1. Before this Court for determination are two applications: the Petitioner's Application dated 3rd February, 2025, and the Debtor's Application dated 7th March, 2025.
2. The first to be filed is the Petitioner’s application, which primarily seeks the following orders:-
(i) The joinder of Mauve Properties Limited as a Respondent under Section 692 of the Insolvency Act, 2015.
(ii) An injunction restraining the Debtor and Mauve Properties Limited from selling, transferring, alienating, charging, or otherwise dealing with properties identified as Land Reference Numbers 21103/2, 20117/2, 20117/3, 20117/4, 20117/5, 20117/6, 20117/7, 20117/8, 20117/9, and 20117/10.
(iii) Alternatively, an order for the sale proceeds of these properties to be deposited in court.
(iv) Costs of the application.
3. The second to be filed is the Debtor's application, which, on the other hand, seeks:-
i. The striking out of the Bankruptcy Petition dated 19th August, 2024, on the grounds that it was prematurely instituted.
ii. The striking out of the Petitioner's applications dated 18th December, 2024, and 3rd February, 2025, as they were filed within a prematurely instituted Bankruptcy Petition.
iii. Alternatively, a stay of these bankruptcy proceedings pending the determination of a suit allegedly filed by the Debtor.
iv. Costs of the application.
4. The background of the matter is that the parties entered into two loan agreements. The first, dated 14th February, 2024, for Kshs. 8,000,000, with a profit of Kshs. 4,000,000, payable within 14 days. The second agreement was dated 5th March, 2024, for Kshs. 5,200,000, with a profit of Kshs. 1,000,000, payable within 1 month from the date of issuance. Both agreements stipulated a default interest rate of 10% per month, compounded monthly, on the loan and profit if payment was not made by the due date.
5. The Debtor defaulted on the repayment of the loan as per the agreements. Consequently, the Creditor issued a Statutory Demand dated 10th July 2024 demanding payment of the principal, profit, and default interest. The Debtor did not, however, satisfy the demand.
6. The Petitioner subsequently filed the Insolvency Petition dated 19th August, 2024, seeking to proceed with the Insolvency proceedings against the Debtor since, according to the Creditor, no application had then been made to set aside the Statutory Demand. The Creditor/Petitioner also filed an application for the appointment of an interim trustee on 18th December, 2024.
7. Parties thereafter engaged with a view to having the matter settled. However, parties did not reach any agreement. The Creditor consequently filed its application dated 3rd February 2025, herein described above, and obtained interim orders against the Debtor, restricting the sale and transfer of the properties owned by Mauve Properties Limited, the proposed Respondent.
8. Upon service of interim orders, the Debtor made a payment of Kshs. 25,767,333.33, which was the amount outstanding as of the date of filing the Petition. The Creditor, while acknowledging the payment, however, demanded the balance, which included the accrued interest.
9. The Debtor, being dissatisfied with the Creditor’s demand, then filed the application dated 7th March, 2025, seeking to discharge interim orders, strike out the petition and the Petitioner's applications, or in the alternative, a stay of proceedings.
10. The Applications are opposed.
11. The Debtor and the proposed 2nd Respondent opposed the Creditor’s application dated 3rd February 2025 vide a replying affidavit, and a further replying affidavit, both dated and sworn on 7th March 2025 by James Samuel Kinyanjui, in his capacity, both as the Debtor, and as a director of Mauve Properties, the proposed 2nd Respondent.
12. In his affidavit, Mr. Kinyanjui opposed the petition and stated as follows: -
a) That the Bankruptcy Petition dated 19th August, 2024, is premature and the Honourable Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the same, since there is a pending application filed by him, dated 1st August 2024, seeking to set aside the Statutory demand.
b) That he had paid Kshs 25,767,333 despite having only been advanced with Kshs 13,200,000. That the extra Kshs. 23,026,652 being demanded by the Creditor relates to disputed interest, which is a subject of a separate suit, being MILIMANI HCCOMM NO E158 OF 2025: James Samuel Kinyanjui vs Pelican Credit Limited.
c) That Mauve Properties Limited (Proposed Respondent) is a separate entity and has never interacted with the Creditor regarding the agreements subject to these proceedings; That the company is not a debtor and cannot be joined as a party as it is not the subject of the proceedings.
d) That in any event, injunctive orders were to be issued, they would be very prejudicial, drastic, and oppressive as it would restrain properties whose values are close to Kshs 1 billion, yet the debt in contention is way much less, which in in case is disputed, and the subject of a separate suit;
e) That insolvency proceedings are not meant to hamstring a creditor, but the sole purpose of this application is to blackmail him into conceding to making payment towards the disputed interest rate.
13. The Creditor, in response to the Debtor’s application dated 7th March 2025, filed a replying affidavit dated and sworn on 21st March 2025 by Jane Njeri Mugo, Advocate and Head of Operations, Director and Team Leader of the Petitioner. In her affidavit, Ms. Mugo deponed as follows:-
a) That the Statutory Demand was issued after the Debtor defaulted in meeting his loan obligations to the creditor, and that the amount outstanding as at the date of the Statutory Demand was Kshs. 18,200,000/-, which amount continued to attract further interest.
b) That the debtor had, through various correspondences between April 2024 and June 2024, committed his indebtedness to the Creditor.
c) That the Petitioner was never served with an application to set aside the statutory demand, and as such proceeded to file an insolvency petition pursuant to the said statutory demand, which petition was duly served upon the Debtor.
d) That the Debtor only paid the said Kshs. 25,767,333.33/- after the commencement of the instant Insolvency proceedings and after being served with the interim orders issued pursuant to the Creditor’s application of 3rd February 2025.
e) That Mauve Properties Limited is a necessary party in these proceedings since the properties in respect of which the injunctive orders are sought, though owned by the proposed second respondent, constituted 50% of the Debtor’s shareholding in the company.
f) That the alleged suit, MILIMANI HCCOMM NO E158 OF 2025: James Samuel Kinyanjui vs Pelican Credit Limited, is an afterthought, was instituted after the commencement of the bankruptcy proceedings, and was merely intended to mislead the court into believing that there is a dispute on substantial grounds.
g) That no application to set aside the Statutory Demand has been served on the Petitioner by the Debtor. Further, the debtor, having made partial payments and participated in the bankruptcy proceedings, has submitted himself to the jurisdiction of this court and therefore abandoned the said application, if any.
h) That the bankruptcy petition is not premature or defective as alleged by the Debtor. The Petitioner has satisfied the threshold for the grant of injunctive orders pending determination of the bankruptcy petition as contemplated under Section 692 of the Insolvency Act.
14. The matter was canvassed by way of written submissions. In support of their respective applications, the Petitioner filed its submissions dated 25th March 2025. The Debtor and the Proposed 2nd Respondent filed their joint submissions dated 24th March 2025.
Analysis and Determination
15. I have carefully considered the two applications and the responses thereto, as well as the parties’ written submissions in support of their respective positions. I identify the following as issues requiring determination by this Court:-
i. Whether the bankruptcy petition herein is premature and/or defective.
ii. Whether there is a dispute on substantial grounds as to the debt amounts, and whether this insolvency court is properly seized of the current proceedings.
iii. Whether the Petitioner has satisfied the threshold for injunctive orders under Section 692 of the Insolvency Act.
iv. Whether the threshold for joinder of Mauve Properties Limited has been satisfied.
16. I now proceed and resolve each of the issues identified above as follows:-
Whether the bankruptcy petition is premature
17. The Petitioner argued that since the bankruptcy petition has been filed and the Debtor has participated in these proceedings without challenging jurisdiction, the application to set aside the Statutory Demand is moot. They cite Natural World Mombasa Safaris Ltd v Karuri [2022] KEHC 9979 (KLR) and Robson Harris & Company Advocates v Invesco Assurance Company Ltd [2022] KEHC 11903 (KLR) in support of this argument.
18. While it is true that active participation in a matter can, in certain circumstances, render previous preliminary objections moot, the fundamental question here is the validity of the underlying Petition itself in light of specific statutory provisions.
19. Section 17 of the Insolvency Act, 2015, provides that:-
“17. Creditor may apply for bankruptcy order in respect of debtor
(1) One or more creditors of a debtor may make an application to the Court for a bankruptcy order to be made in respect of the debtor in relation to a debt or debts owed by the debtor to the creditor or creditors.
(2) Such an application may be made in relation to a debt or debts owed by the debtor only if, at the time the application is made—
(a) the amount of the debt, or the aggregate amount of the debts, is equal to or exceeds the prescribed bankruptcy level;
(b) the debt, or each of the debts, is for a liquidated amount payable to the applicant creditor, or one or more of the applicant creditors, either immediately or at some certain, future time, and is unsecured;
(c) the debt, or each of the debts, is a debt that the debtor appears either to be unable to pay or to have no reasonable prospect of being able to pay; and
( d) there is no outstanding application to set aside a statutory demand in respect of the debt or any of the debts." [emphasis added].
20. From the above, it is clear that pursuant to the provisions of Section 17(2) (d), a bankruptcy application may be made only if "there is no outstanding application to set aside a statutory demand in respect of the debt or any of the debts.”
21. In Denis v Unity Micro Investment Limited (Insolvency Cause 8 of 2021) [2023] KEHC 24534 (KLR) (5 May 2023) (Ruling), the court in recognizing the import of Section 17 of the Insolvency Act stated that:-
“Under Section 17 of the Insolvency Act, a creditor may apply to the Court for a bankruptcy order against a debtor in instances where a valid statutory demand has been served upon the debtor, and the debtor has failed to comply with and/or challenge the said statutory demand within twenty-one days of service ….”[emphasis added].
22. In the present case, evidence on record indicates that the Statutory Demand was issued by the Creditor on 10th July 2024 in IC No. E139 of 2024, and the Debtor, on 1st August 2024, in the same Cause, applied to have the said Statutory Demand set aside. The said application is still pending.
23. The Court noted the Petitioner's assertion that they were never served with the application to set aside the statutory demand. However, the existence of a pending application to set aside a statutory demand, whether served or not, directly impacts the competence of the subsequent bankruptcy petition.
24. In the premises, this Court finds that the existence of an outstanding application to set aside the statutory demand, even if not served, as alleged by the Petitioner, renders the Bankruptcy Petition premature.
25. Additionally, I also find to be without merit the Petitioner’s argument that the Debtor, by participating in the bankruptcy proceedings, subjected himself to the jurisdiction of the court. It is a trite law that the doctrine of estoppel cannot apply in the face of clear statutory provisions. The Requirements of Section 17(2)(d) of the Insolvency Act, 2015, and Regulation 17(9) of the Insolvency Regulations are clear and cannot be overridden by the conduct of parties.
26. Further, Regulation 17(9) of the Insolvency Regulations clarifies that a bankruptcy petition can only be presented after the Court dismisses an application to set aside a statutory demand and issues an order authorizing the petition. The Regulation is explicit that:-
“If the Court dismisses the application, it shall make an Order authorising the creditor to present a bankruptcy application either immediately or on or after a date specified in the Order.”
27. The import of the above provisions of the law is therefore that he filing of the Bankruptcy Petition in this case will have to await, and will be dependent on the outcome of the Debtor’s application to set aside the Statutory Demand.
28. Accordingly, I find and hold that the Bankruptcy Petition dated 19th August, 2024, is premature and therefore defective, the same having been filed while the Debtor’s application dated 1st August, 2024 to set aside the statutory demand is pending, in contravention of Section 17(2)(d) of the Insolvency Act, 2015, and Regulation 17(9) of the Insolvency Regulations.
29. Having found that the Bankruptcy Petition dated 19th August, 2024 premature, it therefore follows that any processes taken out of it, including the Applications dated 18th December, 2024, and 3rd February, 2025, were erroneously filed and cannot be sustained. Consequently, the applications are hereby struck out.
30. In light of the finding that the applications are incompetent and have been struck out, the Court finds it unnecessary to address the remaining issues, including the application for the joinder of Mauve Properties Limited and the ancillary prayers arising therefrom, as doing so would serve no practical purpose.
Disposition
31. In the result, the Court issues the following final orders:-
i. The Bankruptcy Petition dated 19th August 2024 is hereby struck out for having been prematurely instituted.
ii. The Petitioner’s Notice of Motion dated 18th December 2024 is likewise struck out, having been rendered a nullity by the striking out of the main Petition.
iii. The Petitioner’s Notice of Motion dated 3rd February 2025 is similarly struck out, being a nullity consequent upon the striking out of the main Petition.
iv. The interim orders issued on 5th February, 2025, by Hon. Lady Justice J.W.W. Mong’are are hereby discharged.
v. The Debtor's Application dated 7th March, 2025, is hereby allowed, but only to the extent enumerated in (i) to (iv) above.
vi. The Debtor’s Application dated 1st August 2024 seeking to set aside the Statutory Demand dated 10th July 2024, to be heard on a priority basis.
vii. Each party to bear their own costs
32. It is so ordered.
SIGNED, DATED, and DELIVERED IN VIRTUAL COURT THIS
10TH DAY OF JULY 2025
ADO MOSES
JUDGE
In the Presence of:
Moses C/A
Ms. Kendi…….…for the Petitioner
Githumbi…………for the Debtor
2. The first to be filed is the Petitioner’s application, which primarily seeks the following orders:-
(i) The joinder of Mauve Properties Limited as a Respondent under Section 692 of the Insolvency Act, 2015.
(ii) An injunction restraining the Debtor and Mauve Properties Limited from selling, transferring, alienating, charging, or otherwise dealing with properties identified as Land Reference Numbers 21103/2, 20117/2, 20117/3, 20117/4, 20117/5, 20117/6, 20117/7, 20117/8, 20117/9, and 20117/10.
(iii) Alternatively, an order for the sale proceeds of these properties to be deposited in court.
(iv) Costs of the application.
3. The second to be filed is the Debtor's application, which, on the other hand, seeks:-
i. The striking out of the Bankruptcy Petition dated 19th August, 2024, on the grounds that it was prematurely instituted.
ii. The striking out of the Petitioner's applications dated 18th December, 2024, and 3rd February, 2025, as they were filed within a prematurely instituted Bankruptcy Petition.
iii. Alternatively, a stay of these bankruptcy proceedings pending the determination of a suit allegedly filed by the Debtor.
iv. Costs of the application.
4. The background of the matter is that the parties entered into two loan agreements. The first, dated 14th February, 2024, for Kshs. 8,000,000, with a profit of Kshs. 4,000,000, payable within 14 days. The second agreement was dated 5th March, 2024, for Kshs. 5,200,000, with a profit of Kshs. 1,000,000, payable within 1 month from the date of issuance. Both agreements stipulated a default interest rate of 10% per month, compounded monthly, on the loan and profit if payment was not made by the due date.
5. The Debtor defaulted on the repayment of the loan as per the agreements. Consequently, the Creditor issued a Statutory Demand dated 10th July 2024 demanding payment of the principal, profit, and default interest. The Debtor did not, however, satisfy the demand.
6. The Petitioner subsequently filed the Insolvency Petition dated 19th August, 2024, seeking to proceed with the Insolvency proceedings against the Debtor since, according to the Creditor, no application had then been made to set aside the Statutory Demand. The Creditor/Petitioner also filed an application for the appointment of an interim trustee on 18th December, 2024.
7. Parties thereafter engaged with a view to having the matter settled. However, parties did not reach any agreement. The Creditor consequently filed its application dated 3rd February 2025, herein described above, and obtained interim orders against the Debtor, restricting the sale and transfer of the properties owned by Mauve Properties Limited, the proposed Respondent.
8. Upon service of interim orders, the Debtor made a payment of Kshs. 25,767,333.33, which was the amount outstanding as of the date of filing the Petition. The Creditor, while acknowledging the payment, however, demanded the balance, which included the accrued interest.
9. The Debtor, being dissatisfied with the Creditor’s demand, then filed the application dated 7th March, 2025, seeking to discharge interim orders, strike out the petition and the Petitioner's applications, or in the alternative, a stay of proceedings.
10. The Applications are opposed.
11. The Debtor and the proposed 2nd Respondent opposed the Creditor’s application dated 3rd February 2025 vide a replying affidavit, and a further replying affidavit, both dated and sworn on 7th March 2025 by James Samuel Kinyanjui, in his capacity, both as the Debtor, and as a director of Mauve Properties, the proposed 2nd Respondent.
12. In his affidavit, Mr. Kinyanjui opposed the petition and stated as follows: -
a) That the Bankruptcy Petition dated 19th August, 2024, is premature and the Honourable Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the same, since there is a pending application filed by him, dated 1st August 2024, seeking to set aside the Statutory demand.
b) That he had paid Kshs 25,767,333 despite having only been advanced with Kshs 13,200,000. That the extra Kshs. 23,026,652 being demanded by the Creditor relates to disputed interest, which is a subject of a separate suit, being MILIMANI HCCOMM NO E158 OF 2025: James Samuel Kinyanjui vs Pelican Credit Limited.
c) That Mauve Properties Limited (Proposed Respondent) is a separate entity and has never interacted with the Creditor regarding the agreements subject to these proceedings; That the company is not a debtor and cannot be joined as a party as it is not the subject of the proceedings.
d) That in any event, injunctive orders were to be issued, they would be very prejudicial, drastic, and oppressive as it would restrain properties whose values are close to Kshs 1 billion, yet the debt in contention is way much less, which in in case is disputed, and the subject of a separate suit;
e) That insolvency proceedings are not meant to hamstring a creditor, but the sole purpose of this application is to blackmail him into conceding to making payment towards the disputed interest rate.
13. The Creditor, in response to the Debtor’s application dated 7th March 2025, filed a replying affidavit dated and sworn on 21st March 2025 by Jane Njeri Mugo, Advocate and Head of Operations, Director and Team Leader of the Petitioner. In her affidavit, Ms. Mugo deponed as follows:-
a) That the Statutory Demand was issued after the Debtor defaulted in meeting his loan obligations to the creditor, and that the amount outstanding as at the date of the Statutory Demand was Kshs. 18,200,000/-, which amount continued to attract further interest.
b) That the debtor had, through various correspondences between April 2024 and June 2024, committed his indebtedness to the Creditor.
c) That the Petitioner was never served with an application to set aside the statutory demand, and as such proceeded to file an insolvency petition pursuant to the said statutory demand, which petition was duly served upon the Debtor.
d) That the Debtor only paid the said Kshs. 25,767,333.33/- after the commencement of the instant Insolvency proceedings and after being served with the interim orders issued pursuant to the Creditor’s application of 3rd February 2025.
e) That Mauve Properties Limited is a necessary party in these proceedings since the properties in respect of which the injunctive orders are sought, though owned by the proposed second respondent, constituted 50% of the Debtor’s shareholding in the company.
f) That the alleged suit, MILIMANI HCCOMM NO E158 OF 2025: James Samuel Kinyanjui vs Pelican Credit Limited, is an afterthought, was instituted after the commencement of the bankruptcy proceedings, and was merely intended to mislead the court into believing that there is a dispute on substantial grounds.
g) That no application to set aside the Statutory Demand has been served on the Petitioner by the Debtor. Further, the debtor, having made partial payments and participated in the bankruptcy proceedings, has submitted himself to the jurisdiction of this court and therefore abandoned the said application, if any.
h) That the bankruptcy petition is not premature or defective as alleged by the Debtor. The Petitioner has satisfied the threshold for the grant of injunctive orders pending determination of the bankruptcy petition as contemplated under Section 692 of the Insolvency Act.
14. The matter was canvassed by way of written submissions. In support of their respective applications, the Petitioner filed its submissions dated 25th March 2025. The Debtor and the Proposed 2nd Respondent filed their joint submissions dated 24th March 2025.
Analysis and Determination
15. I have carefully considered the two applications and the responses thereto, as well as the parties’ written submissions in support of their respective positions. I identify the following as issues requiring determination by this Court:-
i. Whether the bankruptcy petition herein is premature and/or defective.
ii. Whether there is a dispute on substantial grounds as to the debt amounts, and whether this insolvency court is properly seized of the current proceedings.
iii. Whether the Petitioner has satisfied the threshold for injunctive orders under Section 692 of the Insolvency Act.
iv. Whether the threshold for joinder of Mauve Properties Limited has been satisfied.
16. I now proceed and resolve each of the issues identified above as follows:-
Whether the bankruptcy petition is premature
17. The Petitioner argued that since the bankruptcy petition has been filed and the Debtor has participated in these proceedings without challenging jurisdiction, the application to set aside the Statutory Demand is moot. They cite Natural World Mombasa Safaris Ltd v Karuri [2022] KEHC 9979 (KLR) and Robson Harris & Company Advocates v Invesco Assurance Company Ltd [2022] KEHC 11903 (KLR) in support of this argument.
18. While it is true that active participation in a matter can, in certain circumstances, render previous preliminary objections moot, the fundamental question here is the validity of the underlying Petition itself in light of specific statutory provisions.
19. Section 17 of the Insolvency Act, 2015, provides that:-
“17. Creditor may apply for bankruptcy order in respect of debtor
(1) One or more creditors of a debtor may make an application to the Court for a bankruptcy order to be made in respect of the debtor in relation to a debt or debts owed by the debtor to the creditor or creditors.
(2) Such an application may be made in relation to a debt or debts owed by the debtor only if, at the time the application is made—
(a) the amount of the debt, or the aggregate amount of the debts, is equal to or exceeds the prescribed bankruptcy level;
(b) the debt, or each of the debts, is for a liquidated amount payable to the applicant creditor, or one or more of the applicant creditors, either immediately or at some certain, future time, and is unsecured;
(c) the debt, or each of the debts, is a debt that the debtor appears either to be unable to pay or to have no reasonable prospect of being able to pay; and
( d) there is no outstanding application to set aside a statutory demand in respect of the debt or any of the debts." [emphasis added].
20. From the above, it is clear that pursuant to the provisions of Section 17(2) (d), a bankruptcy application may be made only if "there is no outstanding application to set aside a statutory demand in respect of the debt or any of the debts.”
21. In Denis v Unity Micro Investment Limited (Insolvency Cause 8 of 2021) [2023] KEHC 24534 (KLR) (5 May 2023) (Ruling), the court in recognizing the import of Section 17 of the Insolvency Act stated that:-
“Under Section 17 of the Insolvency Act, a creditor may apply to the Court for a bankruptcy order against a debtor in instances where a valid statutory demand has been served upon the debtor, and the debtor has failed to comply with and/or challenge the said statutory demand within twenty-one days of service ….”[emphasis added].
22. In the present case, evidence on record indicates that the Statutory Demand was issued by the Creditor on 10th July 2024 in IC No. E139 of 2024, and the Debtor, on 1st August 2024, in the same Cause, applied to have the said Statutory Demand set aside. The said application is still pending.
23. The Court noted the Petitioner's assertion that they were never served with the application to set aside the statutory demand. However, the existence of a pending application to set aside a statutory demand, whether served or not, directly impacts the competence of the subsequent bankruptcy petition.
24. In the premises, this Court finds that the existence of an outstanding application to set aside the statutory demand, even if not served, as alleged by the Petitioner, renders the Bankruptcy Petition premature.
25. Additionally, I also find to be without merit the Petitioner’s argument that the Debtor, by participating in the bankruptcy proceedings, subjected himself to the jurisdiction of the court. It is a trite law that the doctrine of estoppel cannot apply in the face of clear statutory provisions. The Requirements of Section 17(2)(d) of the Insolvency Act, 2015, and Regulation 17(9) of the Insolvency Regulations are clear and cannot be overridden by the conduct of parties.
26. Further, Regulation 17(9) of the Insolvency Regulations clarifies that a bankruptcy petition can only be presented after the Court dismisses an application to set aside a statutory demand and issues an order authorizing the petition. The Regulation is explicit that:-
“If the Court dismisses the application, it shall make an Order authorising the creditor to present a bankruptcy application either immediately or on or after a date specified in the Order.”
27. The import of the above provisions of the law is therefore that he filing of the Bankruptcy Petition in this case will have to await, and will be dependent on the outcome of the Debtor’s application to set aside the Statutory Demand.
28. Accordingly, I find and hold that the Bankruptcy Petition dated 19th August, 2024, is premature and therefore defective, the same having been filed while the Debtor’s application dated 1st August, 2024 to set aside the statutory demand is pending, in contravention of Section 17(2)(d) of the Insolvency Act, 2015, and Regulation 17(9) of the Insolvency Regulations.
29. Having found that the Bankruptcy Petition dated 19th August, 2024 premature, it therefore follows that any processes taken out of it, including the Applications dated 18th December, 2024, and 3rd February, 2025, were erroneously filed and cannot be sustained. Consequently, the applications are hereby struck out.
30. In light of the finding that the applications are incompetent and have been struck out, the Court finds it unnecessary to address the remaining issues, including the application for the joinder of Mauve Properties Limited and the ancillary prayers arising therefrom, as doing so would serve no practical purpose.
Disposition
31. In the result, the Court issues the following final orders:-
i. The Bankruptcy Petition dated 19th August 2024 is hereby struck out for having been prematurely instituted.
ii. The Petitioner’s Notice of Motion dated 18th December 2024 is likewise struck out, having been rendered a nullity by the striking out of the main Petition.
iii. The Petitioner’s Notice of Motion dated 3rd February 2025 is similarly struck out, being a nullity consequent upon the striking out of the main Petition.
iv. The interim orders issued on 5th February, 2025, by Hon. Lady Justice J.W.W. Mong’are are hereby discharged.
v. The Debtor's Application dated 7th March, 2025, is hereby allowed, but only to the extent enumerated in (i) to (iv) above.
vi. The Debtor’s Application dated 1st August 2024 seeking to set aside the Statutory Demand dated 10th July 2024, to be heard on a priority basis.
vii. Each party to bear their own costs
32. It is so ordered.
SIGNED, DATED, and DELIVERED IN VIRTUAL COURT THIS
10TH DAY OF JULY 2025
ADO MOSES
JUDGE
In the Presence of:
Moses C/A
Ms. Kendi…….…for the Petitioner
Githumbi…………for the Debtor