'1. I have carefully considered the application dated 30th March 2025, together with the response and the written submissions filed by both parties. The application seeks to compel the sole arbitrator to conduct the arbitral proceedings in accordance with the procedure agreed upon by the parties, orders to expunge certain documents from the arbitral record and to direct that the proceedings be conducted by way of documents only, pursuant to the parties’ agreement dated 28th December 2023.
Analysis and Determination
2. The Court’s jurisdiction to intervene in arbitral proceedings is strictly limited by Section 10 of the Arbitration Act. Judicial involvement is only permitted in instances expressly provided for under the Act. This Court has consistently held that where parties have clearly expressed their intention to resolve disputes through arbitration, judicial intervention must be minimal.
3. The applicant has raised allegations of bias and lack of impartiality on the part of the arbitrator. However, these claims are wholly unsubstantiated. It is trite law that allegations of judicial or arbitral bias must be supported by cogent and credible evidence. Mere assertions, suspicions, or dissatisfaction with the outcome of a procedural or substantive decision do not suffice. Equally, a party’s disagreement with the arbitrator’s interpretation of the law or assessment of the facts does not, without more, amount to bias.
4. The jurisprudence is well settled that courts must exercise great caution before interfering with arbitral proceedings particularly where the alleged bias arises from the manner in which the arbitrator has conducted the proceedings or interpreted the parties’ agreement. As Steyn LJ observed in Geogas S.A v. Trammo Gas Ltd (The "Baleares") [1 Lloyds LR 215]:
"Arbitrators are the masters of the facts. On appeal, the court must accept the arbitrators'' factual findings, regardless of perceived mistakes. The principle of party autonomy decrees that a court should not question arbitrators’ findings of fact."
5. Furthermore, the issue of jurisdiction, now raised before this Court, ought to have been raised in the first instance before the arbitral tribunal. It is a well-established principle under the doctrine of Kompetenz-Kompetenz, as codified in Section 17 of the Arbitration Act, that an arbitral tribunal is competent to rule on its own jurisdiction. Parties are therefore required to raise jurisdictional objections before the tribunal at the earliest opportunity.
6. In the present case, the applicant has not demonstrated that the issue of jurisdiction was ever brought to the attention of the arbitrator. The conduct of arbitral proceedings, including the setting of procedural rules, is a matter reserved for the arbitrator and the parties. This Court has no mandate to interfere in such processes. Granting the orders sought would amount to usurping the powers of the arbitrator.
Disposition
7. For the foregoing reasons, the application dated 30th March 2025 is hereby dismissed with costs.
'
Analysis and Determination
2. The Court’s jurisdiction to intervene in arbitral proceedings is strictly limited by Section 10 of the Arbitration Act. Judicial involvement is only permitted in instances expressly provided for under the Act. This Court has consistently held that where parties have clearly expressed their intention to resolve disputes through arbitration, judicial intervention must be minimal.
3. The applicant has raised allegations of bias and lack of impartiality on the part of the arbitrator. However, these claims are wholly unsubstantiated. It is trite law that allegations of judicial or arbitral bias must be supported by cogent and credible evidence. Mere assertions, suspicions, or dissatisfaction with the outcome of a procedural or substantive decision do not suffice. Equally, a party’s disagreement with the arbitrator’s interpretation of the law or assessment of the facts does not, without more, amount to bias.
4. The jurisprudence is well settled that courts must exercise great caution before interfering with arbitral proceedings particularly where the alleged bias arises from the manner in which the arbitrator has conducted the proceedings or interpreted the parties’ agreement. As Steyn LJ observed in Geogas S.A v. Trammo Gas Ltd (The "Baleares") [1 Lloyds LR 215]:
"Arbitrators are the masters of the facts. On appeal, the court must accept the arbitrators'' factual findings, regardless of perceived mistakes. The principle of party autonomy decrees that a court should not question arbitrators’ findings of fact."
5. Furthermore, the issue of jurisdiction, now raised before this Court, ought to have been raised in the first instance before the arbitral tribunal. It is a well-established principle under the doctrine of Kompetenz-Kompetenz, as codified in Section 17 of the Arbitration Act, that an arbitral tribunal is competent to rule on its own jurisdiction. Parties are therefore required to raise jurisdictional objections before the tribunal at the earliest opportunity.
6. In the present case, the applicant has not demonstrated that the issue of jurisdiction was ever brought to the attention of the arbitrator. The conduct of arbitral proceedings, including the setting of procedural rules, is a matter reserved for the arbitrator and the parties. This Court has no mandate to interfere in such processes. Granting the orders sought would amount to usurping the powers of the arbitrator.
Disposition
7. For the foregoing reasons, the application dated 30th March 2025 is hereby dismissed with costs.
'