Introduction
1. This Ruling is in respect of two applications, the Notice of Motion Application dated 10th November 2023 by the Garnishee & the Affected Party (“Garnishee’s Application”) and the other, being the Notice of Motion Application dated 20th February 2024 by the Plaintiff/Decree Holder (“Decree Holder’s application”).
2. The Garnishee’s Application seeks the following orders;
i. That this Honourable Court be pleased to mark the Plaintiff’s Notice of Motion Application dated 23rd September 2021, and the Ruling therefrom, dated 23rd November 2021, as settled in terms of the consent letter dated 17th December 2021, and filed in court.
ii. That the costs of the instant application be provided for
3. The Garnishee’s Application is expressed to have been brought under the provisions of Article 159 (2) (b) of the Constitution 2010, Sections 1A, 1B and 3A of the Civil Procedure Act Cap 21 Laws of Kenya and Order 13 Rule 2 and Order 51 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules and is supported by the affidavit of Ms. Jeniffer Thiga, the Garnishee’s Legal Officer, and sworn on the 10th November 2023.
4. The main ground of the Garnishee’s Application is that by a consent dated 17.12.2021, the parties herein (Decree Holder, the Judgment Debtor, and the Garnishee) agreed, inter alia that, the Garnishee Order Absolute of 23.11.2021 be marked as settled, with no orders as to costs. That under the consent, the Garnishee was (subject to the condition stated therein) to pay to the Decree-Holder a sum of Kshs. 17,354,741.84 as full and final settlement as opposed to Kshs. 61,261,857.19 as contained in the Garnishee Oder Absolute of 23.11.2021.
5. The Garnishee’s Application was opposed by the Plaintiff/Decree-Holder vide the Replying Affidavit sworn on 20.02.2024, by one Stephen Ndimbui Kamau, the Decree Holder’s Operations Manager. According to the decree-holder, the consent dated 17.12.2021 was entered into without their knowledge and requisite instructions to their former Advocates, A.B Patel & Patel Advocates.
6. It was further the Decree-Holder’s position that in any event, the said consent of 17.12.2021, having not been formally adopted as an order of the court, is therefore incapable of setting aside the Garnishee Order Absolute of 23.11.2021 requiring the Garnishee to pay to the Decree-Holder an amount of Ksh. 61, 261, 857.19, together with interest at 16 per cent per annum, from 1st January 2020 until payment in full.
Decree-Holder’s Application
7. The Decree-Holder also filed an application dated 20.02.2024 seeking the following orders; -
i. Spent
ii. Spent
iii. That the consent letter dated 17.12 2021, is not an order of the court and has no legal effect, and therefore null and void and ought to be expunged from the court’s record.
iv. All proceedings, actions, doings subsequent to the filing of the consent letter dated 17th December 2021, be declared null and void.
v. An order of execution be directed against the Garnishee, directing it to pay the sum of Ksh. 61, 261, 857.19 together with interest thereon at 16 per cent per annum from 1st January 2020 to date, less any monies paid to the Decree Holder or its advocates
vi. That costs of the application be paid by the Garnishee
8. The Decree Holder’s Application is supported by the affidavit of Mr. Stephen Ndibui Kamau, the Decree Holder’s Operations Manager, sworn on 20.02.2024.
9. The main grounds of the Decree-Holder’s Application are essentially the same as those contained in its Replying Affidavit in response to the Garnishee’s Application of 10.11.2023 and I do not, therefore, wish to regurgitate the same, suffice to say that the Decree-Holder maintained in its application that the consent letter dated 17th December 2021 between the parties herein was entered into without the instruction and knowledge of the decree-holder. The decree-holder further asserts that the consent dated 17.12.2021 having not been adopted as an order of the court, cannot override and/or set aside the Garnishee Order Absolute of 23.11.2021 in the matter.
10. The Decree Holder’s Application was opposed by both the judgment debtor and the Garnishee. The Judgment Debtor filed a Replying Affidavit sworn on 10.06.2024 by Nazir Akrabali, the Judgment Debtor’s Director. The Judgment’s Debtor’s response is hoisted upon two limbs, that there is no board resolution by the Decree Holder’s directors, authorizing Mr. Stephen Ndibui Kamau to swear the affidavit on behalf of the Decree Holder, and that, actions of the Decree Holder’s former advocates, and who were duly on record, binds the Decree Holder.
11. On its part, the Garnishee opposed the decree holder’s application vide the replying affidavit of Jeniffer Thiga, sworn on 8.05.2024. In its response, the Garnishee stated that it is not relevant that the consent letter of 17.12.2021 has not been adopted as an order of the court. That despite the consent having not been adopted as an order of the court, the same is binding in personam between the parties that executed it.
12. It was further deponed on behalf of the Garnishee that in any event, the Decree Holder has already benefited from the same consent it now seeks to set aside. That acting on the terms of the consent, the Garnishee released to the decree-holder’s former Advocates (AB Patel & Patel Advocates) a sum of Ksh. 17,354,741.84/=.
13. It was therefore Garnishee’s position that it is not true that a Garnishee order absolute cannot be compromised by consent. That in any event, the decree-holder was guilty of latches. It was further the Garnishee’s position that the decree-holder is bound by the actions of its former advocates. That the Decree-Holder's allegations of fraud, collusion, and misrepresentation, are not supported by any iota of evidence.
Submissions
14. On 21.2.2024, directions were given by this court that both the Decree-Holder’s Application and the Garnishee’s Application be heard together.
15. The two Applications proceeded by way of written submissions. The Garnishee filed two sets of submissions, one dated 29.01.2024 (skeletal submissions) and the other dated 08.05.2024. The Decree Holder on its part filed its submissions dated 08.05.2024. The Judgment debtor however did not file any submissions in this matter.
Garnishee’s Submissions
16. In its submissions, the Garnishee maintained that the consent dated 17.12.2023 was executed by the duly authorized representatives of the Judgment Debtor, the Garnishee, and the Decree-Holder and is therefore lawfully binding on all the parties. Relying on the case of M&E Consulting Engineers Limited v Lake Basin Development Authority & Another [2015] eKLR, the Garnishee maintained that a duly appointed Advocate, as was the case herein, has general authority to compromise a suit on behalf of his/her client.
17. Further citing the case of Stephen Mukiri Ndgewa & Another v Kenya Commercial Bank Limited [2021] eKLR, the Garnishee maintained that a consent once entered into, is binding on all the parties to an action, including those claiming under them. That such a consent cannot be varied or discharged unless in the case of fraud, misrepresentation, collusion, or by an agreement contrary to the policy of the court. That in the instant case, none of the vitiating factors has been proved by the Decree-Holder.
18. It was, therefore, the Garnishee’s argument that where the Decree-Holder is aggrieved by the manner in which its former Advocates executed the consent, the same can only give rise to an action between the Decree Holder and its said former Advocates, and cannot in law, be a basis of interfering with the Consent. The Garnishee cited the case of Patrick S.K. Kimiti v John Ngugi Gachau & Another [2015] eKLR in that regard.
19. The Garnishee maintained that the only distinction between a consent adopted as an order of the court, and a consent which has not been recorded as an order of the court is that, the former is binding in rem and renders a court functus officio, whilst the latter is only binding in personam, and does not render the court funtus officio. The Garnishee cited among others, the Supreme Court decision in the case of Geoffrey M. Asanyo & 3 Others v Attorney General [2018] eKLR, in support of this argument.
20. It was further the Garnishee’s submissions that it had already acted on the terms of the Consent, to its detriment, and released a sum of Kshs. 17,354,741.84 to the Decree-Holder’s former Advocates (A.B. Patel & Patel Advocates). Citing among others, the case of Terry Wanjiku Kariuki v Equity Bank Limited & Another [2018] eKLR, the Garnishee maintained that given that the Decree-Holder has already benefited under the Consent, it is estopped from challenging the validity of the same.
21. On the question as to whether the Garnishee Order of 23.11.2021 can be compromised by way of Consent, the Garnishee submitted in the affirmative and further stated that it is a constitutional imperative under Article 159(3) that all courts promote alternative forms of dispute resolution. The case of Geoffrey M. Asanyo & 3 Others v Attorney General (supra) was cited by the Applicant in support of this position.
22. In the premises, the Garnishee submitted that the Decree-Holder’s Notice of Motion dated 20.02.2024 be dismissed for being frivolous and that the Garnishee’s Application dated 10.11.2023 be allowed.
The Decree Holder’s submissions
23. On its part, the Decree Holder submitted that the consent of 17.12.2021 was entered into by their former advocates without their knowledge and/or instructions. According to the Decree Holder, they were only made aware of the existence of the consent on 16th May 2022 when their former Advocates (A.B. Patel & Patel Advocates) by their email of the same date, forwarded to the decree-holder, the advocate’s letter dated 12.5.2022, purporting to explain the basis upon which the consent was entered.
24. The decree-holder therefore maintained that the said consent letter of 17.12.2021 directing the Garnishee to pay was a sum of Kshs. 17,354,741.84 as opposed to the Kshs. 61,261,857.19 as per the Garnishee Order Absolute was fraudulently signed by their former advocates in collusion with the Advocates of the other parties herein.
25. It was further the decree-holder's submissions that in any event, the said consent letter of 17.12.2021 has to date not been adopted as an order of the court and is therefore incapable of varying, setting aside or reviewing the Ruling of 23.11.21 which issued a Garnishee Order Absolute of Kshs. 61,261,857.19 against the Garnishee. The case of Edward Acholla vs Sogea Satom Kenya Branch & 2 others [2014] eKLR was cited by the decree-holder in this regard.
26. The decree-holder, therefore, urged this court to dismiss the Garnishee and the Affected Party’s Notice of Motion Application dated 10.11.2023 and instead allow the decree-holder’s application dated 20.02.2024, with costs.
Analysis And Determination
27. I have considered the two applications before this court, the respective replying affidavits in response to the two applications, and the submissions on record. From the applications, I note that the primary issue for determination is whether the consent letter dated 17.12.2021 between the parties can be adopted as an Order of the Court.
28. While the Garnishee, in their application dated 10.11.2023, seeks to have the said consent adopted as an order of the court, the decree-holder, on the other hand, vide their application dated 20.2.2024, prays that the same consent letter be set aside and declared of no legal consequence.
29. From the pleadings, I note that it is common ground between parties that on 8.6.2016, a judgment was entered in favour of the decree-holder as against the judgment debtor in the sum of Ksh. 32, 913, 396.84 plus interest at 16 per cent per annum from 1st September 2014, until payment in full. It is also not in dispute that following the entry of the judgment, the court (Mabeya J) on an application by the decree-holder, issued a Garnishee Order Absolute dated 23.11.2021 over the accounts of the Judgment debtor held with the Garnishee, for an amount of Ksh. 61,261,857.19/=, with interest at 16 per cent per annum, from 1st January 2020 until payment in full.
30. However, vide a consent letter of 17.12.2021, the Advocates for the parties herein (the Garnishee, Defendant, and the Judgment Creditor) consented to have the payment under the Garnishee Order Absolute be varied from the Ksh. 61,261,857.19/= ordered by the Court to a sum of Kshs. 17,354,741.84/=. In particular, the said consent letter of 17.11.2021 provided as follows; -
a) The Garnishee Order be marked as settled with no orders as to costs; and
b) In the event that the Defendant’s appeal in the Nairobi Civil Appeal No. 8 of 2018 – Golden Jubilee Limited v Mistry Javda Parbat & Company Limited was successful, the Defendant would pay to the Plaintiff the sum of KES 17,354,741.84/=.
31. It is the said consent letter of 17.11.2021 that the decree-holder, in the instant proceedings contends was signed without their knowledge and in absence of any instructions to their then Advocates (AB Patel & Patel Advocates) and therefore ought to be set aside and be declared of no legal consequences.
32. In the circumstances, this court's duty is to interrogate the decree-holder’s allegations and establish whether sufficient grounds exist for setting aside the said consent letter of 17.11.2021.
33. First, it is critical to note that it is settled principle of law that a consent order entered into by Counsel is binding on their respective clients and cannot be set aside or varied unless it is proved that it was obtained by fraud or collusion or by an agreement contrary to the policy of the court, or where the consent was given without sufficient material facts. See the case of Brooke Bond Liebig Ltd V Mallya [1975] EA 266 at 269 where the Court (Law Ag P) said that:
“A court cannot interfere with a consent judgment except in such circumstances as would afford good ground for varying or rescinding a contract between the parties.”
34. In Kenya Commercial Bank Ltd V Specialised Engineering Co. Ltd [1982] KLR 485, Harris J correctly held inter alia, that –
“1. A consent order entered into by counsel is binding on all parties to the proceedings and cannot be set aside or varied unless it is proved that it was obtained by fraud or collusion or by an agreement contrary to the policy of the court or where the consent was given without sufficient material facts or in misapprehension or ignorance of such facts in general for a reason which would enable the court to set aside an agreement.
“2. A duly instructed advocate has an implied general authority to compromise and settle the action and the client cannot avail himself of any limitation by him of the implied authority to his advocate unless such limitation was brought to the notice of the other side.”
35. Again, in Hirani V. Kassam [1952] 19 EACA 131 the Court of Appeal stated that; -
“It is now well settled law that a consent judgment or order has contractual effect and can only be set aside on grounds which would justify setting a contract aside, or if certain conditions remain to be fulfilled, which are not carried out: see the decision of this court in J. M. Mwakio v Kenya Commercial Bank Limited Civ Apps 28 of 1982 and 69 of 1983. In Purcell v F.C. Trigell Ltd [1970] 3 All ER 671, Winn LJ said at 676: -
“It seems to me that, if a consent order is to be set aside, it can really only be set aside on grounds which would justify the setting aside of a contract entered into with the knowledge of the material matters by legally competent persons, and I see no suggestion here that any matter that occurred would justify the setting aside or rectification of this order looked at as a contract.”
36. From the record, it is apparent that as at the date when the said consent letter of 17.12.2021 was signed, the relationship between the decree-holder and its then advocates (AB Patel & Patel Advocates) was a strained one. The decree-holder in the affidavit of Stephen Ndibui Kamau sworn on 20.2.2024 deponed in support of their application of the same date deponed that around the time the impugned consent was signed, the Decree holder and its former advocates had fallen out. That as a result of the fallout, the decree-holder appointed the firm of Dubow & Company Advocates to act for them in the matter instead.
37. From the record, I note that the firm of Dubow & Company Advocates sent a letter dated 16.12.2021 to the Garnishee demanding payment of the entire sum of Ksh. 61,261,857.19/= as per the Garnishee Order Absolute of 23.11.21. This letter was received by the Garnishee on 17.12.2021, the same day the consent letter of 17.12.2021 was signed, but a day before the said consent letter was filed in court.
38. The Garnishee in their submissions, while admitting that they received a letter dated 16.12.2021 on the subject from the law firm of Dubow & Company Advocates on 18.12.2021, argued that the said law firm was not properly on record for the decree-holder since there was no notice of change of advocates filed, allowing the said advocates to come on record for the decree-holder in place of the law firm of AB Patel & Patel Advocates.
39. While I agree with the submissions by the Garnishee that the law firm of Dubow & Company Advocates was not properly on record for the decree-holder in relation to the dispute then in court, I do not think that was reason enough for the Garnishee to have ignored the letter of 16.12.2021 addressed to them by the said advocates in relation to the dispute in court. At the very least, it was expected that the Garnishee ought to have either responded to the said letter expressing their position regarding the place of Dubow & Company Advocates in the matter or brought the same to the attention of the decree-holder’s former advocates, A.B. Patel & Patel Advocates. The Garnishee after receiving the letter chose to keep silent on the same. The Garnishee did not even do an acknowledgment in respect of this letter, which, though emanating from an advocate not properly on record for the decree-holder, contained critical information concerning a matter in which the Garnishee was about to execute a consent. In fact, none has been done to date.
40. It is evident that the letter dated 16.12.2021 by Dubow & Company Advocates was received by the Garnishee on 17.12.2021 (at Nation Centre Branch) and 18.12.2021 (at the MD’s Office). This was well before the said consent letter was filed in court. It is therefore apparent that prior to the date of filing of the consent in court (18.12.2021), the Garnishee knew, or ought to have known that there was some possibility (the source notwithstanding) that the decree-holder had no knowledge and/or had not given any instructions as to the execution and filing of the subject consent.
41. The fact that the Garnishee received the letter of 16.12.2021 (which appeared to derogate from the terms of the consent) and kept quiet on it, without any evidence of the Garnishee raising any issue with either the author of the letter or the decree-holder’s former Advocates, in my view, points to possible collusion on the part of the Garnishee.
42. Further, even assuming that the import of the letter of 16.12.2021 was not immediately appreciated by the Garnishee as of 17.12.2021 when the consent was signed, I note that payment under the consent was made by the Garnishee’s Advocate to the decree holder’s Advocate much later, specifically, 9.05.2022. This, in my view, was enough time for the Garnishee to establish, whether the letter of 16.12.2021 by Dubow & Company Advocates was written, with or without the decree-holder’s instructions and knowledge. Consequently, the argument by the Garnishee that it has already relied on the said consent letter to its detriment cannot hold.
43. Prudence demands that where a party has reasonable notice, as was the case herein, that there may be a change of circumstances affecting a (proposed) consent, then all reasonable steps should be taken by such a party to ensure that such doubts are eliminated before the consent is either adopted as an order of the court, or any action is taken or commitment made, in reliance on the terms of the consent.
44. In the present case, it is even more telling that the decree-holder only became aware of the existence of the said consent on 16.05.2022, almost six (6) months after the same was signed and filed in court.
45. In the circumstances, I am of the strong view that the decree-holder’s then Advocates (AB Patel & Patel Advocates) did not have instructions from the decree-holder to execute the consent letter of 17.12.2021.
46. While I agree with the submissions by the Garnishee’s Advocate that such a conduct on the part of the part of the decree-holder’s former advocates may be a ground for an action against the said Advocates, I do not think it is reason enough to make the court allow a consent which on the face of it is highly prejudicial to the decree-holder to stand, especially given the inaction by the Garnishee as already explained herein above.
47. Under Order 23 of the Civil Procedure Rules, a Garnishee has the opportunity to challenge Garnishee proceedings before a Garnishee Order Absolute is issued by the Court. In Nyandoro & Company Advocates v National Water Conservation & Pipeline Corporation; Kenya Commercial Bank Group Limited (Garnishee) [2021] eKLR, Mativo J (as he then was) stated as follows on the issue; -
“9. A reading of Order 23 of the Civil Procedure rules shows that it comprises of self-contained provisions which are distinct and independent of Order 22. It prescribes two steps in Garnishee proceedings. The first is a Garnishee Order nisi. Nisi is Norman-French. It means ‘unless.’ It is an order to the bank communicating that unless there is some sufficient reason why the bank should not pay the decree, it will be required to pay money held in the Judgement Debtor’s account. Such reason may exist if the bank disputes its indebtedness to the customer for one reason or other. Or if payment to the creditor might be unfair by preferring him to other creditors….If no sufficient reason appears, the garnishee order is made absolute, to pay to the Judgment-Creditor, or into court, whichever is more appropriate. On making the payment, the bank gets a good discharge from its indebtedness to its own customer, just as if the Judgment-Debtor directed the bank to pay it.
10. As soon as the garnishee order nisi is served on the bank, it operates as an injunction. It prevents the bank from paying the money to its customer until the garnishee order is made absolute, or is discharged, as the case may be. It binds the debt in the hands of the garnishee, that is, creates a charge in favour of the Judgment-Creditor. The money at the bank is then said to be ‘attached,’ but the ‘attachment’ is not an order to pay. It only freezes the sum in the hands of the bank until the order is made absolute or is discharged. It is only when the order is made absolute that the bank is liable to pay.”
48. In the instant case, I have carefully perused Garnishee’s Application dated 10.11.2023 seeking to have the impugned consent letter adopted as an order of the court, as well as the affidavit of Jennifer Thiga sworn on behalf of Garnishee in reply to the decree-holder’s application of 20.02.2024 but I have not seen any plausible reason that may have led to the Garnishee Order Absolute being compromised by the parties herein. The only explanation I see is that contained in the letter dated 12.05.2022 from the decree-holder’s former Advocates (AB Patel & Patel Advocates) to the effect that the consent was informed by the intention of the Garnishee “to appeal the decision of Justice Mabeya of 23rd November 2021 and seeking stay pending appeal.”
49. First, as I have indicated elsewhere in this ruling, this information was provided to the decree-holder, long after the consent of 17.12.2021 had been executed. There is nothing on record to demonstrate that the decree-holder was made aware of the consideration that informed the consent prior to the execution of the consent of 17.12.2021.
50. Secondly, from a reading from Justice Mbeya’s Ruling of 23rd November 2021, it is clear that the Garnishee had not provided any plausible reason why the Garnishee order nisi could not be made absolute. In fact, the judge at paragraph 27 of his ruling observed as follows; -
“The Court is of the opinion that the Barclays case does not apply in the instant case as the garnishee in this case has not showed (sic) that there was any contract executed by the defendant offering the said monies as security for any advances. At best, this will be an attempt by the Garnishee to cushion the defendant from its lawful obligations and obstruct the cause of justice. There is no evidence that the facilities allegedly advanced to the defendant had become due and owing.”
51. Admittedly, even in instances where an objection by a garnishee is dismissed, as was the case herein, parties may still, compromise garnishee proceedings where it is demonstrated, by way of credible evidence, that parties thereto were sufficiently aware of what they are getting themselves into, prior to the execution of the consent. It may be argued, and rightly so, that in the instant case, it was the duty of the decree-holder’s former advocates to ensure that their client was sufficiently aware of the reasons informing the consent. However, to the extent that the Garnishee failed to prudently act, even after having reasonable notice that the decree-holder’s consent may not be aware and/or given instructions as to the execution of the consent herein, makes the Garnishee equally culpable.
52. As demonstrated by the evidence on record, the Garnishee, in this case, filed a consent a day after they had been served with a letter indicating that the Decree Holder may be no longer interested in being party to the consent. The argument by Garnishee that Ms. Dubow Advocates was not properly on record is not reason enough for Garnishee’s failure to act on the letter.
53. In any event, I agree with the argument by the decree-holder that the consent letter of 17.11.2021 having not been adopted as an order of the court, cannot be a basis for setting aside the Ruling and Order of Justice Mabeya of 23.11.2021.
54. In Kenya, the law is that a consent letter is not an order of the court unless it has been formally adopted by the court. The court's adoption process evaluates the clarity of the consent and provides instructions on how to adopt it. This process helps to prevent unlawful orders and validates the adoption and compliance.
55. It is trite that a consent can only become an order of the court once it is adopted. This is the position that was adopted in the case of Edward Acholla vs Sogea Satom Kenya Branch & 2 others [2014] eKLR where the court held that: -
“Consent becomes a judgment or order of the court once adopted as such. Once consent is adopted by the court, it automatically changes character and becomes a consent judgment or order with contractual effect and can only be set aside on grounds which would justify setting aside, or if certain conditions remain unfulfilled, which are not carried out.”
56. Contrary to the Garnishee’s arguments, this court is of the view that a consent which is not adopted as an order of the court, cannot of itself, set aside a valid existing court order. It simply expresses the parties’ intention but does not crystalize unless and until formally adopted as an order of the court.
57. Consequently, I find that the garnishee order absolute issued against the Garnishee on 23.11.2021, for an amount of Ksh. 61,261, 857.19, together with interest at 16 per cent per annum, from 1st January 2020 until payment in full, remains valid and subsisting.
58. However, since the delay was partly due to the decree-holder’s former advocates, I direct that the period between 17.11.2021 when the consent was executed and the date of this Ruling (19.12.2024) shall not count for purposes of computing interest.
59. Accordingly, I find and hold that there exists good reason for setting aside, and expunging from the record, the consent letter dated 17.12.2021.
Disposition
60. In the circumstances I do hereby make the following orders; -
i. The Notice of Motion Application dated 10.11.2023 by the Garnishee is hereby dismissed.
ii. The Decree-Holder’s Notice of Motion Application dated 20.02.2024 is hereby allowed in the following terms; -
a) The consent letter dated 17.12.2021 was executed without knowledge and requisite instructions of the decree-holder and is therefore declared null and void and of no legal consequence. The same is accordingly expunged from the record.
b) The Garnishee is hereby directed to pay to the decree-holder, within forty-five (45) days from the date hereof, a sum of Ksh. 61,261,857.19 together with interest thereon at 16 per cent per annum from 1st January 2020 to date, failure to which, an order of execution shall automatically issue.
c) However, since the delay was partly attributed to the decree-holder’s former advocates, I direct that the period between 17.11.2021 when the consent was executed and the date of this Ruling (19.12.2024) shall not count for purposes of computing interest.
d) Credit shall be given to the amount of Ksh. 17, 354, 741.84 already paid under the consent and the same shall be taken into account in computing the interest.
e) The Garnishee shall bear the Decree Holder’s costs of the two applications.
f) Both the Garnishee and the Judgment Debtor shall each bear their own costs.
61. It is so ordered.
SIGNED DATED and DELIVERED IN VIRTUAL COURT
THIS 19TH DAY OF DECEMBER 2024
ADO MOSES
JUDGE
In the presence of:
Moses – Court Assistant
Manani h/b for Oraro SC………..for the Garnishee
Ms. Wanyama for the ………..Plaintiff/Decree Holder
JanMohammed……………for the Judgment Debtor