[1] Before court for determination is an application dated 9 th April 2026 filed by the applicant, Tecla Chepchumba , through the firm of M/s Bitok & Sambu Advocates. It is brought under the provisions of Sections 1A, 1B, 3A and 80 of the Civil Procedure Act, Cap 21 Laws of Kenya, Section 48 and 76 of the Law of Succession Act Cap 160 Laws of Kenya , Rules 63 and 73 of the Probate and Administration Rules, Order 45 Rule 1 and Order 51 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010). It seeks the following orders:
[a] Spent.
[b] Spent.
[c] THAT this Honourable Court be pleased to review, vacate and set aside the Ruling dated and delivered on 19 th March, 2026 in its entirety.
[d] THAT the Certificate of Confirmation of Grant dated 19 th March, 2026 issued pursuant to the impugned ruling be revoked.
[e] THAT this Honourable Court be pleased to issue directions for the hearing of the Summons for Confirmation of Grant dated 26th August, 2025 and the affidavit of protest dated 7 th October, 2025 afresh.
[f] THAT the costs of this application be provided for.
[2] The application is premised on the grounds that pursuant to a ruling delivered on 18 th June, 2024 the Court declared the applicant and her children to be beneficiaries of the estate of the deceased herein ordered that the applicant be appointed as a co-administrator of the estate of the deceased herein alongside the petitioners. She further pointed out that, pursuant to that ruling, a fresh Grant of Letters of Administration Intestate dated 4 th July, 2024 was issued. The three administrators were to engage and take out Summons for Confirmation of Grant after agreeing on the mode of distribution. She further averred that the Court also directed that in the event the administrators did not agree on the mode of distribution each was to file separate modes of distribution.
[3] The applicant deposed that the petitioners persisted in their refusal to recognize the her as a co-administrator. She was therefore constrained to file an application seeking the setting aside of the orders issued by the court in the ruling dated 18 th June, 2024; which application was dismissed and the earlier orders reiterated.
[4] The applicant also stated that, upon the dismissal of her application on 18 th June 2024, the petitioners filed Summons for Confirmation of Grant dated 26 th August, 2025 where they proposed that she be given only 1 acre for herself and her children. Being dissatisfied with the petitioners’ proposal, she filed an Affidavit of Protest dated 7 th October, 2025 and gave her own proposed mode of distribution. The Protest was disposed of by way of Affidavit evidence and submissions. She further deposed that, in its ruling delivered on 19 th March, 2026 the court dismissed her Protest on the grounds that the she had given consent to the mode of distribution as proposed in the Summons for Confirmation of Grant dated 26 th August, 2025.
[5] The applicant was dissatisfied with the said ruling and resorted to filing the instant application contending that there is an error apparent on the face of the record since she did not sign the consent to the Summons for Confirmation of grant. She therefore prayed that the court record be rectified by way of review and setting aside of the ruling since the error constitutes a fundamental mistake that goes to the root of the decision. She contended that the finding constitutes an error apparent on the face or record as the record clearly shows that she filed her own mode of distribution dated 7 th October, 2025.
[6] According to the applicant, the said error is self-evident and does not require an elaborate process of reasoning or discovery. She therefore averred that, unless the orders sought are granted, she risks being excluded along with her children from benefiting from the deceased's estate, thereby suffering prejudice.
[7] The application was supported by an affidavit sworn by the applicant on 9 th April 2026 in which she reiterated the abovementioned grounds. She annexed several documents to her affidavit, which documents also form part of the court record. They include copies of the rulings delivered on 18 th June 2024, 18 th June 2025 and 19 th March 2026.
[8] The petitioners (hereinafter, “the respondents”) opposed the application vide their Replying Affidavit sworn on the 27 th April 2026 by Jepkinyor Misoi (the 1 st respondent). In their view, the applicant is in effect challenging the reasoning and finding of the Court; which cannot be a valid ground for review but is the subject of appeal. They averred that to allow the application would be tantamount to the Court sitting on appeal in respect of its own decision.
[9] It was further the assertion of the respondents that the Court rendered a ruling based on the evidence placed before it; and that no new evidence has been availed by the applicant to warrant a review of the impugned ruling. They made specific reference to paragraph 9 where the Court stated that "...nearly all if not all the beneficiaries consented to the distribution of the entire estate...” and urged the Court to find that the applicant has misinterpreted the same. They consequently prayed for the dismissal of the application.
[10] The application was disposed of by way of written submissions, pursuant to the directions given herein on 5 th May 2026. In her written submissions dated 9 th June 2026, the applicant proposed the following issues for determination:
[a] Whether the applicant has met the threshold for review of the ruling dated delivered on 19 th March, 2026.
[b] Whether the Certificate for confirmation of Grant dated 19 th March, 2026 should be revoked.
[11] On whether the applicant has met the threshold warranting review of the ruling, the applicant made reference to Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Act as read together with Order 45 rules 1 and 2 of the Civil Procedure Rules. In respect of the ground relied on by the applicant, namely, that there is an error apparent on the face of the record, reliance was placed on National Bank of Kenya v Ndungu Njau Civil Appeal No. 2111 of 1996 and Zablon Mokua v Solomon M. Choti & 3 others [2016] eKLR as to what constitutes an error apparent on the face of the record.
[12] In the submission of the applicant, there is an error apparent on the face of the record in that the Court ruled that she had given her consent to the mode of distribution proposed by the respondents, which was not the case. She added that the Court omitted that fact that she had filed her own proposed mode of distribution.
[13] On whether the Certificate of Confirmation of Grant dated 19 th March, 2026 should be revoked, the applicant relied on Section 76 of the Law of Succession Act which sets out the grounds upon which a grant whether or not confirmed can be revoked. She submitted that having found that the ruling of the court was founded on an error apparent on the face of the record, it follows that the procedure to obtain the Certificate of Confirmation of Grant was defective in substance, and therefore ought to be set aside. Thus, the applicant prayed that the application b allowed.
[14] On their part, the respondents relied on their written submissions dated 7 th May 2026. They submitted that the Court is functus office as the impugned ruling was made after the Court took into account the affidavits and submissions filed by the parties. They relied on the case of Kaunda v Wambua [2022] eKLR where it was stated that once a court has passed judgment or ruling, the court is functus officio and cannot revisit the merits. The respondents also placed reliance on the case of David & 2 others v Bakaya [ 2025] eKLR.
[15] In the submission of the respondents, a grant can only be revoked under Section 76 Law of Succession Act if it was obtained fraudulently, through substantial procedural defects, like concealing beneficiaries or assets, or if the grant has become inoperative or useless, misappropriation or negligence or discovery of a later Will. In support of this proposition, the respondents relied on the case of Matheka & Another v Matheka [2005] 2 KLR 455. They pointed out that the applicant is not just an interested party but one of the administrators of the estate of the deceased who fully participated in the proceedings leading to the impugned decision. They accordingly urged the Court to dismiss the application contending that it is an abuse of the court process and is lacking merit.
[16] I have considered the application, the affidavits filed in respect thereof and the written submissions filed by the parties. I have likewise perused the record of the court to date. It is plain that Grant of Letters of Administration Intestate in respect of the estate of the deceased, Kiprono Arap Misoi , was initially issued on 24 th May 2022 to the two respondents. That Grant was confirmed on 12 th April 2023 whereby the four assets comprising the estate were transmitted to the 1 st respondent, who is the widow of the deceased. Thereafter, the applicant filed an application for revocation of Grant dated 10 th May 2023. As was correctly stated by the applicant, that application was allowed and the applicant was appointed as a co-administrator with the respondents. The three administrators were directed to agree on the mode of distribution and thereafter file an application for confirmation of grant.
[17] The applicant thereafter filed another application for review of the ruling dated 18 th June 2024 was dismissed on the 18 th June 2025 after which the respondents filed an application for Confirmation of Grant dated 26 th August 2025. The applicant was not in agreement with the proposed mode of distribution. She therefore filed an Affidavit of Protest giving an alternative mode of distribution and, in the ruling dated 19 th March 2026, the Court dismissed the applicant’s Protest. The application for confirmation of Grant was allowed and the proposed mode of distribution by the respondent was approved.
[18] In the premises, any reference to Section 76 of the Law of Succession Act was off-mark, granted that the provision sets out the grounds for revocation of Grant as opposed to a Certificate of Confirmation. It states:
A grant of representation, whether or not confirmed, may at any time be revoked or annulled if the court decides, either on application by any interested party or of its own motion—
(a)that the proceedings to obtain the grant were defective in substance;
(b)that the grant was obtained fraudulently by the making of a false statement or by the concealment from the court of something material to the case;
(c)that the grant was obtained by means of an untrue allegation of a fact essential in point of law to justify the grant notwithstanding that the allegation was made in ignorance or inadvertently;
(d)that the person to whom the grant was made has failed, after due notice and without reasonable cause either-
(i)to apply for confirmation of the grant within one year from the date thereof, or such longer period as the court order or allow; or
(ii)to proceed diligently with the administration of the estate; or
(iii)to produce to the court, within the time prescribed, any such inventory or account of administration as is required by the provisions of paragraphs (e) and (g) of section 83 or has produced any such inventory or account which is false in any material particular; or(e)that the grant has become useless and inoperative through subsequent circumstances .
[19] In the premises, the only issue for determination is whether the applicant has made out a case to warrant the review of the ruling delivered herein on 19 th March 2026.
[20] The review application was anchored on Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Act and Order 45 of the Civil Procedure Rules; which is one of the provisions imported to succession proceedings by Rule 63 of the Probate and Administration Rules. Rule 1 of Order 45 provides that:
(1) Any person considering himself aggrieved-
(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred; or
(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is hereby allowed,
and who from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or the order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree or order, may apply for a review of judgment to the court which passed the decree or made the order without unreasonable delay.
[21] Thus, from the aforesaid provision, it is plain that a party seeking review is under obligation to demonstrate that:
[a] there has been discovery of new and important matter or evidence which after due diligence, was not within the applicant's knowledge or could not be produced at the material time; or
[b] that there is some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; or
[c] that there was any other sufficient reason;
[22] The respondents took the view that there is an error apparent on the face of the record with reference to the ruling dated 19 th March 2026. What amounts to an error on the face of the record was discussed thus by the Court of Appeal in Nyamogo & Nyamogo Advocates v Kago [2001] 1 EA 173:
“An error apparent on the face of the record cannot be defined precisely or exhaustively, there being an element of indefiniteness inherent in its very nature, and it must be left to be determined judicially on the facts of each case. There is a real distinction between a mere erroneous decision and an error apparent on the face of the record. Where an error on a substantial point of law stares one in the face, and there could reasonably be no two opinions, a clear case of error apparent on the face of the record would be made out. An error which has to be established by a long drawn process of reasoning or on points where there may conceivably be two opinions can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record. Again, if a view adopted by the Court in the original record is a possible one, it cannot be an error apparent on the face of the record, though another view was also possible. Mere error or wrong view is certainly no ground for review although it may be for an appeal..."
[23] Similarly, in National Bank of Kenya Limited v Ndungu Njau (supra), the Court of Appeal had the following to say:
"A review may be granted whenever the court considers that it is necessary to correct an apparent error or omission on the part of the court. The error or omission must be self-evident and should not require an elaborate argument to be established. It will not be a sufficient ground for review that another judge could have taken a different view of the matter. Nor can it be a ground for review that the Court proceeded on an incorrect exposition of the law and reached an erroneous conclusion of law. Misconstruing a statute or other provision of law cannot be ground for review."
[24] The foregoing pronouncements have been restated in a plethora of cases. For instance, in John Peter Kamau Ruhangi v Kenya Reinsurance Corporation [2012] KECA 7 (KLR) stated as follows:
15. In this case we are mainly concerned with review on the ground of error apparent on the face of the record. As Mr. Machira correctly submitted, an error apparent on the face of the record is not one which is to be established by a long drawn process of reasoning or on points where there could possibly be two opinions. This Court made that quite clear in the case of Nyamogo & Nyamogo Advocates vs Kogo [2001] 1 EA 173. An error apparent on the face of the record includes an omission which must also be glaring and self evident. It is not one that requires an elaborate argument or serious scrutiny of the record to be established-- National Bank of Kenya Ltd. Vs Ndungu Njau, civil Appeal No. 211 of 1996 (unreported). As was stated by the Nigerian Court of Appeal in the case of Peter Cheshe & Another Vs Nicon Hotels Ltd. & Another, Appeal No. CA/A/83/M/98 that an error on the face of the record is one that can be corrected under the slip rule whose jurisdiction is limited to correcting errors, mistakes or omissions in the ruling or judgment and does not permit granting orders not made or extending the scope of the ruling. (see also Associated Insurance Brokers v Kenindia Assurance Co Ltd (Civil Appeal 94 of 2013) [2018] KECA 809 (KLR) (9 February 2018) (Judgment) the Court of Appeal)
[25] From the cited court of appeal decisions it is clear that an error or omission must be self-evident and should not require an elaborate argument to be established. An error which has to be established by a long drawn process of reasoning or on points where there may conceivably be two opinions can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record.
[26] The applicant herein has pointed out that there is an error arising from Court's holding that she had signed the consent form annexed to the Summons for Confirmation of Grant dated 4 th August 2025. She took issue with Paragraphs 9 and 10 of the impugned ruling. The two paragraphs read:
9. Consideration being given to the total acreage of each of the two Parcels of Land, the number of the beneficiaries and the fact that nearly all if not all the beneficiaries consented to the distribution of the entire estate property as proposed by the Petitioners in the summons for confirmation of grant and that they all endorsed the consent annexed to the summons, it is clearly evident that the proposal made by Objector in her affidavit of protest is not reflective of a proportionate and equitable distribution of the estate vis-à-vis the proposal made by the Petitioner.
10. In view of the consent on distribution filed herein together with the Petitioners summons for confirmation of grant, it is doubtful whether Section 40 of the Law of Succession Act would apply in the circumstances of the case.
Apparently, the protest appears not to have been made in good faith considering that the Objector was one of those who consented to the mode of distribution of the entire estate as proposed by the Petitioners.
[27] It is plain from the foregoing that the Court took into account the fact that the applicant had filed an Affidavit of Protest with a different mode of distribution. The ruling also shows that the Court took into account that not all the beneficiaries signed the Consent to the mode of distribution as proposed by the applicant. That being the case, it cannot validly be argued that, because she did not sign the consent there is an error apparent on the fact of the record. To the contrary what is manifest is that her Protest was dismissed on the merits and if she was aggrieved thereby her option was to file an appeal.
[28] In the premises, I find no merit in the Notice of Motion dated 9 th April 2026. The same is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs.
It is so ordered.
DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED VIRTUALLY THIS 6 TH DAY OF AUGUST 2026
[a] Spent.
[b] Spent.
[c] THAT this Honourable Court be pleased to review, vacate and set aside the Ruling dated and delivered on 19 th March, 2026 in its entirety.
[d] THAT the Certificate of Confirmation of Grant dated 19 th March, 2026 issued pursuant to the impugned ruling be revoked.
[e] THAT this Honourable Court be pleased to issue directions for the hearing of the Summons for Confirmation of Grant dated 26th August, 2025 and the affidavit of protest dated 7 th October, 2025 afresh.
[f] THAT the costs of this application be provided for.
[2] The application is premised on the grounds that pursuant to a ruling delivered on 18 th June, 2024 the Court declared the applicant and her children to be beneficiaries of the estate of the deceased herein ordered that the applicant be appointed as a co-administrator of the estate of the deceased herein alongside the petitioners. She further pointed out that, pursuant to that ruling, a fresh Grant of Letters of Administration Intestate dated 4 th July, 2024 was issued. The three administrators were to engage and take out Summons for Confirmation of Grant after agreeing on the mode of distribution. She further averred that the Court also directed that in the event the administrators did not agree on the mode of distribution each was to file separate modes of distribution.
[3] The applicant deposed that the petitioners persisted in their refusal to recognize the her as a co-administrator. She was therefore constrained to file an application seeking the setting aside of the orders issued by the court in the ruling dated 18 th June, 2024; which application was dismissed and the earlier orders reiterated.
[4] The applicant also stated that, upon the dismissal of her application on 18 th June 2024, the petitioners filed Summons for Confirmation of Grant dated 26 th August, 2025 where they proposed that she be given only 1 acre for herself and her children. Being dissatisfied with the petitioners’ proposal, she filed an Affidavit of Protest dated 7 th October, 2025 and gave her own proposed mode of distribution. The Protest was disposed of by way of Affidavit evidence and submissions. She further deposed that, in its ruling delivered on 19 th March, 2026 the court dismissed her Protest on the grounds that the she had given consent to the mode of distribution as proposed in the Summons for Confirmation of Grant dated 26 th August, 2025.
[5] The applicant was dissatisfied with the said ruling and resorted to filing the instant application contending that there is an error apparent on the face of the record since she did not sign the consent to the Summons for Confirmation of grant. She therefore prayed that the court record be rectified by way of review and setting aside of the ruling since the error constitutes a fundamental mistake that goes to the root of the decision. She contended that the finding constitutes an error apparent on the face or record as the record clearly shows that she filed her own mode of distribution dated 7 th October, 2025.
[6] According to the applicant, the said error is self-evident and does not require an elaborate process of reasoning or discovery. She therefore averred that, unless the orders sought are granted, she risks being excluded along with her children from benefiting from the deceased's estate, thereby suffering prejudice.
[7] The application was supported by an affidavit sworn by the applicant on 9 th April 2026 in which she reiterated the abovementioned grounds. She annexed several documents to her affidavit, which documents also form part of the court record. They include copies of the rulings delivered on 18 th June 2024, 18 th June 2025 and 19 th March 2026.
[8] The petitioners (hereinafter, “the respondents”) opposed the application vide their Replying Affidavit sworn on the 27 th April 2026 by Jepkinyor Misoi (the 1 st respondent). In their view, the applicant is in effect challenging the reasoning and finding of the Court; which cannot be a valid ground for review but is the subject of appeal. They averred that to allow the application would be tantamount to the Court sitting on appeal in respect of its own decision.
[9] It was further the assertion of the respondents that the Court rendered a ruling based on the evidence placed before it; and that no new evidence has been availed by the applicant to warrant a review of the impugned ruling. They made specific reference to paragraph 9 where the Court stated that "...nearly all if not all the beneficiaries consented to the distribution of the entire estate...” and urged the Court to find that the applicant has misinterpreted the same. They consequently prayed for the dismissal of the application.
[10] The application was disposed of by way of written submissions, pursuant to the directions given herein on 5 th May 2026. In her written submissions dated 9 th June 2026, the applicant proposed the following issues for determination:
[a] Whether the applicant has met the threshold for review of the ruling dated delivered on 19 th March, 2026.
[b] Whether the Certificate for confirmation of Grant dated 19 th March, 2026 should be revoked.
[11] On whether the applicant has met the threshold warranting review of the ruling, the applicant made reference to Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Act as read together with Order 45 rules 1 and 2 of the Civil Procedure Rules. In respect of the ground relied on by the applicant, namely, that there is an error apparent on the face of the record, reliance was placed on National Bank of Kenya v Ndungu Njau Civil Appeal No. 2111 of 1996 and Zablon Mokua v Solomon M. Choti & 3 others [2016] eKLR as to what constitutes an error apparent on the face of the record.
[12] In the submission of the applicant, there is an error apparent on the face of the record in that the Court ruled that she had given her consent to the mode of distribution proposed by the respondents, which was not the case. She added that the Court omitted that fact that she had filed her own proposed mode of distribution.
[13] On whether the Certificate of Confirmation of Grant dated 19 th March, 2026 should be revoked, the applicant relied on Section 76 of the Law of Succession Act which sets out the grounds upon which a grant whether or not confirmed can be revoked. She submitted that having found that the ruling of the court was founded on an error apparent on the face of the record, it follows that the procedure to obtain the Certificate of Confirmation of Grant was defective in substance, and therefore ought to be set aside. Thus, the applicant prayed that the application b allowed.
[14] On their part, the respondents relied on their written submissions dated 7 th May 2026. They submitted that the Court is functus office as the impugned ruling was made after the Court took into account the affidavits and submissions filed by the parties. They relied on the case of Kaunda v Wambua [2022] eKLR where it was stated that once a court has passed judgment or ruling, the court is functus officio and cannot revisit the merits. The respondents also placed reliance on the case of David & 2 others v Bakaya [ 2025] eKLR.
[15] In the submission of the respondents, a grant can only be revoked under Section 76 Law of Succession Act if it was obtained fraudulently, through substantial procedural defects, like concealing beneficiaries or assets, or if the grant has become inoperative or useless, misappropriation or negligence or discovery of a later Will. In support of this proposition, the respondents relied on the case of Matheka & Another v Matheka [2005] 2 KLR 455. They pointed out that the applicant is not just an interested party but one of the administrators of the estate of the deceased who fully participated in the proceedings leading to the impugned decision. They accordingly urged the Court to dismiss the application contending that it is an abuse of the court process and is lacking merit.
[16] I have considered the application, the affidavits filed in respect thereof and the written submissions filed by the parties. I have likewise perused the record of the court to date. It is plain that Grant of Letters of Administration Intestate in respect of the estate of the deceased, Kiprono Arap Misoi , was initially issued on 24 th May 2022 to the two respondents. That Grant was confirmed on 12 th April 2023 whereby the four assets comprising the estate were transmitted to the 1 st respondent, who is the widow of the deceased. Thereafter, the applicant filed an application for revocation of Grant dated 10 th May 2023. As was correctly stated by the applicant, that application was allowed and the applicant was appointed as a co-administrator with the respondents. The three administrators were directed to agree on the mode of distribution and thereafter file an application for confirmation of grant.
[17] The applicant thereafter filed another application for review of the ruling dated 18 th June 2024 was dismissed on the 18 th June 2025 after which the respondents filed an application for Confirmation of Grant dated 26 th August 2025. The applicant was not in agreement with the proposed mode of distribution. She therefore filed an Affidavit of Protest giving an alternative mode of distribution and, in the ruling dated 19 th March 2026, the Court dismissed the applicant’s Protest. The application for confirmation of Grant was allowed and the proposed mode of distribution by the respondent was approved.
[18] In the premises, any reference to Section 76 of the Law of Succession Act was off-mark, granted that the provision sets out the grounds for revocation of Grant as opposed to a Certificate of Confirmation. It states:
A grant of representation, whether or not confirmed, may at any time be revoked or annulled if the court decides, either on application by any interested party or of its own motion—
(a)that the proceedings to obtain the grant were defective in substance;
(b)that the grant was obtained fraudulently by the making of a false statement or by the concealment from the court of something material to the case;
(c)that the grant was obtained by means of an untrue allegation of a fact essential in point of law to justify the grant notwithstanding that the allegation was made in ignorance or inadvertently;
(d)that the person to whom the grant was made has failed, after due notice and without reasonable cause either-
(i)to apply for confirmation of the grant within one year from the date thereof, or such longer period as the court order or allow; or
(ii)to proceed diligently with the administration of the estate; or
(iii)to produce to the court, within the time prescribed, any such inventory or account of administration as is required by the provisions of paragraphs (e) and (g) of section 83 or has produced any such inventory or account which is false in any material particular; or(e)that the grant has become useless and inoperative through subsequent circumstances .
[19] In the premises, the only issue for determination is whether the applicant has made out a case to warrant the review of the ruling delivered herein on 19 th March 2026.
[20] The review application was anchored on Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Act and Order 45 of the Civil Procedure Rules; which is one of the provisions imported to succession proceedings by Rule 63 of the Probate and Administration Rules. Rule 1 of Order 45 provides that:
(1) Any person considering himself aggrieved-
(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred; or
(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is hereby allowed,
and who from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or the order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree or order, may apply for a review of judgment to the court which passed the decree or made the order without unreasonable delay.
[21] Thus, from the aforesaid provision, it is plain that a party seeking review is under obligation to demonstrate that:
[a] there has been discovery of new and important matter or evidence which after due diligence, was not within the applicant's knowledge or could not be produced at the material time; or
[b] that there is some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; or
[c] that there was any other sufficient reason;
[22] The respondents took the view that there is an error apparent on the face of the record with reference to the ruling dated 19 th March 2026. What amounts to an error on the face of the record was discussed thus by the Court of Appeal in Nyamogo & Nyamogo Advocates v Kago [2001] 1 EA 173:
“An error apparent on the face of the record cannot be defined precisely or exhaustively, there being an element of indefiniteness inherent in its very nature, and it must be left to be determined judicially on the facts of each case. There is a real distinction between a mere erroneous decision and an error apparent on the face of the record. Where an error on a substantial point of law stares one in the face, and there could reasonably be no two opinions, a clear case of error apparent on the face of the record would be made out. An error which has to be established by a long drawn process of reasoning or on points where there may conceivably be two opinions can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record. Again, if a view adopted by the Court in the original record is a possible one, it cannot be an error apparent on the face of the record, though another view was also possible. Mere error or wrong view is certainly no ground for review although it may be for an appeal..."
[23] Similarly, in National Bank of Kenya Limited v Ndungu Njau (supra), the Court of Appeal had the following to say:
"A review may be granted whenever the court considers that it is necessary to correct an apparent error or omission on the part of the court. The error or omission must be self-evident and should not require an elaborate argument to be established. It will not be a sufficient ground for review that another judge could have taken a different view of the matter. Nor can it be a ground for review that the Court proceeded on an incorrect exposition of the law and reached an erroneous conclusion of law. Misconstruing a statute or other provision of law cannot be ground for review."
[24] The foregoing pronouncements have been restated in a plethora of cases. For instance, in John Peter Kamau Ruhangi v Kenya Reinsurance Corporation [2012] KECA 7 (KLR) stated as follows:
15. In this case we are mainly concerned with review on the ground of error apparent on the face of the record. As Mr. Machira correctly submitted, an error apparent on the face of the record is not one which is to be established by a long drawn process of reasoning or on points where there could possibly be two opinions. This Court made that quite clear in the case of Nyamogo & Nyamogo Advocates vs Kogo [2001] 1 EA 173. An error apparent on the face of the record includes an omission which must also be glaring and self evident. It is not one that requires an elaborate argument or serious scrutiny of the record to be established-- National Bank of Kenya Ltd. Vs Ndungu Njau, civil Appeal No. 211 of 1996 (unreported). As was stated by the Nigerian Court of Appeal in the case of Peter Cheshe & Another Vs Nicon Hotels Ltd. & Another, Appeal No. CA/A/83/M/98 that an error on the face of the record is one that can be corrected under the slip rule whose jurisdiction is limited to correcting errors, mistakes or omissions in the ruling or judgment and does not permit granting orders not made or extending the scope of the ruling. (see also Associated Insurance Brokers v Kenindia Assurance Co Ltd (Civil Appeal 94 of 2013) [2018] KECA 809 (KLR) (9 February 2018) (Judgment) the Court of Appeal)
[25] From the cited court of appeal decisions it is clear that an error or omission must be self-evident and should not require an elaborate argument to be established. An error which has to be established by a long drawn process of reasoning or on points where there may conceivably be two opinions can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record.
[26] The applicant herein has pointed out that there is an error arising from Court's holding that she had signed the consent form annexed to the Summons for Confirmation of Grant dated 4 th August 2025. She took issue with Paragraphs 9 and 10 of the impugned ruling. The two paragraphs read:
9. Consideration being given to the total acreage of each of the two Parcels of Land, the number of the beneficiaries and the fact that nearly all if not all the beneficiaries consented to the distribution of the entire estate property as proposed by the Petitioners in the summons for confirmation of grant and that they all endorsed the consent annexed to the summons, it is clearly evident that the proposal made by Objector in her affidavit of protest is not reflective of a proportionate and equitable distribution of the estate vis-à-vis the proposal made by the Petitioner.
10. In view of the consent on distribution filed herein together with the Petitioners summons for confirmation of grant, it is doubtful whether Section 40 of the Law of Succession Act would apply in the circumstances of the case.
Apparently, the protest appears not to have been made in good faith considering that the Objector was one of those who consented to the mode of distribution of the entire estate as proposed by the Petitioners.
[27] It is plain from the foregoing that the Court took into account the fact that the applicant had filed an Affidavit of Protest with a different mode of distribution. The ruling also shows that the Court took into account that not all the beneficiaries signed the Consent to the mode of distribution as proposed by the applicant. That being the case, it cannot validly be argued that, because she did not sign the consent there is an error apparent on the fact of the record. To the contrary what is manifest is that her Protest was dismissed on the merits and if she was aggrieved thereby her option was to file an appeal.
[28] In the premises, I find no merit in the Notice of Motion dated 9 th April 2026. The same is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs.
It is so ordered.
DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED VIRTUALLY THIS 6 TH DAY OF AUGUST 2026