1. The Applicant approached this court through a Notice of Motion dated 3rd December, 2024, seeking orders thus;
(1) Spent.
(2) That pending the hearing and determination of this application or further orders of the court, the Plaintiff/Applicant be allowed to take back possession of her business stall premises situate at Nyahururu Open Air Market within Nyahururu Township and that she be allowed to continue operating her business within the said Nyahururu Open Air Market and its environs.
(3) That pending the interparties hearing and determination of this application there be a stay of execution of the ruling delivered by the court on 21st November, 2014 and all the consequential orders arising thereto in Nyahururu CMCC No. E160 of 2024.
(4) That pending the interparties hearing and determination of this application, a temporary injunction do issue against the Defendant/Respondents restraining them, by themselves, their servants, agents and/or employees from suspending, evicting, restraining, harassing, disrupting, preventing and/or in any other way interfering with Applicant’s business operations in her stall premises situate in Nyahururu Open Air Market within Nyahururu Township and its environs.
(5) That pending the hearing and determination of this appeal there be a stay of execution of the ruling delivered by the court on 21st November, 2024, and all the consequential orders arising thereto in Nyahururu CMCC No. E160 of 2024.
(6) That pending the hearing and determination of this appeal, a temporary injunction do issue against the Defendant/Respondents restraining them by themselves, their servants, agents and/or employees from suspending, evicting, restraining, harassing, disrupting, preventing and/or in any other way interfering with Applicants business operations in her stall premises situate at Nyahururu Open Air Market within Nyahururu Township and its environs.
(7) That the OCS Nyahururu Police Station to enforce the orders.
(8) That the costs of this application be borne by the Respondents.
2. The application is premised on grounds recapitulated in the affidavit deposed by Mercy Wambui Wahome, the Applicant, where she depones that the Applicant operates a stall situate at Nyahururu Open Air Market a public place owned and controlled by Laikipia County Government where she sells tomatoes and other market produce which she relies on for subsistence and as a source of income.
3. That by a letter dated 27th September, 2024, Respondents, committee members and officials of Nyahururu Open Air Market unlawfully and without any justifiable reason issued a suspension notice of six (6) months to the Applicant where she stood suspended from selling her goods at or within the market and its environs with effect from 30th September, 2024 up to 1st April, 2025.
4. That the Applicant challenged the suspension through a letter dated 30th September, 2024 since the Respondents are not members of the Laikipia County Revenue Board as no resolution was passed by the Board seeking to suspend or evict the Applicant from the Open Air Market.
5. That no warning was issued to the Applicant, she was not subject to disciplinary process, there was no complaint against her hence the suspension was malicious, unlawful and against the By Laws of the market.
6. That on 2nd October, 2024 the Respondents overstepped their mandate by using the County enforcement officers to evict the Applicant from the premises without authorization of the County Revenue Board, an act that was in contravention of the law and criminal in nature.
7. That the act perpetrated by the Respondents amount to an infringement of the Applicant’s right to association and carrying out lawful business following the restraint to sell goods in the market and its environs.
8. The Respondents filed a replying affidavit deposed by Alexander Muchemi, the County Attorney of the County Government who avers that the Respondents are authorized by the Laikipia Revenue Board, an entity under the County Government of Laikipia.
9. That the Applicant did made an initial application dated 03/10/2024 but was denied the orders sought; Another application filed on 9th October, 2024 was not found justifiable to warrant interim orders. That notwithstanding the Applicant has misdirected the court with half truths so as to gain sympathy orders termed as interim but are final orders.
10. To buttress the argument by the Respondents it is stated that on 14th October, 2024, the subordinate court issued directions to the effect that the Respondents had 3 days to file and serve their replying affidavit and the Applicant was granted leave to file a supplementary affidavit.
11. That the 2nd to 5th Respondents filed their joint response dated the 16th October, 2024, on 18th October, 2024, at 10.04am but the Applicant had not filed her supplementary affidavit. That the Respondents were unaware of filing of the supplementary affidavit as they came to learn of it on 22nd October, 2024. That the Applicant has approached the court with unclean hands as she has not approached the court as a pauper yet she alleges to be financially handicapped.
12. That the market By laws are important to avoid creating an environment of fracas due to members disregard of the same. That responses by the Respondents in the subordinate court show the insistence by the Applicant to disregard the rules and to hinder the public’s right to us and enjoy the use of the market as a public utility.
13. That following issuance of the interim orders on 10th December, there has been public outcry by members of the market who have refused to pay fees and use the market due to the return of the Applicant.
14. That the County Government is losing revenue in the result due to the constitutional demonstrations, an outcry against the existence of the Applicant who makes the market unhabitable.
15. That while courts of law are used to subvert the rules, there is a threat of creation of a custom of the ‘law of the jungle’ where majority of people see no need to also heed the rules.
16. In a supplementary affidavit, sworn to provide further information, the Applicant states that following advice from her advocate the replying affidavit is defective, offends the natural laws and ought to be expunged from the record, the deponent lacks locus standi being not a party but has descended into the arena of litigants.
17. That there having been no demonstrations at the marketplace and operations have been running smoothly since her return to the market upon issuance of interim orders. She denies the allegation that there were demonstrations following her return to the market and there is no proof that members of the market have refused to pay rent and requisite fees to the county as alleged.
18. That on the date he was to return to the market, the 1st Respondent directed the gate man to open the gate and attempt to create chaos that the Applicant was not wanted but members declined to be involved hence the market was opened and business continued as usual as confirmed under oath by the gateman Moses Ndung’u Waititu.
19. That it was demonstrated that the 1st Respondent in an endeavor to accomplish a personal agenda in an endeavor to justify illegal acts against him, would have people not working at the market hold placards resulting into insults and threats.
20. Parties were given the opportunity to submit but only the Applicant’s counsel filed submissions. The capacity of the deponent of the replying affidavit is questioned and it is urged that an advocate cannot swear an affidavit on contentious issues. That having hauled insults at the Applicant, the affidavit is scandalous, frivolous and inept and should be expunged from the court record.
21. To buttress the argument put forth, learned counsel for the Applicant Ms. Maureen Muriithi relied on Order 19 rule 3 (1) of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010 that provides thus;
Affidavits shall be confined to such facts as the deponent is able of his own knowledge to prove: Provided that in interlocutory proceedings, or by leave of the court, an affidavit may contain statements of information and belief showing the sources and grounds thereof.
22. And other myriad of cases including Republic v Nairobi County Government & 6 Others Exparte Mike Sonko Mbuvi [2015] eKLR where the court held;
“Whereas there is nothing barring an advocate from swearing an affidavit in appropriate cases, where the matters deposed to are agreed or on purely legal positions, advocates should refrain from the temptation of being the avenue through which disputed facts are proclaimed. The rationale for the said principle is to insulate the advocate, an officer of the court, from the vagaries of litigation which, on occasions may be very unpleasant. By swearing an affidavit on such issues an advocate subjects himself to the process of cross-examination thus removing him from his role of legal counsel to that of a witness, a scenario which should be avoided like plague. In my view, however innocent an averment may be, counsel should desist from the temptation to be the pipe stem through which such an averment is transmitted.”
23. And, East African Foundry Works (k) Ltd v Kenya Commercial Bank Ltd [2002] eKLR, where the court held;
“I have considered the rival arguments. I accept the submissions of Mr. Akiwumi that in reality paragraphs 3,4 and 8(c) of the affidavit of Mr. Ngatia contain not statements of facts of which he had personal knowledge but statements based on information the source whereof he has not disclosed. Accordingly, those paragraphs offend Order 18 rule 3(1) of the Civil Procedure Rules. I also accept the further submission of Mr. Akiwumi that indeed they consist of contentious averments of fact which an advocate should not be allowed to depose to in a case where he is appearing as such. I have always deprecated depositions by advocates on contentious matters of fact in suits or applications which they canvass before the courts and I have never had any hesitation in striking out such depositions as a matter of good practice in our courts. The unseemly prospect of counsel being called upon to be cross-examined in matters in which they appear as counsel must be avoided by striking out such affidavits as a matter of good practice. As regards paragraphs 9, I accept the submission of Mr. Ngatia that it is no more than a deposition as to his understanding of the law in response to an affidavit by a fellow advocate.”
24. Further it is submitted that conditions of granting orders of prohibition are set out in the famous case of Giella v Cassman Brown & Co. Ltd [1973] EA 358 and as regards interlocutory mandatory injunctions it has been held that the same principles apply. That the Court of Appeal in Kenya Airports Authority v Paul Njogu Mungai & Others, Civil Application No. Nai 29 of 1997 held thus;
“We would point out that the principles governing the grant of mandatory as well as prohibitory (restrictive) orders pending hearing and determination of a suit in the High Court are the self-same ones enunciated in the celebrated case of Giella – Vs – Cassman Brown & Co. Ltd [1973] EA 358 save that a temporary mandatory injunction can only be granted in exceptional and in the clearest of the cases.”
25. On the question whether appeal shall be rendered nugatory it is submitted that the Applicant has an arguable case. That unless orders sought are confirmed, the Applicants stands to suffer prejudice and the suspicion being unlawful it validates the need to get prohibitory orders.
26. I have considered the application, submissions by the Applicant and authorities cited. Orders sought herein at the outset are provisional not final. This will address specific issues pending determination of the appeal. Notably, at the outset interim orders were granted in the matter by Ndung’u J. that enabled the Applicant to take back possession of her business stall premises situate at Nyahururu Open Air Market within Nyahururu Township. In the result the Applicant has continued to operate her business at the open-air market and its environs.
27. There is the question of the court being called upon to expunge the replying affidavit at the point of submitting. In as much as some of the contents of the affidavit sworn by the County Attorney are procedurally wrong for lack of divulging the source of information, the Attorney descending into disputed facts that may have resulted into him being subjected to possible cross examination and basically alluding to contentious matters; no application was made to this court to enable the respondent to respond.
28. It is imperative for the party seeking to have an affidavit expunged from the record to make a formal application giving reasons calling for proposed removal to enable the court notify the other party who must be given the opportunity to respond to allegations before a finding can be reached. This was not the case herein hence this court restrains itself from making the orders sort.
29. The issue pending is hence whether temporary orders sought should be confirmed.
30. Principles of granting a temporary injunction were enunciated on the case of Giella v Cassman Brown & Co. Ltd [1973] EA 159 where the Court stated thus;
“In an interlocutory injunction application, the Applicant has to satisfy the triple requirements to a, establishes his case only at a prima facie level, b, demonstrates irreparable injury if a temporary injunction is not granted and c, ally any doubts as to be b, by showing that the balance of convenience is in his favour. These are the three pillars on which rest the foundation of any order of injunction interlocutory or permanent. it is established that all the above three conditions and states are to be applied as separate distinct and logical hurdles which the Applicant is expected to surmount sequentially.”
31. It therefore behooved the Applicant to demonstrate existence of a prima facie case with a likelihood of success in the appeal. A prima facie case was defined in Mrao Ltd v First American Bank of Kenya Ltd [2003] eKLR thus;
““... in civil cases, it is a case in which, on the material presented to the court a tribunal properly directing itself will conclude that there exists a legal right which has apparently been infringed by the opposite party as to call for an explanation or rebuttal from the latter.”
32. The interlocutory appeal herein was brought as the Applicant was aggrieved by the ruling of the trial court which dismissed the Notice of Motion seeking interlocutory orders. A perusal of the ruling by the trial court obviously demonstrates issuance of final orders which were overturned by the order granted by Ndung’u J. It will therefore be peremptory to disregard orders sought.
33. On the question of irreparable harm. This is harm that cannot be adequately restored or compensated through legal remedies. The Applicant was required to demonstrate that the harm would be so severe such that monetary compensation would not repair the situation. The Applicant did aver that the stall was her livelihood. The stall which was her place of business is where she carries on activities by which she earns resources to meet her basic needs. Disregarding orders already in force would result into irreparable harm being suffered.
34. Would the balance of convenience favour the Applicant to obtain the temporary relief? It has been submitted at length on how the Applicant’s interests should be protected. The response to her argument was filed by a County Attorney who did not state if he was seized of the matter and in what context he was responding.
35. This therefore leaves evidence of the Applicant which demonstrates the fact that she will suffer greater harm if denied the relief sought prior to determination of the appeal. The Respondents would therefore suffer manageable inconvenience, if any, therefore fairness would be maintained until the final decision is made if orders sought are granted.
36. From the foregoing, I find and hold in favour of the Applicant. In the result, I grant orders thus;
(i) There be stay of execution of the ruling in Nyahururu CMCC No. E160 of 2024 dated 21st November, 2024 and all consequential orders pending hearing and determination of the appeal.
(ii) A temporary injunction do issue against the Respondents restraining them by themselves or their agents, from suspending, evicting, restraining, harassing, disrupting, preventing and/or in any other way interfering with Applicant’s business operations at her stall premises situate at Nyahururu Open Air Market within Nyahururu Township and its environs.
(iii) Costs of the application shall be in the cause.
It is so ordered.
(1) Spent.
(2) That pending the hearing and determination of this application or further orders of the court, the Plaintiff/Applicant be allowed to take back possession of her business stall premises situate at Nyahururu Open Air Market within Nyahururu Township and that she be allowed to continue operating her business within the said Nyahururu Open Air Market and its environs.
(3) That pending the interparties hearing and determination of this application there be a stay of execution of the ruling delivered by the court on 21st November, 2014 and all the consequential orders arising thereto in Nyahururu CMCC No. E160 of 2024.
(4) That pending the interparties hearing and determination of this application, a temporary injunction do issue against the Defendant/Respondents restraining them, by themselves, their servants, agents and/or employees from suspending, evicting, restraining, harassing, disrupting, preventing and/or in any other way interfering with Applicant’s business operations in her stall premises situate in Nyahururu Open Air Market within Nyahururu Township and its environs.
(5) That pending the hearing and determination of this appeal there be a stay of execution of the ruling delivered by the court on 21st November, 2024, and all the consequential orders arising thereto in Nyahururu CMCC No. E160 of 2024.
(6) That pending the hearing and determination of this appeal, a temporary injunction do issue against the Defendant/Respondents restraining them by themselves, their servants, agents and/or employees from suspending, evicting, restraining, harassing, disrupting, preventing and/or in any other way interfering with Applicants business operations in her stall premises situate at Nyahururu Open Air Market within Nyahururu Township and its environs.
(7) That the OCS Nyahururu Police Station to enforce the orders.
(8) That the costs of this application be borne by the Respondents.
2. The application is premised on grounds recapitulated in the affidavit deposed by Mercy Wambui Wahome, the Applicant, where she depones that the Applicant operates a stall situate at Nyahururu Open Air Market a public place owned and controlled by Laikipia County Government where she sells tomatoes and other market produce which she relies on for subsistence and as a source of income.
3. That by a letter dated 27th September, 2024, Respondents, committee members and officials of Nyahururu Open Air Market unlawfully and without any justifiable reason issued a suspension notice of six (6) months to the Applicant where she stood suspended from selling her goods at or within the market and its environs with effect from 30th September, 2024 up to 1st April, 2025.
4. That the Applicant challenged the suspension through a letter dated 30th September, 2024 since the Respondents are not members of the Laikipia County Revenue Board as no resolution was passed by the Board seeking to suspend or evict the Applicant from the Open Air Market.
5. That no warning was issued to the Applicant, she was not subject to disciplinary process, there was no complaint against her hence the suspension was malicious, unlawful and against the By Laws of the market.
6. That on 2nd October, 2024 the Respondents overstepped their mandate by using the County enforcement officers to evict the Applicant from the premises without authorization of the County Revenue Board, an act that was in contravention of the law and criminal in nature.
7. That the act perpetrated by the Respondents amount to an infringement of the Applicant’s right to association and carrying out lawful business following the restraint to sell goods in the market and its environs.
8. The Respondents filed a replying affidavit deposed by Alexander Muchemi, the County Attorney of the County Government who avers that the Respondents are authorized by the Laikipia Revenue Board, an entity under the County Government of Laikipia.
9. That the Applicant did made an initial application dated 03/10/2024 but was denied the orders sought; Another application filed on 9th October, 2024 was not found justifiable to warrant interim orders. That notwithstanding the Applicant has misdirected the court with half truths so as to gain sympathy orders termed as interim but are final orders.
10. To buttress the argument by the Respondents it is stated that on 14th October, 2024, the subordinate court issued directions to the effect that the Respondents had 3 days to file and serve their replying affidavit and the Applicant was granted leave to file a supplementary affidavit.
11. That the 2nd to 5th Respondents filed their joint response dated the 16th October, 2024, on 18th October, 2024, at 10.04am but the Applicant had not filed her supplementary affidavit. That the Respondents were unaware of filing of the supplementary affidavit as they came to learn of it on 22nd October, 2024. That the Applicant has approached the court with unclean hands as she has not approached the court as a pauper yet she alleges to be financially handicapped.
12. That the market By laws are important to avoid creating an environment of fracas due to members disregard of the same. That responses by the Respondents in the subordinate court show the insistence by the Applicant to disregard the rules and to hinder the public’s right to us and enjoy the use of the market as a public utility.
13. That following issuance of the interim orders on 10th December, there has been public outcry by members of the market who have refused to pay fees and use the market due to the return of the Applicant.
14. That the County Government is losing revenue in the result due to the constitutional demonstrations, an outcry against the existence of the Applicant who makes the market unhabitable.
15. That while courts of law are used to subvert the rules, there is a threat of creation of a custom of the ‘law of the jungle’ where majority of people see no need to also heed the rules.
16. In a supplementary affidavit, sworn to provide further information, the Applicant states that following advice from her advocate the replying affidavit is defective, offends the natural laws and ought to be expunged from the record, the deponent lacks locus standi being not a party but has descended into the arena of litigants.
17. That there having been no demonstrations at the marketplace and operations have been running smoothly since her return to the market upon issuance of interim orders. She denies the allegation that there were demonstrations following her return to the market and there is no proof that members of the market have refused to pay rent and requisite fees to the county as alleged.
18. That on the date he was to return to the market, the 1st Respondent directed the gate man to open the gate and attempt to create chaos that the Applicant was not wanted but members declined to be involved hence the market was opened and business continued as usual as confirmed under oath by the gateman Moses Ndung’u Waititu.
19. That it was demonstrated that the 1st Respondent in an endeavor to accomplish a personal agenda in an endeavor to justify illegal acts against him, would have people not working at the market hold placards resulting into insults and threats.
20. Parties were given the opportunity to submit but only the Applicant’s counsel filed submissions. The capacity of the deponent of the replying affidavit is questioned and it is urged that an advocate cannot swear an affidavit on contentious issues. That having hauled insults at the Applicant, the affidavit is scandalous, frivolous and inept and should be expunged from the court record.
21. To buttress the argument put forth, learned counsel for the Applicant Ms. Maureen Muriithi relied on Order 19 rule 3 (1) of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010 that provides thus;
Affidavits shall be confined to such facts as the deponent is able of his own knowledge to prove: Provided that in interlocutory proceedings, or by leave of the court, an affidavit may contain statements of information and belief showing the sources and grounds thereof.
22. And other myriad of cases including Republic v Nairobi County Government & 6 Others Exparte Mike Sonko Mbuvi [2015] eKLR where the court held;
“Whereas there is nothing barring an advocate from swearing an affidavit in appropriate cases, where the matters deposed to are agreed or on purely legal positions, advocates should refrain from the temptation of being the avenue through which disputed facts are proclaimed. The rationale for the said principle is to insulate the advocate, an officer of the court, from the vagaries of litigation which, on occasions may be very unpleasant. By swearing an affidavit on such issues an advocate subjects himself to the process of cross-examination thus removing him from his role of legal counsel to that of a witness, a scenario which should be avoided like plague. In my view, however innocent an averment may be, counsel should desist from the temptation to be the pipe stem through which such an averment is transmitted.”
23. And, East African Foundry Works (k) Ltd v Kenya Commercial Bank Ltd [2002] eKLR, where the court held;
“I have considered the rival arguments. I accept the submissions of Mr. Akiwumi that in reality paragraphs 3,4 and 8(c) of the affidavit of Mr. Ngatia contain not statements of facts of which he had personal knowledge but statements based on information the source whereof he has not disclosed. Accordingly, those paragraphs offend Order 18 rule 3(1) of the Civil Procedure Rules. I also accept the further submission of Mr. Akiwumi that indeed they consist of contentious averments of fact which an advocate should not be allowed to depose to in a case where he is appearing as such. I have always deprecated depositions by advocates on contentious matters of fact in suits or applications which they canvass before the courts and I have never had any hesitation in striking out such depositions as a matter of good practice in our courts. The unseemly prospect of counsel being called upon to be cross-examined in matters in which they appear as counsel must be avoided by striking out such affidavits as a matter of good practice. As regards paragraphs 9, I accept the submission of Mr. Ngatia that it is no more than a deposition as to his understanding of the law in response to an affidavit by a fellow advocate.”
24. Further it is submitted that conditions of granting orders of prohibition are set out in the famous case of Giella v Cassman Brown & Co. Ltd [1973] EA 358 and as regards interlocutory mandatory injunctions it has been held that the same principles apply. That the Court of Appeal in Kenya Airports Authority v Paul Njogu Mungai & Others, Civil Application No. Nai 29 of 1997 held thus;
“We would point out that the principles governing the grant of mandatory as well as prohibitory (restrictive) orders pending hearing and determination of a suit in the High Court are the self-same ones enunciated in the celebrated case of Giella – Vs – Cassman Brown & Co. Ltd [1973] EA 358 save that a temporary mandatory injunction can only be granted in exceptional and in the clearest of the cases.”
25. On the question whether appeal shall be rendered nugatory it is submitted that the Applicant has an arguable case. That unless orders sought are confirmed, the Applicants stands to suffer prejudice and the suspicion being unlawful it validates the need to get prohibitory orders.
26. I have considered the application, submissions by the Applicant and authorities cited. Orders sought herein at the outset are provisional not final. This will address specific issues pending determination of the appeal. Notably, at the outset interim orders were granted in the matter by Ndung’u J. that enabled the Applicant to take back possession of her business stall premises situate at Nyahururu Open Air Market within Nyahururu Township. In the result the Applicant has continued to operate her business at the open-air market and its environs.
27. There is the question of the court being called upon to expunge the replying affidavit at the point of submitting. In as much as some of the contents of the affidavit sworn by the County Attorney are procedurally wrong for lack of divulging the source of information, the Attorney descending into disputed facts that may have resulted into him being subjected to possible cross examination and basically alluding to contentious matters; no application was made to this court to enable the respondent to respond.
28. It is imperative for the party seeking to have an affidavit expunged from the record to make a formal application giving reasons calling for proposed removal to enable the court notify the other party who must be given the opportunity to respond to allegations before a finding can be reached. This was not the case herein hence this court restrains itself from making the orders sort.
29. The issue pending is hence whether temporary orders sought should be confirmed.
30. Principles of granting a temporary injunction were enunciated on the case of Giella v Cassman Brown & Co. Ltd [1973] EA 159 where the Court stated thus;
“In an interlocutory injunction application, the Applicant has to satisfy the triple requirements to a, establishes his case only at a prima facie level, b, demonstrates irreparable injury if a temporary injunction is not granted and c, ally any doubts as to be b, by showing that the balance of convenience is in his favour. These are the three pillars on which rest the foundation of any order of injunction interlocutory or permanent. it is established that all the above three conditions and states are to be applied as separate distinct and logical hurdles which the Applicant is expected to surmount sequentially.”
31. It therefore behooved the Applicant to demonstrate existence of a prima facie case with a likelihood of success in the appeal. A prima facie case was defined in Mrao Ltd v First American Bank of Kenya Ltd [2003] eKLR thus;
““... in civil cases, it is a case in which, on the material presented to the court a tribunal properly directing itself will conclude that there exists a legal right which has apparently been infringed by the opposite party as to call for an explanation or rebuttal from the latter.”
32. The interlocutory appeal herein was brought as the Applicant was aggrieved by the ruling of the trial court which dismissed the Notice of Motion seeking interlocutory orders. A perusal of the ruling by the trial court obviously demonstrates issuance of final orders which were overturned by the order granted by Ndung’u J. It will therefore be peremptory to disregard orders sought.
33. On the question of irreparable harm. This is harm that cannot be adequately restored or compensated through legal remedies. The Applicant was required to demonstrate that the harm would be so severe such that monetary compensation would not repair the situation. The Applicant did aver that the stall was her livelihood. The stall which was her place of business is where she carries on activities by which she earns resources to meet her basic needs. Disregarding orders already in force would result into irreparable harm being suffered.
34. Would the balance of convenience favour the Applicant to obtain the temporary relief? It has been submitted at length on how the Applicant’s interests should be protected. The response to her argument was filed by a County Attorney who did not state if he was seized of the matter and in what context he was responding.
35. This therefore leaves evidence of the Applicant which demonstrates the fact that she will suffer greater harm if denied the relief sought prior to determination of the appeal. The Respondents would therefore suffer manageable inconvenience, if any, therefore fairness would be maintained until the final decision is made if orders sought are granted.
36. From the foregoing, I find and hold in favour of the Applicant. In the result, I grant orders thus;
(i) There be stay of execution of the ruling in Nyahururu CMCC No. E160 of 2024 dated 21st November, 2024 and all consequential orders pending hearing and determination of the appeal.
(ii) A temporary injunction do issue against the Respondents restraining them by themselves or their agents, from suspending, evicting, restraining, harassing, disrupting, preventing and/or in any other way interfering with Applicant’s business operations at her stall premises situate at Nyahururu Open Air Market within Nyahururu Township and its environs.
(iii) Costs of the application shall be in the cause.
It is so ordered.