[1] This appeal arose from the Judgment delivered by Hon. B. O. Omwansa, Senior Principal Magistrate on 20 th August 2020 in Oyugis C MCC No. 57 of 2020: Oscar Otieno alias Otieno Ogono in which the respondent had sued the appellant for compensation in general and special damages. The respondent had alleged that on or about the 3 rd January 2020, he was riding Motorcycle Registration No. KMEH 330X along Oyugis-Kisumu Road when at Ringa area, the appellant’s Motor Vehicle Registration No. KCW 143E was so negligently driven that it veered off its lane and knocked the Motor Cycle Registration No. KMEH 330X. He further contended that, as a result of the accident, he sustained severe bodily injuries.
[2] The respondent supplied the particulars of negligence and injuries at paragraphs 4 and 5 of his Plaint dated 16 th June 2020. He also claimed special damages of Kshs 7,050/= and provided the particulars thereof at paragraph 5 of the Plaint. Hence, the respondent prayed for special damages in the sum of Kshs. 7,050/=, the cost of further medical expenses, general damages to be assessed by the court, costs and interest at court rates and any other relief that the court may deem fit and to grant.
[3] The appellant denied the respondent’s allegations vide his Defence dated 30 th June 2020. He denied the occurrence of the accident as well as the allegations of negligence made against him. In the alternative and on a without prejudice basis, the appellant averred that if an accident occurred then the same was caused by the negligence of the respondent. He likewise supplied the particulars of negligence at paragraph 7 of his Defence.
[4] Upon hearing the parties, the learned magistrate found as a fact that the accident took place and apportioned liability at 20:80 in favour of the respondent. The learned magistrate then proceeded to assess general damages at Kshs. 250,000/= and special damages at Kshs. 7,050/=.
[5] Being aggrieved by that decision, the appellant filed the instant appeal on 13 th January 2023 on the following grounds:
[a] The learned magistrate erred in law and misdirected himself when he failed to consider the appellant’s submissions on both points of law and fact.
[b] The learned magistrate’s decision was unjust, against the weight of evidence and was based on misguided points of fact and wrong principles of law and has occasioned a miscarriage of justice.
[c] The learned magistrate erred in law and misdirected himself when he failed to consider the provisions set out in the Insurance (Motor Vehicle Third Party Risks) (Amendment) Act, 2013.
[d] The learned magistrate erred in law and fact in finding the appellant 80% liable in view of the evidence produced before the trial court and in particular in finding that the respondent had proved his case on liability against the appellant.
[e] The learned magistrate erred in law and fact in allowing the respondent’s claim which was not proved on a balance of probability as required by law.
[f] The learned magistrate misdirected himself and based his findings on wrong considerations.
[g] The learned magistrate erred in law and fact in failing to dismiss the respondent’s suit with costs.
[h] The learned magistrate erred in law and in fact in awarding general damages of Kshs. 250,000/=, an amount that was excessive and unjust in the circumstances considering the evidence adduced before the court and the principles of law.
[i] That the learned magistrate erred in law and fact in failing to appreciate and understand the provisions of Section 8 of the Traffic Act, Cap 403 of the Laws of Kenya.
[j] That the learned magistrate erred in law and fact in over relying on the respondent’s evidence and submissions.
[k] The learned magistrate erred in venturing to have extraneous issues as core issues for determination.
[l] The learned magistrate’s decision albeit discretionary is plainly wrong.
[6] Accordingly, the appellant prayed that the appeal be allowed in its entirety, that the whole judgment of the lower court delivered on 14 th December 2022 be set aside and the damages be assessed afresh.
be substituted with an order of this Court dismissing the said suit. The appellant also prayed that the costs of the appeal be provided for. The appellant also prayed for costs of the appeal and of the trial court.
[7] The appeal was canvassed by way of written submissions. The appellant relied on his written submissions dated 9 th May 2025. He reiterated the submissions filed before the subordinate court and added that, in view of the injuries suffered by the respondent, the sum awarded of Kshs. 250,000/= was excessive. He proposed an award of Kshs. 80,000/= and relied on the following authorities:
[a] Eva Karemi & 2 others v Koskey Kieng & another [2020] eKLR in which the court awarded Kshs. 70,000/= for comparable injuries.
[b] H B (Minor suing through the mother and next friend D K M v Jasper Nchonga Magari & another [2021] eKLR in which the plaintiff sustained blunt object injuries to the head and neck, thorax, abdomen and limbs. He was awarded Kshs. 60,000/=.
[8] On his part, the respondent relied on his written submissions dated 17 th June 2025. He proposed the following three issues for determination:
[a] Whether liability apportioned in the ratio of 80:20 in his favour was justifiable.
[b] Whether the award by the learned magistrate of Kshs. 250,000/= as general damages for pain and suffering was manifestly high as to warrant disturbance by the Court.
[c] Whether the circumstances of the case before the subordinate court, the weight of precedents in similar circumstances and the appellant’s submissions were considered.
[9] On liability, the respondent reiterated the evidence presented by him before the lower court and urged the Court to find he proved on a balance of probabilities that the appellant’s driver was to blame for the accident.by veering off his lane before hitting him on his correct lane. He nevertheless expressed his agreement that he ought to have been on the lookout as held by the lower court. Hence, the respondent submitted that the learned magistrate did not err in apportioning liability at 20:80 against the appellant.
[10] On quantum, the respondent set out the injuries suffered by him and submitted that he had proposed an award of Kshs. 500,000/= before the lower court. He relied on Telkom Orange Kenya Limited v I S O (minor suing through his next friend and mother J N) [2018] eKLR for the proposition that comparable injuries should as far as possible be compensated by comparable awards, while taking into account the diminishing value of the Kenya Shilling and the inflation rates. It was therefore the submission of the respondent that the sum awarded by the lower court was reasonable and no error of principle was committed by the lower court.
[11] The respondent urged the Court to find that the appeal is unmerited and to dismiss the appeal with costs.
[12] This being a first appeal, it is the duty of this Court to re-evaluate the evidence placed before the lower court and make its own conclusions thereon, while giving due consideration for the fact that it did not have the advantage of seeing or hearing the witnesses (see Selle & Another v Associated Motor Boat Co. Ltd & Others , supra). Having considered the grounds of appeal, the evidence adduced before the trial court, as well as the submissions and the authorities referred by learned counsel, the only issue arising for determination is whether the respondent proved his case before the lower court to the requisite standard on the twin issues of liability and quantum. In determining the above issue, the Court must always bear in mind the precept in
[13] In terms of burden of proof Sections 107,108 and 109 of the Evidence Act, Chapter 80 of the Laws of Kenya , are explicit that:
107(1) whoever desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts must prove that those acts exist.
(2) When a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact it is said that the burden of proof lies on that person.
108 The burden of proof in a suit or proceeding lies in that person who would fail if no evidence at all were given an either side.
109 the burden of proof as to any particular fact lies on the person who wishes the court to believe in its existence, unless it is provided by any law that the proof of that fact shall lie on any particular person.
[14] The Court of Appeal in the case of Antony Francis Wareham t/a AF Wareham & 2 others v Kenya Post Office Savings Bank [2004] eKLR held: -
“…we are impelled to state unequivocally that in our adversarial system of litigation, cases are tried and determined on the basis of the pleadings made and the issues of fact or law framed by the parties or the Court on the basis of those pleadings pursuant to the provisions of order XIV of the Civil Procedure Rules. And the burden of proof is on the plaintiff and the degree thereof is on a balance of probabilities. In discharging that burden, the only evidence to be adduced is evidence of existence or non-existence of the facts in issue or facts relevant to the issue. It follows from those principles that only evidence of facts pleaded is to be admitted and if the evidence does not support the facts pleaded, the party with the burden of proof should fail…”
[15] And, in Palace Investment Ltd v Geoffrey Kariuki Mwenda & Another [2015] eKLR, it was held that:
“Denning J, in Miller –vs- Minister of Pensions [1947] 2 All ER 372 discussing the burden of proof had this to say; -
a. “That degree is well settled. It must carry a reasonable degree of probability, but not so high as is required in a criminal case. If the evidence is such that a tribunal can say: we think it more probable than not; the burden is discharged, but, if the probabilities are equal it is not.
b. This burden on a balance or preponderance of probabilities means a win however narrow. A draw is not enough. So, in any case in which the tribunal cannot decide one way or the other which evidence to accept where both parties…are equally (un) convincing, the party bearing the burden of proof will lose because the requisite standard will not have been attained.”
[16] From the evidence presented before the lower court, it was clear that the appellant’s driver veered off his lane and thereby hit the respondent while on his (respondent’s) correct lane. In the circumstances, there is no basis for interfering with conclusion reached by the lower court. Indeed, in Peters v Sunday Post Limited [1958] EA 424 it was held that:
"It is a strong thing for an appellate court to differ from the finding, on a question of fact, of the judge who tried the case, and who has had the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses. An appellate court has, indeed, jurisdiction to review the evidence in order to determine whether the conclusion originally reached upon that evidence should stand. But this is a jurisdiction which should be exercised with caution; it is not enough that the appellate court might itself have come to a different conclusion..."
[17] Although the appellant contended that the learned magistrate erred in law and misdirected himself when he failed to consider the provisions set out in the Insurance (Motor Vehicle Third Party Risks) (Amendment) Act, 2013 as well as the provisions of the Traffic Act, he utterly failed to demonstrate in what respect this was so.
[18] On quantum, it was pointed out in H. West & Son Ltd v Shephard [1964] AC 326, that:
"...In a sphere in which no one can predicate with complete assurance that the award made by another is wrong the best that can be done is to pay regard to the range of limits of current thought. In a case such as the present it is natural and reasonable for any member of an appellate tribunal to pose for himself the question as to what award he himself would have made. Having done so, and remembering that in this sphere there are inevitably differences of view and of opinion, he does not however proceed to dismiss as wrong a figure of an award merely because it does not correspond with the figure of his own assessment."
[19] The Court of Appeal restated this principle thus in Hellen Waruguru Waweru (Suing as the legal representative of Peter Waweru Mwenja vs. Kiarie Shoe Stores Limited [2015] eKLR :
"As a general principle, assessment of damages lies in the discretion of the trial court and an appellate Court will not disturb an award of damages unless it is so inordinately high or low as to represent an erroneous estimate. It must be shown that the Judge proceeded on wrong principles or that he misapprehended the evidence in some material respect and so arrived at a figure which was either inordinately high or low. The Court must be satisfied that either the Judge, in assessing the damages, took into account an irrelevant factor, or left out of account a relevant one or that; short of this, the amount is so inordinately high that it must be a wholly erroneous estimate of the damages."
[20] As has been noted herein above, the lower court awarded the respondent Kshs. 250,000/= as general damages for her injuries along with special damages in the sum of Kshs. 7,050/=. There is no doubt that the respondent justified her claim for special damages by producing supporting documents. As such, there is no contention about that aspect of her claim. The dispute is in respect of the general damages component. The award, naturally, was premised on the nature of the respondent’s injuries. The injuries as pleaded and proved were:
[a] Bruises on the face
[b] Bruises on the scalp
[c] Bruises on the right knee
[d] Bruises on the right hand
[e] Blunt trauma to the mandibles
[21] The respondent produced a Medical Report prepared by Dr. Momanyi Peter Morebu dated 3 rd April 2020 in which he set out the aforementioned injuries. He also relied on the treatment documents and the P3 prepared and signed by Dr. Morebu confirming that the injuries suffered by the respondent were categorized as “harm”. That evidence was not rebutted by the appellant.
[22] The principle reiterated by the Court of Appeal in Stanley Maore v Geoffrey Mwenda [2004] eKLR, is that comparable injuries ought to be compensated by comparable awards. It expressed itself thus:
“…we must consider the award of damages in the light of the injuries sustained. It has been stated now and again that in assessment of damages, the general approach should be that comparable injuries should, as far as possible, be compensated by comparable awards keeping in mind the correct level of awards in similar cases.”
[23] The appellant relied on Channan Agricultural Constractors Ltd v Fred Barasa Mutayo [2013] eKLR in which an award of Kshs. 150,000/= was made for soft tissue injuries to the chest, cut wounds on the head and left leg. Similarly, in Surian Enterprises Ltd v Mary Bahati Peter (Civil Appeal No. E199 of 2021) [2023] KEHC 20426 (KLR) (5 July 2023) (Judgment) an award of Kshs. 300,000/= for soft tissue injuries, including deep cut on the forehead and blunt injury to the right knee, was considered inordinately high. Consequently, the award was reduced to Kshs. 150,000/=.
[24] Thus guided by the two decisions above, it is plain that the award made by the lower court was on the higher side. On the basis of the Surian case , I consider an award of Kshs. 150,000/= to be fair and reasonable in the circumstances.
[25] In the premises, I find merit in the appeal on quantum. The same is hereby allowed and orders granted as follows:
[a] That the judgment and decree of the lower court on general damages be and is hereby set aside, and is substituted with an award of Kshs. 150,000/=.
[b] That the judgment and decree of the lower court on special damages and costs of the lower court be and is hereby upheld.
[c] That costs of the appeal be and are hereby awarded to the appellant.
It is so ordered.
DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED VIRTUALLY THIS 14 TH DAY OF AUGUST, 2026
[2] The respondent supplied the particulars of negligence and injuries at paragraphs 4 and 5 of his Plaint dated 16 th June 2020. He also claimed special damages of Kshs 7,050/= and provided the particulars thereof at paragraph 5 of the Plaint. Hence, the respondent prayed for special damages in the sum of Kshs. 7,050/=, the cost of further medical expenses, general damages to be assessed by the court, costs and interest at court rates and any other relief that the court may deem fit and to grant.
[3] The appellant denied the respondent’s allegations vide his Defence dated 30 th June 2020. He denied the occurrence of the accident as well as the allegations of negligence made against him. In the alternative and on a without prejudice basis, the appellant averred that if an accident occurred then the same was caused by the negligence of the respondent. He likewise supplied the particulars of negligence at paragraph 7 of his Defence.
[4] Upon hearing the parties, the learned magistrate found as a fact that the accident took place and apportioned liability at 20:80 in favour of the respondent. The learned magistrate then proceeded to assess general damages at Kshs. 250,000/= and special damages at Kshs. 7,050/=.
[5] Being aggrieved by that decision, the appellant filed the instant appeal on 13 th January 2023 on the following grounds:
[a] The learned magistrate erred in law and misdirected himself when he failed to consider the appellant’s submissions on both points of law and fact.
[b] The learned magistrate’s decision was unjust, against the weight of evidence and was based on misguided points of fact and wrong principles of law and has occasioned a miscarriage of justice.
[c] The learned magistrate erred in law and misdirected himself when he failed to consider the provisions set out in the Insurance (Motor Vehicle Third Party Risks) (Amendment) Act, 2013.
[d] The learned magistrate erred in law and fact in finding the appellant 80% liable in view of the evidence produced before the trial court and in particular in finding that the respondent had proved his case on liability against the appellant.
[e] The learned magistrate erred in law and fact in allowing the respondent’s claim which was not proved on a balance of probability as required by law.
[f] The learned magistrate misdirected himself and based his findings on wrong considerations.
[g] The learned magistrate erred in law and fact in failing to dismiss the respondent’s suit with costs.
[h] The learned magistrate erred in law and in fact in awarding general damages of Kshs. 250,000/=, an amount that was excessive and unjust in the circumstances considering the evidence adduced before the court and the principles of law.
[i] That the learned magistrate erred in law and fact in failing to appreciate and understand the provisions of Section 8 of the Traffic Act, Cap 403 of the Laws of Kenya.
[j] That the learned magistrate erred in law and fact in over relying on the respondent’s evidence and submissions.
[k] The learned magistrate erred in venturing to have extraneous issues as core issues for determination.
[l] The learned magistrate’s decision albeit discretionary is plainly wrong.
[6] Accordingly, the appellant prayed that the appeal be allowed in its entirety, that the whole judgment of the lower court delivered on 14 th December 2022 be set aside and the damages be assessed afresh.
be substituted with an order of this Court dismissing the said suit. The appellant also prayed that the costs of the appeal be provided for. The appellant also prayed for costs of the appeal and of the trial court.
[7] The appeal was canvassed by way of written submissions. The appellant relied on his written submissions dated 9 th May 2025. He reiterated the submissions filed before the subordinate court and added that, in view of the injuries suffered by the respondent, the sum awarded of Kshs. 250,000/= was excessive. He proposed an award of Kshs. 80,000/= and relied on the following authorities:
[a] Eva Karemi & 2 others v Koskey Kieng & another [2020] eKLR in which the court awarded Kshs. 70,000/= for comparable injuries.
[b] H B (Minor suing through the mother and next friend D K M v Jasper Nchonga Magari & another [2021] eKLR in which the plaintiff sustained blunt object injuries to the head and neck, thorax, abdomen and limbs. He was awarded Kshs. 60,000/=.
[8] On his part, the respondent relied on his written submissions dated 17 th June 2025. He proposed the following three issues for determination:
[a] Whether liability apportioned in the ratio of 80:20 in his favour was justifiable.
[b] Whether the award by the learned magistrate of Kshs. 250,000/= as general damages for pain and suffering was manifestly high as to warrant disturbance by the Court.
[c] Whether the circumstances of the case before the subordinate court, the weight of precedents in similar circumstances and the appellant’s submissions were considered.
[9] On liability, the respondent reiterated the evidence presented by him before the lower court and urged the Court to find he proved on a balance of probabilities that the appellant’s driver was to blame for the accident.by veering off his lane before hitting him on his correct lane. He nevertheless expressed his agreement that he ought to have been on the lookout as held by the lower court. Hence, the respondent submitted that the learned magistrate did not err in apportioning liability at 20:80 against the appellant.
[10] On quantum, the respondent set out the injuries suffered by him and submitted that he had proposed an award of Kshs. 500,000/= before the lower court. He relied on Telkom Orange Kenya Limited v I S O (minor suing through his next friend and mother J N) [2018] eKLR for the proposition that comparable injuries should as far as possible be compensated by comparable awards, while taking into account the diminishing value of the Kenya Shilling and the inflation rates. It was therefore the submission of the respondent that the sum awarded by the lower court was reasonable and no error of principle was committed by the lower court.
[11] The respondent urged the Court to find that the appeal is unmerited and to dismiss the appeal with costs.
[12] This being a first appeal, it is the duty of this Court to re-evaluate the evidence placed before the lower court and make its own conclusions thereon, while giving due consideration for the fact that it did not have the advantage of seeing or hearing the witnesses (see Selle & Another v Associated Motor Boat Co. Ltd & Others , supra). Having considered the grounds of appeal, the evidence adduced before the trial court, as well as the submissions and the authorities referred by learned counsel, the only issue arising for determination is whether the respondent proved his case before the lower court to the requisite standard on the twin issues of liability and quantum. In determining the above issue, the Court must always bear in mind the precept in
[13] In terms of burden of proof Sections 107,108 and 109 of the Evidence Act, Chapter 80 of the Laws of Kenya , are explicit that:
107(1) whoever desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts must prove that those acts exist.
(2) When a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact it is said that the burden of proof lies on that person.
108 The burden of proof in a suit or proceeding lies in that person who would fail if no evidence at all were given an either side.
109 the burden of proof as to any particular fact lies on the person who wishes the court to believe in its existence, unless it is provided by any law that the proof of that fact shall lie on any particular person.
[14] The Court of Appeal in the case of Antony Francis Wareham t/a AF Wareham & 2 others v Kenya Post Office Savings Bank [2004] eKLR held: -
“…we are impelled to state unequivocally that in our adversarial system of litigation, cases are tried and determined on the basis of the pleadings made and the issues of fact or law framed by the parties or the Court on the basis of those pleadings pursuant to the provisions of order XIV of the Civil Procedure Rules. And the burden of proof is on the plaintiff and the degree thereof is on a balance of probabilities. In discharging that burden, the only evidence to be adduced is evidence of existence or non-existence of the facts in issue or facts relevant to the issue. It follows from those principles that only evidence of facts pleaded is to be admitted and if the evidence does not support the facts pleaded, the party with the burden of proof should fail…”
[15] And, in Palace Investment Ltd v Geoffrey Kariuki Mwenda & Another [2015] eKLR, it was held that:
“Denning J, in Miller –vs- Minister of Pensions [1947] 2 All ER 372 discussing the burden of proof had this to say; -
a. “That degree is well settled. It must carry a reasonable degree of probability, but not so high as is required in a criminal case. If the evidence is such that a tribunal can say: we think it more probable than not; the burden is discharged, but, if the probabilities are equal it is not.
b. This burden on a balance or preponderance of probabilities means a win however narrow. A draw is not enough. So, in any case in which the tribunal cannot decide one way or the other which evidence to accept where both parties…are equally (un) convincing, the party bearing the burden of proof will lose because the requisite standard will not have been attained.”
[16] From the evidence presented before the lower court, it was clear that the appellant’s driver veered off his lane and thereby hit the respondent while on his (respondent’s) correct lane. In the circumstances, there is no basis for interfering with conclusion reached by the lower court. Indeed, in Peters v Sunday Post Limited [1958] EA 424 it was held that:
"It is a strong thing for an appellate court to differ from the finding, on a question of fact, of the judge who tried the case, and who has had the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses. An appellate court has, indeed, jurisdiction to review the evidence in order to determine whether the conclusion originally reached upon that evidence should stand. But this is a jurisdiction which should be exercised with caution; it is not enough that the appellate court might itself have come to a different conclusion..."
[17] Although the appellant contended that the learned magistrate erred in law and misdirected himself when he failed to consider the provisions set out in the Insurance (Motor Vehicle Third Party Risks) (Amendment) Act, 2013 as well as the provisions of the Traffic Act, he utterly failed to demonstrate in what respect this was so.
[18] On quantum, it was pointed out in H. West & Son Ltd v Shephard [1964] AC 326, that:
"...In a sphere in which no one can predicate with complete assurance that the award made by another is wrong the best that can be done is to pay regard to the range of limits of current thought. In a case such as the present it is natural and reasonable for any member of an appellate tribunal to pose for himself the question as to what award he himself would have made. Having done so, and remembering that in this sphere there are inevitably differences of view and of opinion, he does not however proceed to dismiss as wrong a figure of an award merely because it does not correspond with the figure of his own assessment."
[19] The Court of Appeal restated this principle thus in Hellen Waruguru Waweru (Suing as the legal representative of Peter Waweru Mwenja vs. Kiarie Shoe Stores Limited [2015] eKLR :
"As a general principle, assessment of damages lies in the discretion of the trial court and an appellate Court will not disturb an award of damages unless it is so inordinately high or low as to represent an erroneous estimate. It must be shown that the Judge proceeded on wrong principles or that he misapprehended the evidence in some material respect and so arrived at a figure which was either inordinately high or low. The Court must be satisfied that either the Judge, in assessing the damages, took into account an irrelevant factor, or left out of account a relevant one or that; short of this, the amount is so inordinately high that it must be a wholly erroneous estimate of the damages."
[20] As has been noted herein above, the lower court awarded the respondent Kshs. 250,000/= as general damages for her injuries along with special damages in the sum of Kshs. 7,050/=. There is no doubt that the respondent justified her claim for special damages by producing supporting documents. As such, there is no contention about that aspect of her claim. The dispute is in respect of the general damages component. The award, naturally, was premised on the nature of the respondent’s injuries. The injuries as pleaded and proved were:
[a] Bruises on the face
[b] Bruises on the scalp
[c] Bruises on the right knee
[d] Bruises on the right hand
[e] Blunt trauma to the mandibles
[21] The respondent produced a Medical Report prepared by Dr. Momanyi Peter Morebu dated 3 rd April 2020 in which he set out the aforementioned injuries. He also relied on the treatment documents and the P3 prepared and signed by Dr. Morebu confirming that the injuries suffered by the respondent were categorized as “harm”. That evidence was not rebutted by the appellant.
[22] The principle reiterated by the Court of Appeal in Stanley Maore v Geoffrey Mwenda [2004] eKLR, is that comparable injuries ought to be compensated by comparable awards. It expressed itself thus:
“…we must consider the award of damages in the light of the injuries sustained. It has been stated now and again that in assessment of damages, the general approach should be that comparable injuries should, as far as possible, be compensated by comparable awards keeping in mind the correct level of awards in similar cases.”
[23] The appellant relied on Channan Agricultural Constractors Ltd v Fred Barasa Mutayo [2013] eKLR in which an award of Kshs. 150,000/= was made for soft tissue injuries to the chest, cut wounds on the head and left leg. Similarly, in Surian Enterprises Ltd v Mary Bahati Peter (Civil Appeal No. E199 of 2021) [2023] KEHC 20426 (KLR) (5 July 2023) (Judgment) an award of Kshs. 300,000/= for soft tissue injuries, including deep cut on the forehead and blunt injury to the right knee, was considered inordinately high. Consequently, the award was reduced to Kshs. 150,000/=.
[24] Thus guided by the two decisions above, it is plain that the award made by the lower court was on the higher side. On the basis of the Surian case , I consider an award of Kshs. 150,000/= to be fair and reasonable in the circumstances.
[25] In the premises, I find merit in the appeal on quantum. The same is hereby allowed and orders granted as follows:
[a] That the judgment and decree of the lower court on general damages be and is hereby set aside, and is substituted with an award of Kshs. 150,000/=.
[b] That the judgment and decree of the lower court on special damages and costs of the lower court be and is hereby upheld.
[c] That costs of the appeal be and are hereby awarded to the appellant.
It is so ordered.
DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED VIRTUALLY THIS 14 TH DAY OF AUGUST, 2026