(Being an appeal from the Ruling of Hon. Rawlings Liluma Musiega (Senior Resident Magistrate) in Nairobi MCCC No. E2426 of 2025 delivered on 19 th September 2025)
1. In a ruling delivered on the 19 th September 2025, the Chief Magistrate’s Court, in Nairobi MCCC No. E2426 of 2025 allowed the respondent’s Notice of Motion application dated 1 st July 2025 and struck out the appellant’s statement of defence for being frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of the court process. The trial court consequently entered judgment in favour of the respondent in terms of prayers (a), (b) & (c) of the plaint, together with costs and interests at court rates.
The Appellant’s Case
2. Aggrieved by the said ruling, the Appellant lodged a Memorandum of Appeal dated 22 nd September 2025 seeking to set aside the impugned ruling on the following grounds: -
1) That the learned magistrate erred in law and in fact in failing to appreciate the appellant’s written submissions on the issues before it.
2) That the learned magistrate erred in law and fact in finding that the defendant’s defence was frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of the court process.
3) That the learned magistrate erred in law and fact in assuming that the details given to the police as to the insurer of the motor vehicle registration number KBY 811F were correct, while there was evidence that the appellant had never insured motor vehicle registration number KBY 811F as at the date of the accident.
4) That the learned magistrate erred in law and fact in observing that the defendant could only challenge the contents of the police abstract, but failed to hold that the averments of the said police abstract cannot be contested at an interlocutory stage.
5) The learned trial magistrate erred in law and fact in finding that the defendant had not provided a statutory defence, while in fact, it had raised a challenge that it had not insured Arthur Moseti, the defendant in the primary suit, when the accident occurred.
6) The learned magistrate erred in law and fact in finding that the defendant had failed to challenge the evidence in the primary suit, while in fact, it was not involved in the primary suit as it had not insured motor vehicle registration number KBY 811F, as at the time of the accident.
7) The learned magistrate erred in law and fact in failing to appreciate that the appellant could only be heard at the declaratory suit and not in the primary suit, where they were not a party.
8) The learned magistrate erred in fact and law in failing to properly analyse the evidence before it.
9) The learned magistrate erred in law and fact in holding that the DMIVC search results provided by the appellant pertained to motor vehicle registration number KBU 811F while in fact, it pertained to motor vehicle registration number KBY 811F being the subject motor vehicle of this declaratory suit.
10) The learned magistrate erred in law in considering extraneous matters at the declaratory suit stage in holding that there were no stay orders in place against the judgment in the primary suit while the application by the respondent was on striking out of the defence of the appellant.
3. The appellant therefore prays that the appeal be allowed, that the ruling of the learned trial magistrate be set aside and the appellant’s defence be reinstated and the suit be heard on its merits.
4. The appeal was canvassed trough written submissions. The appellant’s submissions are dated 20 th February 2026 while the respondent’s are dated 11 th March 2026. The appellant raised two main issues; firstly, whether the appellant’s defence was frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of the court process, and secondly, whether the trial court failed to appreciate the evidence tendered before it. The appellant submitted that the trial court erred in law and fact in finding that the appellant’s defence was frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of the court process. The appellant maintained that its statement of defence raised pertinent issues s regards not being the insurers of the motor vehicle registration number KBY 811F as at the time of the accident. Further, that the appellant provided evidence to the effect that the policy number quoted in the primary suit belonged to a totally different client of theirs and had been issued in respect of a totally different motor vehicle insured by them. That the appellant further provided evidence to the effect that motor vehicle registration number KBY 811F was insured by Occidental Insurance Company Limited as at the time of the accident.
5. The appellant submitted that the issue as to whether the appellant is to be held liable to satisfy the judgment in the primary suit is germane to the suit filed by the respondent as section 10 of the Insurance (Motor Vehicles Third Party Risks) Act, Cap 405 provides that an insurer would only be liable to satisfy judgments against persons insured. The appellant therefore maintained that it had raised triable issues that needed ventilation for determination by the court.
6. The appellant relied on the decision of the Court of Appeal in Kenya Power & Lighting Company Limited v American Life Insurance Company (K) Limited [2015] KECA 598 (KLR) where the court stated thus: -
“[17] The following statement by Ringera, J (as he then was) in Mpaka Road Development Ltd. v Kana [2004]1EA 161 , adopted from the UK Supreme Court Rules, is useful in answering the above question:
“A matter would only be scandalous if it would not be admissible in evidence to show the truth of any allegation in the pleadings which is sought to be impugned. Such would be the case where an imputation is made on the character of a party when the character is not in issue. And I would say a pleading is frivolous if it lacks seriousness. If it is not serious then it would be unsustainable in court. A pleading would be vexatious if it annoys or tends to annoy. Obviously, it would annoy or tend to annoy if it was not serious or it contained scandalous matter which was irrelevant to the action or defence. In short, it is my discernment that a scandalous and/or frivolous pleading is ipso facto vexatious”.
[18] In regard to abuse of process, the Supreme Court recently stated in Civil Application No. 14 of 2014 Charo Hassan Nyange vs Mwashetani Hatibu & 3 Others , as follows:
“The Black’s Law Dictionary defines abuse of process at page 11 as:
‘The improper and tortious use of a legitimately issued court process to obtain a result that is either unlawful or beyond the process’s scope’.
It includes the deliberate use of the court and court process to settle vendetta, to intimidate, to inflict fear and involves the bringing of matters to Court that have no justiciable cause of action”.
[19] We have examined the relevant parts of the appellant’s claim and find nothing that can be said to be inadmissible, or evidence of lack of seriousness. It is apparent that the appellant had a justiciable cause of action arising from the claims made under the contract. Indeed, discussions concerning the claims had been ongoing. It cannot, therefore, be said that the appellant’s suit was intended to annoy.
Nor was the appellant’s claim frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of the court process. The defence relating to limitation was one anchored on the contract and the facts. It was for the court to interpret the contract including the limitation clause and apply the same to the facts to be established at the hearing. In concluding that the appellant had no proper cause of action, the learned Judge prematurely determined the issue without giving the appellant the opportunity to challenge the defence raised by the respondent. Moreover, the learned Judge misdirected himself as the application was not one under Order 6 Rule 13 (1) (a) of the Civil Procedure Rules .
[20] In Ramji Megji Gudka Limited v Muchira & Others , [2005] eKLR, the Court of Appeal stated:
“The Court ought to act very cautiously and carefully and consider all facts of the case without embarking upon a trial thereof before dismissing a case for not disclosing a reasonable cause of action or being otherwise an abuse of the process of the court. At this stage, the court ought not to deal with easy merits of the case for that is a function solely reserved for the Judge at the trial as the court itself is not usually fully informed so as to deal with the merits without discovery, without oral evidence tested by cross-examination in the ordinary way”.
7. The appellant further relied on John Mugambi t/a Mugambi & Company Advocates & another v Showcase Properties Limited [2021] KEHC 4770 (KLR) where Justice Majanja stated as follows:
“9. The court in Republic v Chief Magistrate’s Court at Milimani Law Courts; Director of Public Prosecutions & 2 others(Interested Parties); Ex-parte Applicant: Pravin Galot NRB HC JR Misc. Civil App. No. 622 of 2018 [2020] eKLR held that the word “vexatious” means “harassment by the process of law,’’ “lacking justification” or with “intention to harass” signifies an action not having sufficient grounds, and which therefore, only seeks to annoy the adversary. The hallmark of a vexatious proceeding is that it has no basis in law or at least has no discernible basis and that whatever the intention of the proceeding may be, its only effect is to subject the other party to inconvenience, harassment and expense, which is so great, that it is disproportionate to any gain likely to accrue to the claimant and that it involves an abuse of process of the court.”
8. The appellant therefore urged the court to find that the trial court failed to consider the material evidence provided before it on the issue of the appellant not being the insurer of the motor vehicle in question, KBY 811F, and therefore allow the appeal.
9. On the second issue, the appellant submitted that the trial court erred in finding that the DMVIC search provided belonged to motor vehicle KBU 811F despite the same being for motor vehicle KBY 811F. That the appellant further provided in its evidence that the motor vehicle sued in the primary suit, KBY 811F, was insured by Occidental Insurance Company Limited and not them. That further the trial court failed to appreciate the evidence placed before him that the policy number quoted in the police abstract belonged to a different motor vehicle, not the motor vehicle cited in the police abstract. The appellant submitted that its evidence provided a statutory defence and that it could only be heard in the declaratory suit and not in the primary suit where they were not a party. The appellant therefore urged the court to allow the appeal.
The Respondent’s Case:
10. The respondent opposed the appeal through his written submissions dated 11 th March 2026. It is the respondent’s case that the learned trial magistrate properly exercised judicial discretion and correctly applied the law in striking out the appellant’s defence. The respondent relied on the decision in D.T. Dobie & Company (K) Ltd. vs. Joseph Mbaria Muchina & Another, Civil Appeal No. 37 of 1978[1982]KLR 1, where Madan J.A stated as follows on the power to strike out pleadings:
“No suit ought to be summarily dismissed unless it appears so hopeless that it plainly and obviously discloses no reasonable cause of action and it is so weak as to be beyond redemption and incurable by amendment.”
11. The Respondent argued that the appellant’s defence before the trial court consisted largely of bare denials and did not demonstrate any credible factual or legal dispute capable of trail.
12. The respondent further submitted that the learned trial magistrate was perfectly entitled to rely on the police abstract as prima facie evidence of the insurer of the subject motor vehicle, particularly where the same was not rebutted by credible evidence. Counsel relied on the case of Kibichi v Mathai (Civil Appeal E003 of 2023) [2024] KEHC 4065 (KLR) (25 April 2024) (Judgment) where the court held as follows:
“From the foregoing, the police abstract is intended to capture particulars of the reported accident, owner of subject vehicle, injured person, insurance company and particulars thereof. I take note of the fact that police abstract is a public document and contents are filled by trained police officers who understand their work, understand integrity of public documents and the need to accurately fill particulars required to be filled in the police abstract. The contents of police abstract were not rebutted through any other evidence by the respondent/defendant. Bearing in mind that burden of proof on part of the appellant/plaintiff was on a balance of probabilities, in my view his prove through police abstract was sufficient in the absence of evidence to the contrary.”
13. The respondent submitted that in the present case, the police abstract clearly indicated that the appellant was the insurer of the subject motor vehicle and that the appellant failed to enter appearance in the primary suit despite them being served with a statutory notice. That the appellant cannot now fault the trial magistrate when they failed to discharge their evidential burden. The respondent further submitted that he had demonstrated before the trial court that a valid insurance policy existed as per the abstract, that the appellant had been served with the abstract and that a judgment had already been obtained against the insured.
14. Based on the foregoing submissions, the Respondent prayed that the appeal be dismissed with costs.
Analysis and Determination
15. The sole issue for determination in this appeal is whether the trial Court correctly allowed the application for striking out the defence and entering summary judgment for the respondent. In other words, whether the appellant’s statement of defence was frivolous and vexatious or whether it raised triable issues.
16. This being a first appeal, this court has a duty to re-evaluate and consider afresh the evidence tendered before the trial court and come to its own independent conclusion as was stated in Selle & Anor vs. Associated Motor Boat Co Ltd & Others [1968] EA 123).
17. The parties have sufficiently addressed the legal principles applicable when the court is dealing with an application for striking out pleadings. In the instant case, the appellant denied that it was the insurer of the subject motor vehicle. The trial court casually dismissed the defence as consisting of mere denials. In doing so, the trial court elevated the police abstract to such a high level that it failed to appreciate the evidence that the appellant had provided to in support of its defence that it was not the insurer of the accident motor vehicle. For instance, the appellant had, besides denying that it was the insurer of the subject motor vehicle, provided evidence to show that the said motor vehicle had in fact been insured by Occidental Insurance Company at the time of the accident. They had also pleaded that the police abstract contained erroneous information as the policy number indicated therein related to a different insured and was for a different motor vehicle, not the accident motor vehicle.
18. All the foregoing were serious triable issues which could not be determined through an application for striking out. Had the trial court correctly applied its mind to the information placed before it, it would no doubt have arrived at a different finding. I need not say more on this issue, my finding is that the trial court erred in law in striking out the appellant’s statement of defence yet it raised serious triable issues. This finding alone is sufficient to dispose of the appeal.
Disposition:
19. In the end, the following final orders hereby issue: -
a) The appeal is allowed.
b) The ruling of the Chief Magistrate’s Court as delivered on the 19 th September 2025 is set aside and substituted with an order dismissing the respondent’s Notice of Motion dated 1 st July 2025 with costs.
c) The matter is hereby remitted back to the lower court for hearing and determination on merit before a Judicial Officer other than Hon Rawlings Liluma Musiega.
d) The appellant is hereby awarded the costs of the appeal.
Dated, signed and delivered virtually this 25th day of June 2026.
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1. In a ruling delivered on the 19 th September 2025, the Chief Magistrate’s Court, in Nairobi MCCC No. E2426 of 2025 allowed the respondent’s Notice of Motion application dated 1 st July 2025 and struck out the appellant’s statement of defence for being frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of the court process. The trial court consequently entered judgment in favour of the respondent in terms of prayers (a), (b) & (c) of the plaint, together with costs and interests at court rates.
The Appellant’s Case
2. Aggrieved by the said ruling, the Appellant lodged a Memorandum of Appeal dated 22 nd September 2025 seeking to set aside the impugned ruling on the following grounds: -
1) That the learned magistrate erred in law and in fact in failing to appreciate the appellant’s written submissions on the issues before it.
2) That the learned magistrate erred in law and fact in finding that the defendant’s defence was frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of the court process.
3) That the learned magistrate erred in law and fact in assuming that the details given to the police as to the insurer of the motor vehicle registration number KBY 811F were correct, while there was evidence that the appellant had never insured motor vehicle registration number KBY 811F as at the date of the accident.
4) That the learned magistrate erred in law and fact in observing that the defendant could only challenge the contents of the police abstract, but failed to hold that the averments of the said police abstract cannot be contested at an interlocutory stage.
5) The learned trial magistrate erred in law and fact in finding that the defendant had not provided a statutory defence, while in fact, it had raised a challenge that it had not insured Arthur Moseti, the defendant in the primary suit, when the accident occurred.
6) The learned magistrate erred in law and fact in finding that the defendant had failed to challenge the evidence in the primary suit, while in fact, it was not involved in the primary suit as it had not insured motor vehicle registration number KBY 811F, as at the time of the accident.
7) The learned magistrate erred in law and fact in failing to appreciate that the appellant could only be heard at the declaratory suit and not in the primary suit, where they were not a party.
8) The learned magistrate erred in fact and law in failing to properly analyse the evidence before it.
9) The learned magistrate erred in law and fact in holding that the DMIVC search results provided by the appellant pertained to motor vehicle registration number KBU 811F while in fact, it pertained to motor vehicle registration number KBY 811F being the subject motor vehicle of this declaratory suit.
10) The learned magistrate erred in law in considering extraneous matters at the declaratory suit stage in holding that there were no stay orders in place against the judgment in the primary suit while the application by the respondent was on striking out of the defence of the appellant.
3. The appellant therefore prays that the appeal be allowed, that the ruling of the learned trial magistrate be set aside and the appellant’s defence be reinstated and the suit be heard on its merits.
4. The appeal was canvassed trough written submissions. The appellant’s submissions are dated 20 th February 2026 while the respondent’s are dated 11 th March 2026. The appellant raised two main issues; firstly, whether the appellant’s defence was frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of the court process, and secondly, whether the trial court failed to appreciate the evidence tendered before it. The appellant submitted that the trial court erred in law and fact in finding that the appellant’s defence was frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of the court process. The appellant maintained that its statement of defence raised pertinent issues s regards not being the insurers of the motor vehicle registration number KBY 811F as at the time of the accident. Further, that the appellant provided evidence to the effect that the policy number quoted in the primary suit belonged to a totally different client of theirs and had been issued in respect of a totally different motor vehicle insured by them. That the appellant further provided evidence to the effect that motor vehicle registration number KBY 811F was insured by Occidental Insurance Company Limited as at the time of the accident.
5. The appellant submitted that the issue as to whether the appellant is to be held liable to satisfy the judgment in the primary suit is germane to the suit filed by the respondent as section 10 of the Insurance (Motor Vehicles Third Party Risks) Act, Cap 405 provides that an insurer would only be liable to satisfy judgments against persons insured. The appellant therefore maintained that it had raised triable issues that needed ventilation for determination by the court.
6. The appellant relied on the decision of the Court of Appeal in Kenya Power & Lighting Company Limited v American Life Insurance Company (K) Limited [2015] KECA 598 (KLR) where the court stated thus: -
“[17] The following statement by Ringera, J (as he then was) in Mpaka Road Development Ltd. v Kana [2004]1EA 161 , adopted from the UK Supreme Court Rules, is useful in answering the above question:
“A matter would only be scandalous if it would not be admissible in evidence to show the truth of any allegation in the pleadings which is sought to be impugned. Such would be the case where an imputation is made on the character of a party when the character is not in issue. And I would say a pleading is frivolous if it lacks seriousness. If it is not serious then it would be unsustainable in court. A pleading would be vexatious if it annoys or tends to annoy. Obviously, it would annoy or tend to annoy if it was not serious or it contained scandalous matter which was irrelevant to the action or defence. In short, it is my discernment that a scandalous and/or frivolous pleading is ipso facto vexatious”.
[18] In regard to abuse of process, the Supreme Court recently stated in Civil Application No. 14 of 2014 Charo Hassan Nyange vs Mwashetani Hatibu & 3 Others , as follows:
“The Black’s Law Dictionary defines abuse of process at page 11 as:
‘The improper and tortious use of a legitimately issued court process to obtain a result that is either unlawful or beyond the process’s scope’.
It includes the deliberate use of the court and court process to settle vendetta, to intimidate, to inflict fear and involves the bringing of matters to Court that have no justiciable cause of action”.
[19] We have examined the relevant parts of the appellant’s claim and find nothing that can be said to be inadmissible, or evidence of lack of seriousness. It is apparent that the appellant had a justiciable cause of action arising from the claims made under the contract. Indeed, discussions concerning the claims had been ongoing. It cannot, therefore, be said that the appellant’s suit was intended to annoy.
Nor was the appellant’s claim frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of the court process. The defence relating to limitation was one anchored on the contract and the facts. It was for the court to interpret the contract including the limitation clause and apply the same to the facts to be established at the hearing. In concluding that the appellant had no proper cause of action, the learned Judge prematurely determined the issue without giving the appellant the opportunity to challenge the defence raised by the respondent. Moreover, the learned Judge misdirected himself as the application was not one under Order 6 Rule 13 (1) (a) of the Civil Procedure Rules .
[20] In Ramji Megji Gudka Limited v Muchira & Others , [2005] eKLR, the Court of Appeal stated:
“The Court ought to act very cautiously and carefully and consider all facts of the case without embarking upon a trial thereof before dismissing a case for not disclosing a reasonable cause of action or being otherwise an abuse of the process of the court. At this stage, the court ought not to deal with easy merits of the case for that is a function solely reserved for the Judge at the trial as the court itself is not usually fully informed so as to deal with the merits without discovery, without oral evidence tested by cross-examination in the ordinary way”.
7. The appellant further relied on John Mugambi t/a Mugambi & Company Advocates & another v Showcase Properties Limited [2021] KEHC 4770 (KLR) where Justice Majanja stated as follows:
“9. The court in Republic v Chief Magistrate’s Court at Milimani Law Courts; Director of Public Prosecutions & 2 others(Interested Parties); Ex-parte Applicant: Pravin Galot NRB HC JR Misc. Civil App. No. 622 of 2018 [2020] eKLR held that the word “vexatious” means “harassment by the process of law,’’ “lacking justification” or with “intention to harass” signifies an action not having sufficient grounds, and which therefore, only seeks to annoy the adversary. The hallmark of a vexatious proceeding is that it has no basis in law or at least has no discernible basis and that whatever the intention of the proceeding may be, its only effect is to subject the other party to inconvenience, harassment and expense, which is so great, that it is disproportionate to any gain likely to accrue to the claimant and that it involves an abuse of process of the court.”
8. The appellant therefore urged the court to find that the trial court failed to consider the material evidence provided before it on the issue of the appellant not being the insurer of the motor vehicle in question, KBY 811F, and therefore allow the appeal.
9. On the second issue, the appellant submitted that the trial court erred in finding that the DMVIC search provided belonged to motor vehicle KBU 811F despite the same being for motor vehicle KBY 811F. That the appellant further provided in its evidence that the motor vehicle sued in the primary suit, KBY 811F, was insured by Occidental Insurance Company Limited and not them. That further the trial court failed to appreciate the evidence placed before him that the policy number quoted in the police abstract belonged to a different motor vehicle, not the motor vehicle cited in the police abstract. The appellant submitted that its evidence provided a statutory defence and that it could only be heard in the declaratory suit and not in the primary suit where they were not a party. The appellant therefore urged the court to allow the appeal.
The Respondent’s Case:
10. The respondent opposed the appeal through his written submissions dated 11 th March 2026. It is the respondent’s case that the learned trial magistrate properly exercised judicial discretion and correctly applied the law in striking out the appellant’s defence. The respondent relied on the decision in D.T. Dobie & Company (K) Ltd. vs. Joseph Mbaria Muchina & Another, Civil Appeal No. 37 of 1978[1982]KLR 1, where Madan J.A stated as follows on the power to strike out pleadings:
“No suit ought to be summarily dismissed unless it appears so hopeless that it plainly and obviously discloses no reasonable cause of action and it is so weak as to be beyond redemption and incurable by amendment.”
11. The Respondent argued that the appellant’s defence before the trial court consisted largely of bare denials and did not demonstrate any credible factual or legal dispute capable of trail.
12. The respondent further submitted that the learned trial magistrate was perfectly entitled to rely on the police abstract as prima facie evidence of the insurer of the subject motor vehicle, particularly where the same was not rebutted by credible evidence. Counsel relied on the case of Kibichi v Mathai (Civil Appeal E003 of 2023) [2024] KEHC 4065 (KLR) (25 April 2024) (Judgment) where the court held as follows:
“From the foregoing, the police abstract is intended to capture particulars of the reported accident, owner of subject vehicle, injured person, insurance company and particulars thereof. I take note of the fact that police abstract is a public document and contents are filled by trained police officers who understand their work, understand integrity of public documents and the need to accurately fill particulars required to be filled in the police abstract. The contents of police abstract were not rebutted through any other evidence by the respondent/defendant. Bearing in mind that burden of proof on part of the appellant/plaintiff was on a balance of probabilities, in my view his prove through police abstract was sufficient in the absence of evidence to the contrary.”
13. The respondent submitted that in the present case, the police abstract clearly indicated that the appellant was the insurer of the subject motor vehicle and that the appellant failed to enter appearance in the primary suit despite them being served with a statutory notice. That the appellant cannot now fault the trial magistrate when they failed to discharge their evidential burden. The respondent further submitted that he had demonstrated before the trial court that a valid insurance policy existed as per the abstract, that the appellant had been served with the abstract and that a judgment had already been obtained against the insured.
14. Based on the foregoing submissions, the Respondent prayed that the appeal be dismissed with costs.
Analysis and Determination
15. The sole issue for determination in this appeal is whether the trial Court correctly allowed the application for striking out the defence and entering summary judgment for the respondent. In other words, whether the appellant’s statement of defence was frivolous and vexatious or whether it raised triable issues.
16. This being a first appeal, this court has a duty to re-evaluate and consider afresh the evidence tendered before the trial court and come to its own independent conclusion as was stated in Selle & Anor vs. Associated Motor Boat Co Ltd & Others [1968] EA 123).
17. The parties have sufficiently addressed the legal principles applicable when the court is dealing with an application for striking out pleadings. In the instant case, the appellant denied that it was the insurer of the subject motor vehicle. The trial court casually dismissed the defence as consisting of mere denials. In doing so, the trial court elevated the police abstract to such a high level that it failed to appreciate the evidence that the appellant had provided to in support of its defence that it was not the insurer of the accident motor vehicle. For instance, the appellant had, besides denying that it was the insurer of the subject motor vehicle, provided evidence to show that the said motor vehicle had in fact been insured by Occidental Insurance Company at the time of the accident. They had also pleaded that the police abstract contained erroneous information as the policy number indicated therein related to a different insured and was for a different motor vehicle, not the accident motor vehicle.
18. All the foregoing were serious triable issues which could not be determined through an application for striking out. Had the trial court correctly applied its mind to the information placed before it, it would no doubt have arrived at a different finding. I need not say more on this issue, my finding is that the trial court erred in law in striking out the appellant’s statement of defence yet it raised serious triable issues. This finding alone is sufficient to dispose of the appeal.
Disposition:
19. In the end, the following final orders hereby issue: -
a) The appeal is allowed.
b) The ruling of the Chief Magistrate’s Court as delivered on the 19 th September 2025 is set aside and substituted with an order dismissing the respondent’s Notice of Motion dated 1 st July 2025 with costs.
c) The matter is hereby remitted back to the lower court for hearing and determination on merit before a Judicial Officer other than Hon Rawlings Liluma Musiega.
d) The appellant is hereby awarded the costs of the appeal.
Dated, signed and delivered virtually this 25th day of June 2026.
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