1. I have considered the application dated 3rd November, 2023, together with the affidavit in support sworn on even date; the replying affidavit in opposition to the same sworn on 19th February, 2024; the submissions of the parties; and the applicable law.
2. The Applicant is seeking a review of the ruling dated 19th October, 2023, by my brother, Mwita, J. adopting an arbitral award as a judgment of the court, the procedure of which is governed by Section 36 of the Arbitration Act 1995 (“the Act”).
3. Upon perusal of the record, the court could not locate, and counsel could not state with certainty if the Applicant had attached a copy of the impugned ruling to its application. Counsel for the Respondent however clarified that the same had not been annexed.
4. Additionally, counsel for the applicant could not state which specific criteria of Section 36 had not been complied with at the time of adopting the award as a judgment of the court. Rather, counsel spoke to the merits of the award as the basis upon which he sought a review of the said ruling.
5. Having considered the submissions of counsel, I am of the view that court intervention is strictly limited in arbitration matters. The extent of intervention is governed by the provisions of Section 10 of the Act. The effect of Section 10 is that the ordinary rules of Civil Procedure do not apply to arbitration matters. The Act is a complete code and is a self-governing regime.
6. In this regard, the Arbitration Act does not contemplate a provision for review of a ruling arising from section 36 of the Act, which is the relief sought by the Applicant. In fact, no such provision known as review may be found anywhere in the entire Act.
7. I am not inclined to import the provisions of review from the Civil Procedure Rules into the Arbitration Act. To do so would be contrary to the intention of arbitration, which is intended to be final and binding.
8. Finally, to my mind, a challenge relating to refusal of recognition and enforcement of an award is governed by Section 37 of the Act. The same provision is however, time bound. Notably, the application must be made within the timelines set out in sections 35 and 36 of the Act, and in accordance with the procedure contained therein. Again, this was not done at the time my brother Mwita, J. adopted the arbitral award as a judgment of the court.
9. The statutory time limit to challenge the award has since expired, this being three months from the date of publication of the award.
10. I do not think that the Applicant may rebirth the provisions of Section 35 by way of review. To do so would defeat the objectives and purpose of the Act, and give credence a provision, that in any case, is not a process contemplated under the Arbitration Act.
11. Based on the reasons above, I find that the application is without merit and the same is dismissed with costs.