Introduction
1. Before the Court is the Defendant's Chamber Summons dated 28th October 2025 and filed on 8th December 2025, brought under the provisions of Sections 1A, 1B and 3A of the Civil Procedure Act, Order 1 Rules 10(2), 14 and 15 and Order 51 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules, seeking the following orders:
a) The defendant to file the application out of time.
b) The defendant to issue a third-party notice to Rupra Construction Company Limited
c) An order as to costs.
2. The application is supported by the affidavit of Brian Kilonzo dated 28th October 2025 together with the annexures thereto and written submissions.
3. The Plaintiff opposes the application through a Replying Affidavit sworn by Sam Mwai on 23rd January 2026 together with the annexures thereto.
4. The Plaintiff instituted this suit against the Defendant seeking reliefs arising from two Performance Bonds issued by the Defendant in favour of the Plaintiff in relation to a construction project undertaken by Rupra Construction Company Limited.
5. The Plaintiff's case is that the Defendant, having issued the Performance Bonds, became contractually bound to honour its obligations thereunder upon the occurrence of the stipulated events. It is alleged that despite a proper demand having been made, the Defendant failed to honour the guarantees, thereby exposing itself to liability.
6. The Defendant does not dispute issuing the Performance Bonds. Its case, however, is that the guarantees were issued solely at the request of the Intended Third Party, who was the contractor engaged by the Plaintiff under the underlying construction contract. According to the Defendant, the Intended Third Party executed contractual undertakings, including indemnity obligations, in favour of the Defendant and is consequently liable to indemnify and/or contribute towards any liability that may ultimately be established against the Defendant in this suit.
7. It is on that basis that the Defendant seeks leave to commence third-party proceedings, contending that all questions arising from the same commercial transaction should be determined within these proceedings rather than through separate litigation.
8. The Defendant submits that its intended claim falls squarely within the ambit of Order 1 Rule 15 of the Civil Procedure Rules. It argues that the Intended Third Party requested the issuance of the Performance Bonds and undertook contractual obligations to indemnify the Defendant should liability arise under those guarantees.
9. It is further contended that the intended third-party proceedings arise directly from the same transaction that forms the subject matter of the Plaintiff's claim. Consequently, determining all related questions within one suit would promote judicial economy, avoid multiplicity of proceedings and eliminate the risk of inconsistent judicial determinations.
10. Although acknowledging that the application has been brought outside the period contemplated under Order 1 Rule 15, the Defendant urges the Court to exercise its discretion in its favour. It submits that the Plaintiff will suffer no prejudice incapable of compensation by an award of costs and that any inconvenience may adequately be addressed through appropriate case-management directions.
11. The Defendant further relies on the overriding objective under Sections 1A and 1B of the Civil Procedure Act, arguing that the interests of justice favour the comprehensive determination of all interconnected disputes arising from the same commercial transaction.
12. The Plaintiff opposes the application in its entirety. It contends that the application is incompetent, misconceived and has been brought after inordinate and unexplained delay.
13. The Plaintiff submits that the Defendant has, since the commencement of these proceedings, been fully aware of all material facts upon which the present application is founded and has failed to offer any satisfactory explanation for not invoking Order 1 Rule 15 within the prescribed period.
14. The Plaintiff further contends that its claim is founded exclusively upon the Performance Bonds, which constitute autonomous contractual undertakings independent of disputes arising under the underlying construction contract. It therefore argues that any alleged rights of indemnity between the Defendant and the Intended Third Party are separate contractual matters that ought not to be introduced into the present proceedings through third-party procedure.
15. The Plaintiff also relies on the arbitral proceedings conducted between itself and the Intended Third Party, contending that permitting the proposed third-party proceedings would unnecessarily delay the hearing of the suit and effectively reopen disputes that have already been determined through arbitration and urges the Court to dismiss the application with costs.
Analysis and determination
17. Having carefully considered the application, the affidavits, the documentary material placed before the Court, the rival submissions and the authorities cited, I am of the considered view that the primary issue for determination is whether the Defendant has established sufficient grounds for the grant of leave to issue and serve a Third Party Notice out of time under Order 1 Rule 15 of the Civil Procedure Rules.
18. The Defendant's application is brought under Order 1 Rule 15 of the Civil Procedure Rules, which empowers the Court, upon application by a defendant, to grant leave for the issuance of a Third Party Notice where the defendant claims that a person not already a party to the suit is liable to indemnify or contribute towards any judgment that may be entered against the defendant or where a question connected with the subject matter of the suit ought properly to be determined as between the defendant and the proposed third party.
19. The object of the Rule is to facilitate the complete and effectual determination of all disputes arising from the same transaction while avoiding multiplicity of proceedings and the possibility of inconsistent judicial determinations. It is a procedural mechanism intended to promote the efficient administration of justice and to ensure that interconnected disputes are, where appropriate, resolved in one action.
20. In Cheruiyot Edwin Mutai v Cyrus Ngaruiya [2020] KEELC 1839 (KLR), relied upon by the Defendant, the Court observed that Order 1 Rule 15 is not confined to claims for contribution or indemnity alone. It extends to situations where issues arising between the plaintiff, the defendant and the proposed third party are so connected that they ought, in the interests of justice, to be determined within the same proceedings.
21. Likewise, in Elgon Kenya Limited v Bayer East Africa Limited [2021] KEHC 6533 (KLR), the Court reaffirmed that the purpose of third-party proceedings is to avoid a multiplicity of suits by enabling all disputes arising from one transaction to be determined comprehensively in a single action.
22. Those authorities underscore that, at the leave stage, the Court is not required to determine the merits of the intended third-party claim. Rather, the inquiry is whether the Defendant has disclosed a bona fide and arguable claim which ought properly to be tried together with the principal suit.
23. That approach accords with the broader objective of civil litigation as embodied in Sections 1A and 1B of the Civil Procedure Act, namely, the facilitation of the just, expeditious, proportionate and affordable resolution of disputes. It also accords with the Court's inherent jurisdiction under Section 3A of the Act to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice.
24. Turning to the facts of the present case, it is common ground that the Defendant issued a Performance Bond (renewed on 5th January 2017) for the sum of Kshs. 49,999,999/=, which forms the basis of the Plaintiff's claim. It is equally undisputed that those guarantees were issued in connection with the construction contract between the Plaintiff and the Intended Third Party.
25. The Defendant's case is that the Performance Bonds were issued at the request of the Intended Third Party and pursuant to contractual arrangements under which the Intended Third Party undertook to indemnify the Defendant against any liability arising from the guarantees. The Defendant therefore contends that, should it ultimately be held liable to the Plaintiff, it possesses a corresponding contractual right to seek indemnity or contribution from the Intended Third Party.
26. Having examined the Supporting Affidavit and the annexures thereto, I am satisfied that the Defendant's intended claim is neither speculative nor frivolous. The documents exhibited disclose, on a prima facie basis, a contractual relationship between the Defendant and the Intended Third Party relating to the procurement and issuance of the Performance Bonds. Whether that relationship ultimately gives rise to an enforceable right of indemnity is a question that cannot properly be determined at this interlocutory stage.
27. The Plaintiff argued that the intended third-party proceedings are legally untenable because the Performance Bonds constitute autonomous and independent contractual undertakings whose enforcement is unaffected by disputes arising under the underlying construction contract.
28. I readily agree that this proposition represents a settled principle of commercial law. A Performance Bond or demand guarantee is ordinarily construed as an independent undertaking whose enforceability is determined by its own terms and not by disputes arising under the principal contract. That principle serves the important commercial purpose of ensuring certainty and reliability in banking and commercial transactions.
29. However, the Plaintiff's submission, though correct as a statement of the law, does not in my respectful view determine the issue presently before the Court.
30. The Plaintiff's cause of action against the Defendant is founded upon the Performance Bonds. The Defendant's intended claim against the Intended Third Party, on the other hand, is founded upon alleged contractual obligations of indemnity arising from a separate legal relationship. The two claims, while connected by the same commercial transaction, are juridically distinct.
31. The Defendant is not, through the proposed third-party proceedings, seeking to avoid or postpone its obligations under the Performance Bonds. Neither does it seek to challenge the Plaintiff's right to enforce those guarantees should the Plaintiff ultimately establish its case. Rather, the Defendant seeks to preserve what it contends is an independent contractual right of recourse against the party at whose request the guarantees were issued.
32. In those circumstances, I am unable to agree with the Plaintiff that permitting third-party proceedings would undermine the autonomy of the Performance Bonds.
33. It was the Plaintiff’s further argument that the application ought to be denied on account of inordinate and unexplained delay. It submits that the Defendant has been aware, from the inception of the suit, of the factual basis upon which the intended third-party proceedings are founded and has offered no satisfactory explanation for failing to invoke Order 1 Rule 15 within the time contemplated by the Civil Procedure Rules.
34. There is no dispute that the application was not presented within the period prescribed under Order 1 Rule 15. The Defendant has accordingly sought leave to institute the intended third-party proceedings out of time. The question for determination is therefore whether the delay, viewed in the context of this case, is sufficient to disentitle the Defendant to the equitable relief sought.
35. The Court's discretion under Order 1 Rule 15 is not exercised mechanically. Like all judicial discretions, it must be exercised upon settled legal principles, taking into account the circumstances of each particular case. In Salat v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission & 7 others [2014] KESC 12 (KLR), the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the exercise of judicial discretion must be guided by the interests of justice and that procedural rules are intended to facilitate, rather than obstruct, the fair determination of disputes.
36. I readily accept that the Defendant ought to have moved the Court with greater expedition. Nevertheless, delay, standing alone, is not an absolute bar to the grant of leave. The Court must consider whether the delay has occasioned such prejudice to the opposing party as cannot fairly be remedied by appropriate directions or an award of costs.
37. In the present case, the Plaintiff has asserted that the application will delay the expeditious determination of the suit. While that concern is understandable, I am not persuaded, on the material before the Court, that the prejudice alleged rises to the level of denying the Defendant an opportunity to ventilate what I have already found to be a bona fide and arguable claim for indemnity. The Plaintiff will retain the full opportunity to prosecute its claim against the Defendant, while the Intended Third Party, if joined, will equally have the opportunity to answer the Defendant's claim. Any additional procedural steps can adequately be managed through appropriate directions of the Court.
38. Conversely, if leave were refused and the Defendant were subsequently found liable under the Performance Bonds, the Defendant would be compelled to institute separate proceedings against the Intended Third Party. Such an outcome would fragment litigation arising from the same commercial transaction, increase costs, duplicate evidence and expose the parties to the possibility of inconsistent judicial determinations. Those are precisely the mischiefs that Order 1 Rule 15 seeks to avoid.
39. I therefore find that, although the application was not brought promptly, the delay is not, in the circumstances of this case, so inordinate or so prejudicial as to justify the refusal of leave.
40. Finally, on the effect of the Arbitral Proceedings, the Plaintiff contended that the issues arising from the construction contract have already been determined through arbitration and that permitting the Defendant to issue a Third Party Notice would, in effect, reopen matters that have already attained finality.
41. With respect, I am unable to agree with that submission.
42. The Defendant was not seeking, through the present application, to challenge, vary or set aside the arbitral award. Nor has it invited this Court to revisit the findings of the arbitral tribunal. The Defendant's intended claim is founded upon its own alleged contractual rights against the Intended Third Party arising from the procurement of the Performance Bonds and the attendant indemnity arrangements.
43. Whether those rights exist, and whether they are ultimately enforceable, are questions distinct from those determined in the arbitral proceedings. Their determination, in my respectful view, will neither impeach nor undermine the arbitral award. Rather, they concern a separate legal relationship which has not been conclusively determined in these proceedings.
44. I am therefore satisfied that the existence of the arbitral proceedings does not constitute a legal impediment to the commencement of third-party proceedings under Order 1 Rule 15 of the Civil Procedure Rules.
Disposition
45. Accordingly, and for the foregoing reasons, I find merit in the Defendant's Chamber Summons dated 28th October 2025 and make the following orders:
a) Leave is hereby granted to the Defendant to issue and serve a Third-Party Notice upon Rupra Construction Company Limited within fourteen (14) days from the date of this Ruling.
b) The Intended Third Party shall enter appearance and file its response within 14 days of service with the Third-Party Notice.
c) Upon the close of pleadings in the third-party proceedings, the Deputy Registrar shall list the matter before the Court for further directions on the expeditious hearing and determination of both the main suit and the third-party proceedings.
d) The costs of the Chamber Summons dated 28th October 2025 shall abide the outcome of the main suit.
46. It is so ordered.
DATED, SIGNED, AND DELIVERED AT NAIROBI
THIS 17TH SEPTEMBER 2026
HON. MR. JUSTICE MOSES ADO
Judge of the High Court
In the Presence of:
Moses C/A
……………… for the Plaintiff
……………for the Defendant
1. Before the Court is the Defendant's Chamber Summons dated 28th October 2025 and filed on 8th December 2025, brought under the provisions of Sections 1A, 1B and 3A of the Civil Procedure Act, Order 1 Rules 10(2), 14 and 15 and Order 51 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules, seeking the following orders:
a) The defendant to file the application out of time.
b) The defendant to issue a third-party notice to Rupra Construction Company Limited
c) An order as to costs.
2. The application is supported by the affidavit of Brian Kilonzo dated 28th October 2025 together with the annexures thereto and written submissions.
3. The Plaintiff opposes the application through a Replying Affidavit sworn by Sam Mwai on 23rd January 2026 together with the annexures thereto.
4. The Plaintiff instituted this suit against the Defendant seeking reliefs arising from two Performance Bonds issued by the Defendant in favour of the Plaintiff in relation to a construction project undertaken by Rupra Construction Company Limited.
5. The Plaintiff's case is that the Defendant, having issued the Performance Bonds, became contractually bound to honour its obligations thereunder upon the occurrence of the stipulated events. It is alleged that despite a proper demand having been made, the Defendant failed to honour the guarantees, thereby exposing itself to liability.
6. The Defendant does not dispute issuing the Performance Bonds. Its case, however, is that the guarantees were issued solely at the request of the Intended Third Party, who was the contractor engaged by the Plaintiff under the underlying construction contract. According to the Defendant, the Intended Third Party executed contractual undertakings, including indemnity obligations, in favour of the Defendant and is consequently liable to indemnify and/or contribute towards any liability that may ultimately be established against the Defendant in this suit.
7. It is on that basis that the Defendant seeks leave to commence third-party proceedings, contending that all questions arising from the same commercial transaction should be determined within these proceedings rather than through separate litigation.
8. The Defendant submits that its intended claim falls squarely within the ambit of Order 1 Rule 15 of the Civil Procedure Rules. It argues that the Intended Third Party requested the issuance of the Performance Bonds and undertook contractual obligations to indemnify the Defendant should liability arise under those guarantees.
9. It is further contended that the intended third-party proceedings arise directly from the same transaction that forms the subject matter of the Plaintiff's claim. Consequently, determining all related questions within one suit would promote judicial economy, avoid multiplicity of proceedings and eliminate the risk of inconsistent judicial determinations.
10. Although acknowledging that the application has been brought outside the period contemplated under Order 1 Rule 15, the Defendant urges the Court to exercise its discretion in its favour. It submits that the Plaintiff will suffer no prejudice incapable of compensation by an award of costs and that any inconvenience may adequately be addressed through appropriate case-management directions.
11. The Defendant further relies on the overriding objective under Sections 1A and 1B of the Civil Procedure Act, arguing that the interests of justice favour the comprehensive determination of all interconnected disputes arising from the same commercial transaction.
12. The Plaintiff opposes the application in its entirety. It contends that the application is incompetent, misconceived and has been brought after inordinate and unexplained delay.
13. The Plaintiff submits that the Defendant has, since the commencement of these proceedings, been fully aware of all material facts upon which the present application is founded and has failed to offer any satisfactory explanation for not invoking Order 1 Rule 15 within the prescribed period.
14. The Plaintiff further contends that its claim is founded exclusively upon the Performance Bonds, which constitute autonomous contractual undertakings independent of disputes arising under the underlying construction contract. It therefore argues that any alleged rights of indemnity between the Defendant and the Intended Third Party are separate contractual matters that ought not to be introduced into the present proceedings through third-party procedure.
15. The Plaintiff also relies on the arbitral proceedings conducted between itself and the Intended Third Party, contending that permitting the proposed third-party proceedings would unnecessarily delay the hearing of the suit and effectively reopen disputes that have already been determined through arbitration and urges the Court to dismiss the application with costs.
Analysis and determination
17. Having carefully considered the application, the affidavits, the documentary material placed before the Court, the rival submissions and the authorities cited, I am of the considered view that the primary issue for determination is whether the Defendant has established sufficient grounds for the grant of leave to issue and serve a Third Party Notice out of time under Order 1 Rule 15 of the Civil Procedure Rules.
18. The Defendant's application is brought under Order 1 Rule 15 of the Civil Procedure Rules, which empowers the Court, upon application by a defendant, to grant leave for the issuance of a Third Party Notice where the defendant claims that a person not already a party to the suit is liable to indemnify or contribute towards any judgment that may be entered against the defendant or where a question connected with the subject matter of the suit ought properly to be determined as between the defendant and the proposed third party.
19. The object of the Rule is to facilitate the complete and effectual determination of all disputes arising from the same transaction while avoiding multiplicity of proceedings and the possibility of inconsistent judicial determinations. It is a procedural mechanism intended to promote the efficient administration of justice and to ensure that interconnected disputes are, where appropriate, resolved in one action.
20. In Cheruiyot Edwin Mutai v Cyrus Ngaruiya [2020] KEELC 1839 (KLR), relied upon by the Defendant, the Court observed that Order 1 Rule 15 is not confined to claims for contribution or indemnity alone. It extends to situations where issues arising between the plaintiff, the defendant and the proposed third party are so connected that they ought, in the interests of justice, to be determined within the same proceedings.
21. Likewise, in Elgon Kenya Limited v Bayer East Africa Limited [2021] KEHC 6533 (KLR), the Court reaffirmed that the purpose of third-party proceedings is to avoid a multiplicity of suits by enabling all disputes arising from one transaction to be determined comprehensively in a single action.
22. Those authorities underscore that, at the leave stage, the Court is not required to determine the merits of the intended third-party claim. Rather, the inquiry is whether the Defendant has disclosed a bona fide and arguable claim which ought properly to be tried together with the principal suit.
23. That approach accords with the broader objective of civil litigation as embodied in Sections 1A and 1B of the Civil Procedure Act, namely, the facilitation of the just, expeditious, proportionate and affordable resolution of disputes. It also accords with the Court's inherent jurisdiction under Section 3A of the Act to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice.
24. Turning to the facts of the present case, it is common ground that the Defendant issued a Performance Bond (renewed on 5th January 2017) for the sum of Kshs. 49,999,999/=, which forms the basis of the Plaintiff's claim. It is equally undisputed that those guarantees were issued in connection with the construction contract between the Plaintiff and the Intended Third Party.
25. The Defendant's case is that the Performance Bonds were issued at the request of the Intended Third Party and pursuant to contractual arrangements under which the Intended Third Party undertook to indemnify the Defendant against any liability arising from the guarantees. The Defendant therefore contends that, should it ultimately be held liable to the Plaintiff, it possesses a corresponding contractual right to seek indemnity or contribution from the Intended Third Party.
26. Having examined the Supporting Affidavit and the annexures thereto, I am satisfied that the Defendant's intended claim is neither speculative nor frivolous. The documents exhibited disclose, on a prima facie basis, a contractual relationship between the Defendant and the Intended Third Party relating to the procurement and issuance of the Performance Bonds. Whether that relationship ultimately gives rise to an enforceable right of indemnity is a question that cannot properly be determined at this interlocutory stage.
27. The Plaintiff argued that the intended third-party proceedings are legally untenable because the Performance Bonds constitute autonomous and independent contractual undertakings whose enforcement is unaffected by disputes arising under the underlying construction contract.
28. I readily agree that this proposition represents a settled principle of commercial law. A Performance Bond or demand guarantee is ordinarily construed as an independent undertaking whose enforceability is determined by its own terms and not by disputes arising under the principal contract. That principle serves the important commercial purpose of ensuring certainty and reliability in banking and commercial transactions.
29. However, the Plaintiff's submission, though correct as a statement of the law, does not in my respectful view determine the issue presently before the Court.
30. The Plaintiff's cause of action against the Defendant is founded upon the Performance Bonds. The Defendant's intended claim against the Intended Third Party, on the other hand, is founded upon alleged contractual obligations of indemnity arising from a separate legal relationship. The two claims, while connected by the same commercial transaction, are juridically distinct.
31. The Defendant is not, through the proposed third-party proceedings, seeking to avoid or postpone its obligations under the Performance Bonds. Neither does it seek to challenge the Plaintiff's right to enforce those guarantees should the Plaintiff ultimately establish its case. Rather, the Defendant seeks to preserve what it contends is an independent contractual right of recourse against the party at whose request the guarantees were issued.
32. In those circumstances, I am unable to agree with the Plaintiff that permitting third-party proceedings would undermine the autonomy of the Performance Bonds.
33. It was the Plaintiff’s further argument that the application ought to be denied on account of inordinate and unexplained delay. It submits that the Defendant has been aware, from the inception of the suit, of the factual basis upon which the intended third-party proceedings are founded and has offered no satisfactory explanation for failing to invoke Order 1 Rule 15 within the time contemplated by the Civil Procedure Rules.
34. There is no dispute that the application was not presented within the period prescribed under Order 1 Rule 15. The Defendant has accordingly sought leave to institute the intended third-party proceedings out of time. The question for determination is therefore whether the delay, viewed in the context of this case, is sufficient to disentitle the Defendant to the equitable relief sought.
35. The Court's discretion under Order 1 Rule 15 is not exercised mechanically. Like all judicial discretions, it must be exercised upon settled legal principles, taking into account the circumstances of each particular case. In Salat v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission & 7 others [2014] KESC 12 (KLR), the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the exercise of judicial discretion must be guided by the interests of justice and that procedural rules are intended to facilitate, rather than obstruct, the fair determination of disputes.
36. I readily accept that the Defendant ought to have moved the Court with greater expedition. Nevertheless, delay, standing alone, is not an absolute bar to the grant of leave. The Court must consider whether the delay has occasioned such prejudice to the opposing party as cannot fairly be remedied by appropriate directions or an award of costs.
37. In the present case, the Plaintiff has asserted that the application will delay the expeditious determination of the suit. While that concern is understandable, I am not persuaded, on the material before the Court, that the prejudice alleged rises to the level of denying the Defendant an opportunity to ventilate what I have already found to be a bona fide and arguable claim for indemnity. The Plaintiff will retain the full opportunity to prosecute its claim against the Defendant, while the Intended Third Party, if joined, will equally have the opportunity to answer the Defendant's claim. Any additional procedural steps can adequately be managed through appropriate directions of the Court.
38. Conversely, if leave were refused and the Defendant were subsequently found liable under the Performance Bonds, the Defendant would be compelled to institute separate proceedings against the Intended Third Party. Such an outcome would fragment litigation arising from the same commercial transaction, increase costs, duplicate evidence and expose the parties to the possibility of inconsistent judicial determinations. Those are precisely the mischiefs that Order 1 Rule 15 seeks to avoid.
39. I therefore find that, although the application was not brought promptly, the delay is not, in the circumstances of this case, so inordinate or so prejudicial as to justify the refusal of leave.
40. Finally, on the effect of the Arbitral Proceedings, the Plaintiff contended that the issues arising from the construction contract have already been determined through arbitration and that permitting the Defendant to issue a Third Party Notice would, in effect, reopen matters that have already attained finality.
41. With respect, I am unable to agree with that submission.
42. The Defendant was not seeking, through the present application, to challenge, vary or set aside the arbitral award. Nor has it invited this Court to revisit the findings of the arbitral tribunal. The Defendant's intended claim is founded upon its own alleged contractual rights against the Intended Third Party arising from the procurement of the Performance Bonds and the attendant indemnity arrangements.
43. Whether those rights exist, and whether they are ultimately enforceable, are questions distinct from those determined in the arbitral proceedings. Their determination, in my respectful view, will neither impeach nor undermine the arbitral award. Rather, they concern a separate legal relationship which has not been conclusively determined in these proceedings.
44. I am therefore satisfied that the existence of the arbitral proceedings does not constitute a legal impediment to the commencement of third-party proceedings under Order 1 Rule 15 of the Civil Procedure Rules.
Disposition
45. Accordingly, and for the foregoing reasons, I find merit in the Defendant's Chamber Summons dated 28th October 2025 and make the following orders:
a) Leave is hereby granted to the Defendant to issue and serve a Third-Party Notice upon Rupra Construction Company Limited within fourteen (14) days from the date of this Ruling.
b) The Intended Third Party shall enter appearance and file its response within 14 days of service with the Third-Party Notice.
c) Upon the close of pleadings in the third-party proceedings, the Deputy Registrar shall list the matter before the Court for further directions on the expeditious hearing and determination of both the main suit and the third-party proceedings.
d) The costs of the Chamber Summons dated 28th October 2025 shall abide the outcome of the main suit.
46. It is so ordered.
DATED, SIGNED, AND DELIVERED AT NAIROBI
THIS 17TH SEPTEMBER 2026
HON. MR. JUSTICE MOSES ADO
Judge of the High Court
In the Presence of:
Moses C/A
……………… for the Plaintiff
……………for the Defendant