1. Edna Magoma Matagi was convicted on 29th June 2026 of the murder of her son, Master Derrick Ombui Ogisi, contrary to section 203 as read with section 204 of the Penal Code. The deceased was about two years and eight months old. The court found that he died from head injury due to blunt-force trauma inflicted while he was in the convict's immediate care.
2. Before sentencing, the court received the mitigation made on behalf of the convict, the prosecution's confirmation that she has no previous criminal record, and a pre-sentence report dated 20th July 2026. I have considered all that material together with the circumstances established in the judgment.
The applicable sentencing principles
3. Section 204 of the Penal Code prescribes death as the punishment for murder. In Francis Karioko Muruatetu & another v Republic [2017] eKLR, as clarified in Muruatetu & another v Republic; Katiba Institute & 5 others (Amicus Curiae) [2021] KESC 31 (KLR), the Supreme Court held that the death sentence is not mandatory and that the court must undertake an individualised sentencing inquiry and impose a lawful and proportionate sentence after considering the offence, the offender, the victim and the interests of the community. The death sentence remains lawful, but it is reserved for an appropriate case.
4. The Sentencing Policy Guidelines, 2023 require a court to balance retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation, restorative justice, community protection and denunciation. No one objective is decisive in every case. The ultimate sentence must reflect both the seriousness of the harm and the convict's personal culpability.
Aggravating factors
5. The aggravating circumstances are substantial. The child lost his life in this case, The deceased was a toddler: defenceless, wholly dependent on adults and incapable of protecting himself or reporting abuse. The fatal force was directed to his head, a vulnerable and vital part of the body, and caused a frontal subgaleal haematoma, parietal-occipital injury, skull injury and cerebral oedema.
6. The offence also involved a grave breach of parental trust. The deceased was entitled to safety in his mother's care. Article 53(1)(d) of the Constitution protects every child from abuse and violence. A sentence must therefore affirm the sanctity of the deceased's life and the duty owed to children of tender years.
Mitigating factors
7. The convict is 29 years old and a first offender. There is no history of violence, alcohol or substance abuse. Her family, the local administration and members of the community describe her as hardworking, responsible and ordinarily of good character. The probation officer assessed her as presenting a low risk to public safety and as having favourable prospects of rehabilitation.
8. The pre-sentence inquiry reveals that the offence occurred against a background of prolonged marital conflict, domestic abuse, financial hardship, limited emotional support and the demands of caring for a child with a congenital heart condition. Those circumstances neither excuse nor justify the unlawful act. They nevertheless provide relevant context when assessing the degree of moral blameworthiness.
9. The report records that the convict has now accepted that she struck the child on the head with a cooking stick when she became overwhelmed by his persistent crying. She describes the act as impulsive and unpremeditated. This post-conviction account does not reopen or qualify the findings in the judgment. I take it only as an acceptance of responsibility for the fatal act and as evidence relevant to remorse.
10. After the child became critically ill, the convict screamed for assistance and neighbours helped take him to hospital. She did not flee and later presented herself to the police with the local administration. The report describes her remorse as genuine and her grief as profound. Her willingness to undertake counselling, parenting support and trauma-focused intervention is a positive indicator of reform.
11. The deceased's father does not harbour resentment towards the convict. He believes that she loved the child, supports a rehabilitative outcome and wishes her an opportunity to rebuild her life. The victim's family's views are important and have been accorded due weight. Still, they cannot determine the sentence or displace the public interest in proportionate accountability for the loss of a child's life.
12. The convict is also the mother of two surviving children. Her one-year-old child, who is presently with her in custody and is said to have been diagnosed with a urachal cyst and awaits corrective surgery. Article 53(2) of the Constitution requires the child's best interests to be a primary consideration. Though the convict is a mother of a young child said to be having a medical condition requiring surgery, the deceased was also her son whose life was cut short by the acts of the mother. There is thus a need to balance the rights of both children. The sick child's welfare is therefore relevant, but it cannot by itself erase the gravity of this offence. This court must protect it through suitable care and continuity of medical treatment.
Whether a non-custodial sentence is appropriate
13. The probation officer recommends that the convict be placed on probation for three years. A pre-sentence report is an important aid to the court, but its recommendation is advisory. The court remains responsible for determining a just and proportionate sentence.
14. I have considered the recommendation with care. The convict's low risk of reoffending, family support, remorse and rehabilitative prospects strongly militate against the death sentence, life imprisonment or a very long custodial term. They do not, however, make three years' probation proportionate to the intentional application of fatal blunt force to the head of a toddler by the very person entrusted with his care. Such a sentence would inadequately reflect the harm caused, the victim's vulnerability, deterrence, denunciation, and public confidence in the administration of justice.
15. A custodial sentence is therefore necessary as it will punish and denounce the offence while preserving a realistic opportunity for rehabilitation and reintegration.
Sentence and final orders
16. Balancing all the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, I sentence Edna Magoma Matagi to twelve (12) years' imprisonment.
17. In compliance with section 333(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, the sentence shall take full account of every day the convict spent in lawful custody in this case before sentence. The record indicates that she was first arraigned in court on 31st August 2023, remained in custody until her release on bond on 6th May 2024 (250 days), and was remanded again following conviction on 29th June 2026 until today (sentencing date). The prison authorities shall take into account the 250 + 79 = 329 days the convict spent in custody when computing her sentence.
18. The Officer in Charge of the prison where she will serve the sentence shall facilitate the convict's enrolment in counselling, anger-management, parenting and trauma-focused psychosocial programmes and shall ensure that she receives any necessary mental-health assessment and support.
19. The Kisii County Children Officer, working with the Officer in Charge of the prison and the child's father, shall promptly make suitable care arrangements for the convict's one-year-old child and ensure continuity of the child's scheduled medical review and corrective treatment.
20. The convict has a right of appeal against the sentence. The Court has explained this right to her.
T. A. ODERA
JUDGE
16.9.2026
DELIVERED VIRTUALLY VIA MICROSOFT TEAMS AT KISII THIS 16TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER 2026.
In the presence of:
Mr Koima for the State
Mr Magara for the Accused
Accused present
Court Assistant: George Onkundi
2. Before sentencing, the court received the mitigation made on behalf of the convict, the prosecution's confirmation that she has no previous criminal record, and a pre-sentence report dated 20th July 2026. I have considered all that material together with the circumstances established in the judgment.
The applicable sentencing principles
3. Section 204 of the Penal Code prescribes death as the punishment for murder. In Francis Karioko Muruatetu & another v Republic [2017] eKLR, as clarified in Muruatetu & another v Republic; Katiba Institute & 5 others (Amicus Curiae) [2021] KESC 31 (KLR), the Supreme Court held that the death sentence is not mandatory and that the court must undertake an individualised sentencing inquiry and impose a lawful and proportionate sentence after considering the offence, the offender, the victim and the interests of the community. The death sentence remains lawful, but it is reserved for an appropriate case.
4. The Sentencing Policy Guidelines, 2023 require a court to balance retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation, restorative justice, community protection and denunciation. No one objective is decisive in every case. The ultimate sentence must reflect both the seriousness of the harm and the convict's personal culpability.
Aggravating factors
5. The aggravating circumstances are substantial. The child lost his life in this case, The deceased was a toddler: defenceless, wholly dependent on adults and incapable of protecting himself or reporting abuse. The fatal force was directed to his head, a vulnerable and vital part of the body, and caused a frontal subgaleal haematoma, parietal-occipital injury, skull injury and cerebral oedema.
6. The offence also involved a grave breach of parental trust. The deceased was entitled to safety in his mother's care. Article 53(1)(d) of the Constitution protects every child from abuse and violence. A sentence must therefore affirm the sanctity of the deceased's life and the duty owed to children of tender years.
Mitigating factors
7. The convict is 29 years old and a first offender. There is no history of violence, alcohol or substance abuse. Her family, the local administration and members of the community describe her as hardworking, responsible and ordinarily of good character. The probation officer assessed her as presenting a low risk to public safety and as having favourable prospects of rehabilitation.
8. The pre-sentence inquiry reveals that the offence occurred against a background of prolonged marital conflict, domestic abuse, financial hardship, limited emotional support and the demands of caring for a child with a congenital heart condition. Those circumstances neither excuse nor justify the unlawful act. They nevertheless provide relevant context when assessing the degree of moral blameworthiness.
9. The report records that the convict has now accepted that she struck the child on the head with a cooking stick when she became overwhelmed by his persistent crying. She describes the act as impulsive and unpremeditated. This post-conviction account does not reopen or qualify the findings in the judgment. I take it only as an acceptance of responsibility for the fatal act and as evidence relevant to remorse.
10. After the child became critically ill, the convict screamed for assistance and neighbours helped take him to hospital. She did not flee and later presented herself to the police with the local administration. The report describes her remorse as genuine and her grief as profound. Her willingness to undertake counselling, parenting support and trauma-focused intervention is a positive indicator of reform.
11. The deceased's father does not harbour resentment towards the convict. He believes that she loved the child, supports a rehabilitative outcome and wishes her an opportunity to rebuild her life. The victim's family's views are important and have been accorded due weight. Still, they cannot determine the sentence or displace the public interest in proportionate accountability for the loss of a child's life.
12. The convict is also the mother of two surviving children. Her one-year-old child, who is presently with her in custody and is said to have been diagnosed with a urachal cyst and awaits corrective surgery. Article 53(2) of the Constitution requires the child's best interests to be a primary consideration. Though the convict is a mother of a young child said to be having a medical condition requiring surgery, the deceased was also her son whose life was cut short by the acts of the mother. There is thus a need to balance the rights of both children. The sick child's welfare is therefore relevant, but it cannot by itself erase the gravity of this offence. This court must protect it through suitable care and continuity of medical treatment.
Whether a non-custodial sentence is appropriate
13. The probation officer recommends that the convict be placed on probation for three years. A pre-sentence report is an important aid to the court, but its recommendation is advisory. The court remains responsible for determining a just and proportionate sentence.
14. I have considered the recommendation with care. The convict's low risk of reoffending, family support, remorse and rehabilitative prospects strongly militate against the death sentence, life imprisonment or a very long custodial term. They do not, however, make three years' probation proportionate to the intentional application of fatal blunt force to the head of a toddler by the very person entrusted with his care. Such a sentence would inadequately reflect the harm caused, the victim's vulnerability, deterrence, denunciation, and public confidence in the administration of justice.
15. A custodial sentence is therefore necessary as it will punish and denounce the offence while preserving a realistic opportunity for rehabilitation and reintegration.
Sentence and final orders
16. Balancing all the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, I sentence Edna Magoma Matagi to twelve (12) years' imprisonment.
17. In compliance with section 333(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, the sentence shall take full account of every day the convict spent in lawful custody in this case before sentence. The record indicates that she was first arraigned in court on 31st August 2023, remained in custody until her release on bond on 6th May 2024 (250 days), and was remanded again following conviction on 29th June 2026 until today (sentencing date). The prison authorities shall take into account the 250 + 79 = 329 days the convict spent in custody when computing her sentence.
18. The Officer in Charge of the prison where she will serve the sentence shall facilitate the convict's enrolment in counselling, anger-management, parenting and trauma-focused psychosocial programmes and shall ensure that she receives any necessary mental-health assessment and support.
19. The Kisii County Children Officer, working with the Officer in Charge of the prison and the child's father, shall promptly make suitable care arrangements for the convict's one-year-old child and ensure continuity of the child's scheduled medical review and corrective treatment.
20. The convict has a right of appeal against the sentence. The Court has explained this right to her.
T. A. ODERA
JUDGE
16.9.2026
DELIVERED VIRTUALLY VIA MICROSOFT TEAMS AT KISII THIS 16TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER 2026.
In the presence of:
Mr Koima for the State
Mr Magara for the Accused
Accused present
Court Assistant: George Onkundi