Skip to content
JudgmentSPACEBUSTER LIMITED VS CALEB MATENGO OSORE AND PAMELA ATIENO NYAMORI AND 1 Others11 min read

SPACEBUSTER LIMITED VS CALEB MATENGO OSORE AND PAMELA ATIENO NYAMORI AND 1 Others

High Court at Kisumu High Court · · Joe M. Omido

1. By way of the plaint dated 23rd February, 2026, the Plaintiff, Spacebuster Company Limited, instituted the present suit based on a lease agreement it entered into with the 1st and 2nd Defendants concerning two parcels of land, namely Kisumu/Manyatta ‘A’/844 and Kisumu/Manyatta ‘A’/845, which are jointly registered in the names of the 1st and 2nd Defendants.

2. The Plaintiff averred that, under the lease, it undertook to develop the two parcels of land at its own expense, constructing 31 permanent business units at a total cost of Ksh.10,120,000/-, each of which it intended to lease out at a monthly rent of Ksh.15,000/- per unit.

3. The Plaintiff further alleged that the Defendants deliberately frustrated the lease agreement by rendering the premises uninhabitable and hostile to the intended business operations.

4. The Plaintiff claimed that the Defendants employed goons to intimidate and harass the tenants occupying the business units, with the objective of forcing the Plaintiff to vacate the premises. This conduct, the Plaintiff pleaded, constituted a breach of contract, resulting in a loss of monthly rental income amounting to Ksh.480,000/-, while the Plaintiff continued to pay the agreed monthly rent of Ksh.90,000/- to the 1st and 2nd Defendants.

5. The Plaintiff sought the following reliefs against the Defendants jointly and severally:

a. A permanent injunction restraining the Defendants of their own, or through their authorized officers, agents and/or employees, from evicting the Plaintiff, trespassing onto, alienating or in any other way howsoever, interfering with the Plaintiff's lawful occupation and use of all that parcel of land designated as Kisumu/Manyatta “A”/844 and 845.

b. That the Defendants compensate the Plaintiff to the full extent of the costs incurred in developing the property amounting to Ksh.10,120,000/- and the loss of projected business income in the sum of Ksh.28,800,000/- for a term of five years as agreed.

c. Costs of the suit.

6. Contemporaneous with the plaint, the Plaintiff filed a notice of motion dated 22nd February, 2026 seeking interim injunctive relief pending the hearing and determination of the suit.

7. When the Plaintiff’s motion was called for directions, I considered the prayers in the application and the reliefs sought in the plaint and, sua sponte, raised the issue of jurisdiction, specifically whether this Court was the proper forum for the suit or whether it should have been filed in the Environment and Land Court (ELC). I accordingly directed the parties to file skeleton submissions addressing this issue before any further proceedings could be taken.

8. In their submissions, the Defendants take the position that this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the present suit, emphasizing that jurisdiction is a fundamental prerequisite for any court’s authority to adjudicate a matter. They rely on the well-established principle in Owners of the Motor Vessel “Lillian S” v Caltex Oil (Kenya) Ltd (1989) KLR 1, where Nyarangi JA famously held that “jurisdiction is everything” and that a court must immediately down its tools once it determines that it lacks jurisdiction.

9. The Defendants further submit that Article 162(2)(b) of the Constitution establishes the ELC with the specific mandate to hear and determine disputes relating to the environment, as well as the use, occupation and title to land. They argue that this constitutional provision is reinforced by Section 13 of the Environment and Land Court Act, which confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the ELC over disputes concerning title, occupation, use and interests in land.

10. It is the Defendants’ contention that the Plaintiff’s pleadings clearly disclose that the dispute revolves around land and/or proprietary interests therein, thereby bringing the matter squarely within the jurisdiction of the ELC. They assert that the High Court cannot assume jurisdiction over a matter that has been expressly and constitutionally reserved for a specialized court.

11. In further support of their argument, the Defendants rely on the decision in Republic v Karisa Chengo & 2 Others [2017] eKLR, where the Supreme Court underscored that although the High Court and the courts established under Article 162(2) are of equal status, they exercise distinct and separate jurisdictions. On this basis, the Defendants maintain that this Court lacks the requisite jurisdiction to hear and determine the present dispute.

12. In conclusion, the Defendants submit that this Court lacks jurisdiction to determine the dispute. Consequently, they urge the Court to dismiss the suit with costs.

13. On its part, the Plaintiff submits that the nature of the claim before the Court is primarily commercial, going by the reliefs sought, which include compensation for business losses and restraining orders to protect the Plaintiff’s business situated on parcels of land known as Kisumu/Manyatta “A”/844 and 845. The Plaintiff contends that the reference to land is merely incidental, being the location upon which the business operates, and does not transform the dispute into a land dispute per se.

14. The Plaintiff acknowledges that the ELC is a specialized court established under Article 162(2)(b) of the Constitution and operationalized through the Environment and Land Court Act, whose mandate is to hear and determine disputes relating to the environment and the use, occupation and title to land.

15. In elaborating on the jurisdiction of the ELC, the Plaintiff refers to Section 13(1) of the Environment and Land Court Act, which grants the Court original and appellate jurisdiction over disputes relating to environment and land, as well as Section 13(2), which enumerates specific categories of disputes falling within its mandate, including those relating to land use, title, tenure, boundaries, compulsory acquisition, land administration and other interests in land.

16. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Plaintiff maintains that a strict interpretation of the pleadings and the reliefs sought reveals that the present dispute does not fall within any of the categories outlined under Section 13(2) of the Act. The Plaintiff emphasizes that although land is mentioned, the dispute does not concern title, occupation, use or any enforceable interest in land as contemplated under the statute.

17. The Plaintiff further submits that pursuant to Article 165 of the Constitution, the High Court is vested with unlimited original jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters, save for those expressly reserved for courts established under Article 162(2). It is argued that since the present dispute does not fall within the jurisdiction of the ELC, this Court is properly seized of jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter.

18. In conclusion, the Plaintiff urges the Court to find that it has jurisdiction over the dispute and to proceed with the matter accordingly.

19. Having considered the record, the plaint and the rival submissions by the parties, the Court is of the view that the issues that arise for determination are as follows:

a. Whether this Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine the present dispute, having regard to the nature of the Plaintiff’s claim, the reliefs sought and the constitutional and statutory provisions governing the jurisdictional mandate of the High Court vis-à-vis the ELC.

b. If this Court finds that it lacks jurisdiction, whether it has the power to transfer the suit to the ELC for hearing and determination, as opposed to striking out or dismissing the suit.

c. Who should bear the costs of the proceedings, taking into account the outcome of the Court’s determination on jurisdiction and any consequential orders made therein.

20. I will proceed to determine the issues seriatim.

21. The first issue for determination is whether this Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine the present dispute. Jurisdiction is a threshold issue that must be resolved at the earliest opportunity.

22. The law on jurisdiction is firmly settled. In the case of Owners of the Motor Vessel “Lillian S” v Caltex Oil (Kenya) Ltd [1989] KLR, Nyarangi JA stated as follows, in his canonical words:

“Jurisdiction is everything. Without it, a court has no power to make one more step… A court of law downs tools in respect of the matter before it the moment it holds the opinion that it is without jurisdiction.”

23. This principle underscores that a court must first satisfy itself that it is properly seized of jurisdiction before proceeding any further.

24. The Supreme Court in the case of Samuel Kamau Macharia & another v Kenya Commercial Bank Limited & 2 others [2012] eKLR authoritatively pronounced itself on the source of jurisdiction, holding that:

“A Court’s jurisdiction flows from either the Constitution or legislation or both… A Court of law cannot arrogate to itself jurisdiction exceeding that which is conferred upon it by law.”

25. The Court further emphasized that where the Constitution exhaustively provides for the jurisdiction of a court, that court must operate strictly within those limits.

26. The distinct and separate jurisdiction of courts established under Article 162(2) of the Constitution was addressed in the authority of Karisa Chengo & 2 others v Republic [2015] eKLR, in which the Court of Appeal held that the specialized courts created under that Article are not divisions of the High Court but are courts of equal status exercising different jurisdictions. This position was affirmed by the Supreme Court in Republic v Karisa Chengo & 2 Others [2017] eKLR, in which the Court stated that:

“The three courts, though of the same status, have different jurisdictions… each exercises jurisdiction as conferred by the Constitution or legislation, and none can trespass upon the jurisdiction of the other.”

27. Further guidance is found in Mohamed Ali Baadi & others v Attorney General & 11 others [2018] eKLR where the Court held that in determining jurisdiction, a court must consider the substance of the dispute. The applicable doctrine, to that end, is the predominant purpose doctrine.

28. In Mohamed Ali Baadi, the Court, in applying the doctrine, observed that where a matter predominantly concerns the use, occupation and title to land, it falls within the jurisdiction of the ELC, even where other ancillary issues arise. In that case, the Court emphasized that jurisdiction is determined not by the form of the pleadings, but by the true nature of the dispute.

29. Applying the foregoing principles to the present case, it is evident that the Plaintiff’s claim arises from a lease agreement over land parcels known as Kisumu/Manyatta “A”/844 and 845. The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants have interfered with its quiet possession and enjoyment of the suit premises and seeks, inter alia, a permanent injunction restraining the Defendants from evicting it or otherwise interfering with its occupation and use of the land.

30. While the Plaintiff has framed part of its claim as one for compensation for business losses and development costs, those claims are directly anchored on the alleged interference with its possession and use of the suit properties. The alleged acts of intimidation and disruption of tenants are, in essence, complaints relating to the Plaintiff’s right to occupy and utilize the leased premises without interference.

31. In line with the holding in Mohamed Ali Baadi & others, this Court is enjoined to look at the substance rather than the form of the dispute. The substratum of the present suit concerns the Plaintiff’s rights of occupation, use and quiet enjoyment of land, which are matters falling squarely within the jurisdiction of the ELC under Article 162(2)(b) of the Constitution and Section 13 of the Environment and Land Court Act.

32. Guided by the binding authorities cited above, this Court finds that the dispute herein falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the ELC. In the premises, and in keeping with the settled legal position that a court without jurisdiction must down its tools, this Court holds that it lacks jurisdiction to hear and determine the present suit.

33. Having found that this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear and determine the present suit, the next question is whether this Court may transfer the matter to the ELC or whether it must simply stop proceedings altogether. In addressing this issue, it is necessary to examine the settled law on whether a court that is without jurisdiction can transfer a suit to another forum.

34. The Court of Appeal in Phoenix of E.A. Assurance Company Limited v S. M. Thiga t/a Newspaper Service [2019] eKLR clearly stated that jurisdiction must be present at the inception of a suit and that a court cannot cure a jurisdictional defect by transfer. The Court observed that:

“Jurisdiction is primordial in every suit. It has to be there when the suit is filed in the first place. If a suit is filed without jurisdiction, the only remedy is to withdraw it and file a compliant one in the court seized of jurisdiction. A suit filed devoid of jurisdiction is dead on arrival and cannot be remedied. Without jurisdiction, the Court cannot confer jurisdiction on itself.”

35. This position was expressly endorsed in Equity Bank Limited v Bruce Mutie Mutuku t/a Diani Tour Travel [2016] eKLR, where the Court of Appeal explained the fundamental rule that a suit filed in a court that lacks jurisdiction cannot be transferred under Section 18 of the Civil Procedure Act to a court that has jurisdiction. The Court held:

“In numerous decided cases, courts, including this Court have held that it would be illegal for the High Court in exercise of its powers under Section 18 of the Civil Procedure Act to transfer a suit filed in a court lacking jurisdiction to a court with jurisdiction and therefore sanctify an incompetent suit… Jurisdiction is a weighty fundamental matter and … parties cannot, even by their consent, confer jurisdiction on a court where no such jurisdiction exists… where it lacks, parties cannot even seek refuge under the O2 principle or the overriding objective under the Civil Procedure Act… to remedy the same.”

36. The rationale for these authorities is that a suit instituted in a court without jurisdiction is a nullity in law and therefore there is nothing legally capable of being transferred.

37. In the present case, this Court has found that when the Plaintiff filed the suit in the High Court, the matter was one that falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the ELC. Consequently, the suit was competently filed outside the jurisdiction of this Court, rendering it a nullity in law and this Court cannot exercise any power to transfer that nullity to the ELC as doing so would conflict with the well settled principles articulated in Phoenix of E.A. Assurance Co. Ltd and Equity Bank Limited v Bruce Mutie Mutuku t/a Diani Tour Travel.

38. Consequently, the only course available is to strike out the suit as incompetent for want of jurisdiction, which I hereby do.

39. On costs, the default rule under Section 27 of the Civil Procedure Act is that the successful party would ordinarily be entitled to costs. However, as the issue of jurisdiction was raised by the Court on its own motion, each party shall bear its own costs of the suit.

40. This file is hereby closed.

DELIVERED (virtually) DATED & SIGNED this 31st March, 2026.

JOE M. OMIDO
JUDGE

FOR THE PLAINTIFF: Mr. Ouma.
FOR THE DEFENDANTS: Mr. Sala.
COURT ASSISTANTS: Mr. Ngoge & Mr. Juma.