prima facie case, the former being the lesser standard of the two ... In civil cases a prima facie case is a case in which on the material presented to the Court a tribunal properly directing itself will conclude that there exists a right which has apparently been infringed by the opposite party to call for an explanation or rebuttal from the latter. A prima facie case is more than an arguable case. It is not sufficient to raise issues but the evidence must show an infringement of a right, and the probability of success of the Plaintiffs’ case upon trial. That is clearly a standard, which is higher than an arguable case.”
12. I also bear in mind, that the Application being unopposed does not relieve this Court of the duty to independently satisfy itself, on the material before it, that the Plaintiffs have met the requisite threshold. This is because, whether or not the Application is controverted, an interlocutory injunction still remains a discretionary equitable remedy to be granted only where the Court is judicially satisfied that the conditions set out in Giella have been met.
13. At this stage therefore, the Court is not called upon to determine conclusively the allegations made by the Plaintiffs, including, whether he was made to only sign blank documents, or whether the loan agreement is invalid, or what amount was actually disbursed. Those matters must await the production of the original documents and the trial of the suit. The Court need only determine whether the Plaintiffs have shown an apparent right requiring protection pending that determination.
14. Applying the above principles to the facts herein, I am satisfied that the Plaintiffs have demonstrated the existence of a prima facie case. The question is not merely whether the Plaintiffs have raised issues deserving investigation at trial, but whether the material placed before Court discloses an apparent right that has been infringed, or is threatened by the Defendant. The Plaintiffs’ assertions are, on the face of it, backed up by the exhibited loan statements said to have been supplied by the Defendant, which there is nothing before Court to contradict. Looking at the statements, there is the apparent discrepancy between the sums the Plaintiffs aver were actually disbursed and the sums reflected in the loan statement. There is also the Plaintiffs’ assertion, which stands unrebutted on this record, that he was never furnished with a copy of the executed loan agreement and was instead, asked to sign blank documents to be completed by the Defendant's credit officer. Unlike a case where a chargor merely resists enforcement of an undisputed facility on undisputed terms, what is put in issue here is whether a validly executed agreement, on ascertained terms, exists at all.
15. In respect to threat of the Plaintiffs suffering “ irreparable harm ” , the subject matter of the threatened recovery action is immovable property (land) put forward as security or collateral. Once sold, the properties may be irretrievably lost, leaving the Plaintiffs with only a claim in damages, which may not restore his original position, more so where the very sum said to be outstanding is itself in dispute. As such, I am satisfied that the threat to sell the properties exposes the Plaintiffs to “ irreparable harm ” which may not be compensated by an award of damages.
16. On “ balance of convenience ” , I consider that the underlying account and the very execution of the loan agreement are genuinely contested, and the charged properties will in any event remain available as security for whatever sum, if any, is ultimately found due. I find that, in these circumstances, the “ balance of convenience ” favours preservation of the “ status quo” pending trial, the Defendant suffering no irremediable prejudice from a short deferral of realization.
17. Turning to the remaining prayers 7-10, I expect the Plaintiffs’ Counsel to be aware of the basic principle of handling interlocutory injunctions, which is that the Court has no mandate, at this stage, to make final determinations. It is settled that in interim applications, such as in this case, the Court should avoid making final determinations on matters of fact made on the basis of the conflicting Affidavit evidence. In affirming this position, the Court of Appeal, in the case of Mbuthia vs Jimba Credit Finance Corporation & Another [1988] KLR 1, guided that:
“………. the correct approach in dealing with an application for an interlocutory injunction is not to decide the issues of fact, but rather to weigh up the relevant strength of each side’s propositions.”
18. I cannot therefore, at this stage, grant orders to compel the Defendant to release monies alleged to be a shortfall of the agreed loan amount, or to fix a rate of interest on the loan, or to declare the loan terms to be unconscionable, or oppressive. These are final substantive reliefs going to the very merits of the suit, resting on contested figures that cannot be resolved on mere Affidavit evidence at an interlocutory stage. They are in fact some of the very final prayers made in the Plaint. If granted now, it would effectively dispose of the entire suit before a trial. That the Application is unopposed does not alter this position, and non-participation by the Defendant is not a licence for this Court to grant final relief that is yet to be tested at trial. As such, determination of prayers 7-10 are left for determination at the trial of the suit.
19. I am however satisfied that prayer 6 seeking an order directing the Defendant to furnish the Plaintiffs with a copy of the executed loan agreement is merited as an ancillary order to aid in the fair disposal of the suit, given that the very existence and/or terms of that agreement are in issue in this case, and such order does not, in any way, determine any right between the parties. The part of prayer 6 seeking the furnishing of documents described as “ including but not limited to charge instruments, disbursement vouchers, third-party payment instructions and a correct loan statement ” is however, ambiguous, speculatory, and vague. That portion of the prayer, I will not therefore grant at this stage.
Final Orders
20. In the premises, the Plaintiffs' Notice of Motion dated 25/11/2025 partially succeeds to the following extent:
i) A temporary injunction is hereby issued restraining the Defendant, whether by itself, its directors, officers, servants, agents, auctioneers, or any person acting on its behalf, from demanding repayment, advertising, auctioning, selling, disposing of, transferring, or in any other manner interfering with the Plaintiffs’ properties, namely L.R. Nos. 209/6083 and 209/6084 , or from taking any other recovery action in respect of Loan Reference No. SPCL/2025/07/337, pending the hearing and determination of this suit.
ii) The Defendant shall, within seven (7) days of being served with this order, furnish the Plaintiffs with a copy of the duly executed loan agreement relating to the said Loan Reference No. SPCL/2025/07/337.
iii) Costs of the Application shall abide by the outcome of the suit.
DELIVERED, DATED AND SIGNED AT NAIROBI THIS 14 TH DAY OF AUGUST 2026
…………………
WANANDA JOHN R. ANURO
JUDGE
Delivered in the presence of:
N/A for all parties
Court Assistant: Amos Boso