'
RULING
(Revision of sentence in Kilifi Law Courts Magistrate Criminal Case (SO) NO. 308 OF 2014 delivered on 6 th October 2016)
The homemade Notice of Motion before this Court prepared and filed by the Applicant is brought under Section 364 (1) (b) of the Criminal Procedure Code. The Applicant through his tailor made application has moved the court for a review of his sentence passed on 6th October 2016.
The Applicant was charged, convicted and sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment for the offence of Defilement contrary to Section 8 (1) as read with Section 8 (2) of the Sexual Offences Act vide Kilifi Magistrate Criminal (SO) Case number 308 of 2014. The particulars of the charge were that on the 13 th February 2014 at Karimboni village in Chasimba sub location in Chonyi Location within Kilifi County, intentionally and unlawfully caused his penis penetrate into the vagina of MCK (name withheld) a child aged 12 years.
He was also charged with an alternative charge of indecent act contrary to Section 6 (b) of the Sexual Offences Act no. 3 of 2006. The particulars of the charge were that on 13 th February 2014 at Karimboni village in Chasimba sub-location in Chonyi Location within Kilifi County, intentionally touched the genital organs of MCK (name withheld) a child aged 12 years with his penis.
The applicant faced a 2 nd count of defilement contrary to Section 8 (1) as read with Section 8 (2) of the Sexual Offences Act. The particulars are that on the 13 th February 2014 at Karimboni village in Chasimba sub-location in Chonyi location within Kilifi County intentionally and unlawfully caused his penis penetrate into the vagina of CPK (name withheld) a child aged 9 years.
Additionally, the applicant faced an alternative charge of indecent act contrary to Section 6 (b) of the Sexual Offences Act. The particulars are that on the 13 th February 2014 at Karimboni village in Chasimba sub-location in Chonyi location within Kilifi County, intentionally touched the genital organs of CPK (name withheld) a child aged 9 years.
The Honourable Magistrate found the applicant guilty of the 1 st and 2 nd counts of defilement and convicted him accordingly. She sentenced him to serve 20 years’ imprisonment for count 1 and to life imprisonment for Count 2.
The applicant filed HC CRA no. 46 OF 2016 and on 3 rd July 2018, Hon Njoki Mwangi, Judge upheld the conviction and sentence in Count 1. Subsequently, the Judge set aside the conviction and sentence in Count 2 and substituted the charge of defilement in the said count with that of attempted defilement contrary to section 9 (2) as read with Section 9 (3) of the Sexual Offences Act. The judge then set aside the sentence of life imprisonment and imposed a sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment.
Aggrieved with the High Court decision the Applicant moved to the Court of Appeal vide Criminal Appeal no. 10 of 2019. On 19 th April 2021 the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and held that the sentences for both counts herein to run concurrently.
The applicant has religiously served his sentence and has 2 years 9 months to be discharged as per the prison records. He now prays that the custodial sentence be reduced into a non-custodial sentence.
I have considered the application and the affidavit in support of the same. The Respondent has not opposed it nor submitted on the application, as at the time of making this determination. The issue for consideration is whether the application has merit and what orders this court should make.
Section 364 of the Criminal Procedure Code grants this Court supervisory and revisional powers over subordinate courts. It allows this Court to alter or reverse orders other than acquittals, enhance sentences, stay orders from subordinate courts. However, it cannot make a prejudicial order against an accused person without giving them a chance to be heard, unless the subordinate court failed to pass a required sentence.
Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act states that: -
“4. Power of court to permit conditional release of offenders.
(1) Where a person is charged with an offence which is triable by a subordinate court, and the court thinks that the charge is proved but is of the opinion that, having regard to age, character, antecedents, home surroundings, health or mental condition of the offender, or to the nature of the offence, or to any extenuating circumstances in which the offence was committed, it is expedient to release the offender on probation, the court may—
(a) convict the offender and make a probation order; or
(b) without proceeding to conviction, make a probation order, and in either case may require the offender to enter into a recognizance, with or without sureties, in such sum as the court may deem fit.
(2) Where any person is convicted of an offence by the High Court and the court is of the opinion that, having regard to the age, character, antecedents, home surroundings health or mental condition of the offender, or to the nature of the offence, or to any extenuating circumstances in which the offence was committed, it is expedient to release the offender on probation, the court may, in lieu of sentencing him to any punishment, make a probation order, and may require the offender to enter into a recognizance, with or without sureties, in such sum as the court may deem fit.”
In Kimutai vs Republic (2024) KEHC 6871 (KLR ) the court listed the considerations to appreciate when determining a custodial and non-custodial sentencing as follows:
In determining whether to impose a custodial or non-custodial sentence, the Court is required to take into account the following factors: -
Gravity of the offence – sentence of imprisonment should be avoided for misdemeanor.
Criminal history of the offender - taking into account the seriousness of the offences, first offenders should be considered for non-custodial sentence.
Character of the offender – non-custodial sentence is best suited for offenders who are already remorseful and receptive to rehabilitative measures.
Protection of the community – where the offender is likely to pose a threat to the community.
Offender’s responsibility to third parties – where there are people depending on the offender.
Further, in the case of Republic vs Felix Madalitso Keke Confirmation Appeal no. 404 of 2010 (unreported) where the court held as follows: -
“Considerations of the public interest when sentencing offenders must go beyond considerations of deterrence; there is always the consideration that the public whose interest the sentence wants to serve includes the prisoner before the court at first instance. It is in public interest that sentences are passed which are not cruel, degrading and inhuman. Harsh or lenient sentences may not necessarily serve the public interest; they are likely to have an opposite effect. While sentences must fit the crime, the offender and the victim, they must also fit and cohere with overall sentencing goals, justice, reformation, restoration and rehabilitation. Our sentences may not be in the public interest if they only succeed in instilling crime and fail in bringing the prisoner a better person in the society’’’’s continuum.”
From the onset the offences herein are not misdemeanor. The Applicant was charged, convicted and sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment for the offence of Defilement contrary to Section 8 (1) as read with Section 8 (2) of the Sexual Offences. From the record the age of the 1 st victim was 12 years at the time the offence was committed hence the sentence is the minimum mandatory sentence provided for under the Act.
The applicant was also sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment for the offence of attempted defilement contrary to section 9 (2) as read with Section 9 (3) of the Sexual Offences Act. The sentence is also the minimum mandatory sentence provided for under the Act.
In weighing the nature of the offence, the circumstances on how the crime was done, the age of the victims at the doing of the crime and the sentence meted out I am not persuaded by the applicant’s application. The nature and seriousness of the instant offence cannot be gainsaid. So much so, that the legislators imposed a minimum mandatory sentence upon conviction of the offence.
In my view the reduction and/or substitution of the sentence to a non-custodial sentence cannot extend to serious offences such as sexual offences because the same carry minimum mandatory sentences.
In Republic vs Mwangi; Initiative for strategic Litigation in Africa (ISLA) & 3 Others (Amicus Curiae) (Petition E018 of 2023) [2024] KESC 34 (KLR) (12 July 2024) (judgement) the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of the minimum sentence under the Sexual Offences Act and categorically and emphatically held that the same are constitutional and the courts must impose the same unless and until they are declared unconstitutional.
In the case of Charles & Another vs Republic (Criminal Appeal 38 of 2019) [2024] KECA 1902 (KLR) (25 th October 2024) (Judgement) the Court of Appeal ceded to the binding nature of the decision of the Supreme Court and stated; -
“35. We will now come to the final issue: sentence. The appellants complain against the mandatory nature of the minimum sentence terming it unconstitutional for not permitting individualized mitigation. In the circumstances of the case, they both complain that the minimum sentence was harsh and excessive since they were both of extreme youth; first offenders; and were remorseful. Additionally, they showed great capacity for reform and rehabilitation.
36. All these extenuating factors are true. It is also true that our jurisprudence had taken a turn to impugning the constitutionality of the minimum sentences prescribed in the Sexual Offences Act . Unfortunately for the appellants, that jurisprudential trajectory was halted by the recent decision by the Supreme Court in Republic v Joshua Gichuki Mwangi (Petition E018 of 2023) [2024] KESC 34 (KLR)(delivered on 12 th July, 2024). In that case, the Supreme Court held that the mandatory minimum sentences in the Sexual Offences Act are not unconstitutional; and that trial courts have no discretion to go below the minimum statutory minimum sentences in sexual offences.
37.The Supreme Court held:
“56. Mandatory sentences leave the trial court with absolutely no discretion such that upon conviction, the singular sentence is already prescribed by law. Minimum sentences however set the floor rather than the ceiling when it comes to sentences. What is prescribed is the least severe sentence a court can issue, leaving it open to the discretion of the courts to impose a harsher sentence. In fact, to use the words mandatory and minimum together convolutes the express different definitions given to each of the two words. Although, the term ‘mandatory minimum’ can be found used in different jurisdictions, including the United States, and in a number of academic articles, it is not applicable as a legally recognised term in Kenya. In this country, a mandatory sentence and minimum sentence can neither be used interchangeably nor in similar circumstances as they refer to two very different set of meanings and circumstances.
57. In the Muruatetu case, this court solely considered the mandatory sentence of death under Section 204 of the Penal Code as it is applied to murder cases; it did not address minimum sentences at all. Therefore, mandatory sentences that apply for example to capital offences, are vastly different from minimum sentences such as those found in the Sexual Offences Act , and the Penal Code . Often in crafting different sentencing for criminal offences, the drafters of the law in the Legislature, take into consideration a number of issues including deterrence of crime, enhancing public safety, sequestering of dangerous offenders, and eliminating unjustifiable sentencing disparities.”
38.This decision is binding on us under the doctrine of stare decisis. In the present case, the appellants were convicted under section 8(2) of the Sexual Offences Act . The statutory minimum sentence under that sub-section is twenty (20) years imprisonment. That was the sentence imposed on the appellants. Given the Supreme Court’s binding precedent, we cannot interfere with that sentence whatever our views on the extenuating circumstances.”
Considering the above precedents, it now crystal clear that the mandatory minimum sentence in the Sexual Offences Act are not unconstitutional. Trial Courts have no discretion to go below the minimum statutory sentences in sexual offences.
Further in the case of Republic vs Ayako (Petition E002 of 2024) [2025] KESC 20 (KLR) (11 April 2025) (judgement) the supreme court stated:
“46. In Muruatetu I, faced with a similar question of ascribing a term sentence to life imprisonment, this Court considered Article 51 of the Constitution which provides for the rights of detained persons. Sub article 3 thereof specifically tasks Parliament with enacting legislation for the humane treatment of detainees, persons in remand and convicts. We, therefore, held that while life imprisonment ought not necessarily mean a prisoner’s natural life, it is for the Legislature to prescribe what constitutes life imprisonment and the parameters applicable, if at all. In that connection, we did, as the Supreme Court, recommend that the Attorney General and Parliament ought to commence an enquiry on this issue, and develop legislation on what constitutes a life sentence. Despite making this recommendation on 14th December 2017, and making an order that the Judgment be placed before the Speakers of the National Assembly and the Senate to, among other things, set the parameters of what constitutes life imprisonment, we note this recommendation has not been given consideration by the two offices of Parliament.
47. In view of the foregoing, we find that the Court of Appeal ought not to have proceeded to set a term sentence of thirty (30) years as a substitution for life imprisonment, as the effect would be to create a provision with the force of law while no such jurisdiction is granted to it. The term of thirty years was arrived at arbitrarily without involvement of Parliament and the people. In consequence, we find that the Court of Appeal ventured outside its mandate and powers.”
In a nutshell, the decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal are binding on this court. Therefore, the invitation to interfere with the sentence is declined.
I have considered the Sentence review report dated 6 th February 2025 and note that his family is still intact and reside at the same residence as before the applicant’s incarceration. The applicant has undergone remarkable rehabilitation and reformation as per the holding facility. I am not persuaded with the report to warrant the court’s interference with the minimum mandatory sentence stipulated under the law.
The application lacks merit and the same is dismissed.
I however note he has less than 3 years to go. He may be considered under de congestion
DELIVERED, DATED and SIGNED at MOMBASA on this 27t h day of NOVEMBER 2025.
Ruling delivered through Microsoft Teams Online Platform.
WENDY KAGENDO MICHENI
JUDGE
In the presence of;-
The applicant
MR NGIRI FOR THE RESPONDENT
MS BEBORA COURT ASSISTANT
'
RULING
(Revision of sentence in Kilifi Law Courts Magistrate Criminal Case (SO) NO. 308 OF 2014 delivered on 6 th October 2016)
The homemade Notice of Motion before this Court prepared and filed by the Applicant is brought under Section 364 (1) (b) of the Criminal Procedure Code. The Applicant through his tailor made application has moved the court for a review of his sentence passed on 6th October 2016.
The Applicant was charged, convicted and sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment for the offence of Defilement contrary to Section 8 (1) as read with Section 8 (2) of the Sexual Offences Act vide Kilifi Magistrate Criminal (SO) Case number 308 of 2014. The particulars of the charge were that on the 13 th February 2014 at Karimboni village in Chasimba sub location in Chonyi Location within Kilifi County, intentionally and unlawfully caused his penis penetrate into the vagina of MCK (name withheld) a child aged 12 years.
He was also charged with an alternative charge of indecent act contrary to Section 6 (b) of the Sexual Offences Act no. 3 of 2006. The particulars of the charge were that on 13 th February 2014 at Karimboni village in Chasimba sub-location in Chonyi Location within Kilifi County, intentionally touched the genital organs of MCK (name withheld) a child aged 12 years with his penis.
The applicant faced a 2 nd count of defilement contrary to Section 8 (1) as read with Section 8 (2) of the Sexual Offences Act. The particulars are that on the 13 th February 2014 at Karimboni village in Chasimba sub-location in Chonyi location within Kilifi County intentionally and unlawfully caused his penis penetrate into the vagina of CPK (name withheld) a child aged 9 years.
Additionally, the applicant faced an alternative charge of indecent act contrary to Section 6 (b) of the Sexual Offences Act. The particulars are that on the 13 th February 2014 at Karimboni village in Chasimba sub-location in Chonyi location within Kilifi County, intentionally touched the genital organs of CPK (name withheld) a child aged 9 years.
The Honourable Magistrate found the applicant guilty of the 1 st and 2 nd counts of defilement and convicted him accordingly. She sentenced him to serve 20 years’ imprisonment for count 1 and to life imprisonment for Count 2.
The applicant filed HC CRA no. 46 OF 2016 and on 3 rd July 2018, Hon Njoki Mwangi, Judge upheld the conviction and sentence in Count 1. Subsequently, the Judge set aside the conviction and sentence in Count 2 and substituted the charge of defilement in the said count with that of attempted defilement contrary to section 9 (2) as read with Section 9 (3) of the Sexual Offences Act. The judge then set aside the sentence of life imprisonment and imposed a sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment.
Aggrieved with the High Court decision the Applicant moved to the Court of Appeal vide Criminal Appeal no. 10 of 2019. On 19 th April 2021 the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and held that the sentences for both counts herein to run concurrently.
The applicant has religiously served his sentence and has 2 years 9 months to be discharged as per the prison records. He now prays that the custodial sentence be reduced into a non-custodial sentence.
I have considered the application and the affidavit in support of the same. The Respondent has not opposed it nor submitted on the application, as at the time of making this determination. The issue for consideration is whether the application has merit and what orders this court should make.
Section 364 of the Criminal Procedure Code grants this Court supervisory and revisional powers over subordinate courts. It allows this Court to alter or reverse orders other than acquittals, enhance sentences, stay orders from subordinate courts. However, it cannot make a prejudicial order against an accused person without giving them a chance to be heard, unless the subordinate court failed to pass a required sentence.
Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act states that: -
“4. Power of court to permit conditional release of offenders.
(1) Where a person is charged with an offence which is triable by a subordinate court, and the court thinks that the charge is proved but is of the opinion that, having regard to age, character, antecedents, home surroundings, health or mental condition of the offender, or to the nature of the offence, or to any extenuating circumstances in which the offence was committed, it is expedient to release the offender on probation, the court may—
(a) convict the offender and make a probation order; or
(b) without proceeding to conviction, make a probation order, and in either case may require the offender to enter into a recognizance, with or without sureties, in such sum as the court may deem fit.
(2) Where any person is convicted of an offence by the High Court and the court is of the opinion that, having regard to the age, character, antecedents, home surroundings health or mental condition of the offender, or to the nature of the offence, or to any extenuating circumstances in which the offence was committed, it is expedient to release the offender on probation, the court may, in lieu of sentencing him to any punishment, make a probation order, and may require the offender to enter into a recognizance, with or without sureties, in such sum as the court may deem fit.”
In Kimutai vs Republic (2024) KEHC 6871 (KLR ) the court listed the considerations to appreciate when determining a custodial and non-custodial sentencing as follows:
In determining whether to impose a custodial or non-custodial sentence, the Court is required to take into account the following factors: -
Gravity of the offence – sentence of imprisonment should be avoided for misdemeanor.
Criminal history of the offender - taking into account the seriousness of the offences, first offenders should be considered for non-custodial sentence.
Character of the offender – non-custodial sentence is best suited for offenders who are already remorseful and receptive to rehabilitative measures.
Protection of the community – where the offender is likely to pose a threat to the community.
Offender’s responsibility to third parties – where there are people depending on the offender.
Further, in the case of Republic vs Felix Madalitso Keke Confirmation Appeal no. 404 of 2010 (unreported) where the court held as follows: -
“Considerations of the public interest when sentencing offenders must go beyond considerations of deterrence; there is always the consideration that the public whose interest the sentence wants to serve includes the prisoner before the court at first instance. It is in public interest that sentences are passed which are not cruel, degrading and inhuman. Harsh or lenient sentences may not necessarily serve the public interest; they are likely to have an opposite effect. While sentences must fit the crime, the offender and the victim, they must also fit and cohere with overall sentencing goals, justice, reformation, restoration and rehabilitation. Our sentences may not be in the public interest if they only succeed in instilling crime and fail in bringing the prisoner a better person in the society’’’’s continuum.”
From the onset the offences herein are not misdemeanor. The Applicant was charged, convicted and sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment for the offence of Defilement contrary to Section 8 (1) as read with Section 8 (2) of the Sexual Offences. From the record the age of the 1 st victim was 12 years at the time the offence was committed hence the sentence is the minimum mandatory sentence provided for under the Act.
The applicant was also sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment for the offence of attempted defilement contrary to section 9 (2) as read with Section 9 (3) of the Sexual Offences Act. The sentence is also the minimum mandatory sentence provided for under the Act.
In weighing the nature of the offence, the circumstances on how the crime was done, the age of the victims at the doing of the crime and the sentence meted out I am not persuaded by the applicant’s application. The nature and seriousness of the instant offence cannot be gainsaid. So much so, that the legislators imposed a minimum mandatory sentence upon conviction of the offence.
In my view the reduction and/or substitution of the sentence to a non-custodial sentence cannot extend to serious offences such as sexual offences because the same carry minimum mandatory sentences.
In Republic vs Mwangi; Initiative for strategic Litigation in Africa (ISLA) & 3 Others (Amicus Curiae) (Petition E018 of 2023) [2024] KESC 34 (KLR) (12 July 2024) (judgement) the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of the minimum sentence under the Sexual Offences Act and categorically and emphatically held that the same are constitutional and the courts must impose the same unless and until they are declared unconstitutional.
In the case of Charles & Another vs Republic (Criminal Appeal 38 of 2019) [2024] KECA 1902 (KLR) (25 th October 2024) (Judgement) the Court of Appeal ceded to the binding nature of the decision of the Supreme Court and stated; -
“35. We will now come to the final issue: sentence. The appellants complain against the mandatory nature of the minimum sentence terming it unconstitutional for not permitting individualized mitigation. In the circumstances of the case, they both complain that the minimum sentence was harsh and excessive since they were both of extreme youth; first offenders; and were remorseful. Additionally, they showed great capacity for reform and rehabilitation.
36. All these extenuating factors are true. It is also true that our jurisprudence had taken a turn to impugning the constitutionality of the minimum sentences prescribed in the Sexual Offences Act . Unfortunately for the appellants, that jurisprudential trajectory was halted by the recent decision by the Supreme Court in Republic v Joshua Gichuki Mwangi (Petition E018 of 2023) [2024] KESC 34 (KLR)(delivered on 12 th July, 2024). In that case, the Supreme Court held that the mandatory minimum sentences in the Sexual Offences Act are not unconstitutional; and that trial courts have no discretion to go below the minimum statutory minimum sentences in sexual offences.
37.The Supreme Court held:
“56. Mandatory sentences leave the trial court with absolutely no discretion such that upon conviction, the singular sentence is already prescribed by law. Minimum sentences however set the floor rather than the ceiling when it comes to sentences. What is prescribed is the least severe sentence a court can issue, leaving it open to the discretion of the courts to impose a harsher sentence. In fact, to use the words mandatory and minimum together convolutes the express different definitions given to each of the two words. Although, the term ‘mandatory minimum’ can be found used in different jurisdictions, including the United States, and in a number of academic articles, it is not applicable as a legally recognised term in Kenya. In this country, a mandatory sentence and minimum sentence can neither be used interchangeably nor in similar circumstances as they refer to two very different set of meanings and circumstances.
57. In the Muruatetu case, this court solely considered the mandatory sentence of death under Section 204 of the Penal Code as it is applied to murder cases; it did not address minimum sentences at all. Therefore, mandatory sentences that apply for example to capital offences, are vastly different from minimum sentences such as those found in the Sexual Offences Act , and the Penal Code . Often in crafting different sentencing for criminal offences, the drafters of the law in the Legislature, take into consideration a number of issues including deterrence of crime, enhancing public safety, sequestering of dangerous offenders, and eliminating unjustifiable sentencing disparities.”
38.This decision is binding on us under the doctrine of stare decisis. In the present case, the appellants were convicted under section 8(2) of the Sexual Offences Act . The statutory minimum sentence under that sub-section is twenty (20) years imprisonment. That was the sentence imposed on the appellants. Given the Supreme Court’s binding precedent, we cannot interfere with that sentence whatever our views on the extenuating circumstances.”
Considering the above precedents, it now crystal clear that the mandatory minimum sentence in the Sexual Offences Act are not unconstitutional. Trial Courts have no discretion to go below the minimum statutory sentences in sexual offences.
Further in the case of Republic vs Ayako (Petition E002 of 2024) [2025] KESC 20 (KLR) (11 April 2025) (judgement) the supreme court stated:
“46. In Muruatetu I, faced with a similar question of ascribing a term sentence to life imprisonment, this Court considered Article 51 of the Constitution which provides for the rights of detained persons. Sub article 3 thereof specifically tasks Parliament with enacting legislation for the humane treatment of detainees, persons in remand and convicts. We, therefore, held that while life imprisonment ought not necessarily mean a prisoner’s natural life, it is for the Legislature to prescribe what constitutes life imprisonment and the parameters applicable, if at all. In that connection, we did, as the Supreme Court, recommend that the Attorney General and Parliament ought to commence an enquiry on this issue, and develop legislation on what constitutes a life sentence. Despite making this recommendation on 14th December 2017, and making an order that the Judgment be placed before the Speakers of the National Assembly and the Senate to, among other things, set the parameters of what constitutes life imprisonment, we note this recommendation has not been given consideration by the two offices of Parliament.
47. In view of the foregoing, we find that the Court of Appeal ought not to have proceeded to set a term sentence of thirty (30) years as a substitution for life imprisonment, as the effect would be to create a provision with the force of law while no such jurisdiction is granted to it. The term of thirty years was arrived at arbitrarily without involvement of Parliament and the people. In consequence, we find that the Court of Appeal ventured outside its mandate and powers.”
In a nutshell, the decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal are binding on this court. Therefore, the invitation to interfere with the sentence is declined.
I have considered the Sentence review report dated 6 th February 2025 and note that his family is still intact and reside at the same residence as before the applicant’s incarceration. The applicant has undergone remarkable rehabilitation and reformation as per the holding facility. I am not persuaded with the report to warrant the court’s interference with the minimum mandatory sentence stipulated under the law.
The application lacks merit and the same is dismissed.
I however note he has less than 3 years to go. He may be considered under de congestion
DELIVERED, DATED and SIGNED at MOMBASA on this 27t h day of NOVEMBER 2025.
Ruling delivered through Microsoft Teams Online Platform.
WENDY KAGENDO MICHENI
JUDGE
In the presence of;-
The applicant
MR NGIRI FOR THE RESPONDENT
MS BEBORA COURT ASSISTANT
'