REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA AT MACHAKOS
COMMERCIAL APPEAL NO. E001 OF 2024
NCBA KENYA BANK PLC.................................................APPELLANT
VERSUS
RODGERS JEFFERSON WEKESA...................................RESPONDENT
(Being an appeal from the Ruling and Order of the Honourable Mr. Kuto, SPM delivered on the 14th February, 2024 in ELC Case No. E107 of 2023)
JUDGMENT
1. The Appellant filed an appeal via a Memorandum of Appeal dated 13th March 2024 against the ruling by Hon Mr. Kuto, SPM in ELC Case No. E107 of 2023 delivered on the 14/2/2024 on the following grounds:-
a. The Trial Magistrate erred in law and in fact by allowing the Respondent's Notice of Motion Application dated 24th August, 2023.
b. The Trial Magistrate erred in law and in fact by failing to look at and consider all the evidence tendered before it being the Appellant's Replying Affidavit and annexures thereto and Submissions that were filed in opposition to the Respondent's Notice of Motion Application dated 24th August, 2023.
c. The Magistrate erred in law and in fact by holding that the Respondent had not adduced any evidence to support their claim of service of statutory notices and yet all the statutory notices and the respective certificates of postage were annexed in the Appellant's Replying affidavit.
d. The Trial magistrate erred in law and fact by failing to consider and appreciate that the certificates of postages produced as evidence of service of the statutory notices amount to sufficient proof of service.
e. The Trial magistrate erred in law and in fact by failing to consider that the Respondent is in default of the loan agreement with the bank, which fact they admitted and despite being given several opportunities to redeem their security they failed to do so.
f. The Trial Magistrate erred in law and fact by failing to find that the Respondent's statutory power of sale crystallized.
g. The Magistrate erred in law and in fact by finding that the Respondent had satisfied the criteria for granting an order of injunction.
h. The Magistrate erred in law and fact by failing to appreciate that the Respondent didn't meet any ground to warrant issuance of Injunction orders.
2. Consequently, the Appellant sought for the following orders;
a. The appeal be allowed.
b. The Ruling of the Honorable D. Kuto, Senior Principal Magistrate, delivered on 14th February, 2024 be set aside and be substituted with an order dismissing the Notice of Motion Application dated 24th August, 2023 with costs.
c. The cost of the Appeal and those of the subordinate Court be awarded to the Appellant.
d. This Honorable Court be pleased to make such further and other orders as it may deem just in the circumstances.
3. The appeal was canvassed by way of written submissions.
4. Upon perusing the file and the appeal through CTS, at the time of writing this judgement, I found that only the Appellant filed their submissions to this appeal. The Respondent did not file any response or submissions despite service by Peter Kimalu, a process server on four occasions ie. 10/7/2024, 14/11/2024, 19/11/2024 and 3/2/2025.
5. The submissions filed by the Appellant are dated 3/2/2025. I have considered the said submissions.
6. The dispute herein is over the outstanding loan facility obtained by the Respondent from the Appellant and charged on the Respondent’s property being L.R 12715/2746/ Syokimau/Mavoko.
7. In an attempt to exercising its statutory power of sale over the property 1271512746 Syokimau, Mavoko Municipality, the Respondent filed an application dated 24/8/2023 before the Magistrate Court at Mavoko in ELC Case No. E107 of 2023 between Rodgers Jefferson Wekesa v NCBA Kenya Bank PLC and sought injunctive orders restraining the Appellant from exercising the statutory power of sale over the aforementioned property.
8. Upon considering the application inter-partes, the trial magistrate observed that there was a contention by the Plaintiff/Applicant therein on the repayment of the loan, the service of the statutory notification of sale as required in law as well as the valuation report of the charged property and the exorbitant interest charged. The Defendant/Respondent in the trial court refuted the Plaintiff’s claim and contended that the Plaintiff has continuously defaulted in repayment of the loan facility advanced to him. Further that all notices were duly served upon the Plaintiff as prescribed by law.
9. The trial magistrate noted that the Defendant had not adduced any evidence to support the claim of service of the notices and the valuation report. The trial court proceeded to consider the Plaintiff’s application in light of the principles applicable to the grant of an interim injunction as were laid out in the rule setting case of Giella -Cassman Brown & Co. Ltd and Another (1973) E.A 358 which are as follows:-Firstly, the applicant must show a prima facie case with probability of success, secondly, normally an interlocutory injunction will not be granted unless the applicant would suffer an injury which cannot adequately be compensated in damages and Thirdly, that if the court is in doubt it should decide the application on a balance of convenience.
10. The trial Magistrate stated at the onus is on the Chargee to prove service of statutory notice. The trial Magistrate relied on the case Nyangilo Ochieng & Another v Kenya Commercial Bank. Court of Appeal at Kisumu,Civil Appeal No. 148 of 1995 (1996) eKLR where the Court of Appeal stated as follows :-
"It is for the chargee to make sure that there is compliance with the requirements of s.74 (1) of the Registered Land Act. That burden is not in any manner on the chargor. Once the chargor alleges non-receipt of the statutory notice it is for the chargee to prove that such notice was in fact sent".
11. The trial magistrate was further guided by the case of Moses Kibiego Yator-vs-Ecobank Kenya Limited [2014] eKLR, it where it was stated as follows:
"...the Applicant stated that he found the Notification of sale on 29 August,2013 in his home, the Prudent thing for the Defendant to have done would have been to have the Auctioneer swear an Affidavit and say, when, and upon whom, he served the Notification of sale. If the proprietor refused to sign, then the requisite certificate ought to have been attached. None was done and I have no material to doubt the averments of the Plaintiff that he was not served property...".
12. The trial magistrate observed that the Respondent had the duty to provide evidence of service of the statutory notice and of the valuation report marked but did adduce any evidence that the same were served upon the Plaintiff. Service of the contested documents is the core of these proceedings. Absence of proof service of the statutory notice upon the Plaintiff means that the Defendant has not discharged the burden of proof under Section 197 of the Evidence Act. He cited the High Court case of Hellen Jane Achieng' Odeul v Kenya Commercial Bank (2016) eKLR held that:
“Where service of statutory notices is disputed, the burden shifts to the Chargee to demonstrate prima facie service was effected”
13. The trial magistrate therefore found that the Plaintiff has a prima facie case with probability of success and the same ought to be canvassed at the hearing.
14. On whether the Plaintiff would suffer irreparable harm, the trial magistrate observed that the Applicant stated that the land has been grossly undervalued. In addition, since the issue of service of the statutory notice is contested, if the land parcel in question were to be sold before the matter is heard and determined, the Plaintiff stands to lose his parcel of land, which harm may not be able to be compensated.
15. I have considered the record of appeal. I have also considered the Appellant’s written submissions in this Appeal and the itemized grounds of appeal. In determining the issues raised in the Appeal this court is cognizant of its duty on a first appeal as set out in the case of Selle & Another v Associated Motor Boat Co. Ltd & others [1968] EA 123 cited with approval in China 2 hogxing Construction Company Ltd v Ann Akeru Sophia [2020] eKLR.
16. As has also been restated in the case of United India Insurance Co. Ltd v East African Underwriters (Kenya) Ltd [1985] E.A., a court sitting on Appeal will not interfere with a discretionary decision appealed from simply on the ground that the court, if sitting at first instance, would or might have given different weight to that given by the court to the various factors in the case.
17. This court sitting on Appeal is only entitled to interfere if one or more of the following matters are established; first, that the court misdirected himself in law; secondly, that the court misapprehended the facts; thirdly, that the court took account of considerations of which it should not have taken account; fourthly, that the court failed to take account of considerations of which it should have taken account, or fifthly, that the court’s decision, albeit a discretionary one, is plainly wrong.
18. Having considered the application herein and the submissions by the Appellant in the absence of a response or submissions by the Respondent, I am of the considered view that repayment of the loan, the service of the statutory notification of sale as well as the valuation report of the charged property and the alleged exorbitant interest charged can only be resolved by calling of witnesses in the main trial of the suit pending before the Magistrate’s court at Mavoko. The disputed facts herein cannot be resolved by affidavits evidence. The Court at this stage is not supposed to determine the very issues which will be determined at the main trial through affidavit evidence. All the Court is entitled to do at this stage is to determine whether the Applicant is deserving of the sought orders using the usual criteria. See the case of Edwin Kamau Muriu vs Barclays Bank of Kenya Ltd Nairobi HCCC No. 1118 of 2002, where the court held that:
“In an Interlocutory application, the Court is not required to determine the very issues which will be canvassed at the trial with finality. All the Court is entitled at that stage is whether the Applicant is entitled to an Injunction sought on the usual criteria---‘
19. Order 40 Rules 7 of the Civil Procedure Rules provides that:
“Any Order for injunction may be discharged or varied or set aside by the court on application made thereto by any party dissatisfied with such order.”
20. The order for temporary injunction herein was issued on 14/2/2024. The Defendant seemed to have been dissatisfied with the said order and lodged the Appeal herein on 7th May 2024 after a period of two months for setting aside and or substitution by a dismissal of the aforestated or discharge of the temporary injunction. It is settled law that an interlocutory injunction will be set aside or discharged if it has been obtained by means of misrepresentation or concealment of the material facts.
21. A party seeking variation and/or discharge of such orders bears the burden of proving that the beneficiary thereof concealed/misrepresented some material facts which would have influenced the decision of the court. The court in the case of Atlas Copco Customer Finance AB vs. Polarize Enterprises [2016] eKLR distilled the factors that may be considered when faced with a question of discharge of an injunction. The court held as follows:
“It is now trite that some of the factors that guide the exercise of the courts' discretion in this area of law are, but not limited to:
a. proof that the injunction was obtained by concealment of facts which if presented would have worked against the granting of the injunction;
b. a radical change in the circumstances of the suit, such that it is no longer necessary to have the injunction;
c. proof that the general conduct of the holder of injunction is such that the court is impelled to discharge the injunction, for instance, where the injunction is being used to intimidate the Defendant or achieve an ulterior purpose;
d. proof that the sustenance of the injunction would cause an injustice.”
22. Further, in the case of Nairobi, Commercial & Admiralty Division HCCC No. 828 of 2010; Harrish Chandra Bhovanbhai Jobanputra and Anor v Paramount Universal Bank Ltd & 3 Others, F. Gikonyo, J stated that;
“I think the discretion under Order 40 rule 7 ought to be sparingly used so as to avoid a situation where it would appear as if the same is being used as a tool for appeal. This is because before issuing an injunction, the Court must have been satisfied that it was necessary to grant the same. If it were not satisfied, the Court would not have issued an injunction in the first place. However, if the injunction was obtained by concealing facts which if put to the judge in the first instance would have affected his judgment on whether or not to give the injunction, then the Court can be inclined to vary or vacate the injunction in light of the new facts. So too if the circumstances of the suit have radically changed so that it’s no longer necessary to have the injunction”
23. I have looked at the supporting affidavit of the Plaintiff/Applicant dated 23/8/2023 filed before the trial court and it is quite evident that the information therein was before the Court at the time of granting of prayer 3 and 4 of the Plaintiff/applicant dated 23/8/2023. Further, the Appellant has not shown that there is any information that was concealed and/or misrepresented to the Court.
24. It would be easy to set aside or discharge the orders being challenged if the Plaintiff’s/Respondent’s conduct in relation to the subject matter of the suit is demonstrated to fall short of the requirements of a court of equity. But when all is considered, there is nothing convincing showing blameworthy conduct on the part of the Plaintiff/Respondent. If anything, it is doubtful if the Appellant/Applicant’s evidence tendered through the Appellant’s Replying Affidavit and annexures were not considered as it alleges. Records show that the Appellant did not prove that the statutory notice was indeed served upon the Respondent/Plaintiff.
25. The court therefore granted the prayer which in essence is a temporary injunction until the hearing of the suit.
26. The upshot of the foregoing is that the Appellant has not discharged their burden of demonstrating why the injunctive orders granted in the ruling of Hon. D. Kuto, SPM delivered on 14/2/2024 should be set aside or be substituted with an order dismissing the Notice of Motion dated 24/8/2023.
27. The Appeal herein is therefore dismissed with no order as to costs.
28. This file is closed.
29. Orders accordingly
JUDGMENT WRITTEN, DATED & SIGNED AT MACHAKOS THIS 7TH MAY 2025
NOEL I. ADAGI
JUDGE
DELIVERED VIRTUALLY ON TEAMS AT MACHAKOS THIS 7TH MAY 2025
In the presence of :
Ms Kale...... for Appellant
Absent........ ..for Respondent
Milly.............. Court Assistant
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA AT MACHAKOS
COMMERCIAL APPEAL NO. E001 OF 2024
NCBA KENYA BANK PLC.................................................APPELLANT
VERSUS
RODGERS JEFFERSON WEKESA...................................RESPONDENT
(Being an appeal from the Ruling and Order of the Honourable Mr. Kuto, SPM delivered on the 14th February, 2024 in ELC Case No. E107 of 2023)
JUDGMENT
1. The Appellant filed an appeal via a Memorandum of Appeal dated 13th March 2024 against the ruling by Hon Mr. Kuto, SPM in ELC Case No. E107 of 2023 delivered on the 14/2/2024 on the following grounds:-
a. The Trial Magistrate erred in law and in fact by allowing the Respondent's Notice of Motion Application dated 24th August, 2023.
b. The Trial Magistrate erred in law and in fact by failing to look at and consider all the evidence tendered before it being the Appellant's Replying Affidavit and annexures thereto and Submissions that were filed in opposition to the Respondent's Notice of Motion Application dated 24th August, 2023.
c. The Magistrate erred in law and in fact by holding that the Respondent had not adduced any evidence to support their claim of service of statutory notices and yet all the statutory notices and the respective certificates of postage were annexed in the Appellant's Replying affidavit.
d. The Trial magistrate erred in law and fact by failing to consider and appreciate that the certificates of postages produced as evidence of service of the statutory notices amount to sufficient proof of service.
e. The Trial magistrate erred in law and in fact by failing to consider that the Respondent is in default of the loan agreement with the bank, which fact they admitted and despite being given several opportunities to redeem their security they failed to do so.
f. The Trial Magistrate erred in law and fact by failing to find that the Respondent's statutory power of sale crystallized.
g. The Magistrate erred in law and in fact by finding that the Respondent had satisfied the criteria for granting an order of injunction.
h. The Magistrate erred in law and fact by failing to appreciate that the Respondent didn't meet any ground to warrant issuance of Injunction orders.
2. Consequently, the Appellant sought for the following orders;
a. The appeal be allowed.
b. The Ruling of the Honorable D. Kuto, Senior Principal Magistrate, delivered on 14th February, 2024 be set aside and be substituted with an order dismissing the Notice of Motion Application dated 24th August, 2023 with costs.
c. The cost of the Appeal and those of the subordinate Court be awarded to the Appellant.
d. This Honorable Court be pleased to make such further and other orders as it may deem just in the circumstances.
3. The appeal was canvassed by way of written submissions.
4. Upon perusing the file and the appeal through CTS, at the time of writing this judgement, I found that only the Appellant filed their submissions to this appeal. The Respondent did not file any response or submissions despite service by Peter Kimalu, a process server on four occasions ie. 10/7/2024, 14/11/2024, 19/11/2024 and 3/2/2025.
5. The submissions filed by the Appellant are dated 3/2/2025. I have considered the said submissions.
6. The dispute herein is over the outstanding loan facility obtained by the Respondent from the Appellant and charged on the Respondent’s property being L.R 12715/2746/ Syokimau/Mavoko.
7. In an attempt to exercising its statutory power of sale over the property 1271512746 Syokimau, Mavoko Municipality, the Respondent filed an application dated 24/8/2023 before the Magistrate Court at Mavoko in ELC Case No. E107 of 2023 between Rodgers Jefferson Wekesa v NCBA Kenya Bank PLC and sought injunctive orders restraining the Appellant from exercising the statutory power of sale over the aforementioned property.
8. Upon considering the application inter-partes, the trial magistrate observed that there was a contention by the Plaintiff/Applicant therein on the repayment of the loan, the service of the statutory notification of sale as required in law as well as the valuation report of the charged property and the exorbitant interest charged. The Defendant/Respondent in the trial court refuted the Plaintiff’s claim and contended that the Plaintiff has continuously defaulted in repayment of the loan facility advanced to him. Further that all notices were duly served upon the Plaintiff as prescribed by law.
9. The trial magistrate noted that the Defendant had not adduced any evidence to support the claim of service of the notices and the valuation report. The trial court proceeded to consider the Plaintiff’s application in light of the principles applicable to the grant of an interim injunction as were laid out in the rule setting case of Giella -Cassman Brown & Co. Ltd and Another (1973) E.A 358 which are as follows:-Firstly, the applicant must show a prima facie case with probability of success, secondly, normally an interlocutory injunction will not be granted unless the applicant would suffer an injury which cannot adequately be compensated in damages and Thirdly, that if the court is in doubt it should decide the application on a balance of convenience.
10. The trial Magistrate stated at the onus is on the Chargee to prove service of statutory notice. The trial Magistrate relied on the case Nyangilo Ochieng & Another v Kenya Commercial Bank. Court of Appeal at Kisumu,Civil Appeal No. 148 of 1995 (1996) eKLR where the Court of Appeal stated as follows :-
"It is for the chargee to make sure that there is compliance with the requirements of s.74 (1) of the Registered Land Act. That burden is not in any manner on the chargor. Once the chargor alleges non-receipt of the statutory notice it is for the chargee to prove that such notice was in fact sent".
11. The trial magistrate was further guided by the case of Moses Kibiego Yator-vs-Ecobank Kenya Limited [2014] eKLR, it where it was stated as follows:
"...the Applicant stated that he found the Notification of sale on 29 August,2013 in his home, the Prudent thing for the Defendant to have done would have been to have the Auctioneer swear an Affidavit and say, when, and upon whom, he served the Notification of sale. If the proprietor refused to sign, then the requisite certificate ought to have been attached. None was done and I have no material to doubt the averments of the Plaintiff that he was not served property...".
12. The trial magistrate observed that the Respondent had the duty to provide evidence of service of the statutory notice and of the valuation report marked but did adduce any evidence that the same were served upon the Plaintiff. Service of the contested documents is the core of these proceedings. Absence of proof service of the statutory notice upon the Plaintiff means that the Defendant has not discharged the burden of proof under Section 197 of the Evidence Act. He cited the High Court case of Hellen Jane Achieng' Odeul v Kenya Commercial Bank (2016) eKLR held that:
“Where service of statutory notices is disputed, the burden shifts to the Chargee to demonstrate prima facie service was effected”
13. The trial magistrate therefore found that the Plaintiff has a prima facie case with probability of success and the same ought to be canvassed at the hearing.
14. On whether the Plaintiff would suffer irreparable harm, the trial magistrate observed that the Applicant stated that the land has been grossly undervalued. In addition, since the issue of service of the statutory notice is contested, if the land parcel in question were to be sold before the matter is heard and determined, the Plaintiff stands to lose his parcel of land, which harm may not be able to be compensated.
15. I have considered the record of appeal. I have also considered the Appellant’s written submissions in this Appeal and the itemized grounds of appeal. In determining the issues raised in the Appeal this court is cognizant of its duty on a first appeal as set out in the case of Selle & Another v Associated Motor Boat Co. Ltd & others [1968] EA 123 cited with approval in China 2 hogxing Construction Company Ltd v Ann Akeru Sophia [2020] eKLR.
16. As has also been restated in the case of United India Insurance Co. Ltd v East African Underwriters (Kenya) Ltd [1985] E.A., a court sitting on Appeal will not interfere with a discretionary decision appealed from simply on the ground that the court, if sitting at first instance, would or might have given different weight to that given by the court to the various factors in the case.
17. This court sitting on Appeal is only entitled to interfere if one or more of the following matters are established; first, that the court misdirected himself in law; secondly, that the court misapprehended the facts; thirdly, that the court took account of considerations of which it should not have taken account; fourthly, that the court failed to take account of considerations of which it should have taken account, or fifthly, that the court’s decision, albeit a discretionary one, is plainly wrong.
18. Having considered the application herein and the submissions by the Appellant in the absence of a response or submissions by the Respondent, I am of the considered view that repayment of the loan, the service of the statutory notification of sale as well as the valuation report of the charged property and the alleged exorbitant interest charged can only be resolved by calling of witnesses in the main trial of the suit pending before the Magistrate’s court at Mavoko. The disputed facts herein cannot be resolved by affidavits evidence. The Court at this stage is not supposed to determine the very issues which will be determined at the main trial through affidavit evidence. All the Court is entitled to do at this stage is to determine whether the Applicant is deserving of the sought orders using the usual criteria. See the case of Edwin Kamau Muriu vs Barclays Bank of Kenya Ltd Nairobi HCCC No. 1118 of 2002, where the court held that:
“In an Interlocutory application, the Court is not required to determine the very issues which will be canvassed at the trial with finality. All the Court is entitled at that stage is whether the Applicant is entitled to an Injunction sought on the usual criteria---‘
19. Order 40 Rules 7 of the Civil Procedure Rules provides that:
“Any Order for injunction may be discharged or varied or set aside by the court on application made thereto by any party dissatisfied with such order.”
20. The order for temporary injunction herein was issued on 14/2/2024. The Defendant seemed to have been dissatisfied with the said order and lodged the Appeal herein on 7th May 2024 after a period of two months for setting aside and or substitution by a dismissal of the aforestated or discharge of the temporary injunction. It is settled law that an interlocutory injunction will be set aside or discharged if it has been obtained by means of misrepresentation or concealment of the material facts.
21. A party seeking variation and/or discharge of such orders bears the burden of proving that the beneficiary thereof concealed/misrepresented some material facts which would have influenced the decision of the court. The court in the case of Atlas Copco Customer Finance AB vs. Polarize Enterprises [2016] eKLR distilled the factors that may be considered when faced with a question of discharge of an injunction. The court held as follows:
“It is now trite that some of the factors that guide the exercise of the courts' discretion in this area of law are, but not limited to:
a. proof that the injunction was obtained by concealment of facts which if presented would have worked against the granting of the injunction;
b. a radical change in the circumstances of the suit, such that it is no longer necessary to have the injunction;
c. proof that the general conduct of the holder of injunction is such that the court is impelled to discharge the injunction, for instance, where the injunction is being used to intimidate the Defendant or achieve an ulterior purpose;
d. proof that the sustenance of the injunction would cause an injustice.”
22. Further, in the case of Nairobi, Commercial & Admiralty Division HCCC No. 828 of 2010; Harrish Chandra Bhovanbhai Jobanputra and Anor v Paramount Universal Bank Ltd & 3 Others, F. Gikonyo, J stated that;
“I think the discretion under Order 40 rule 7 ought to be sparingly used so as to avoid a situation where it would appear as if the same is being used as a tool for appeal. This is because before issuing an injunction, the Court must have been satisfied that it was necessary to grant the same. If it were not satisfied, the Court would not have issued an injunction in the first place. However, if the injunction was obtained by concealing facts which if put to the judge in the first instance would have affected his judgment on whether or not to give the injunction, then the Court can be inclined to vary or vacate the injunction in light of the new facts. So too if the circumstances of the suit have radically changed so that it’s no longer necessary to have the injunction”
23. I have looked at the supporting affidavit of the Plaintiff/Applicant dated 23/8/2023 filed before the trial court and it is quite evident that the information therein was before the Court at the time of granting of prayer 3 and 4 of the Plaintiff/applicant dated 23/8/2023. Further, the Appellant has not shown that there is any information that was concealed and/or misrepresented to the Court.
24. It would be easy to set aside or discharge the orders being challenged if the Plaintiff’s/Respondent’s conduct in relation to the subject matter of the suit is demonstrated to fall short of the requirements of a court of equity. But when all is considered, there is nothing convincing showing blameworthy conduct on the part of the Plaintiff/Respondent. If anything, it is doubtful if the Appellant/Applicant’s evidence tendered through the Appellant’s Replying Affidavit and annexures were not considered as it alleges. Records show that the Appellant did not prove that the statutory notice was indeed served upon the Respondent/Plaintiff.
25. The court therefore granted the prayer which in essence is a temporary injunction until the hearing of the suit.
26. The upshot of the foregoing is that the Appellant has not discharged their burden of demonstrating why the injunctive orders granted in the ruling of Hon. D. Kuto, SPM delivered on 14/2/2024 should be set aside or be substituted with an order dismissing the Notice of Motion dated 24/8/2023.
27. The Appeal herein is therefore dismissed with no order as to costs.
28. This file is closed.
29. Orders accordingly
JUDGMENT WRITTEN, DATED & SIGNED AT MACHAKOS THIS 7TH MAY 2025
NOEL I. ADAGI
JUDGE
DELIVERED VIRTUALLY ON TEAMS AT MACHAKOS THIS 7TH MAY 2025
In the presence of :
Ms Kale...... for Appellant
Absent........ ..for Respondent
Milly.............. Court Assistant