Background and Introduction
1. I have considered the Notice of Motion dated 28th February 2025 in which the plaintiff seeks injunctive relief to restrain the respondents from repossessing, selling, or otherwise interfering with the motor vehicles listed in the application (hereinafter referred to as “the suit motor vehicles”). The applicant further prays for the release of the said vehicles and for the 1st respondent (the Bank) to render accounts relating to the loan facilities advanced. I have equally considered the response filed by the Bank, together with the rival submissions of counsel for both parties.
Analysis and Determination
2. The main issue for determination is whether the applicant has met the threshold for granting the injunction orders they seek. To succeed, the applicants must satisfy the conditions established in Giella v. Cassman Brown & Co., Ltd. [1973] E.A. 358. These conditions require the them to demonstrate a prima facie case with a probability of success, show that they would suffer irreparable harm that could not be adequately compensated by damages, and, if the court is in doubt, have the application determined on the balance of convenience.
3. The evidence before the Court confirms that the Bank advanced loan facilities to the applicant, which were secured by the suit motor vehicles. The applicant does not deny this indebtedness. Indeed, the applicant candidly admits that it has struggled to service the facility due to diminished revenue streams. The record further reflects that negotiations and a restructuring agreement were attempted but ultimately failed to cure the default.
4. The Bank has quantified the outstanding debt at Kshs. 117,895,487.89 as at 10th March 2024. This figure is supported by duly produced loan statements. By dint of the Evidence Act, such entries are deemed authentic unless specifically challenged. The applicant has not tendered any evidence to impeach their accuracy.
5. The record also shows that the Bank issued numerous notices to the applicant, none of which elicited any objection until the Bank commenced the process of exercising its statutory power of sale. As such I find no breach of the alleged section 90(1) of the Movable Property Securities Act. Further, the interim orders granted on 3rd October 2025 were conditional. Those orders lapsed automatically when the applicant failed to comply with the condition granted by this Court within the stipulated 30 days. The proclamation notices are therefore properly on record.
6. In light of the foregoing, I find that the applicant has failed to establish a prima facie case with a probability of success. This finding alone is sufficient to dispose of the application, consistent with the holding in Nguruman Limited v. Jan Bonde Nielsen & 2 Others [2014] eKLR, which emphasized that failure to satisfy the first limb is fatal to an injunction application.
7. Even if I were to consider the second limb, the applicant has not demonstrated irreparable harm. The suit motor vehicles are commercial assets whose value can be quantified. Any loss occasioned by repossession or sale can be adequately compensated by damages. The applicant has not shown that the Bank is incapable of meeting such an award if ordered.
8. On the balance of convenience, it tilts in favor of the Bank. The debt continues to balloon while the value of the suit motor vehicles depreciates with time. Allowing the Bank to realize its security ensures that the debt is mitigated and prevents further erosion of the collateral’s value. To restrain the Bank at this stage would unfairly prejudice its statutory right to recover the outstanding sums.
Disposition
9. Accordingly, the application dated 28th February 2025 is dismissed with costs. Any interim previously granted are vacated forthwith.
1. I have considered the Notice of Motion dated 28th February 2025 in which the plaintiff seeks injunctive relief to restrain the respondents from repossessing, selling, or otherwise interfering with the motor vehicles listed in the application (hereinafter referred to as “the suit motor vehicles”). The applicant further prays for the release of the said vehicles and for the 1st respondent (the Bank) to render accounts relating to the loan facilities advanced. I have equally considered the response filed by the Bank, together with the rival submissions of counsel for both parties.
Analysis and Determination
2. The main issue for determination is whether the applicant has met the threshold for granting the injunction orders they seek. To succeed, the applicants must satisfy the conditions established in Giella v. Cassman Brown & Co., Ltd. [1973] E.A. 358. These conditions require the them to demonstrate a prima facie case with a probability of success, show that they would suffer irreparable harm that could not be adequately compensated by damages, and, if the court is in doubt, have the application determined on the balance of convenience.
3. The evidence before the Court confirms that the Bank advanced loan facilities to the applicant, which were secured by the suit motor vehicles. The applicant does not deny this indebtedness. Indeed, the applicant candidly admits that it has struggled to service the facility due to diminished revenue streams. The record further reflects that negotiations and a restructuring agreement were attempted but ultimately failed to cure the default.
4. The Bank has quantified the outstanding debt at Kshs. 117,895,487.89 as at 10th March 2024. This figure is supported by duly produced loan statements. By dint of the Evidence Act, such entries are deemed authentic unless specifically challenged. The applicant has not tendered any evidence to impeach their accuracy.
5. The record also shows that the Bank issued numerous notices to the applicant, none of which elicited any objection until the Bank commenced the process of exercising its statutory power of sale. As such I find no breach of the alleged section 90(1) of the Movable Property Securities Act. Further, the interim orders granted on 3rd October 2025 were conditional. Those orders lapsed automatically when the applicant failed to comply with the condition granted by this Court within the stipulated 30 days. The proclamation notices are therefore properly on record.
6. In light of the foregoing, I find that the applicant has failed to establish a prima facie case with a probability of success. This finding alone is sufficient to dispose of the application, consistent with the holding in Nguruman Limited v. Jan Bonde Nielsen & 2 Others [2014] eKLR, which emphasized that failure to satisfy the first limb is fatal to an injunction application.
7. Even if I were to consider the second limb, the applicant has not demonstrated irreparable harm. The suit motor vehicles are commercial assets whose value can be quantified. Any loss occasioned by repossession or sale can be adequately compensated by damages. The applicant has not shown that the Bank is incapable of meeting such an award if ordered.
8. On the balance of convenience, it tilts in favor of the Bank. The debt continues to balloon while the value of the suit motor vehicles depreciates with time. Allowing the Bank to realize its security ensures that the debt is mitigated and prevents further erosion of the collateral’s value. To restrain the Bank at this stage would unfairly prejudice its statutory right to recover the outstanding sums.
Disposition
9. Accordingly, the application dated 28th February 2025 is dismissed with costs. Any interim previously granted are vacated forthwith.