INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
1. If, like a technological philistine, you are unfamiliar with the newly established modus vivendi of courtroom attendance, the transition to virtual courts is complete. With it, come certain peccadillos. Need a for instance? Persons disremembering to unmute and permitting their orals to go to the aurals of those unintended; or failing to troubleshoot the camera option and being unseen à la John Cena; or not adjusting basic telephonic functions like speakers, angles and avatars.
2. I hazard that the quicksmart thing to do, when technology fails or when there is human error, is to approach Court and let it grapple with whether in the triangle of the scales of justice and the rectangle of virtual court, it is fair and square that a matter dismissed due to failure to hear it being called out, may be reinstated.
3. The Applicant has moved the court by way of Notice of Motion dated 20 th November 2025, brought under Sections 1A, 1B and 3A of the Civil Procedure Act and Order 12 Rule 7 and Order 51 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules, seeking the following orders: -
I. Spent.
II. THAT this Honourable Court be pleased to set aside and/or vacate the dismissal order issued on 17 th November 2025 in respect of the Applicant’s Application dated 3 rd November 2025.
III. THAT the Application dated 3 rd November 2025 be reinstated for hearing on the merits.
IV. THAT this Honourable Court be pleased to allocate an urgent hearing date for the reinstated application dated 3 rd November, 2025
V. THAT costs of this application be in the cause.
4. The application is supported by the affidavit of Sophia Muthoni Njiru sworn on 20 th November 2025.
5. The Applicant depones that her application dated 3 rd November 2025 was scheduled for hearing on 17 th November 2025, but was dismissed for non-attendance despite her former counsel having attended the virtual court session.
6. Counsel allegedly did not hear the matter being called out and had unsuccessfully attempted to obtain clarification from the Court.
7. The Applicant states that her former counsel subsequently wrote to the Deputy Registrar explaining the circumstances but received no positive response. She maintains that she was not afforded an opportunity to be heard and that the dismissal was procedurally unfair. She further contends that unless the application is reinstated, she risks suffering irreparable harm as her property remains unprotected. She therefore urges the Court to set aside the dismissal, reinstate the application dated 3 rd November 2025 and have it heard on its merits.
BACKGROUND
8. I find it necessary, at this juncture, to briefly recapitulate the circumstances upon which the Application for reinstatement is premised. The dispute arises from an agricultural loan facility of Kshs. 8,000,000/= advanced by the 1 st Respondent to the Applicant. According to the Respondents, the facility was secured by charges over three properties, namely Kajiado/Kaputei North/108740, Ruiru/Kiu Block 2/Githunguri/20660 and Nyeri/Lusoi/1556, which form the subject of the dispute. The Applicant subsequently defaulted in servicing the facility, with the Respondents stating that the outstanding non-performing balance stood at approximately Kshs. 6,212,000/= at the time of default declaration.
9. The Applicant challenged the exercise of the statutory power of sale and sought injunctive relief before the subordinate court. The subordinate court, however, dismissed the application on 29 th October 2025, giving rise to the present appeal. In her Memorandum of Appeal, the Applicant contends, among other things, that the three properties remained registered in her name notwithstanding the alleged auction, that the trial court failed to give proper consideration to the official searches, and that there were unresolved questions concerning the alleged auction of Nyeri/Lusoi/1556 and the charge over Kajiado/Kaputei North/108740.
10. The Applicant thereafter filed an application dated 3 rd November 2025, seeking temporary injunctive orders pending hearing of the application and determination of the appeal, as well as stay of proceedings in the trial court. That application was scheduled for hearing on 17 th November 2025, but was dismissed for non-attendance.
SUBMISSIONS
11. The 1 st and 2 nd Respondents filed a Replying Affidavit and written submissions. I note, however, that the Respondents’ response and submissions substantially address the merits of the Applicant’s earlier application dated 3 rd November 2025, particularly the validity of the auction conducted on 28 th May 2025 and the Respondents’ exercise of the statutory power of sale. They contend that the Applicant’s loan facility of Kshs. 8,000,000/= was secured by charges over Nyeri/Lusoi/1556, Kajiado/Kaputei North/108740 and Ruiru/Kiu Block 2/Githunguri/20660, and that the Applicant defaulted in her repayment obligations, leaving an outstanding balance of Kshs. 6,212,000/=.
12. The Respondents submit that the statutory requirements under the Land Act were complied with, including the issuance of a 90-day statutory notice under Section 90, a subsequent 40-day notice, notification of sale and redemption notices. They further submit that the property was sold through a licensed auctioneer following a pre-sale valuation and advertisement in the national newspapers. In relation to the duty of care, the Respondents rely on Section 97 of the Land Act, while in relation to the protection accorded to a purchaser following a completed sale, they rely on Section 99 of the Land Act.
13. The Respondents further rely on Section 90(1) of the Land Act No. 6 of 2012 and the decision in Mrao Ltd v First American Bank of Kenya Ltd & 2 Others [2003] eKLR in support of their position on the exercise of the statutory power of sale and the grant of injunctive relief.
14. They contend that the completed sale ought not to be reversed as doing so would prejudice the protection afforded to a purchaser under Section 99(3) of the Land Act, save in circumstances of fraud, misrepresentation or other dishonest conduct.
15. On costs, the Respondents submit that costs follow the event and consequently urge the Court to dismiss the application with costs.
16. I have carefully considered the foregoing response and submissions. However, it is material to observe that the present application before the Court is the Notice of Motion dated 20 th November 2025, whose principal prayer is for the setting aside of the dismissal order issued on 17 th November 2025 and the reinstatement of the Applicant’s earlier application dated 3 rd November 2025.
17. The substantive merits of the application dated 3 rd November 2025, including the validity of the auction and the exercise of the statutory power of sale, are therefore not the subject of determination in this ruling. The Respondents’ submissions on those matters are consequently relevant only to the extent that they assist the Court in appreciating the background and circumstances surrounding the earlier application.
18. Further, upon perusal of the physical court file and the information available on the Court’s Case Tracking System (CTS), I note that the Applicant had not filed any written submissions as at the date of drafting this ruling. Accordingly, there are no written submissions by the Applicant for consideration in determining the present application.
ISSUE FOR DETERMINATION
19. Having considered the Application dated 20 th November 2025, the supporting affidavit, the Replying Affidavit and the other material placed before the Court, and in the exercise of its discretion, the Court has distilled the sole issue for determination as follows:
Whether the Applicant has demonstrated sufficient cause to warrant the setting aside of the order made on 17 th November 2025 dismissing the application dated 3 rd November 2025 for non-attendance and its consequent reinstatement.
ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION
20. The power of the court to dismiss a suit and for reinstatement is provided under Order 12 Rules 1 and 7 of the Civil Procedure Rules, which provides as follows: -
1. If on the day fixed for hearing, after the suit has been called on for hearing outside the court, neither party attends, the court may dismiss the suit.
7. Where under this Order judgment has been entered or the suit has been dismissed, the court, on application, may set aside or vary the judgment or order upon such terms as may be just.
21. The provision is discretionary in nature. The Court’s jurisdiction to reinstate a dismissed application, as opposed to a suit, has also been recognised in Mutua Mwangangi & Another v James Mutua Mutio [2016] eKLR, where the Court held that: -
“……….an application being a minor procedure within a suit, the court would have similar powers to dismiss and reinstate an application as in this case.”
22. The principles governing the exercise of that discretion are also settled in Shah v Mbogo & Another [1967] EA 116 , where Harris J. stated that:
“The discretion is intended so to be exercised to avoid injustice or hardship resulting from accident, inadvertence, or excusable mistake or error, but is not designed to assist the person who has deliberately sought whether by evasion or otherwise, to obstruct or delay the course of justice.”
23. Similarly, in Pithon Waweru Maina v Thuka Mugiria [1983] eKLR , the Court of Appeal considered the principles applicable to the setting aside of a dismissal for non-attendance and affirmed that the discretion should be exercised judicially and, on the facts, and circumstances of each case.
24. In the present case, the non-attendance arose from an inadvertent failure by the Applicant’s then advocate to hear the matter when it was called out in Court. The Applicant depones that her then advocate, Ms. Wanjiru Kahura, attended the virtual court session at 9:00 a.m. but did not hear the matter being called out.
25. Counsel is further said to have attempted to obtain clarification from the Court through the online platform without success. The Court subsequently adjourned to 10:15 a.m., during which counsel briefly attended to another matter, and upon returning was informed that the application had already been called out and dismissed for non-attendance.
26. The Applicant further depones that counsel wrote to the Deputy Registrar on the same day explaining the circumstances surrounding the dismissal. The Applicant consequently contends that the dismissal was occasioned by a procedural technicality and ought not to stand where the circumstances demonstrate that there was no deliberate failure to attend Court or intention to delay the proceedings.
27. I find the explanation material to the exercise of the Court’s discretion. This is not a case where the Applicant or her advocate was wholly unaware of the hearing date or simply failed to attend Court. On the material before the Court, counsel was aware of the hearing and had logged into the virtual court session. The complaint is instead that the matter was not heard by counsel when she was present on the platform and that, after an adjournment, she returned to find that the application had been called out and dismissed.
28. Of significance also is the fact that the Applicant moved the Court shortly thereafter. The dismissal occurred on 17 th November 2025, while the present application seeking to set aside that order and reinstate the earlier application was filed on 20 th November 2025. The promptness with which the Applicant approached the Court is, in my view, inconsistent with an intention to deliberately delay or obstruct the proceedings.
29. The Court must nevertheless guard against treating an advocate’s mistake as an automatic ground for reinstatement. The fact that the default is attributed to counsel does not, by itself, entitle a litigant to an indulgence. The Court must consider whether, in the circumstances of the particular case, the mistake constitutes an excusable error and whether refusing relief would occasion an injustice disproportionate to any prejudice suffered by the opposing party.
30. In Philip Chemwolo & Another v Augustine Kubende (1986) eKLR , the Court observed:
“Blunders will continue to be made from time to time and it does not follow that because a mistake has been made that a party should suffer the penalty of not having his case heard on merit.”
31. The Court went on to emphasise that the broad equitable approach is that, absent fraud or an intention to overreach, an error or default may, in an appropriate case, be remedied by appropriate terms, including costs.
32. I am also guided by the principle that the discretion under Order 12 Rule 7 is intended to facilitate the determination of disputes on their merits where the circumstances justify such intervention. As was observed in Pithon Waweru Maina (supra), the discretion is not restricted by rigid rules but must be exercised upon consideration of the circumstances before the Court.
33. In the instant matter, there is no material before me suggesting that the Applicant deliberately failed to attend Court, sought to delay the proceedings, or otherwise abused the Court process. On the contrary, the evidence placed before the Court is that counsel was present on the virtual platform, attempted to obtain guidance, and thereafter took steps to explain the circumstances of the dismissal. The subsequent application for reinstatement was also brought within a short period of three days.
34. Further, the dismissal was of the Applicant’s first hearing of the application dated 3 rd November 2025. The Applicant specifically depones that she had not previously had an opportunity to have that application heard and determined on its merits. In my view, this is a relevant consideration when determining whether the consequence of the dismissal should be allowed to stand.
35. I am also cognisant of the constitutional imperative under Article 50(1) of the Constitution, which guarantees every person the right to have a dispute that can be resolved by the application of law decided in a fair and public hearing. While that right does not entitle a litigant to disregard procedural rules, it reinforces the Court’s obligation to exercise procedural discretion in a manner that advances, rather than unnecessarily defeats, substantive justice.
36. The Court must balance that consideration against the Respondents’ right to have the matter concluded without unnecessary delay. In the circumstances of this case, I do not discern any prejudice to the Respondents that cannot be adequately addressed through appropriate directions as to the expeditious prosecution of the reinstated application.
37. The Respondents will retain the opportunity to oppose the application dated 3 rd November 2025 on its merits. Indeed, the fact that their present response substantially addresses that application demonstrates that they have already engaged with the substantive dispute, although that issue is not for determination in this ruling.
38. Consequently, having considered the above explanations, I am satisfied that the Applicant has demonstrated sufficient cause for the exercise of the Court’s discretion in her favour.
DISPOSITION AND ORDERS
39. In the result, I find merit in the Notice of Motion dated 20 th November 2025 and accordingly make the following orders:
i. The order issued on 17 th November 2025 dismissing the Applicant’s application dated 3 rd November 2025 for non-attendance is hereby set aside.
ii. The Applicant’s application dated 3 rd November 2025 is hereby reinstated for hearing on its merits.
iii. The reinstated application dated 3 rd November 2025 shall be fixed for hearing on a priority basis on a date to be allocated by the Court.
iv. The costs of the Notice of Motion dated 20 th November 2025 shall be in the cause.
Orders accordingly.
DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED AT NAIROBI THIS 17 th DAY OF SEPTEMBER 2026.
MURUNGA, J
Delivered on virtual platform in the presence of:
…………………… for the Applicant
…………………… for the Respondent
Kevin Babu - Court Assistant
1. If, like a technological philistine, you are unfamiliar with the newly established modus vivendi of courtroom attendance, the transition to virtual courts is complete. With it, come certain peccadillos. Need a for instance? Persons disremembering to unmute and permitting their orals to go to the aurals of those unintended; or failing to troubleshoot the camera option and being unseen à la John Cena; or not adjusting basic telephonic functions like speakers, angles and avatars.
2. I hazard that the quicksmart thing to do, when technology fails or when there is human error, is to approach Court and let it grapple with whether in the triangle of the scales of justice and the rectangle of virtual court, it is fair and square that a matter dismissed due to failure to hear it being called out, may be reinstated.
3. The Applicant has moved the court by way of Notice of Motion dated 20 th November 2025, brought under Sections 1A, 1B and 3A of the Civil Procedure Act and Order 12 Rule 7 and Order 51 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules, seeking the following orders: -
I. Spent.
II. THAT this Honourable Court be pleased to set aside and/or vacate the dismissal order issued on 17 th November 2025 in respect of the Applicant’s Application dated 3 rd November 2025.
III. THAT the Application dated 3 rd November 2025 be reinstated for hearing on the merits.
IV. THAT this Honourable Court be pleased to allocate an urgent hearing date for the reinstated application dated 3 rd November, 2025
V. THAT costs of this application be in the cause.
4. The application is supported by the affidavit of Sophia Muthoni Njiru sworn on 20 th November 2025.
5. The Applicant depones that her application dated 3 rd November 2025 was scheduled for hearing on 17 th November 2025, but was dismissed for non-attendance despite her former counsel having attended the virtual court session.
6. Counsel allegedly did not hear the matter being called out and had unsuccessfully attempted to obtain clarification from the Court.
7. The Applicant states that her former counsel subsequently wrote to the Deputy Registrar explaining the circumstances but received no positive response. She maintains that she was not afforded an opportunity to be heard and that the dismissal was procedurally unfair. She further contends that unless the application is reinstated, she risks suffering irreparable harm as her property remains unprotected. She therefore urges the Court to set aside the dismissal, reinstate the application dated 3 rd November 2025 and have it heard on its merits.
BACKGROUND
8. I find it necessary, at this juncture, to briefly recapitulate the circumstances upon which the Application for reinstatement is premised. The dispute arises from an agricultural loan facility of Kshs. 8,000,000/= advanced by the 1 st Respondent to the Applicant. According to the Respondents, the facility was secured by charges over three properties, namely Kajiado/Kaputei North/108740, Ruiru/Kiu Block 2/Githunguri/20660 and Nyeri/Lusoi/1556, which form the subject of the dispute. The Applicant subsequently defaulted in servicing the facility, with the Respondents stating that the outstanding non-performing balance stood at approximately Kshs. 6,212,000/= at the time of default declaration.
9. The Applicant challenged the exercise of the statutory power of sale and sought injunctive relief before the subordinate court. The subordinate court, however, dismissed the application on 29 th October 2025, giving rise to the present appeal. In her Memorandum of Appeal, the Applicant contends, among other things, that the three properties remained registered in her name notwithstanding the alleged auction, that the trial court failed to give proper consideration to the official searches, and that there were unresolved questions concerning the alleged auction of Nyeri/Lusoi/1556 and the charge over Kajiado/Kaputei North/108740.
10. The Applicant thereafter filed an application dated 3 rd November 2025, seeking temporary injunctive orders pending hearing of the application and determination of the appeal, as well as stay of proceedings in the trial court. That application was scheduled for hearing on 17 th November 2025, but was dismissed for non-attendance.
SUBMISSIONS
11. The 1 st and 2 nd Respondents filed a Replying Affidavit and written submissions. I note, however, that the Respondents’ response and submissions substantially address the merits of the Applicant’s earlier application dated 3 rd November 2025, particularly the validity of the auction conducted on 28 th May 2025 and the Respondents’ exercise of the statutory power of sale. They contend that the Applicant’s loan facility of Kshs. 8,000,000/= was secured by charges over Nyeri/Lusoi/1556, Kajiado/Kaputei North/108740 and Ruiru/Kiu Block 2/Githunguri/20660, and that the Applicant defaulted in her repayment obligations, leaving an outstanding balance of Kshs. 6,212,000/=.
12. The Respondents submit that the statutory requirements under the Land Act were complied with, including the issuance of a 90-day statutory notice under Section 90, a subsequent 40-day notice, notification of sale and redemption notices. They further submit that the property was sold through a licensed auctioneer following a pre-sale valuation and advertisement in the national newspapers. In relation to the duty of care, the Respondents rely on Section 97 of the Land Act, while in relation to the protection accorded to a purchaser following a completed sale, they rely on Section 99 of the Land Act.
13. The Respondents further rely on Section 90(1) of the Land Act No. 6 of 2012 and the decision in Mrao Ltd v First American Bank of Kenya Ltd & 2 Others [2003] eKLR in support of their position on the exercise of the statutory power of sale and the grant of injunctive relief.
14. They contend that the completed sale ought not to be reversed as doing so would prejudice the protection afforded to a purchaser under Section 99(3) of the Land Act, save in circumstances of fraud, misrepresentation or other dishonest conduct.
15. On costs, the Respondents submit that costs follow the event and consequently urge the Court to dismiss the application with costs.
16. I have carefully considered the foregoing response and submissions. However, it is material to observe that the present application before the Court is the Notice of Motion dated 20 th November 2025, whose principal prayer is for the setting aside of the dismissal order issued on 17 th November 2025 and the reinstatement of the Applicant’s earlier application dated 3 rd November 2025.
17. The substantive merits of the application dated 3 rd November 2025, including the validity of the auction and the exercise of the statutory power of sale, are therefore not the subject of determination in this ruling. The Respondents’ submissions on those matters are consequently relevant only to the extent that they assist the Court in appreciating the background and circumstances surrounding the earlier application.
18. Further, upon perusal of the physical court file and the information available on the Court’s Case Tracking System (CTS), I note that the Applicant had not filed any written submissions as at the date of drafting this ruling. Accordingly, there are no written submissions by the Applicant for consideration in determining the present application.
ISSUE FOR DETERMINATION
19. Having considered the Application dated 20 th November 2025, the supporting affidavit, the Replying Affidavit and the other material placed before the Court, and in the exercise of its discretion, the Court has distilled the sole issue for determination as follows:
Whether the Applicant has demonstrated sufficient cause to warrant the setting aside of the order made on 17 th November 2025 dismissing the application dated 3 rd November 2025 for non-attendance and its consequent reinstatement.
ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION
20. The power of the court to dismiss a suit and for reinstatement is provided under Order 12 Rules 1 and 7 of the Civil Procedure Rules, which provides as follows: -
1. If on the day fixed for hearing, after the suit has been called on for hearing outside the court, neither party attends, the court may dismiss the suit.
7. Where under this Order judgment has been entered or the suit has been dismissed, the court, on application, may set aside or vary the judgment or order upon such terms as may be just.
21. The provision is discretionary in nature. The Court’s jurisdiction to reinstate a dismissed application, as opposed to a suit, has also been recognised in Mutua Mwangangi & Another v James Mutua Mutio [2016] eKLR, where the Court held that: -
“……….an application being a minor procedure within a suit, the court would have similar powers to dismiss and reinstate an application as in this case.”
22. The principles governing the exercise of that discretion are also settled in Shah v Mbogo & Another [1967] EA 116 , where Harris J. stated that:
“The discretion is intended so to be exercised to avoid injustice or hardship resulting from accident, inadvertence, or excusable mistake or error, but is not designed to assist the person who has deliberately sought whether by evasion or otherwise, to obstruct or delay the course of justice.”
23. Similarly, in Pithon Waweru Maina v Thuka Mugiria [1983] eKLR , the Court of Appeal considered the principles applicable to the setting aside of a dismissal for non-attendance and affirmed that the discretion should be exercised judicially and, on the facts, and circumstances of each case.
24. In the present case, the non-attendance arose from an inadvertent failure by the Applicant’s then advocate to hear the matter when it was called out in Court. The Applicant depones that her then advocate, Ms. Wanjiru Kahura, attended the virtual court session at 9:00 a.m. but did not hear the matter being called out.
25. Counsel is further said to have attempted to obtain clarification from the Court through the online platform without success. The Court subsequently adjourned to 10:15 a.m., during which counsel briefly attended to another matter, and upon returning was informed that the application had already been called out and dismissed for non-attendance.
26. The Applicant further depones that counsel wrote to the Deputy Registrar on the same day explaining the circumstances surrounding the dismissal. The Applicant consequently contends that the dismissal was occasioned by a procedural technicality and ought not to stand where the circumstances demonstrate that there was no deliberate failure to attend Court or intention to delay the proceedings.
27. I find the explanation material to the exercise of the Court’s discretion. This is not a case where the Applicant or her advocate was wholly unaware of the hearing date or simply failed to attend Court. On the material before the Court, counsel was aware of the hearing and had logged into the virtual court session. The complaint is instead that the matter was not heard by counsel when she was present on the platform and that, after an adjournment, she returned to find that the application had been called out and dismissed.
28. Of significance also is the fact that the Applicant moved the Court shortly thereafter. The dismissal occurred on 17 th November 2025, while the present application seeking to set aside that order and reinstate the earlier application was filed on 20 th November 2025. The promptness with which the Applicant approached the Court is, in my view, inconsistent with an intention to deliberately delay or obstruct the proceedings.
29. The Court must nevertheless guard against treating an advocate’s mistake as an automatic ground for reinstatement. The fact that the default is attributed to counsel does not, by itself, entitle a litigant to an indulgence. The Court must consider whether, in the circumstances of the particular case, the mistake constitutes an excusable error and whether refusing relief would occasion an injustice disproportionate to any prejudice suffered by the opposing party.
30. In Philip Chemwolo & Another v Augustine Kubende (1986) eKLR , the Court observed:
“Blunders will continue to be made from time to time and it does not follow that because a mistake has been made that a party should suffer the penalty of not having his case heard on merit.”
31. The Court went on to emphasise that the broad equitable approach is that, absent fraud or an intention to overreach, an error or default may, in an appropriate case, be remedied by appropriate terms, including costs.
32. I am also guided by the principle that the discretion under Order 12 Rule 7 is intended to facilitate the determination of disputes on their merits where the circumstances justify such intervention. As was observed in Pithon Waweru Maina (supra), the discretion is not restricted by rigid rules but must be exercised upon consideration of the circumstances before the Court.
33. In the instant matter, there is no material before me suggesting that the Applicant deliberately failed to attend Court, sought to delay the proceedings, or otherwise abused the Court process. On the contrary, the evidence placed before the Court is that counsel was present on the virtual platform, attempted to obtain guidance, and thereafter took steps to explain the circumstances of the dismissal. The subsequent application for reinstatement was also brought within a short period of three days.
34. Further, the dismissal was of the Applicant’s first hearing of the application dated 3 rd November 2025. The Applicant specifically depones that she had not previously had an opportunity to have that application heard and determined on its merits. In my view, this is a relevant consideration when determining whether the consequence of the dismissal should be allowed to stand.
35. I am also cognisant of the constitutional imperative under Article 50(1) of the Constitution, which guarantees every person the right to have a dispute that can be resolved by the application of law decided in a fair and public hearing. While that right does not entitle a litigant to disregard procedural rules, it reinforces the Court’s obligation to exercise procedural discretion in a manner that advances, rather than unnecessarily defeats, substantive justice.
36. The Court must balance that consideration against the Respondents’ right to have the matter concluded without unnecessary delay. In the circumstances of this case, I do not discern any prejudice to the Respondents that cannot be adequately addressed through appropriate directions as to the expeditious prosecution of the reinstated application.
37. The Respondents will retain the opportunity to oppose the application dated 3 rd November 2025 on its merits. Indeed, the fact that their present response substantially addresses that application demonstrates that they have already engaged with the substantive dispute, although that issue is not for determination in this ruling.
38. Consequently, having considered the above explanations, I am satisfied that the Applicant has demonstrated sufficient cause for the exercise of the Court’s discretion in her favour.
DISPOSITION AND ORDERS
39. In the result, I find merit in the Notice of Motion dated 20 th November 2025 and accordingly make the following orders:
i. The order issued on 17 th November 2025 dismissing the Applicant’s application dated 3 rd November 2025 for non-attendance is hereby set aside.
ii. The Applicant’s application dated 3 rd November 2025 is hereby reinstated for hearing on its merits.
iii. The reinstated application dated 3 rd November 2025 shall be fixed for hearing on a priority basis on a date to be allocated by the Court.
iv. The costs of the Notice of Motion dated 20 th November 2025 shall be in the cause.
Orders accordingly.
DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED AT NAIROBI THIS 17 th DAY OF SEPTEMBER 2026.
MURUNGA, J
Delivered on virtual platform in the presence of:
…………………… for the Applicant
…………………… for the Respondent
Kevin Babu - Court Assistant