1. For determination is the Chamber Summons dated 13th April 2026 taken out by Simon Maina Kamau, the Applicant/Client. It is expressed to be brought under paragraph 11(1), (2) and (4) of the Advocates Remuneration Order, sections 1A, 1B, 3A, 38 and 40 of the Civil Procedure Act and Articles 25(a), 26, 27, 28, 29, 47, 48 and 50 of the Constitution.
2. The prayers being sought are:
i. Spent.
ii. Spent.
iii. That leave be granted to the applicant to file a reference out of time against the taxation ruling delivered on 8th August 2024.
iv. That the annexed reference be deemed duly filed upon grant of leave.
v. That the warrants of arrest in execution dated the 23rd January 2026 be set aside.
vi. That the decision of the Taxing Officer delivered on 8th August 2024 be set aside.
vii. That the Advocate/Client Bill of Costs dated 8th May 2024 be taxed afresh.
viii. That costs be in the cause.
3. The application is supported by the affidavit of the Applicant sworn on 13th April 2026. It is opposed through the replying affidavit of George Mwangi Kamau, Advocate, sworn on 28th May 2026. Both parties filed written submissions which the Court has considered together with the application, affidavits and the record.
Background
4. The Respondent/Advocate filed an Advocate/Client Bill of Costs dated 8th May 2024. The record contains an affidavit of service stating that the bill and taxation notice were served upon the Applicant by WhatsApp on 24th June 2024. A further taxation notice was served on 2nd July 2024.
5. The bill was taxed by the Deputy Registrar on 8th August 2024 at Kshs.181,247.68. A Certificate of Costs dated 20th August 2024 subsequently issued. Upon the Advocate’s application under section 51(2) of the Advocates Act, judgment was entered on 31st October 2024 and a decree followed on 6th November 2024.
6. On 4th February 2025 the Applicant filed a motion seeking, among other reliefs, to set aside the taxation, the decree and warrants of execution. He asserted that he had not been served, had not instructed the Advocate and had been denied a hearing.
7. That motion was heard and determined by Mulwa J in a ruling delivered on 31st July 2025. The Court found that service of the bill, taxation notices and demands had been proved; that the retainer could be inferred from the parties’ conduct; and that the Applicant had invoked the wrong procedure. At paragraph 24, the Court held that the Applicant ought to have sought extension of time to file a reference against the Taxing Officer’s ruling. The motion was dismissed with costs.
8. Execution thereafter proceeded. The record shows an application for execution filed on 11th August 2025 seeking a notice to show cause. The Applicant states that warrants of arrest dated 23rd January 2026 were served upon him on 31st March 2026. The present summons was filed on 13th April 2026.
The Applicant’s Case
9. The Applicant submits that he challenged the taxation through his former advocates, but counsel adopted the wrong procedure. He relies on the observation in the ruling of 31st July 2025 that an application for extension of time to file a reference was the appropriate course. He contends that counsel’s mistake should not be visited upon him.
10. He argues that paragraph 11(4) of the Advocates Remuneration Order gives this Court an unfettered discretion to enlarge time. In his view, the intended reference is arguable because the bill was excessive and was not taxed in accordance with the applicable Schedule. He also says the Respondent will suffer no prejudice that cannot be compensated by costs.
11. On execution, the Applicant contends that arrest and detention are measures of last resort. He states that no proper inquiry into his means was conducted and that other modes of execution were not exhausted. He invokes the rights to dignity, liberty, access to justice and a fair hearing.
12. The Applicant relies, among other decisions, on Belinda Murai and 9 Others v Amos Wainaina [1978] eKLR for the proposition that an advocate’s mistake may be excused where justice requires.
The Respondent’s Case
13. The Respondent raises a preliminary issue to the representation of the Applicant. He states that T M Kuria and Company Advocates filed a Notice of Change of Advocate after judgment without first obtaining leave or filing a consent as required by Order 9 rule 9 of the Civil Procedure Rules. He submits that the Advocate on record for the client, Mr Thomas Mbaria Kuria t/a T M Kuria & Company Advocates is not qualified to practice law in the year 2026.To this extend he attached a letter dated 11th May 2026 from the Law Society of Kenya, confirming indeed that mentioned Advocate does not hold a valid practicing Certificate for 2026, and is therefore not certified to practice law as at the date of the letter.
14. The Respondent further contends that the summons impermissibly combines an application for extension of time with the proposed reference. He relies on Silei trading as Leteipa Silei Law Advocates v Bomet County Public Service Board (Miscellaneous Application E001 of 2024) [2024] KEELRC 13209 (KLR), Gathenji and Company Advocates v David N Thuku and Another [2019] eKLR and Nicholas Kiptoo Arap Korir Salat v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission and 7 Others [2014] eKLR.
15. It is also the Respondent’s case that prayers seeking to set aside the taxation and to have the bill taxed afresh were sought in the application dated 4th February 2025 and are res judicata. He characterizes the present summons as a delaying device filed only after execution reached the stage of arrest.
16. The Respondent consequently urges the Court to dismiss the entire application with costs.
Issues for Determination
17. The following issues arise for determination:
i. Whether Counsel for the Applicant is properly on record.
ii. Whether the application or any of its prayers are barred by res judicata.
iii. Whether time should be enlarged under paragraph 11(4) of the Advocates Remuneration Order to file a reference
iv. Whether the reference may simultaneously be deemed filed and determined.
v. Whether the warrants of arrest should be set aside.
Analysis and Determination
18. Order 9 rule 9 of the Civil Procedure Rules requires that a change of advocate after judgment be effected only upon an order of the Court on application with notice to all parties, or upon a consent between the outgoing and incoming advocates. The requirement protects the advocate previously on record and ensures an orderly transition after judgment.
19. The record shows that judgment was entered on 31st October 2024. The Notice of Change of Advocate by T M Kuria and Company Advocates is dated 13th April 2026. No prior order granting leave and no consent with Mwenda Njagi and Company Advocates was exhibited. The notice alone did not satisfy the requirements of Order 9 rule 9. The Court nevertheless considers the remaining objections so that the dispute is resolved on all grounds and without elevating that irregularity into the sole basis of the decision.
20. On res judicata, section 7 of the Civil Procedure Act bars a court from trying an issue that was directly and substantially in issue between the same parties, litigating under the same title, where a competent court heard and finally determined it. The Court of Appeal stated those elements in Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission v Maina Kiai and 5 Others [2017] eKLR. The Supreme Court affirmed the doctrine and its public-interest foundation in John Florence Maritime Services Limited and Another v Cabinet Secretary for Transport and Infrastructure and 3 Others [2021] KESC 39 (KLR).
21. The application dated 4th February 2025 and the present summons arise from the same taxation and involve the same parties. The earlier Court conclusively determined the allegations of non-service and absence of retainer. Those findings cannot be reopened through the proposed reference or under the guise of an application for enlargement of time.
22. The precise prayer for enlargement of time under paragraph 11(4), however, was not before the Court in the earlier motion. Indeed, the Court expressly identified that procedure as the course which the Applicant ought to have taken. It would therefore be incorrect to hold that the prayer for enlargement itself is res judicata. The prayers to set aside the taxation and to tax the bill afresh stand on a different footing: they are either repetitive of relief previously refused or constitute the substantive reference which cannot be considered until time has first been enlarged.
23. Paragraph 11(1) requires a party objecting to taxation to give notice in writing to the Taxing Officer within fourteen days of the decision, specifying the items objected to. Under paragraph 11(2), the objector may apply to a Judge by chamber summons within fourteen days after receiving the reasons. Paragraph 11(4) permits the High Court, in its discretion, to enlarge time for taking any step under paragraph 11.
24. Extension of time is an equitable discretion, not a right. In Nicholas Kiptoo Arap Korir Salat v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission and 7 Others [2014] eKLR, the Supreme Court identified the relevant considerations as including the length and explanation of delay, prejudice, the importance of compliance with time limits and whether the application was brought without undue delay. The Supreme Court restated in County Executive of Kisumu v County Government of Kisumu and 8 Others [2017] eKLR that the whole period of delay must be declared and satisfactorily explained.
25. In the instant case, the taxation ruling was delivered on 8th August 2024. The present application was filed on 13th April 2026, approximately twenty months later. Even accepting that the Applicant first moved the Court on 4th February 2025, no satisfactory account is given for the period of nearly nine months between taxation and that application.
26. More significantly, the ruling of 31st July 2025 told the Applicant in express terms that he ought to have sought extension of time to file a reference. He waited for about nine months before filing the present summons. The supporting affidavit does not explain what occurred during that period. The immediate catalyst disclosed in the papers was service of the warrants on 31st March 2026.
27. The assertion that previous Counsel used the wrong procedure explains the nature of the application dated 4th February 2025. It does not explain the delay before that application, nor the prolonged inaction after the Court identified the correct procedure. A litigant may in an appropriate case be relieved from Counsel’s excusable mistake, but the phrase “mistake of counsel” is not a substitute for evidence explaining every material period of delay.
28. In Tana and Athi Rivers Development Authority v Jeremiah Kimigho Mwakio and 3 Others [2015] eKLR, the Court of Appeal cautioned that a litigant has a duty to pursue his case and cannot invariably transfer the consequences of prolonged inaction to Counsel. On the facts before this Court, the Applicant has not demonstrated diligence after 31st July 2025.
29. The Court must also consider prospects and prejudice. A Judge interferes with taxation only where the Taxing Officer acted on a wrong principle or the award is so manifestly excessive or low as to infer an error of principle. That settled threshold appears in Kipkorir, Titoo and Kiara Advocates v Deposit Protection Fund Board [2005] eKLR, a decision binding upon this Court.
30. The proposed reference makes broad assertions that the amount is excessive and the bill was not drawn to scale. It does not identify with precision the particular taxed items, the applicable scale, the amount properly allowable or a distinct error of principle. Its challenges, founded on lack of service and lack of instructions are foreclosed by the ruling of 31st July 2025. The intended reference therefore does not disclose a sufficiently cogent basis to offset the prolonged and unexplained delay.
31. The Respondent obtained a certificate, judgment and decree and has pursued execution over an extended period. Enlarging time after the Applicant allowed execution to advance to warrants of arrest would deprive the Respondent of the accrued finality of those orders and occasion prejudice beyond ordinary inconvenience.
32. The Court therefore declines to enlarge time. Once that prayer fails, there is no competent reference before the Court. Prayers that the annexed reference be deemed filed, that the taxation ruling be set aside and that the bill be taxed afresh have no legal foundation.
33. That conclusion is consistent with Nicholas Kiptoo Arap Korir Salat v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission and 7 Others [2014] eKLR: where the prescribed time has expired, extension must first be obtained before the contemplated step can validly be taken. The omnibus procedure adopted here asks the Court to grant leave and, in the same breath, to deem the reference filed and determine it. Those sequential steps cannot properly be collapsed.
34. The Court has also considered the challenge to the warrants of arrest. Section 38 of the Civil Procedure Act and Order 22 of the Civil Procedure Rules regulate execution by arrest and detention. Civil detention is not automatic upon default; the judgment debtor must be afforded notice and the Court must be satisfied on the statutory grounds before committal.
35. The material before the Court shows that execution by notice to show cause was sought after judgment and decree. The Applicant has not placed before the Court the proceedings of the notice to show cause, the order authorizing arrest, or evidence establishing that the executing Court omitted the inquiry required by section 38. The mere fact that a warrant issued does not, without the antecedent record, prove that the statutory procedure was violated.
36. Further, the warrants execute the judgment and decree, not the Taxing Officer’s ruling in isolation. A reference under paragraph 11 is not an appeal against the execution process. The summons does not invoke the appropriate review, setting-aside or appellate jurisdiction against a specific execution order, supported by the proceedings in which that order was made.
37. Articles 28, 29, 48 and 50 of the Constitution remain material safeguards. They do not, however, dispense with the statutory procedure for challenging a decree or warrant. On the evidence presented, the Court has no basis to quash the warrants. The prayer for stay was interim and cannot survive dismissal of the substantive request for enlargement of time.
38. The result is that the summons is affected by an irregular change of advocate, contains premature prayers constituting the intended reference, and does not satisfactorily explain a delay of approximately twenty months. The discretion under paragraph 11(4) cannot be exercised in the Applicant’s favour.
39. The Respondent had also raised a fundamental issue in the Replying Affidavit, about the qualification of Counsel for the Applicant to practice law for the year 2026.It is alleged that Counsel does not hold a practice certificate for the year 2026.This averment, backed by a letter from the Law Society of Kenya, dated 11th May,2026 remains uncontroverted, thus putting into further scrutiny the competence of the application before court.
Disposition
40. Accordingly, the Chamber Summons dated 13th April 2026 is dismissed.
41. The Applicant shall bear the Respondent’s costs of the application.
DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED AT NAIROBI THIS 21ST DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2026, VIRTUALLY THROUGH THE MICROSOFT TEAMS PLATFORM
KENNEDY KANDET
JUDGE
In the Presence of:
WAMBUGU HOLDING BRIEF FOR KURIA FOR THE APPLICANT
MWANGI FOR THE RESPONDENT
COURT ASSISTANT: AGGREY
2. The prayers being sought are:
i. Spent.
ii. Spent.
iii. That leave be granted to the applicant to file a reference out of time against the taxation ruling delivered on 8th August 2024.
iv. That the annexed reference be deemed duly filed upon grant of leave.
v. That the warrants of arrest in execution dated the 23rd January 2026 be set aside.
vi. That the decision of the Taxing Officer delivered on 8th August 2024 be set aside.
vii. That the Advocate/Client Bill of Costs dated 8th May 2024 be taxed afresh.
viii. That costs be in the cause.
3. The application is supported by the affidavit of the Applicant sworn on 13th April 2026. It is opposed through the replying affidavit of George Mwangi Kamau, Advocate, sworn on 28th May 2026. Both parties filed written submissions which the Court has considered together with the application, affidavits and the record.
Background
4. The Respondent/Advocate filed an Advocate/Client Bill of Costs dated 8th May 2024. The record contains an affidavit of service stating that the bill and taxation notice were served upon the Applicant by WhatsApp on 24th June 2024. A further taxation notice was served on 2nd July 2024.
5. The bill was taxed by the Deputy Registrar on 8th August 2024 at Kshs.181,247.68. A Certificate of Costs dated 20th August 2024 subsequently issued. Upon the Advocate’s application under section 51(2) of the Advocates Act, judgment was entered on 31st October 2024 and a decree followed on 6th November 2024.
6. On 4th February 2025 the Applicant filed a motion seeking, among other reliefs, to set aside the taxation, the decree and warrants of execution. He asserted that he had not been served, had not instructed the Advocate and had been denied a hearing.
7. That motion was heard and determined by Mulwa J in a ruling delivered on 31st July 2025. The Court found that service of the bill, taxation notices and demands had been proved; that the retainer could be inferred from the parties’ conduct; and that the Applicant had invoked the wrong procedure. At paragraph 24, the Court held that the Applicant ought to have sought extension of time to file a reference against the Taxing Officer’s ruling. The motion was dismissed with costs.
8. Execution thereafter proceeded. The record shows an application for execution filed on 11th August 2025 seeking a notice to show cause. The Applicant states that warrants of arrest dated 23rd January 2026 were served upon him on 31st March 2026. The present summons was filed on 13th April 2026.
The Applicant’s Case
9. The Applicant submits that he challenged the taxation through his former advocates, but counsel adopted the wrong procedure. He relies on the observation in the ruling of 31st July 2025 that an application for extension of time to file a reference was the appropriate course. He contends that counsel’s mistake should not be visited upon him.
10. He argues that paragraph 11(4) of the Advocates Remuneration Order gives this Court an unfettered discretion to enlarge time. In his view, the intended reference is arguable because the bill was excessive and was not taxed in accordance with the applicable Schedule. He also says the Respondent will suffer no prejudice that cannot be compensated by costs.
11. On execution, the Applicant contends that arrest and detention are measures of last resort. He states that no proper inquiry into his means was conducted and that other modes of execution were not exhausted. He invokes the rights to dignity, liberty, access to justice and a fair hearing.
12. The Applicant relies, among other decisions, on Belinda Murai and 9 Others v Amos Wainaina [1978] eKLR for the proposition that an advocate’s mistake may be excused where justice requires.
The Respondent’s Case
13. The Respondent raises a preliminary issue to the representation of the Applicant. He states that T M Kuria and Company Advocates filed a Notice of Change of Advocate after judgment without first obtaining leave or filing a consent as required by Order 9 rule 9 of the Civil Procedure Rules. He submits that the Advocate on record for the client, Mr Thomas Mbaria Kuria t/a T M Kuria & Company Advocates is not qualified to practice law in the year 2026.To this extend he attached a letter dated 11th May 2026 from the Law Society of Kenya, confirming indeed that mentioned Advocate does not hold a valid practicing Certificate for 2026, and is therefore not certified to practice law as at the date of the letter.
14. The Respondent further contends that the summons impermissibly combines an application for extension of time with the proposed reference. He relies on Silei trading as Leteipa Silei Law Advocates v Bomet County Public Service Board (Miscellaneous Application E001 of 2024) [2024] KEELRC 13209 (KLR), Gathenji and Company Advocates v David N Thuku and Another [2019] eKLR and Nicholas Kiptoo Arap Korir Salat v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission and 7 Others [2014] eKLR.
15. It is also the Respondent’s case that prayers seeking to set aside the taxation and to have the bill taxed afresh were sought in the application dated 4th February 2025 and are res judicata. He characterizes the present summons as a delaying device filed only after execution reached the stage of arrest.
16. The Respondent consequently urges the Court to dismiss the entire application with costs.
Issues for Determination
17. The following issues arise for determination:
i. Whether Counsel for the Applicant is properly on record.
ii. Whether the application or any of its prayers are barred by res judicata.
iii. Whether time should be enlarged under paragraph 11(4) of the Advocates Remuneration Order to file a reference
iv. Whether the reference may simultaneously be deemed filed and determined.
v. Whether the warrants of arrest should be set aside.
Analysis and Determination
18. Order 9 rule 9 of the Civil Procedure Rules requires that a change of advocate after judgment be effected only upon an order of the Court on application with notice to all parties, or upon a consent between the outgoing and incoming advocates. The requirement protects the advocate previously on record and ensures an orderly transition after judgment.
19. The record shows that judgment was entered on 31st October 2024. The Notice of Change of Advocate by T M Kuria and Company Advocates is dated 13th April 2026. No prior order granting leave and no consent with Mwenda Njagi and Company Advocates was exhibited. The notice alone did not satisfy the requirements of Order 9 rule 9. The Court nevertheless considers the remaining objections so that the dispute is resolved on all grounds and without elevating that irregularity into the sole basis of the decision.
20. On res judicata, section 7 of the Civil Procedure Act bars a court from trying an issue that was directly and substantially in issue between the same parties, litigating under the same title, where a competent court heard and finally determined it. The Court of Appeal stated those elements in Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission v Maina Kiai and 5 Others [2017] eKLR. The Supreme Court affirmed the doctrine and its public-interest foundation in John Florence Maritime Services Limited and Another v Cabinet Secretary for Transport and Infrastructure and 3 Others [2021] KESC 39 (KLR).
21. The application dated 4th February 2025 and the present summons arise from the same taxation and involve the same parties. The earlier Court conclusively determined the allegations of non-service and absence of retainer. Those findings cannot be reopened through the proposed reference or under the guise of an application for enlargement of time.
22. The precise prayer for enlargement of time under paragraph 11(4), however, was not before the Court in the earlier motion. Indeed, the Court expressly identified that procedure as the course which the Applicant ought to have taken. It would therefore be incorrect to hold that the prayer for enlargement itself is res judicata. The prayers to set aside the taxation and to tax the bill afresh stand on a different footing: they are either repetitive of relief previously refused or constitute the substantive reference which cannot be considered until time has first been enlarged.
23. Paragraph 11(1) requires a party objecting to taxation to give notice in writing to the Taxing Officer within fourteen days of the decision, specifying the items objected to. Under paragraph 11(2), the objector may apply to a Judge by chamber summons within fourteen days after receiving the reasons. Paragraph 11(4) permits the High Court, in its discretion, to enlarge time for taking any step under paragraph 11.
24. Extension of time is an equitable discretion, not a right. In Nicholas Kiptoo Arap Korir Salat v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission and 7 Others [2014] eKLR, the Supreme Court identified the relevant considerations as including the length and explanation of delay, prejudice, the importance of compliance with time limits and whether the application was brought without undue delay. The Supreme Court restated in County Executive of Kisumu v County Government of Kisumu and 8 Others [2017] eKLR that the whole period of delay must be declared and satisfactorily explained.
25. In the instant case, the taxation ruling was delivered on 8th August 2024. The present application was filed on 13th April 2026, approximately twenty months later. Even accepting that the Applicant first moved the Court on 4th February 2025, no satisfactory account is given for the period of nearly nine months between taxation and that application.
26. More significantly, the ruling of 31st July 2025 told the Applicant in express terms that he ought to have sought extension of time to file a reference. He waited for about nine months before filing the present summons. The supporting affidavit does not explain what occurred during that period. The immediate catalyst disclosed in the papers was service of the warrants on 31st March 2026.
27. The assertion that previous Counsel used the wrong procedure explains the nature of the application dated 4th February 2025. It does not explain the delay before that application, nor the prolonged inaction after the Court identified the correct procedure. A litigant may in an appropriate case be relieved from Counsel’s excusable mistake, but the phrase “mistake of counsel” is not a substitute for evidence explaining every material period of delay.
28. In Tana and Athi Rivers Development Authority v Jeremiah Kimigho Mwakio and 3 Others [2015] eKLR, the Court of Appeal cautioned that a litigant has a duty to pursue his case and cannot invariably transfer the consequences of prolonged inaction to Counsel. On the facts before this Court, the Applicant has not demonstrated diligence after 31st July 2025.
29. The Court must also consider prospects and prejudice. A Judge interferes with taxation only where the Taxing Officer acted on a wrong principle or the award is so manifestly excessive or low as to infer an error of principle. That settled threshold appears in Kipkorir, Titoo and Kiara Advocates v Deposit Protection Fund Board [2005] eKLR, a decision binding upon this Court.
30. The proposed reference makes broad assertions that the amount is excessive and the bill was not drawn to scale. It does not identify with precision the particular taxed items, the applicable scale, the amount properly allowable or a distinct error of principle. Its challenges, founded on lack of service and lack of instructions are foreclosed by the ruling of 31st July 2025. The intended reference therefore does not disclose a sufficiently cogent basis to offset the prolonged and unexplained delay.
31. The Respondent obtained a certificate, judgment and decree and has pursued execution over an extended period. Enlarging time after the Applicant allowed execution to advance to warrants of arrest would deprive the Respondent of the accrued finality of those orders and occasion prejudice beyond ordinary inconvenience.
32. The Court therefore declines to enlarge time. Once that prayer fails, there is no competent reference before the Court. Prayers that the annexed reference be deemed filed, that the taxation ruling be set aside and that the bill be taxed afresh have no legal foundation.
33. That conclusion is consistent with Nicholas Kiptoo Arap Korir Salat v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission and 7 Others [2014] eKLR: where the prescribed time has expired, extension must first be obtained before the contemplated step can validly be taken. The omnibus procedure adopted here asks the Court to grant leave and, in the same breath, to deem the reference filed and determine it. Those sequential steps cannot properly be collapsed.
34. The Court has also considered the challenge to the warrants of arrest. Section 38 of the Civil Procedure Act and Order 22 of the Civil Procedure Rules regulate execution by arrest and detention. Civil detention is not automatic upon default; the judgment debtor must be afforded notice and the Court must be satisfied on the statutory grounds before committal.
35. The material before the Court shows that execution by notice to show cause was sought after judgment and decree. The Applicant has not placed before the Court the proceedings of the notice to show cause, the order authorizing arrest, or evidence establishing that the executing Court omitted the inquiry required by section 38. The mere fact that a warrant issued does not, without the antecedent record, prove that the statutory procedure was violated.
36. Further, the warrants execute the judgment and decree, not the Taxing Officer’s ruling in isolation. A reference under paragraph 11 is not an appeal against the execution process. The summons does not invoke the appropriate review, setting-aside or appellate jurisdiction against a specific execution order, supported by the proceedings in which that order was made.
37. Articles 28, 29, 48 and 50 of the Constitution remain material safeguards. They do not, however, dispense with the statutory procedure for challenging a decree or warrant. On the evidence presented, the Court has no basis to quash the warrants. The prayer for stay was interim and cannot survive dismissal of the substantive request for enlargement of time.
38. The result is that the summons is affected by an irregular change of advocate, contains premature prayers constituting the intended reference, and does not satisfactorily explain a delay of approximately twenty months. The discretion under paragraph 11(4) cannot be exercised in the Applicant’s favour.
39. The Respondent had also raised a fundamental issue in the Replying Affidavit, about the qualification of Counsel for the Applicant to practice law for the year 2026.It is alleged that Counsel does not hold a practice certificate for the year 2026.This averment, backed by a letter from the Law Society of Kenya, dated 11th May,2026 remains uncontroverted, thus putting into further scrutiny the competence of the application before court.
Disposition
40. Accordingly, the Chamber Summons dated 13th April 2026 is dismissed.
41. The Applicant shall bear the Respondent’s costs of the application.
DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED AT NAIROBI THIS 21ST DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2026, VIRTUALLY THROUGH THE MICROSOFT TEAMS PLATFORM
KENNEDY KANDET
JUDGE
In the Presence of:
WAMBUGU HOLDING BRIEF FOR KURIA FOR THE APPLICANT
MWANGI FOR THE RESPONDENT
COURT ASSISTANT: AGGREY