(Being an appeal from the ruling and order of the Children’s Court Hon. Hon. G.W. Kirugumi, Principal Magistrate, in Kerugoya Magistrate’s Court Children’s Case No. 9 of 2020 delivered on 16/1/2023)
JUDGMENT
1. P.M.H. the appellant herein is the mother of R.N.M. a minor, while D.M.G, the respondent is the father of the minor. The respondent sued the appellant seeking to have her share legal custody of the minor with him and that he be given unlimited access to the minor. The appellant counterclaimed for legal and actual custody of the minor and payment of maintenance by the respondent.
2. The matter came up for hearing on 19/7/2021 and after the respondent (plaintiff) had testified and was cross-examined, the parties recorded a consent disposing of the claim which inter alia provided that:
a. both plaintiff and defendant granted joint legal custody of the minor.
b. the defendant to have physical custody except the times the plaintiff is allowed to have the child.
c. the plaintiff to send the defendant KShs 4,000/= every month via M-pesa starting 5/8/2021 until the child attains 18 years. However, if the child should be in boarding school the KShs 4,000/= to be sent only during the school holidays except the holiday the plaintiff is with the child.
d. the plaintiff to pay fees for the minor (R.N.M) and all school related necessities until the minor completes university.
e. the plaintiff to have access of the minor the last weekend of every month starting 9.00 a.m. on Saturday to take the child to 12.00 noon on Sunday.
3. On 3/3/2022, the appellant/defendant, through a notice of motion dated 2/3/2022 sought orders for the court to review, vary, set aside the orders of 21/7/2021 (being the date the orders of 19/7/2021 were extracted), and in particular the orders giving access of the minor to the plaintiff on grounds that the minor had reported a case of indecent molestation by the plaintiff. That the matter had been documented at Nairobi Metropolitan Services (SGBVSS Medical Summary Sheet) and also reported at Child Protection Unit, South C and was under active investigations. It was alleged that the minor had reported “baba aliniambia ninyonye hapa (pointing at the breast).”
4. On 4/3/2022, the respondent/plaintiff through a chamber summons dated 28/2/2022 sought orders to cite the appellant/defendant for contempt of court for being in breach of the orders given on 21/7/2021 and to commit her to imprisonment for six months. Secondly that the court partially reviews the said orders and grants the respondent/plaintiff both legal and physical custody of the minor as the appellant/defendant had blatantly denied the respondent/plaintiff the legal and physical custody of the minor contrary to the court’s orders of 21/7/2021. The grounds in support were that whereas the respondent was duly complying with the court orders the appellant/defendant was not discharging her obligations under the said orders.
5. Each party supported his/her application with an affidavit and respectively opposed the others application with a replying affidavit.
6. At the hearing of the application, after each counsel for a party ad made his submissions, the party was cross-examined on his/her affidavit.
7. In a ruling dated 16/1/2023 the learned trial magistrate dismissed both applications.
8. The appellant was dissatisfied with the trial court’s decision dismissing her application to review, suspend, vary, or set aside the orders it had issued on 21/7/2021 in order to deny the respondent access to the minor. That is what gives rise to the present appeal by the appellant through the memorandum dated 24/1/2023. The are seven grounds of appeal but the bottom line is that the appellant is aggrieved that the learned trial magistrate erred in both law and fact in not allowing her application to review, vary, stay or set aside the orders issued on 21/7/2021 in order to keep the minor away from the respondent pending investigations into the allegations of indecent molestation against the respondent. That in the circumstances the learned trial magistrate failed to protect the child in line with the best interests of the child. That the trial court should have interviewed the minor to assess the veracity of the allegations.
9. The appellant therefore prays that the appeal be allowed, the court sets aside the ruling of the learned trial magistrate delivered on 16/1/2023 and in lieu thereof:
a. issue a declaration that the orders of the trial court dated 21/7/2023 particularly orders numbered 2, 3, 4, and 8 are stayed and/or suspended.
b. issue and order directing that the orders issued by the trial court particularly orders numbered 2, 3, 4, and 8, be reviewed in the interests of the minor.
c. Costs of the present appeal and for the application appealed from the trial court be awarded to the appellant.
10. The appeal was disposed of by way of written submissions filed by learned counsels for both parties.
11. This is a first appeal. Learned counsels for both parties call upon this court to review the evidence before the trial court. Indeed, the duty of this court is to examine, re-evaluate, re-analyze and re-consider the evidence and draw its own conclusions, bearing in mind that it did not see witnesses testifying and therefore give due allowance for that as held in Selle & another vs. Associated Motor Boat Co. Ltd & others [1968] E.A at page 126.
12. The appellant listed the following issues for determination:
a. whether the allegation of molestation was sufficient ground for the trial court to review, suspend, vary or set aside the orders issued on 21/7/2021.
b. whether the trial court erred in law and in fact by failing to interview the child on the allegations regarding indecent molestation by the respondent.
c. whether the trial court erred in law and in fact by failing to uphold the best interests of the minor.
13. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that there was abuse of the minor as defined under section 2(g) of the Children Act 2022 and that the alleged conduct of the respondent against the minor also constituted an offence of indecent act with a child under section 11(1) of the Sexual Offences Act (Cap. 63A) Laws of Kenya. That Article 53(1)(d) of the constitution grants every child the right to be protected from any form of abuse and section 22 of the Children’s Act also protects every child from any form of abuse. Learned counsel submits that from the evidence tendered at the trial on the allegations of indecent molestation of the minor by the respondent the court ought to have issued the orders sought restricting the respondent from accessing the minor until investigations into the issue were complete. That therefore the continued access to the child is prejudicial and puts the child at risk of continued alleged abuse, which if true, no reparation shall suffice as it shall be too late.
14. Learned counsel for the respondent hinged his response to the appeal and his submission are on the sole issue on a preliminary ground that leave to appeal had not been sought and granted before the present appeal was filed as required under Order 43 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010. However, appeals under the Children’s Act are provided for under section 99 that unless otherwise provided under the Act, in any civil or criminal proceedings in a Children’s Court, an appeal shall lie in the first instance, to the High Court on points of fact and la and in the second instance, to the Court of Appeal on points of law only. My understanding of that section is that no leave is required to file an appeal to the High Court and reference need not be made to the Civil Procedure Rules.
15. I have considered the grounds of appeal filed herein, the submissions by learned counsels for the parties and the judgment of the learned trial magistrate.
16. The point for determination is whether the appellant has made out a case to warrant the setting aside of the learned trial court’s orders of 16/1/2023 dismissing her application to deny the respondent access to the minor on account of allegations of molestation or abuse of the minor by the respondent.
17. In arriving at her decision, the learned trial magistrate found that there was evidence that the appellant and the respondent have a very acrimonious relationship that was impacting negatively on the child. She found that on the issue of molestation, the respondent had not been arrested or formally charged in court over the allegations even after a considerable duration of time had elapsed. Emphasizing that the court took the welfare of the minor as primary consideration the learned trial magistrate found that the allegations had been reported at Kasarani police station where the appellant worked and given the open hostility between her and the respondent and in the absence of proof of an active and ongoing investigation, arrest or formal charge against the respondent, the allegations were insufficient to warrant a stay of the orders issued earlier.
18. Given these findings by the trial court, it is not true that the learned trial magistrate failed to give due regard to the evidence before her. She did and arrived at her decision upon assessing it. I note that the learned trial magistrate put each party to cross-examination of the contents of their respective affidavits. That was equivalent to a viva voce trial of the matter given that the main suit had been finalized through compromise by way of a consent agreement between the parties.
19. The issue the trial court was faced with is not isolated or new as it is usually at the centre stage of child custody litigation and it is not an easy one. It requires the balancing of the provisions of Article 53(1) that every child has the right (d) to be protected from abuse, neglect, harmful cultural practices, all forms of violence, inhuman treatment and punishment, and hazardous or exploitative labour and (e) to parental care and protection, which includes equal responsibility of the mother and father to provide for the child, whether they are married to each other or not; and at the same time under Article 53(2) the court must always take into account the fact that a child’s best interests are of paramount importance in every matter concerning the child.
20. The trial court had only the word of the appellant as against that of the respondent. It is apparent from the trial court’s ruling that no report of the investigations by the Child Protection Unit South C was made available to the court. As I understand it, the Anti-Human Trafficking and Child Protection Unit (DCI-AHTCPU) is a section of the Directorate of Criminal Investigations which in turn is a department of the National Police Service. The appellant submits that the trial court ought to have called the child for interview. But I do not think even that would have resolved the issue.
21. There is no doubt that an issue of child abuse is a serious allegation that cannot be taken lightly. Every effort must be made to establish the truth or otherwise of the allegations so that the child’s best interests are protected by all persons dealing with the child as required under the law. The Constitution of Kenya, 2010 provides in Article 53(2) that a child’s best interests are of paramount importance in every matter concerning the child.
22. This constitutional provision is the bedrock of child protection and is expounded more in section 8(1) to (3) of the Children Act, 2022 which provides that: -
“(1) In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies—
(a) the best interests of the child shall be the primary consideration;
(b) the best interests of the child shall include, but shall not be limited to the considerations set out in the First Schedule.
(2) All judicial and administrative institutions, and all persons acting in the name of such institutions, when exercising any powers conferred under this Act or any other written law, shall treat the interests of the child as the first and paramount consideration to the extent that this is consistent with adopting a course of action calculated to—
(a) safeguard and promote the rights and welfare of the child;
(b) conserve and promote the welfare of the child; and
(c) secure for the child such guidance and correction as is necessary for the welfare of the child, and in the public interest.
(3) In any matters affecting a child, the child shall be accorded an opportunity to express their opinion, and that opinion shall be taken into account in appropriate cases, having regard to the child’s age and degree of maturity”.
23. Under section 222(1) of the Children’s Act, it is stipulated that every child shall be afforded an opportunity to be heard in proceedings affecting the child, either directly or through a representative. The minor, the subject of the proceedings was about six years old at the time. She was fairly young and even though her views are paramount, this was not a case of choice of her custody between her father and mother and neither was it a trial of the father on charges of abuse. It was going to be an investigation which is ordinarily conducted by persons who have special knowledge and skill in children’s matters. Considering the likely ramifications of taking evidence in court, I believe it would be prejudicial to the investigations under way for the court to take the evidence of the minor on the issue at that stage because it would appear like the court’s findings would be conclusive on the issue. It is therefore not correct as submitted by the appellant that the court in failing to call the minor for interview was in error or thereby failed to uphold her best interests
24. This Court under Section 3A of the Civil Procedure Rules has inherent powers to make or issue such orders as may be necessary to meet the ends of justice and any decision made by this court should be in the best interests of the minor. The appellant also prayed that this court may grant any other relief and/or order that it may deem fit. In order to put the issue herein to rest in a conclusive manner that takes into account the best interests of the child, it is important that the bottom-line of the allegations of the inappropriate conduct of the respondent towards the minor be reached. The trial court made its decision without the benefit of an independent investigator which no doubt was a challenge given the stated acrimonious relationship between the parties.
25. I find that it is important that independent investigations into the allegations be conducted by the Directorate of Children Services and a report thereon filed in the Children’s court for its consideration. After that, the trial court, other than Hon. G.W. Kirugumi will make its ruling on the notice of motion application by the appellant dated 2/3/2022.
26. Consequently, the ruling of the trial court dated 16/1/2023 is hereby set aside and substituted with an order remitting this matter to the Children’s Court with directions that:
(i) Within 14 days the Children’s Court at Kerugoya will appoint an independent investigator from the Directorate of Children Services, to be made available by the Director of Children Services, preferably one with experience in such investigations to investigate the allegations and file a report in court within 14 days and not exceeding 30 days in any case.
(ii) The findings in the report shall not be released to the parties other than at the time of the court making its ruling.
(iii) The investigation is independent of any other investigation by any police criminal agency and shall in no way be refer to in any such criminal investigations other than the fact that a report was made thereon.
(iv) Within the initial 14 days, the Children’s Court will mention the matter and summon the parties to appear virtually and caution them that in case the report reveals that the allegations of molestation of the minor by the respondent are baseless the court, weighing the best interests of the minor, will be at liberty to grant sole physical custody to the respondent just as in case it is positive, the physical custody shall be granted to the appellant.
(v) In case there shall be costs of the independent investigator the same shall be borne by the parties equally and paid within 7 days of the order.
(vi) In case any party fails to cooperate at any stage of the investigations the Children’s court is at liberty to issue any orders including adverse orders against the non-compliant party.
(vii) The Children’s Court is at liberty to vary or add to this order any other directions for the expeditious and efficient handling of the matter.
(viii) Mention before the Children’s Court on Monday 16/6/2025 for further directions.
27. Each party will bear its own costs.
28. Orders accordingly.
ANDAYI W. FRANCIS
JUDGE
Dated, signed and delivered on the Virtual platform Teams this 9th day of June 2025 in the presence of:
JUDGMENT
1. P.M.H. the appellant herein is the mother of R.N.M. a minor, while D.M.G, the respondent is the father of the minor. The respondent sued the appellant seeking to have her share legal custody of the minor with him and that he be given unlimited access to the minor. The appellant counterclaimed for legal and actual custody of the minor and payment of maintenance by the respondent.
2. The matter came up for hearing on 19/7/2021 and after the respondent (plaintiff) had testified and was cross-examined, the parties recorded a consent disposing of the claim which inter alia provided that:
a. both plaintiff and defendant granted joint legal custody of the minor.
b. the defendant to have physical custody except the times the plaintiff is allowed to have the child.
c. the plaintiff to send the defendant KShs 4,000/= every month via M-pesa starting 5/8/2021 until the child attains 18 years. However, if the child should be in boarding school the KShs 4,000/= to be sent only during the school holidays except the holiday the plaintiff is with the child.
d. the plaintiff to pay fees for the minor (R.N.M) and all school related necessities until the minor completes university.
e. the plaintiff to have access of the minor the last weekend of every month starting 9.00 a.m. on Saturday to take the child to 12.00 noon on Sunday.
3. On 3/3/2022, the appellant/defendant, through a notice of motion dated 2/3/2022 sought orders for the court to review, vary, set aside the orders of 21/7/2021 (being the date the orders of 19/7/2021 were extracted), and in particular the orders giving access of the minor to the plaintiff on grounds that the minor had reported a case of indecent molestation by the plaintiff. That the matter had been documented at Nairobi Metropolitan Services (SGBVSS Medical Summary Sheet) and also reported at Child Protection Unit, South C and was under active investigations. It was alleged that the minor had reported “baba aliniambia ninyonye hapa (pointing at the breast).”
4. On 4/3/2022, the respondent/plaintiff through a chamber summons dated 28/2/2022 sought orders to cite the appellant/defendant for contempt of court for being in breach of the orders given on 21/7/2021 and to commit her to imprisonment for six months. Secondly that the court partially reviews the said orders and grants the respondent/plaintiff both legal and physical custody of the minor as the appellant/defendant had blatantly denied the respondent/plaintiff the legal and physical custody of the minor contrary to the court’s orders of 21/7/2021. The grounds in support were that whereas the respondent was duly complying with the court orders the appellant/defendant was not discharging her obligations under the said orders.
5. Each party supported his/her application with an affidavit and respectively opposed the others application with a replying affidavit.
6. At the hearing of the application, after each counsel for a party ad made his submissions, the party was cross-examined on his/her affidavit.
7. In a ruling dated 16/1/2023 the learned trial magistrate dismissed both applications.
8. The appellant was dissatisfied with the trial court’s decision dismissing her application to review, suspend, vary, or set aside the orders it had issued on 21/7/2021 in order to deny the respondent access to the minor. That is what gives rise to the present appeal by the appellant through the memorandum dated 24/1/2023. The are seven grounds of appeal but the bottom line is that the appellant is aggrieved that the learned trial magistrate erred in both law and fact in not allowing her application to review, vary, stay or set aside the orders issued on 21/7/2021 in order to keep the minor away from the respondent pending investigations into the allegations of indecent molestation against the respondent. That in the circumstances the learned trial magistrate failed to protect the child in line with the best interests of the child. That the trial court should have interviewed the minor to assess the veracity of the allegations.
9. The appellant therefore prays that the appeal be allowed, the court sets aside the ruling of the learned trial magistrate delivered on 16/1/2023 and in lieu thereof:
a. issue a declaration that the orders of the trial court dated 21/7/2023 particularly orders numbered 2, 3, 4, and 8 are stayed and/or suspended.
b. issue and order directing that the orders issued by the trial court particularly orders numbered 2, 3, 4, and 8, be reviewed in the interests of the minor.
c. Costs of the present appeal and for the application appealed from the trial court be awarded to the appellant.
10. The appeal was disposed of by way of written submissions filed by learned counsels for both parties.
11. This is a first appeal. Learned counsels for both parties call upon this court to review the evidence before the trial court. Indeed, the duty of this court is to examine, re-evaluate, re-analyze and re-consider the evidence and draw its own conclusions, bearing in mind that it did not see witnesses testifying and therefore give due allowance for that as held in Selle & another vs. Associated Motor Boat Co. Ltd & others [1968] E.A at page 126.
12. The appellant listed the following issues for determination:
a. whether the allegation of molestation was sufficient ground for the trial court to review, suspend, vary or set aside the orders issued on 21/7/2021.
b. whether the trial court erred in law and in fact by failing to interview the child on the allegations regarding indecent molestation by the respondent.
c. whether the trial court erred in law and in fact by failing to uphold the best interests of the minor.
13. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that there was abuse of the minor as defined under section 2(g) of the Children Act 2022 and that the alleged conduct of the respondent against the minor also constituted an offence of indecent act with a child under section 11(1) of the Sexual Offences Act (Cap. 63A) Laws of Kenya. That Article 53(1)(d) of the constitution grants every child the right to be protected from any form of abuse and section 22 of the Children’s Act also protects every child from any form of abuse. Learned counsel submits that from the evidence tendered at the trial on the allegations of indecent molestation of the minor by the respondent the court ought to have issued the orders sought restricting the respondent from accessing the minor until investigations into the issue were complete. That therefore the continued access to the child is prejudicial and puts the child at risk of continued alleged abuse, which if true, no reparation shall suffice as it shall be too late.
14. Learned counsel for the respondent hinged his response to the appeal and his submission are on the sole issue on a preliminary ground that leave to appeal had not been sought and granted before the present appeal was filed as required under Order 43 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010. However, appeals under the Children’s Act are provided for under section 99 that unless otherwise provided under the Act, in any civil or criminal proceedings in a Children’s Court, an appeal shall lie in the first instance, to the High Court on points of fact and la and in the second instance, to the Court of Appeal on points of law only. My understanding of that section is that no leave is required to file an appeal to the High Court and reference need not be made to the Civil Procedure Rules.
15. I have considered the grounds of appeal filed herein, the submissions by learned counsels for the parties and the judgment of the learned trial magistrate.
16. The point for determination is whether the appellant has made out a case to warrant the setting aside of the learned trial court’s orders of 16/1/2023 dismissing her application to deny the respondent access to the minor on account of allegations of molestation or abuse of the minor by the respondent.
17. In arriving at her decision, the learned trial magistrate found that there was evidence that the appellant and the respondent have a very acrimonious relationship that was impacting negatively on the child. She found that on the issue of molestation, the respondent had not been arrested or formally charged in court over the allegations even after a considerable duration of time had elapsed. Emphasizing that the court took the welfare of the minor as primary consideration the learned trial magistrate found that the allegations had been reported at Kasarani police station where the appellant worked and given the open hostility between her and the respondent and in the absence of proof of an active and ongoing investigation, arrest or formal charge against the respondent, the allegations were insufficient to warrant a stay of the orders issued earlier.
18. Given these findings by the trial court, it is not true that the learned trial magistrate failed to give due regard to the evidence before her. She did and arrived at her decision upon assessing it. I note that the learned trial magistrate put each party to cross-examination of the contents of their respective affidavits. That was equivalent to a viva voce trial of the matter given that the main suit had been finalized through compromise by way of a consent agreement between the parties.
19. The issue the trial court was faced with is not isolated or new as it is usually at the centre stage of child custody litigation and it is not an easy one. It requires the balancing of the provisions of Article 53(1) that every child has the right (d) to be protected from abuse, neglect, harmful cultural practices, all forms of violence, inhuman treatment and punishment, and hazardous or exploitative labour and (e) to parental care and protection, which includes equal responsibility of the mother and father to provide for the child, whether they are married to each other or not; and at the same time under Article 53(2) the court must always take into account the fact that a child’s best interests are of paramount importance in every matter concerning the child.
20. The trial court had only the word of the appellant as against that of the respondent. It is apparent from the trial court’s ruling that no report of the investigations by the Child Protection Unit South C was made available to the court. As I understand it, the Anti-Human Trafficking and Child Protection Unit (DCI-AHTCPU) is a section of the Directorate of Criminal Investigations which in turn is a department of the National Police Service. The appellant submits that the trial court ought to have called the child for interview. But I do not think even that would have resolved the issue.
21. There is no doubt that an issue of child abuse is a serious allegation that cannot be taken lightly. Every effort must be made to establish the truth or otherwise of the allegations so that the child’s best interests are protected by all persons dealing with the child as required under the law. The Constitution of Kenya, 2010 provides in Article 53(2) that a child’s best interests are of paramount importance in every matter concerning the child.
22. This constitutional provision is the bedrock of child protection and is expounded more in section 8(1) to (3) of the Children Act, 2022 which provides that: -
“(1) In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies—
(a) the best interests of the child shall be the primary consideration;
(b) the best interests of the child shall include, but shall not be limited to the considerations set out in the First Schedule.
(2) All judicial and administrative institutions, and all persons acting in the name of such institutions, when exercising any powers conferred under this Act or any other written law, shall treat the interests of the child as the first and paramount consideration to the extent that this is consistent with adopting a course of action calculated to—
(a) safeguard and promote the rights and welfare of the child;
(b) conserve and promote the welfare of the child; and
(c) secure for the child such guidance and correction as is necessary for the welfare of the child, and in the public interest.
(3) In any matters affecting a child, the child shall be accorded an opportunity to express their opinion, and that opinion shall be taken into account in appropriate cases, having regard to the child’s age and degree of maturity”.
23. Under section 222(1) of the Children’s Act, it is stipulated that every child shall be afforded an opportunity to be heard in proceedings affecting the child, either directly or through a representative. The minor, the subject of the proceedings was about six years old at the time. She was fairly young and even though her views are paramount, this was not a case of choice of her custody between her father and mother and neither was it a trial of the father on charges of abuse. It was going to be an investigation which is ordinarily conducted by persons who have special knowledge and skill in children’s matters. Considering the likely ramifications of taking evidence in court, I believe it would be prejudicial to the investigations under way for the court to take the evidence of the minor on the issue at that stage because it would appear like the court’s findings would be conclusive on the issue. It is therefore not correct as submitted by the appellant that the court in failing to call the minor for interview was in error or thereby failed to uphold her best interests
24. This Court under Section 3A of the Civil Procedure Rules has inherent powers to make or issue such orders as may be necessary to meet the ends of justice and any decision made by this court should be in the best interests of the minor. The appellant also prayed that this court may grant any other relief and/or order that it may deem fit. In order to put the issue herein to rest in a conclusive manner that takes into account the best interests of the child, it is important that the bottom-line of the allegations of the inappropriate conduct of the respondent towards the minor be reached. The trial court made its decision without the benefit of an independent investigator which no doubt was a challenge given the stated acrimonious relationship between the parties.
25. I find that it is important that independent investigations into the allegations be conducted by the Directorate of Children Services and a report thereon filed in the Children’s court for its consideration. After that, the trial court, other than Hon. G.W. Kirugumi will make its ruling on the notice of motion application by the appellant dated 2/3/2022.
26. Consequently, the ruling of the trial court dated 16/1/2023 is hereby set aside and substituted with an order remitting this matter to the Children’s Court with directions that:
(i) Within 14 days the Children’s Court at Kerugoya will appoint an independent investigator from the Directorate of Children Services, to be made available by the Director of Children Services, preferably one with experience in such investigations to investigate the allegations and file a report in court within 14 days and not exceeding 30 days in any case.
(ii) The findings in the report shall not be released to the parties other than at the time of the court making its ruling.
(iii) The investigation is independent of any other investigation by any police criminal agency and shall in no way be refer to in any such criminal investigations other than the fact that a report was made thereon.
(iv) Within the initial 14 days, the Children’s Court will mention the matter and summon the parties to appear virtually and caution them that in case the report reveals that the allegations of molestation of the minor by the respondent are baseless the court, weighing the best interests of the minor, will be at liberty to grant sole physical custody to the respondent just as in case it is positive, the physical custody shall be granted to the appellant.
(v) In case there shall be costs of the independent investigator the same shall be borne by the parties equally and paid within 7 days of the order.
(vi) In case any party fails to cooperate at any stage of the investigations the Children’s court is at liberty to issue any orders including adverse orders against the non-compliant party.
(vii) The Children’s Court is at liberty to vary or add to this order any other directions for the expeditious and efficient handling of the matter.
(viii) Mention before the Children’s Court on Monday 16/6/2025 for further directions.
27. Each party will bear its own costs.
28. Orders accordingly.
ANDAYI W. FRANCIS
JUDGE
Dated, signed and delivered on the Virtual platform Teams this 9th day of June 2025 in the presence of: