1. The Petitioner, Ndiang’ui Kinyagia, brings this Petition pursuant to Articles 22(1) and 258(1) of the Constitution, asserting that his fundamental rights have been violated and are under continuing threat. He avers that on 21 June 2025, officers of the 1st Respondent descended upon his residence at 1313 Apartments, Kinoo, in unmarked Subaru vehicles. The significance of the Subaru vehicles is that they had become synonymous with abductions, forced disappearance and extrajudicial killings. The Petitioner states that no summons had been issued to him prior to this covert operation, and that the manner of the raid caused him to fear for his life, forcing him into hiding.
2. The Petition details a series of alleged unconstitutional acts, including illegal breaking, entry, search, and seizure of the Petitioner’s home and property. The officers allegedly broke his locks, entered his house in his absence, ransacked the premises, and seized laptops, mobile phones, passports, and personal documents. He avers that these acts contravene Articles 31 (privacy), 40 (property), 29 (security of the person), 28 (dignity), 43 (socioeconomic rights) and 47 (fair administrative action).
3. The Petitioner further alleges continuing violations and threats, including surveillance, intimidation, and constructive eviction after the Respondents allegedly replaced the locks to his house. He states that he is mentally and psychologically broken and has developed paranoia due to persistent monitoring by unidentified individuals in unmarked vehicles. He contends that the Respondents’ conduct offends Articles 2, 3, 10, 19–24, and 21(1), and amounts to a breach of their constitutional mandates under Articles 73 and 232 relating to integrity, accountability, and professional ethics in public service.
4. As remedies, the Petitioner seeks a suite of constitutional declarations and judicial relief under Article 23 of the Constitution, including declarations of violation of rights under Articles 25, 28, 29, 31, 40, 43, and 47; mandatory orders compelling the immediate release of his seized items; prohibitory orders restraining the Respondents from harassment, arrest, intimidation, or interference with his movement; compensation for violation of rights and constructive eviction; and orders barring the respondents from extracting or using any information from the seized devices. He also seeks an order prohibiting the 3rd respondent from instituting any trumped-up charges against him
5. The supporting affidavit of Ndiang’ui Kinyagia, sworn on 6 September 2025, narrates a sequence of events beginning on 21 June 2025, when officers believed to be from the Directorate of Criminal Investigation (DCI) allegedly arrived at his residence in unmarked vehicles, conducted inquiries about his whereabouts, and later, according to both his neighbours and the caretaker, forcefully broke into his house without a warrant. He states that the covert nature of the operation, coupled with the national climate of abductions and disappearances, caused him to fear for his life, prompting him to switch off his phone and go into hiding.
6. During this period, his mother reported him missing, and the Law Society of Kenya filed a habeas corpus petition; HCCHRPET E387 OF 2025, Law Society of Kenya & Anor v Inspector General of Police & 5 Others. He avers that the officers unlawfully searched his home, seized laptops, phones, passport, and his vaccination certificate, and replaced his locks, effectively taking over his residence. He further asserts that the Respondents relied on section 60 of the National Police Service Act without complying with its mandatory procedural safeguards, including recording grounds for the search, producing identification, and presenting seized items before a magistrate.
7. He additionally depones that the raid was allegedly linked to an X platform post made under the handle @daguindd , which he denies authoring, stating that his account had been compromised. Upon resurfacing, he recorded a statement at DCI headquarters and learned from affidavits sworn by Sgt. Samuel Itegi (30 June 2025) and Cpl. Leonard Siele (2 July 2025) that the officers admitted to the break-in. He describes ongoing surveillance, intimidation, psychological trauma, and drastic lifestyle changes resulting from fear of further harm. He therefore seeks constitutional protection, declarations on the illegality of the Respondents’ actions, return of his property, and orders restraining arrest or harassment pending determination of the petition
8. The 1 st , 2 nd and 4 th Respondents’ position, as expressed in their Grounds of Opposition dated 9 October 2025 and affidavits sworn on 15 th October 2025 and 16 th December 2025, is that the Petition is fundamentally defective. They argue that the Petitioner has not pleaded constitutional violations with the precision demanded by law, noting that he has neither demonstrated detention nor any wrongful charging that would invite judicial intervention.
9. In the Replying Affidavit sworn on 14 October 2025, No. 239238 C.I. Nickson Kinyua, an investigator attached to the DCI Serious Crimes Unit, explains that the Petitioner is a suspect in DCI Inquiry File No. 190 of 2025, involving alleged offences under the Computer Misuse and Cybercrimes Act. He states that electronic devices were lawfully seized and subjected to forensic examination, and that the Petitioner in fact honored summons and recommended a statement of his own volition. It is averred that the investigations are grounded in statutory mandate and responsive to allegations requiring inquiry.
10. He further depones that the Respondents have complied with all court directions and have continued to observe the Petitioner’s constitutional rights. He states that there has been no arbitrary arrest, detention, or discriminatory conduct, and that no summons has been issued that would threaten the Petitioner’s liberties. He emphasizes that any future decision to charge will be constitutionally guided, and that the sufficiency or accuracy of evidence is a matter reserved for the trial court, which is best equipped to deal with the quality and sufficiency of evidence gathered.
11. The affidavit concludes that the Petition is an improper attempt to draw the High Court into factual determinations reserved for the criminal process. The deponent asserts that the Petitioner has not shown illegality, bad faith, procedural impropriety, or excess of mandate on the part of the Respondents. He characterises the Petition as an effort to “subvert the criminal justice system” and prays that it be dismissed so that investigations may proceed to their logical conclusion, with the ODPP empowered to advise on charges once culpability is established.
12. The 3rd Respondent contends that the Petition and Notice of Motion are fundamentally misconceived, premature, and constitutionally unsound. Anchoring its position on Article 157, the Respondent stresses that the Applicant seeks to restrain prosecutorial powers before they have crystallised, noting that no prosecutorial decision has been made and that therefore the application is premature and speculative. In the Respondent’s view, the Court is being invited to intervene in an investigative process that is still unfolding, thereby violating the doctrines of ripeness, exhaustion, and the constitutional architecture that insulates prosecutorial discretion from judicial interference.
13. Further, the 3 rd Respondent asserts that the grievances raised; entry, seizure, and alleged violations, fall squarely within investigative conduct and cannot be imputed to the DPP before an investigation file is even received or reviewed. To grant the orders sought, the Respondent argues, would be to improperly fetter the independence of the DPP, collapse the separation of powers, and convert constitutional litigation into a shield against lawful inquiry.
14. The Petitioner swore a Supplementary Affidavit on 6th November 2025, responding to the Replying Affidavit of C.I. Nickson Kinyua. He maintains that the police conducted an unlawful raid on 21st June 2025 without a search warrant, without recording grounds of belief as required under Section 60 of the National Police Service Act, and without presenting the seized items before a magistrate. He further states that claims of a forensic order in Misc. Application No. E2492 of 2025 are untrue, as he was never served with any such order.
15. He avers that the Respondents violated multiple constitutional rights through violent entry, confiscation of property, intimidation, surveillance, and continued detention of his items for over five months despite no charges being preferred. He emphasizes that some seized items are his tools of trade, rendering him jobless, while others are travel documents restricting his movement. He rejects the Respondents’ assertion of acting within their mandate, arguing that investigative powers cannot justify warrantless raids or indefinite seizure of property.
16. Finally, he asserts that the Petition is a legitimate pursuit of constitutional protection under Articles 22 and 23. He notes that no criminal charges exist, making the Respondents’ claim that issues should be left to a trial court untenable. He concludes that the Replying Affidavit fails to justify the impugned actions and instead reveals a pattern of impunity.
17. The Petition was canvassed via written submissions.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE PETITIONER
18. The Petitioner submits that his non derogable right to freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment under Articles 25(a) and 29 was violated when officers in unmarked Subaru vehicles, associated with abductions, descended on his home, prompting him to flee and hide. He cites the definition of torture under the Convention against Torture, noting that the Respondents’ conduct caused “severe mental anguish, fear, humiliation and psychological suffering.” The psychological reports confirm paranoia, sleeplessness, and trauma. The Petitioner relies on Chege Kuria Mwere & 6 Others Vs Attorney General [2017] eKLR and Wamwere & 5 others v Attorney General [2023] KESC 3 (KLR) to show that intentional exposure to fear and humiliation constitutes inhuman treatment.
19. On freedom and security of the person, the Petitioner submits that the Respondents acted arbitrarily, without summons or lawful basis, and created a reasonable apprehension of danger given the national context of abductions between 2024–2025. His mother even filed a missing person report and participated in habeas corpus proceedings. The Respondents’ break in and replacement of locks rendered him effectively homeless and fearful of returning. He cites Muriithi v Inspector General of Police & 3 Others [2025] KEHC 534 (KLR) and CORD v Republic of Kenya [2015] eKLR , emphasizing that constitutional protection extends to threatened violations.
20. The Petitioner asserts that his right to dignity under Article 28 was gravely violated through the unlawful invasion of his home, constructive eviction, seizure of his tools of trade, and psychological trauma. He quotes the South African case S v Makwanyane (1995) (3) SA 391 (CC) and also relies on Mutua & Another v Gitau & 2 Others [2024] KEHC 14443 (KLR) and Francis Coralie Mullin v Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi (1981) AIR 746 , arguing that deprivation of livelihood and shelter undermines human dignity.
21. On privacy under Article 31, the Petitioner highlights the unlawful break-in, search, and seizure of laptops, phones, passports and personal documents without a warrant or compliance with Sections 60 and 61 of the National Police Service Act. He notes that the items were never presented before a magistrate as required under Section 60(3)(b) of the National Police Service Act. He cites Samura Engineering Limited & 10 others v Kenya Revenue Authority [2012] eKLR, where the Court held that searches must comply with Article 24 safeguards, and Manfred Walter Schmitt & Another v Republic [2013] eKLR , affirming that arbitrary searches offend constitutional protections.
22. The Petitioner further submits that the seizure of his passports and continued surveillance violated his freedom of movement under Article 39, relying on Jade Louise Salthouse v Mark Maina [2026] KEHC 2808 (KLR). He also argues that the seizure of his laptops and phones violated property rights under Article 40, citing Isaac Gathungu Wanjohi v Attorney General [2012] eKLR and Virendra Ramji Gudka v Attorney General [2014] eKLR . He contends that the cumulative violations justify general damages, relying on Gitobu Imanyara & 2 Others v Attorney General [2016] eKLR , and seeks reliefs under Article 23(3), including declarations, compensation, and exclusion of illegally obtained evidence under Article 50(4)
SUMMARY OF SUBMISSIONS OF 1 ST , 2 ND AND 4 TH RESPONDENTS
23. The Respondents argue that the central issue in the Petition, whether the Petitioner’s constitutional rights were violated, fails at the outset because the search and seizure complained of were conducted pursuant to a valid court warrant issued by the Court in Milimani Miscellaneous Criminal Application No. E2492 of 2025, where the Magistrate authorised seizure and forensic extraction of data from the Petitioner’s devices. It is therefore submitted that the Petitioner’s claims of illegal entry, illegal seizure, and violation of privacy under Article 31 are unfounded.
24. Further it is submitted that the actions of the officers were lawful under section 24(e) and section 60 of the National Police Service Act, which empower police to investigate complaints and, in certain circumstances, conduct warrantless searches. They rely on jurisprudence emphasising non interference with investigations, including Kipoki Oreu Tasur v Inspector General of Police & 5 others (2014) eKLR , where Mumbi Ngugi J (as she then was) held that the criminal justice system must operate without undue restraint, and Republic v Commissioner of Police ex parte Michael Monari & another [2012] eKLR , which affirmed that police need only establish reasonable suspicion before preferring charges. It is submitted that the Petitioner has not demonstrated abuse of power.
25. The Respondents further argue that several of the Petitioner’s allegations, violation of dignity (Article 28), torture or cruel treatment (Article 25(a)), violation of freedom and security (Article 29), and harassment, are unsupported by evidence. They highlight that the Petitioner has not identified any specific incident amounting to torture or degrading treatment, nor has he shown that seizure of property constitutes a deprivation of personal liberty. They also note that the Petitioner admitted he went into hiding voluntarily, undermining claims of intimidation. The Respondents insist that lawful seizure of property, even if prolonged, does not automatically amount to violation of dignity or security.
26. As regards the alleged violation to the Petitioner’s right to property (Article 40) and the Petitioner’s claim that the Respondents took over his rented premises. The Respondents deny occupying or constructively terminating the tenancy, arguing that a temporary search cannot amount to taking possession. They emphasise that Article 40(3) permits deprivation of property in accordance with the law, and since the seizure was warrant based, no constitutional violation arises. They also note that the Petitioner’s prayers for release of seized items have been overtaken by events, as the High Court’s ruling of 27th January 2026 ordered their return, and the Petitioner is now in full possession of them.
27. Finally, the Respondents submit that the Petition fails the Anarita Karimi Njeru precision test and the burden of proof requirements under sections 107 and 109 of the Evidence Act. They argue that the Petitioner merely listed numerous constitutional provisions without demonstrating the manner of violation. They rely on Communications Commission of Kenya & 5 others v Royal Media Services Limited & 5 others [2014] eKLR , which requires a clear link between the alleged violation and the constitutional provision invoked. Since no such link is established, and because any limitations on rights arising from the warrant satisfy Article 24 of the Constitution, the Respondents contend that no declaratory or conservatory orders should issue, and the claim for general damages is unsustainable. They therefore urge the Court to dismiss the Petition with costs.
SUMMARY OF 3 RD RESPONDENT’S SUBMISSIONS
28. The 3rd Respondent submits that its constitutional mandate is strictly prosecutorial under Article 157, while investigative powers lie exclusively with the police under Article 245. This distinction, affirmed in Republic v Commissioner of Police & another ex parte Michael Monari & another (2012) eKLR and Diamond Hasham Lalji & another v Attorney General & 4 others (2018) eKLR , demonstrates that the ODPP neither seized the Petitioner’s property nor conducted any searches or arrests. Consequently, allegations relating to investigative excesses cannot be attributed to the 3rd Respondent.
29. The Petitioner’s fear of “trumped-up charges” is described as speculative and legally untenable. Relying on Meixner & another v Attorney General (2005) eKLR and Republic v Director of Public Prosecutions & 2 others ex parte Chamanlal Vrajlal Kamani & 2 others (2015) eKLR , the Respondent emphasizes that courts only intervene where prosecution is for a collateral purpose, is oppressive or malicious, or constitutes an abuse of process, none of which has been demonstrated.
30. The Respondent further invokes the doctrine of ripeness, asserting that the Petition is premature because no prosecutorial decision has been made and cites John Harun Mwau v Peter Gastrow & 3 others (2014) eKLR .
31. In conclusion, the 3rd Respondent maintains that the Petition, as framed against it, is speculative, premature, and legally unsustainable. It reiterates that it has not made any decision to charge the Petitioner and has not violated any constitutional rights. The Petitioner’s prayers are characterized as an attempt to obtain insulation from the possibility of lawful prosecution rather than protection of rights. The Respondent therefore urges the Court to decline all relief sought against it in the interest of justice and public interest
ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION
32. Arising from the foregoing I raise the following as the issues for determination;
a. Does the Petition meet the precision test as articulated in the Anarita Karimi Njeru Case?
b. If the answer to (a) above is in the affirmative, whether the rights of the Petitioner have been violated or are threatened with violation as alleged?
c. In light of (a) and (b) above what are the consequential orders.
Does the Petition meet the precision test as articulated in the Anarita Karimi Njeru Case?
33. In the precedent-setting case of Anarita Karimi Njeru v Republic [1979] KEHC 30 (KLR) the Court pronounced itself thus-
[5] ….We would, however, again stress that if a person is seeking redress from the High Court on a matter which involves a reference to the Constitution, it is important (if only to ensure that justice is done to his case) that he should set out with a reasonable degree of precision that of which he complains, the provisions said to be infringed, and the manner in which they are alleged to be infringed
34. The Court of Appeal elaborated on the test in Mumo Matemu v Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance & 5 Others [2013] eKLR , explaining thus-
The principle in Anarita Karimi Njeru (supra) is not a technical requirement of form. It is a substantive requirement intended to ensure that parties understand the case they have to meet and the court is properly guided. What is required is reasonable precision in framing complaints, not perfect particularity. A petition should disclose the specific constitutional provisions alleged to be infringed, the manner of infringement, and the nature of the redress sought. The test is one of substance, not of formula….We cannot look at Article 22 in isolation. We agree with the High Court that precision is not coterminous with exactitude. It is not a ritualistic requirement. The principle in Anarita Karimi Njeru that requires reasonable precision in framing issues is to ensure that the Respondent has adequate notice and that the court is able to fashion an appropriate remedy. The standard is one of reasonable specificity, not mechanical nicety.
35. Further, Rule 10 of the Constitution of Kenya (Protection of Rights and Fundamental Freedoms) Practice and Procedure Rules, 2013 prescribes the form and essential content of a constitutional petition. The Rule embodies the foundational rationale that a respondent must be placed on adequate notice of the case they are required to meet, and that the Court must be apprised with sufficient clarity of the nature of the claim so as to enable it to fashion an appropriate and effective remedy. The rule therefore serves both procedural fairness and substantive justice, ensuring that constitutional litigation proceeds on a clear, intelligible, and properly delineated framework.
36. In the current case, the Petition identifies the entry, search and seizure of assets of the Petitioner on 21 st June 2025, the surveillance of the Petitioner by the respondents, the psychological trauma of the Petitioner as the factual basis of the Petition, the Petitioner alleges violation of Articles 31, 28, 29 and 40 of the Constitution. The allegations in my view are sufficiently set out to enable the respondents to understand the case to meet and to allow the Court to craft appropriate remedies. The objection to the Petition on this ground must therefore fail.
If the answer to (a) above is in the affirmative, whether the rights of the Petitioner have been violated or are threatened with violation as alleged?
37. The sequence of events giving rise to the present Petition is discernible from the pleadings and proceedings in HCCHR Petition No. E387 of 2025 (Law Society of Kenya) , Milimani Chief Magistrate Misc. Application No. E2492 of 2025 , together with the materials filed herein.
38. It all began with a post published on the X platform account @Daguindd on 18 th June 2025. Officers of the 1st Respondent, apprehensive that the post was inflammatory and seditious, initiated investigations which, in their assessment, led them to the Petitioner. Upon seeking the assistance of the Director General, Communications Authority of Kenya on 20 th June 2025 to analyse and preserve the messages associated with the said account, the officers proceeded to the Petitioner’s residence on 21st June 2025. They remained at the premises for the better part of the day, attempting without success to reach the Petitioner. When their efforts yielded no response, the officers forcibly entered the house and removed several items, leaving a copy of the inventory with the caretaker.
39. Meanwhile, the Petitioner, having learnt of the presence of officers at his residence and being apprehensive for his safety considering the prevailing national environment, went into hiding. His mother, unaware of these developments, became increasingly concerned when she was unable to reach him. Upon visiting his residence, she was informed that police officers had raided the home and taken away various items. Distressed by the lack of information and unable to make meaningful progress with the police, she lodged a report. When this too yielded no clarity, she sought assistance from the Law Society of Kenya, and with their support filed a habeas corpus application
40. It was at that stage that the police disclosed the basis upon which they had accessed the Petitioner’s residence. They maintained that their actions were undertaken in the exercise of their statutory mandate under sections 24 and 60 of the National Police Service Act. In their view, those provisions empowered them to investigate the alleged offence, enter the premises, and secure items considered relevant to the inquiry.
41. Concomitantly, the Petitioner resurfaced, evidently disoriented, psychological reports revealed that the events of the preceding weeks had left him traumatised and he would require counselling. He set about recovering his assets from the respondents. The respondents moved to Court via Milimani Chief Magistrate Misc. Application No. E2492 of 2025 and obtained orders allowing them to undertake a forensic analysis of the gadgets removed from the house of the Petitioner.
42. Article 165 (3)(d)(ii) grants jurisdiction to the High Court to ‘hear any question respecting interpretation of this Constitution including the determination of.. ‘the question whether anything said to be done under the authority of this Constitution or of any law is inconsistent with, or in contravention of, this Constitution’.
43. The 1st, 2nd and 4th Respondents, in addition to placing reliance on the provisions of the National Police Service Act, invoke Article 245(4)(a) of the Constitution, which safeguards the investigative independence of the Inspector-General. They contend, in effect, that the Constitution draws a deliberate line between the lawful exercise of investigative powers by the Inspector-General and external interference with the discharge of that mandate. That independence, however, is a constitutional protection, not a constitutional exemption. It does not place the exercise of investigative power beyond the reach of the Constitution, the law, or judicial scrutiny. The question before the Court is therefore not whether the Inspector-General enjoys investigative independence, but whether the exercise of that power, in the circumstances of this case, remained within the constitutional and statutory limits of that independence.
44. The Petitioner contends that the entry, search and seizure of items from his house on the 21 st June 2025 was an unconstitutional infringement of his right to privacy under Article 31 of the Constitution. Article 31 of the Constitution provides-
Every person has the right to privacy, which includes the right not to have—
(a) their person, home or property searched;
(b) their possessions seized;
(c) information relating to their family or private affairs unnecessarily required or revealed; or
(d) the privacy of their communications infringed.
45. The home occupies a special place in our constitutional order. Article 31 of the Constitution protects every person against the search of his or her person, home or property, and against the seizure of possessions, save in accordance with law. The 1st, 2nd, and 4th Respondents contend that the impugned search and seizure without a warrant was permissible under section 60 of the National Police Service Act. Having invoked section 60 as the source of their authority, it was incumbent upon them to demonstrate, by evidence, that the circumstances prescribed by that provision existed and that the statutory safeguards governing the exercise of that power were observed. They have not done so.
46. Section 60 requires-
60. Power to search without warrant in special circumstances
(1) When a police officer in charge of a police station, or a police officer investigating an alleged offence, has reasonable grounds to believe that something was used in the commission of a crime, is likely to be found in any place and that the delay occasioned by obtaining a search warrant under section 118 of the Criminal Procedure Code(Cap. 75) will in his opinion substantially prejudice such investigation, he may, after recording in writing the grounds of his belief and such description as is available to him of the thing for which search is to be made, without such warrant, enter any premises in or on which he or she suspects the thing to be and search or cause search to be made for, and take possession of such thing.
(2) Sections 119, 120 and 121 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap. 75) as to die execution of search warrant, and the provisions of that Code as to searches shall apply to a search without a warrant under this section.
(3) For purposes of conducting a search under this section—
(a) the officer shall carry with him, and produce to the occupier of the premises on request by him, the officer's certificate of appointment;
(b) if anything is seized under subsection (1), the police officer shall immediately make a record describing anything so seized, and without undue delay take or cause it to be taken before a magistrate within whose jurisdiction the thing was found, to be dealt with according to the law.
47. The Officers who entered and searched the house were required at the minimum to; record in writing reasons for the belief (that something was used in the commission of a crime, is likely to be found in any place and that the delay occasioned by obtaining a search warrant under section 118 of the Criminal Procedure Code(Cap. 75) will in his opinion substantially prejudice such investigation); make a record of the items seized and without undue delay take or cause it to be taken before a magistrate within whose jurisdiction the thing was found to be dealt with according to the law.
48. Section 60 of the National Police Service Act is not a decorative provision. It is a constitutional safeguard given statutory form. The statutory sequence matters. Officers must give reasons for sidestepping the requirement to obtain a search warrant, and the exercise of the mandate under section 60 must be supervised by the Court. In Jimi Wanjigi & another v Inspector General of Police & 3 others [2019] KEHC 11436 (KLR) the Court stressed,
[44]The above provisions must however be read in
[...truncated]
2. The Petition details a series of alleged unconstitutional acts, including illegal breaking, entry, search, and seizure of the Petitioner’s home and property. The officers allegedly broke his locks, entered his house in his absence, ransacked the premises, and seized laptops, mobile phones, passports, and personal documents. He avers that these acts contravene Articles 31 (privacy), 40 (property), 29 (security of the person), 28 (dignity), 43 (socioeconomic rights) and 47 (fair administrative action).
3. The Petitioner further alleges continuing violations and threats, including surveillance, intimidation, and constructive eviction after the Respondents allegedly replaced the locks to his house. He states that he is mentally and psychologically broken and has developed paranoia due to persistent monitoring by unidentified individuals in unmarked vehicles. He contends that the Respondents’ conduct offends Articles 2, 3, 10, 19–24, and 21(1), and amounts to a breach of their constitutional mandates under Articles 73 and 232 relating to integrity, accountability, and professional ethics in public service.
4. As remedies, the Petitioner seeks a suite of constitutional declarations and judicial relief under Article 23 of the Constitution, including declarations of violation of rights under Articles 25, 28, 29, 31, 40, 43, and 47; mandatory orders compelling the immediate release of his seized items; prohibitory orders restraining the Respondents from harassment, arrest, intimidation, or interference with his movement; compensation for violation of rights and constructive eviction; and orders barring the respondents from extracting or using any information from the seized devices. He also seeks an order prohibiting the 3rd respondent from instituting any trumped-up charges against him
5. The supporting affidavit of Ndiang’ui Kinyagia, sworn on 6 September 2025, narrates a sequence of events beginning on 21 June 2025, when officers believed to be from the Directorate of Criminal Investigation (DCI) allegedly arrived at his residence in unmarked vehicles, conducted inquiries about his whereabouts, and later, according to both his neighbours and the caretaker, forcefully broke into his house without a warrant. He states that the covert nature of the operation, coupled with the national climate of abductions and disappearances, caused him to fear for his life, prompting him to switch off his phone and go into hiding.
6. During this period, his mother reported him missing, and the Law Society of Kenya filed a habeas corpus petition; HCCHRPET E387 OF 2025, Law Society of Kenya & Anor v Inspector General of Police & 5 Others. He avers that the officers unlawfully searched his home, seized laptops, phones, passport, and his vaccination certificate, and replaced his locks, effectively taking over his residence. He further asserts that the Respondents relied on section 60 of the National Police Service Act without complying with its mandatory procedural safeguards, including recording grounds for the search, producing identification, and presenting seized items before a magistrate.
7. He additionally depones that the raid was allegedly linked to an X platform post made under the handle @daguindd , which he denies authoring, stating that his account had been compromised. Upon resurfacing, he recorded a statement at DCI headquarters and learned from affidavits sworn by Sgt. Samuel Itegi (30 June 2025) and Cpl. Leonard Siele (2 July 2025) that the officers admitted to the break-in. He describes ongoing surveillance, intimidation, psychological trauma, and drastic lifestyle changes resulting from fear of further harm. He therefore seeks constitutional protection, declarations on the illegality of the Respondents’ actions, return of his property, and orders restraining arrest or harassment pending determination of the petition
8. The 1 st , 2 nd and 4 th Respondents’ position, as expressed in their Grounds of Opposition dated 9 October 2025 and affidavits sworn on 15 th October 2025 and 16 th December 2025, is that the Petition is fundamentally defective. They argue that the Petitioner has not pleaded constitutional violations with the precision demanded by law, noting that he has neither demonstrated detention nor any wrongful charging that would invite judicial intervention.
9. In the Replying Affidavit sworn on 14 October 2025, No. 239238 C.I. Nickson Kinyua, an investigator attached to the DCI Serious Crimes Unit, explains that the Petitioner is a suspect in DCI Inquiry File No. 190 of 2025, involving alleged offences under the Computer Misuse and Cybercrimes Act. He states that electronic devices were lawfully seized and subjected to forensic examination, and that the Petitioner in fact honored summons and recommended a statement of his own volition. It is averred that the investigations are grounded in statutory mandate and responsive to allegations requiring inquiry.
10. He further depones that the Respondents have complied with all court directions and have continued to observe the Petitioner’s constitutional rights. He states that there has been no arbitrary arrest, detention, or discriminatory conduct, and that no summons has been issued that would threaten the Petitioner’s liberties. He emphasizes that any future decision to charge will be constitutionally guided, and that the sufficiency or accuracy of evidence is a matter reserved for the trial court, which is best equipped to deal with the quality and sufficiency of evidence gathered.
11. The affidavit concludes that the Petition is an improper attempt to draw the High Court into factual determinations reserved for the criminal process. The deponent asserts that the Petitioner has not shown illegality, bad faith, procedural impropriety, or excess of mandate on the part of the Respondents. He characterises the Petition as an effort to “subvert the criminal justice system” and prays that it be dismissed so that investigations may proceed to their logical conclusion, with the ODPP empowered to advise on charges once culpability is established.
12. The 3rd Respondent contends that the Petition and Notice of Motion are fundamentally misconceived, premature, and constitutionally unsound. Anchoring its position on Article 157, the Respondent stresses that the Applicant seeks to restrain prosecutorial powers before they have crystallised, noting that no prosecutorial decision has been made and that therefore the application is premature and speculative. In the Respondent’s view, the Court is being invited to intervene in an investigative process that is still unfolding, thereby violating the doctrines of ripeness, exhaustion, and the constitutional architecture that insulates prosecutorial discretion from judicial interference.
13. Further, the 3 rd Respondent asserts that the grievances raised; entry, seizure, and alleged violations, fall squarely within investigative conduct and cannot be imputed to the DPP before an investigation file is even received or reviewed. To grant the orders sought, the Respondent argues, would be to improperly fetter the independence of the DPP, collapse the separation of powers, and convert constitutional litigation into a shield against lawful inquiry.
14. The Petitioner swore a Supplementary Affidavit on 6th November 2025, responding to the Replying Affidavit of C.I. Nickson Kinyua. He maintains that the police conducted an unlawful raid on 21st June 2025 without a search warrant, without recording grounds of belief as required under Section 60 of the National Police Service Act, and without presenting the seized items before a magistrate. He further states that claims of a forensic order in Misc. Application No. E2492 of 2025 are untrue, as he was never served with any such order.
15. He avers that the Respondents violated multiple constitutional rights through violent entry, confiscation of property, intimidation, surveillance, and continued detention of his items for over five months despite no charges being preferred. He emphasizes that some seized items are his tools of trade, rendering him jobless, while others are travel documents restricting his movement. He rejects the Respondents’ assertion of acting within their mandate, arguing that investigative powers cannot justify warrantless raids or indefinite seizure of property.
16. Finally, he asserts that the Petition is a legitimate pursuit of constitutional protection under Articles 22 and 23. He notes that no criminal charges exist, making the Respondents’ claim that issues should be left to a trial court untenable. He concludes that the Replying Affidavit fails to justify the impugned actions and instead reveals a pattern of impunity.
17. The Petition was canvassed via written submissions.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE PETITIONER
18. The Petitioner submits that his non derogable right to freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment under Articles 25(a) and 29 was violated when officers in unmarked Subaru vehicles, associated with abductions, descended on his home, prompting him to flee and hide. He cites the definition of torture under the Convention against Torture, noting that the Respondents’ conduct caused “severe mental anguish, fear, humiliation and psychological suffering.” The psychological reports confirm paranoia, sleeplessness, and trauma. The Petitioner relies on Chege Kuria Mwere & 6 Others Vs Attorney General [2017] eKLR and Wamwere & 5 others v Attorney General [2023] KESC 3 (KLR) to show that intentional exposure to fear and humiliation constitutes inhuman treatment.
19. On freedom and security of the person, the Petitioner submits that the Respondents acted arbitrarily, without summons or lawful basis, and created a reasonable apprehension of danger given the national context of abductions between 2024–2025. His mother even filed a missing person report and participated in habeas corpus proceedings. The Respondents’ break in and replacement of locks rendered him effectively homeless and fearful of returning. He cites Muriithi v Inspector General of Police & 3 Others [2025] KEHC 534 (KLR) and CORD v Republic of Kenya [2015] eKLR , emphasizing that constitutional protection extends to threatened violations.
20. The Petitioner asserts that his right to dignity under Article 28 was gravely violated through the unlawful invasion of his home, constructive eviction, seizure of his tools of trade, and psychological trauma. He quotes the South African case S v Makwanyane (1995) (3) SA 391 (CC) and also relies on Mutua & Another v Gitau & 2 Others [2024] KEHC 14443 (KLR) and Francis Coralie Mullin v Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi (1981) AIR 746 , arguing that deprivation of livelihood and shelter undermines human dignity.
21. On privacy under Article 31, the Petitioner highlights the unlawful break-in, search, and seizure of laptops, phones, passports and personal documents without a warrant or compliance with Sections 60 and 61 of the National Police Service Act. He notes that the items were never presented before a magistrate as required under Section 60(3)(b) of the National Police Service Act. He cites Samura Engineering Limited & 10 others v Kenya Revenue Authority [2012] eKLR, where the Court held that searches must comply with Article 24 safeguards, and Manfred Walter Schmitt & Another v Republic [2013] eKLR , affirming that arbitrary searches offend constitutional protections.
22. The Petitioner further submits that the seizure of his passports and continued surveillance violated his freedom of movement under Article 39, relying on Jade Louise Salthouse v Mark Maina [2026] KEHC 2808 (KLR). He also argues that the seizure of his laptops and phones violated property rights under Article 40, citing Isaac Gathungu Wanjohi v Attorney General [2012] eKLR and Virendra Ramji Gudka v Attorney General [2014] eKLR . He contends that the cumulative violations justify general damages, relying on Gitobu Imanyara & 2 Others v Attorney General [2016] eKLR , and seeks reliefs under Article 23(3), including declarations, compensation, and exclusion of illegally obtained evidence under Article 50(4)
SUMMARY OF SUBMISSIONS OF 1 ST , 2 ND AND 4 TH RESPONDENTS
23. The Respondents argue that the central issue in the Petition, whether the Petitioner’s constitutional rights were violated, fails at the outset because the search and seizure complained of were conducted pursuant to a valid court warrant issued by the Court in Milimani Miscellaneous Criminal Application No. E2492 of 2025, where the Magistrate authorised seizure and forensic extraction of data from the Petitioner’s devices. It is therefore submitted that the Petitioner’s claims of illegal entry, illegal seizure, and violation of privacy under Article 31 are unfounded.
24. Further it is submitted that the actions of the officers were lawful under section 24(e) and section 60 of the National Police Service Act, which empower police to investigate complaints and, in certain circumstances, conduct warrantless searches. They rely on jurisprudence emphasising non interference with investigations, including Kipoki Oreu Tasur v Inspector General of Police & 5 others (2014) eKLR , where Mumbi Ngugi J (as she then was) held that the criminal justice system must operate without undue restraint, and Republic v Commissioner of Police ex parte Michael Monari & another [2012] eKLR , which affirmed that police need only establish reasonable suspicion before preferring charges. It is submitted that the Petitioner has not demonstrated abuse of power.
25. The Respondents further argue that several of the Petitioner’s allegations, violation of dignity (Article 28), torture or cruel treatment (Article 25(a)), violation of freedom and security (Article 29), and harassment, are unsupported by evidence. They highlight that the Petitioner has not identified any specific incident amounting to torture or degrading treatment, nor has he shown that seizure of property constitutes a deprivation of personal liberty. They also note that the Petitioner admitted he went into hiding voluntarily, undermining claims of intimidation. The Respondents insist that lawful seizure of property, even if prolonged, does not automatically amount to violation of dignity or security.
26. As regards the alleged violation to the Petitioner’s right to property (Article 40) and the Petitioner’s claim that the Respondents took over his rented premises. The Respondents deny occupying or constructively terminating the tenancy, arguing that a temporary search cannot amount to taking possession. They emphasise that Article 40(3) permits deprivation of property in accordance with the law, and since the seizure was warrant based, no constitutional violation arises. They also note that the Petitioner’s prayers for release of seized items have been overtaken by events, as the High Court’s ruling of 27th January 2026 ordered their return, and the Petitioner is now in full possession of them.
27. Finally, the Respondents submit that the Petition fails the Anarita Karimi Njeru precision test and the burden of proof requirements under sections 107 and 109 of the Evidence Act. They argue that the Petitioner merely listed numerous constitutional provisions without demonstrating the manner of violation. They rely on Communications Commission of Kenya & 5 others v Royal Media Services Limited & 5 others [2014] eKLR , which requires a clear link between the alleged violation and the constitutional provision invoked. Since no such link is established, and because any limitations on rights arising from the warrant satisfy Article 24 of the Constitution, the Respondents contend that no declaratory or conservatory orders should issue, and the claim for general damages is unsustainable. They therefore urge the Court to dismiss the Petition with costs.
SUMMARY OF 3 RD RESPONDENT’S SUBMISSIONS
28. The 3rd Respondent submits that its constitutional mandate is strictly prosecutorial under Article 157, while investigative powers lie exclusively with the police under Article 245. This distinction, affirmed in Republic v Commissioner of Police & another ex parte Michael Monari & another (2012) eKLR and Diamond Hasham Lalji & another v Attorney General & 4 others (2018) eKLR , demonstrates that the ODPP neither seized the Petitioner’s property nor conducted any searches or arrests. Consequently, allegations relating to investigative excesses cannot be attributed to the 3rd Respondent.
29. The Petitioner’s fear of “trumped-up charges” is described as speculative and legally untenable. Relying on Meixner & another v Attorney General (2005) eKLR and Republic v Director of Public Prosecutions & 2 others ex parte Chamanlal Vrajlal Kamani & 2 others (2015) eKLR , the Respondent emphasizes that courts only intervene where prosecution is for a collateral purpose, is oppressive or malicious, or constitutes an abuse of process, none of which has been demonstrated.
30. The Respondent further invokes the doctrine of ripeness, asserting that the Petition is premature because no prosecutorial decision has been made and cites John Harun Mwau v Peter Gastrow & 3 others (2014) eKLR .
31. In conclusion, the 3rd Respondent maintains that the Petition, as framed against it, is speculative, premature, and legally unsustainable. It reiterates that it has not made any decision to charge the Petitioner and has not violated any constitutional rights. The Petitioner’s prayers are characterized as an attempt to obtain insulation from the possibility of lawful prosecution rather than protection of rights. The Respondent therefore urges the Court to decline all relief sought against it in the interest of justice and public interest
ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION
32. Arising from the foregoing I raise the following as the issues for determination;
a. Does the Petition meet the precision test as articulated in the Anarita Karimi Njeru Case?
b. If the answer to (a) above is in the affirmative, whether the rights of the Petitioner have been violated or are threatened with violation as alleged?
c. In light of (a) and (b) above what are the consequential orders.
Does the Petition meet the precision test as articulated in the Anarita Karimi Njeru Case?
33. In the precedent-setting case of Anarita Karimi Njeru v Republic [1979] KEHC 30 (KLR) the Court pronounced itself thus-
[5] ….We would, however, again stress that if a person is seeking redress from the High Court on a matter which involves a reference to the Constitution, it is important (if only to ensure that justice is done to his case) that he should set out with a reasonable degree of precision that of which he complains, the provisions said to be infringed, and the manner in which they are alleged to be infringed
34. The Court of Appeal elaborated on the test in Mumo Matemu v Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance & 5 Others [2013] eKLR , explaining thus-
The principle in Anarita Karimi Njeru (supra) is not a technical requirement of form. It is a substantive requirement intended to ensure that parties understand the case they have to meet and the court is properly guided. What is required is reasonable precision in framing complaints, not perfect particularity. A petition should disclose the specific constitutional provisions alleged to be infringed, the manner of infringement, and the nature of the redress sought. The test is one of substance, not of formula….We cannot look at Article 22 in isolation. We agree with the High Court that precision is not coterminous with exactitude. It is not a ritualistic requirement. The principle in Anarita Karimi Njeru that requires reasonable precision in framing issues is to ensure that the Respondent has adequate notice and that the court is able to fashion an appropriate remedy. The standard is one of reasonable specificity, not mechanical nicety.
35. Further, Rule 10 of the Constitution of Kenya (Protection of Rights and Fundamental Freedoms) Practice and Procedure Rules, 2013 prescribes the form and essential content of a constitutional petition. The Rule embodies the foundational rationale that a respondent must be placed on adequate notice of the case they are required to meet, and that the Court must be apprised with sufficient clarity of the nature of the claim so as to enable it to fashion an appropriate and effective remedy. The rule therefore serves both procedural fairness and substantive justice, ensuring that constitutional litigation proceeds on a clear, intelligible, and properly delineated framework.
36. In the current case, the Petition identifies the entry, search and seizure of assets of the Petitioner on 21 st June 2025, the surveillance of the Petitioner by the respondents, the psychological trauma of the Petitioner as the factual basis of the Petition, the Petitioner alleges violation of Articles 31, 28, 29 and 40 of the Constitution. The allegations in my view are sufficiently set out to enable the respondents to understand the case to meet and to allow the Court to craft appropriate remedies. The objection to the Petition on this ground must therefore fail.
If the answer to (a) above is in the affirmative, whether the rights of the Petitioner have been violated or are threatened with violation as alleged?
37. The sequence of events giving rise to the present Petition is discernible from the pleadings and proceedings in HCCHR Petition No. E387 of 2025 (Law Society of Kenya) , Milimani Chief Magistrate Misc. Application No. E2492 of 2025 , together with the materials filed herein.
38. It all began with a post published on the X platform account @Daguindd on 18 th June 2025. Officers of the 1st Respondent, apprehensive that the post was inflammatory and seditious, initiated investigations which, in their assessment, led them to the Petitioner. Upon seeking the assistance of the Director General, Communications Authority of Kenya on 20 th June 2025 to analyse and preserve the messages associated with the said account, the officers proceeded to the Petitioner’s residence on 21st June 2025. They remained at the premises for the better part of the day, attempting without success to reach the Petitioner. When their efforts yielded no response, the officers forcibly entered the house and removed several items, leaving a copy of the inventory with the caretaker.
39. Meanwhile, the Petitioner, having learnt of the presence of officers at his residence and being apprehensive for his safety considering the prevailing national environment, went into hiding. His mother, unaware of these developments, became increasingly concerned when she was unable to reach him. Upon visiting his residence, she was informed that police officers had raided the home and taken away various items. Distressed by the lack of information and unable to make meaningful progress with the police, she lodged a report. When this too yielded no clarity, she sought assistance from the Law Society of Kenya, and with their support filed a habeas corpus application
40. It was at that stage that the police disclosed the basis upon which they had accessed the Petitioner’s residence. They maintained that their actions were undertaken in the exercise of their statutory mandate under sections 24 and 60 of the National Police Service Act. In their view, those provisions empowered them to investigate the alleged offence, enter the premises, and secure items considered relevant to the inquiry.
41. Concomitantly, the Petitioner resurfaced, evidently disoriented, psychological reports revealed that the events of the preceding weeks had left him traumatised and he would require counselling. He set about recovering his assets from the respondents. The respondents moved to Court via Milimani Chief Magistrate Misc. Application No. E2492 of 2025 and obtained orders allowing them to undertake a forensic analysis of the gadgets removed from the house of the Petitioner.
42. Article 165 (3)(d)(ii) grants jurisdiction to the High Court to ‘hear any question respecting interpretation of this Constitution including the determination of.. ‘the question whether anything said to be done under the authority of this Constitution or of any law is inconsistent with, or in contravention of, this Constitution’.
43. The 1st, 2nd and 4th Respondents, in addition to placing reliance on the provisions of the National Police Service Act, invoke Article 245(4)(a) of the Constitution, which safeguards the investigative independence of the Inspector-General. They contend, in effect, that the Constitution draws a deliberate line between the lawful exercise of investigative powers by the Inspector-General and external interference with the discharge of that mandate. That independence, however, is a constitutional protection, not a constitutional exemption. It does not place the exercise of investigative power beyond the reach of the Constitution, the law, or judicial scrutiny. The question before the Court is therefore not whether the Inspector-General enjoys investigative independence, but whether the exercise of that power, in the circumstances of this case, remained within the constitutional and statutory limits of that independence.
44. The Petitioner contends that the entry, search and seizure of items from his house on the 21 st June 2025 was an unconstitutional infringement of his right to privacy under Article 31 of the Constitution. Article 31 of the Constitution provides-
Every person has the right to privacy, which includes the right not to have—
(a) their person, home or property searched;
(b) their possessions seized;
(c) information relating to their family or private affairs unnecessarily required or revealed; or
(d) the privacy of their communications infringed.
45. The home occupies a special place in our constitutional order. Article 31 of the Constitution protects every person against the search of his or her person, home or property, and against the seizure of possessions, save in accordance with law. The 1st, 2nd, and 4th Respondents contend that the impugned search and seizure without a warrant was permissible under section 60 of the National Police Service Act. Having invoked section 60 as the source of their authority, it was incumbent upon them to demonstrate, by evidence, that the circumstances prescribed by that provision existed and that the statutory safeguards governing the exercise of that power were observed. They have not done so.
46. Section 60 requires-
60. Power to search without warrant in special circumstances
(1) When a police officer in charge of a police station, or a police officer investigating an alleged offence, has reasonable grounds to believe that something was used in the commission of a crime, is likely to be found in any place and that the delay occasioned by obtaining a search warrant under section 118 of the Criminal Procedure Code(Cap. 75) will in his opinion substantially prejudice such investigation, he may, after recording in writing the grounds of his belief and such description as is available to him of the thing for which search is to be made, without such warrant, enter any premises in or on which he or she suspects the thing to be and search or cause search to be made for, and take possession of such thing.
(2) Sections 119, 120 and 121 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap. 75) as to die execution of search warrant, and the provisions of that Code as to searches shall apply to a search without a warrant under this section.
(3) For purposes of conducting a search under this section—
(a) the officer shall carry with him, and produce to the occupier of the premises on request by him, the officer's certificate of appointment;
(b) if anything is seized under subsection (1), the police officer shall immediately make a record describing anything so seized, and without undue delay take or cause it to be taken before a magistrate within whose jurisdiction the thing was found, to be dealt with according to the law.
47. The Officers who entered and searched the house were required at the minimum to; record in writing reasons for the belief (that something was used in the commission of a crime, is likely to be found in any place and that the delay occasioned by obtaining a search warrant under section 118 of the Criminal Procedure Code(Cap. 75) will in his opinion substantially prejudice such investigation); make a record of the items seized and without undue delay take or cause it to be taken before a magistrate within whose jurisdiction the thing was found to be dealt with according to the law.
48. Section 60 of the National Police Service Act is not a decorative provision. It is a constitutional safeguard given statutory form. The statutory sequence matters. Officers must give reasons for sidestepping the requirement to obtain a search warrant, and the exercise of the mandate under section 60 must be supervised by the Court. In Jimi Wanjigi & another v Inspector General of Police & 3 others [2019] KEHC 11436 (KLR) the Court stressed,
[44]The above provisions must however be read in
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