1. The appellant, Kenneth Kibutu Woki, was charged with the offence of grievous harm contrary to section 234 of the Penal Code. The particulars of the charge are that on 02nd February 2024, Appellant caused grievous harm to Sylvester Musyoki Mutuku.
2. The appellant pleaded not guilty on 5th February 2024. The trial proceeded with the prosecution called ten witnesses. The appellant gave sworn evidence and called one witness, his mother, Esther Kivutu.
3. The prosecution called ten witnesses. PW1, Sylvester Musyoki Mutuku ("the complainant"), testified that on 2nd February 2024 at about 10.00 p.m., as he walked home from Muselele Market, he encountered the appellant, Kenneth Kibutu Woki alias Ken Mule, on the road. The appellant had been lying in wait among trees at a dark spot beside the road, from where he emerged and stabbed the complainant on the stomach/right side. The complainant managed to walk approximately 100 metres to the home of Joyce Alex, where he raised alarm and sought assistance.
4. He testified that although the spot where the appellant had lain in wait was dark, moonlight and security lighting from neighbouring plots enabled him to identify his attacker. He stated that during the attack the appellant asked him whether a particular phone belonged to him. He added that he was well acquainted with the appellant, the two having been friends and relatives for a long time, and he identified the appellant in court.
5. The complainant identified the clothing he had worn at the time of the incident: a black ¾ short, a white short with black drawings, a black T-shirt with flowers, and a black jacket, produced as Prosecution Exhibits 1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively. The T-shirt and jacket bore knife holes and were blood-stained. He stated that he was admitted at Kitui County Referral Hospital from 2nd February 2024 to 21st February 2024.
6. PW2, Patricia Mwende Mutuku, the complainant's mother, testified that on the night of 2nd February 2024 she found the complainant injured at a neighbour's gate, and he informed her he had been stabbed by Kenneth.
7. PW3, Joyce Alex, testified that at about 10.10 p.m. her grounds man alerted her to someone screaming at her gate. She went and found the complainant asking for help, saying he had been stabbed. She called complainant’s father and complainant informed him that Ken had stabbed him.
8. PW4, Mbaluka Mutuku, testified that at about 4.30 a.m. on 3rd February 2024, he was informed that the complainant had been stabbed and was asked to help apprehend the suspect, who was said to be called Kennedy. He proceeded to the appellant’s home and found he had already been apprehended. That subsequently, the appellant led them to recover a knife with a blue handle which had blood on it. PW8, Richard Kioko Nyamai similarly stated that he witnessed the recovery of the knife PEXH. 6.
9. PW5, Antony Mwanzia Mwaniki, a bodaboda rider, similarly testified that he heard complainant say that he had been stabbed by Ken. Dain David M. Nzioki, the complainant’s father, likewise said that the complainant told him that he had been stabbed by Ken.
10. PW7, Alex Kivuva Ngumbi, the area chief escorted the Appellant to the police station on the morning of 3rd February 2024.
11. PW9, Robinson Katana Musyoka, a clinical officer at Kitui County Referral Hospital testified that on 5th February 2024, he examined the complainant and noted that he had a stab wound on the right loin region and bruises on the right elbow. According to his observation, the injuries had been caused by a sharp object and surgery had been performed. He assessed the degree of injury as grievous harm as shown on produced the P3 form as Prosecution Exhibit 5.
12. PW10 PC Mary Musembi, investigated the complainant’s case and caused the Appellant to be charged.
13. In his sworn defence, the Appellant denied stabbing the complainant. He stated that on 2nd February 2024 he remained at home throughout the day, worked with his mother, ate supper at about 9.30 p.m. and went to sleep. He stated that at about 1.00 a.m. he was called out of the house and found the complainant’s father and others, who assaulted him, tied him up and threatened to burn him. The appellant denied that any knife was recovered from him.
14. DW2, Esther Kivutu, the appellant’s mother, testified that she was with the appellant during the day. She returned home at about 7.30 p.m., they prepared and ate supper and went to sleep at about 9.30 p.m. She stated that the complainant’s father and others came during the night, called the appellant out and assaulted him.
15. On 22nd October 2024 the trial court delivered its judgment and convicted the appellant of grievous harm contrary to section 234 of the Penal Code and sentenced him to life imprisonment.
16. The appellant’s written submissions were dated 24th August 2026. He submitted that the prosecution failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. His principal complaints concerned the reliability of PW1’s identification at night, the absence of adequate evidence concerning the lighting conditions, the failure to conduct a forensic examination of the knife, the failure to call the alleged owner of the phone and other witnesses, the alleged unreliability of the alleged admission, and the failure to give adequate consideration to his defence. On sentence, he submitted that section 234 does not prescribe mandatory life imprisonment and urged the Court to substitute the sentence with an appropriate custodial term.
17. The appellant, being aggrieved by the conviction and lodged a Petition of Appeal dated 22nd October 2024 setting out the following grounds of appeal:
1) That the learned trial magistrate erred in law and fact by relying on prosecution evidence which did not prove the case beyond reasonable doubt.
2) That the learned trial magistrate erred in law and fact by failing to find that the prosecution evidence was merely a frame-up intended to connect the appellant with the offence.
3) That the learned trial magistrate erred in law and fact by basing the conviction on matters which were not corroborated by the prosecution evidence.
4) That the learned trial magistrate erred in law and fact by failing to consider the appellant’s defence, which was not given due consideration.
5) That the sentence imposed upon the appellant was unfair, harsh and excessive.
18. The appellant’s written submissions dated 24th August 2026 challenged the conviction on identification, the knife, footprints, alleged admissions, failure to call the phone owner, and failure to properly consider the defence. He also challenged the life sentence as harsh and excessive and argued that it was not mandatory.
19. The respondent’s written submissions dated 25th August 2026 opposed the appeal, maintaining that grievous harm, unlawfulness and the appellant’s identity were proved. The respondent relied on the complainant’s recognition, the lighting, medical evidence and the weakness of the defence, and urged that both conviction and life sentence be upheld.
20. From the petition and the submissions, I consider the following issues to arise:
1) Whether grievous harm was proved;
2) Whether the injury was unlawfully inflicted;
3) Whether the appellant was reliably identified as the assailant;
4) Whether the evidence concerning the knife, footprints and alleged admission provided sufficient corroboration;
5) Whether failure to call the alleged owner of the phone and other witnesses weakened the prosecution case;
6) Whether the appellant’s defence and alleged frame-up raised a reasonable doubt;
7) Whether the conviction and the sentence of life imprisonment are safe
21. This being a first appeal, this Court is required to reconsider and re-evaluate the evidence that was before the trial court and draw its own independent conclusions, bearing in mind that it neither saw nor heard the witnesses. In Okeno v Republic [1972] EA 32, the Court stated the duty of a first appellate court to subject the evidence to a fresh and exhaustive examination, weigh conflicting evidence and reach its own conclusion.
22. The first issue is whether the prosecution proved that the complainant suffered grievous harm. Section 234 of the Penal Code criminalises the unlawful infliction of grievous harm. The evidence on the nature of the injury came principally from PW1 and PW9.
23. PW1 testified that he was stabbed on the right side of his stomach. PW9, the clinical officer, examined him on 5th February 2024 and noted a stab wound in the right loin region and bruises on the right elbow. He confirmed that the injuries were caused by a sharp object, that the complainant had undergone surgery, and assessed the degree of injury as grievous harm. PW9 produced the P3 form, which he had personally completed, as Prosecution Exhibit 5.
24. The medical findings materially corroborated PW1’s account of having been stabbed and were consistent with the physical damage observed on his clothes. The defence did not materially challenge the nature or extent of the injuries. I am therefore satisfied that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that PW1 sustained grievous harm.
25. The second issue is whether the grievous harm was unlawfully inflicted. PW1’s evidence was that he was walking home when a person emerged from among trees beside the road and stabbed him. There was no evidence of consent, accident, self-defence or any other lawful justification for the infliction of the injury. The circumstances described by PW1 were those of an unlawful assault. I therefore find that the grievous harm was unlawfully inflicted.
26. The third and central issue is whether the appellant was reliably identified as the assailant. This is the issue on which the conviction substantially turns. The appellant's submissions of 24th August 2026 challenge the identification on grounds that the incident occurred at night, the appellant's hiding place was dark, the lighting conditions were inadequately established, no description was given before his arrest, and no identification parade was held. The respondent's submissions of 25th August 2026 counter that PW1 knew the appellant as a friend and relative, and that moonlight and security lighting enabled him to see and recognise him.
27. PW1 testified that the appellant lay among trees at a dark spot beside the road before emerging to stab him, and later explained that moonlight and security lighting from neighbouring plots were present. Absent from the evidence, however, is any detailed account of the lighting conditions at the precise point and moment of identification: the intensity or direction of the moonlight, the distance from which it illuminated the appellant, and the strength and direction of the security lights and how they fell on his face.
28. In Maitanyi v Republic [1986] KECA 39 (KLR), the Court of Appeal held that where identification occurs in difficult circumstances, the court must scrutinise the nature, size and position of the available light, and consider whether the witness gave a description at the earliest opportunity, the purpose being to determine objectively whether the conditions afforded a genuine opportunity for accurate identification. That standard applies squarely here. The incident occurred at about 10.00 p.m.; the appellant was allegedly concealed among trees in a dark spot; the evidence of moonlight and security lighting was too general to establish that his face was actually illuminated at the material time; the attack occurred suddenly, and the evidence does not establish how long PW1 observed him, the distance between them at the critical moment, or the extent to which the available light illuminated him.
29. Recognition evidence attracts the same caution. In Wamunga v Republic [1989] KECA 47 (KLR), the Court of Appeal held that even recognition of a person known to the witness is not infallible, and the court must still examine the circumstances to exclude the possibility of error. The respondent's reliance on PW1's prior acquaintance with the appellant is relevant but not determinative on this authority: familiarity does not dispense with the need to show the circumstances permitted reliable recognition.
30. The evidence that the complainant referred to his assailant as "Ken" shortly after the attack, given by PW3, PW5 and PW6, is relevant but does not independently establish that the appellant was the "Ken" referred to; indeed, PW5 stated he did not know which Ken was meant. The naming does not resolve the underlying question of visual identification: it can only support PW1's identification if that identification was itself reliable, and cannot cure the deficiencies already identified.
31. The fourth issue is whether the evidence concerning the knife, footprints and alleged admission supplied sufficient independent support for the identification. The appellant submitted that it did not, pointing out that the knife was not subjected to DNA or fingerprint examination, that it was recovered by civilians rather than from his person, and that no scientific comparison was made between the alleged footprints and his footwear. He also challenged the alleged admissions on account of the circumstances in which they were said to have been made.
32. PW4 and PW8 testified that the appellant eventually led them to a place where a knife with a blue handle was recovered, produced as Prosecution Exhibit 6. The knife was not, however, subjected to fingerprint, DNA or other forensic examination. No evidence was produced linking the blood on it to the complainant, and no fingerprint or other scientific evidence linked it to the appellant.
33. The footprint evidence is similarly inconclusive. PW6 stated that footprints were followed from the scene towards the appellant's home and that his shoe appeared to correspond with them, but no expert examined the footprints and no scientific comparison was undertaken. This evidence cannot establish a reliable forensic link between the appellant and the scene.
34. PW6, PW7 and PW10 referred to statements allegedly made by the appellant after his apprehension. Section 25A of the Evidence Act renders a confession inadmissible unless made in court before a judge or magistrate, or before a police officer not below the rank of Chief Inspector, not being the investigating officer, in the presence of a third party of the accused's choice, conditions none of these statements meet, having been made to civilians. These circumstances make it unsafe to attach substantial weight to the alleged statements as independent evidence of guilt.
35. The fifth issue is whether the failure to call the alleged phone owner weakened the prosecution case. The respondent correctly submits that the prosecution need not call every person with some knowledge of the matter, provided the evidence called suffices to establish the charge (Keter v Republic [2007] 1 EA 135). Although the alleged phone dispute referenced by both PW1 and PW10 was not independently corroborated, and the phone itself was not produced, motive was not an ingredient of the offence, and this omission does not undermine the sufficiency of the prosecution case.
36. I turn to the appellant's defence and the allegation of a frame-up. He stated that he was at home on the material night, ate supper at about 9.30 p.m. and went to sleep, denying that he met or stabbed the complainant. He further stated that he was later awakened, assaulted and threatened by the complainant's father and other persons before being taken away.
37. DW2, the appellant's mother, corroborated that he had been at home before she retired to sleep, but conceded she did not know whether he left thereafter, and her evidence therefore did not account for his whereabouts throughout the material period.
38. The appellant bore no burden to prove his innocence; the burden remained on the prosecution throughout to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Given the deficiencies already found in the identification evidence, the appellant's denial of involvement is not displaced by the prosecution case and raises a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.
39. This brings me to the safety of the conviction and sentence. Having analysed the evidence above, I find that the appellant's identity as the assailant was not established beyond reasonable doubt, and the conviction under section 234 of the Penal Code is accordingly unsafe and the sentence necessarily falls with it.
40. In the end, the appeal is allowed. The conviction of the appellant, Kenneth Kibutu Woki, for grievous harm contrary to section 234 of the Penal Code is quashed, and the sentence of life imprisonment imposed on 22nd October 2024 is set aside. The appellant shall be set at liberty forthwith, unless otherwise lawfully held.
2. The appellant pleaded not guilty on 5th February 2024. The trial proceeded with the prosecution called ten witnesses. The appellant gave sworn evidence and called one witness, his mother, Esther Kivutu.
3. The prosecution called ten witnesses. PW1, Sylvester Musyoki Mutuku ("the complainant"), testified that on 2nd February 2024 at about 10.00 p.m., as he walked home from Muselele Market, he encountered the appellant, Kenneth Kibutu Woki alias Ken Mule, on the road. The appellant had been lying in wait among trees at a dark spot beside the road, from where he emerged and stabbed the complainant on the stomach/right side. The complainant managed to walk approximately 100 metres to the home of Joyce Alex, where he raised alarm and sought assistance.
4. He testified that although the spot where the appellant had lain in wait was dark, moonlight and security lighting from neighbouring plots enabled him to identify his attacker. He stated that during the attack the appellant asked him whether a particular phone belonged to him. He added that he was well acquainted with the appellant, the two having been friends and relatives for a long time, and he identified the appellant in court.
5. The complainant identified the clothing he had worn at the time of the incident: a black ¾ short, a white short with black drawings, a black T-shirt with flowers, and a black jacket, produced as Prosecution Exhibits 1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively. The T-shirt and jacket bore knife holes and were blood-stained. He stated that he was admitted at Kitui County Referral Hospital from 2nd February 2024 to 21st February 2024.
6. PW2, Patricia Mwende Mutuku, the complainant's mother, testified that on the night of 2nd February 2024 she found the complainant injured at a neighbour's gate, and he informed her he had been stabbed by Kenneth.
7. PW3, Joyce Alex, testified that at about 10.10 p.m. her grounds man alerted her to someone screaming at her gate. She went and found the complainant asking for help, saying he had been stabbed. She called complainant’s father and complainant informed him that Ken had stabbed him.
8. PW4, Mbaluka Mutuku, testified that at about 4.30 a.m. on 3rd February 2024, he was informed that the complainant had been stabbed and was asked to help apprehend the suspect, who was said to be called Kennedy. He proceeded to the appellant’s home and found he had already been apprehended. That subsequently, the appellant led them to recover a knife with a blue handle which had blood on it. PW8, Richard Kioko Nyamai similarly stated that he witnessed the recovery of the knife PEXH. 6.
9. PW5, Antony Mwanzia Mwaniki, a bodaboda rider, similarly testified that he heard complainant say that he had been stabbed by Ken. Dain David M. Nzioki, the complainant’s father, likewise said that the complainant told him that he had been stabbed by Ken.
10. PW7, Alex Kivuva Ngumbi, the area chief escorted the Appellant to the police station on the morning of 3rd February 2024.
11. PW9, Robinson Katana Musyoka, a clinical officer at Kitui County Referral Hospital testified that on 5th February 2024, he examined the complainant and noted that he had a stab wound on the right loin region and bruises on the right elbow. According to his observation, the injuries had been caused by a sharp object and surgery had been performed. He assessed the degree of injury as grievous harm as shown on produced the P3 form as Prosecution Exhibit 5.
12. PW10 PC Mary Musembi, investigated the complainant’s case and caused the Appellant to be charged.
13. In his sworn defence, the Appellant denied stabbing the complainant. He stated that on 2nd February 2024 he remained at home throughout the day, worked with his mother, ate supper at about 9.30 p.m. and went to sleep. He stated that at about 1.00 a.m. he was called out of the house and found the complainant’s father and others, who assaulted him, tied him up and threatened to burn him. The appellant denied that any knife was recovered from him.
14. DW2, Esther Kivutu, the appellant’s mother, testified that she was with the appellant during the day. She returned home at about 7.30 p.m., they prepared and ate supper and went to sleep at about 9.30 p.m. She stated that the complainant’s father and others came during the night, called the appellant out and assaulted him.
15. On 22nd October 2024 the trial court delivered its judgment and convicted the appellant of grievous harm contrary to section 234 of the Penal Code and sentenced him to life imprisonment.
16. The appellant’s written submissions were dated 24th August 2026. He submitted that the prosecution failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. His principal complaints concerned the reliability of PW1’s identification at night, the absence of adequate evidence concerning the lighting conditions, the failure to conduct a forensic examination of the knife, the failure to call the alleged owner of the phone and other witnesses, the alleged unreliability of the alleged admission, and the failure to give adequate consideration to his defence. On sentence, he submitted that section 234 does not prescribe mandatory life imprisonment and urged the Court to substitute the sentence with an appropriate custodial term.
17. The appellant, being aggrieved by the conviction and lodged a Petition of Appeal dated 22nd October 2024 setting out the following grounds of appeal:
1) That the learned trial magistrate erred in law and fact by relying on prosecution evidence which did not prove the case beyond reasonable doubt.
2) That the learned trial magistrate erred in law and fact by failing to find that the prosecution evidence was merely a frame-up intended to connect the appellant with the offence.
3) That the learned trial magistrate erred in law and fact by basing the conviction on matters which were not corroborated by the prosecution evidence.
4) That the learned trial magistrate erred in law and fact by failing to consider the appellant’s defence, which was not given due consideration.
5) That the sentence imposed upon the appellant was unfair, harsh and excessive.
18. The appellant’s written submissions dated 24th August 2026 challenged the conviction on identification, the knife, footprints, alleged admissions, failure to call the phone owner, and failure to properly consider the defence. He also challenged the life sentence as harsh and excessive and argued that it was not mandatory.
19. The respondent’s written submissions dated 25th August 2026 opposed the appeal, maintaining that grievous harm, unlawfulness and the appellant’s identity were proved. The respondent relied on the complainant’s recognition, the lighting, medical evidence and the weakness of the defence, and urged that both conviction and life sentence be upheld.
20. From the petition and the submissions, I consider the following issues to arise:
1) Whether grievous harm was proved;
2) Whether the injury was unlawfully inflicted;
3) Whether the appellant was reliably identified as the assailant;
4) Whether the evidence concerning the knife, footprints and alleged admission provided sufficient corroboration;
5) Whether failure to call the alleged owner of the phone and other witnesses weakened the prosecution case;
6) Whether the appellant’s defence and alleged frame-up raised a reasonable doubt;
7) Whether the conviction and the sentence of life imprisonment are safe
21. This being a first appeal, this Court is required to reconsider and re-evaluate the evidence that was before the trial court and draw its own independent conclusions, bearing in mind that it neither saw nor heard the witnesses. In Okeno v Republic [1972] EA 32, the Court stated the duty of a first appellate court to subject the evidence to a fresh and exhaustive examination, weigh conflicting evidence and reach its own conclusion.
22. The first issue is whether the prosecution proved that the complainant suffered grievous harm. Section 234 of the Penal Code criminalises the unlawful infliction of grievous harm. The evidence on the nature of the injury came principally from PW1 and PW9.
23. PW1 testified that he was stabbed on the right side of his stomach. PW9, the clinical officer, examined him on 5th February 2024 and noted a stab wound in the right loin region and bruises on the right elbow. He confirmed that the injuries were caused by a sharp object, that the complainant had undergone surgery, and assessed the degree of injury as grievous harm. PW9 produced the P3 form, which he had personally completed, as Prosecution Exhibit 5.
24. The medical findings materially corroborated PW1’s account of having been stabbed and were consistent with the physical damage observed on his clothes. The defence did not materially challenge the nature or extent of the injuries. I am therefore satisfied that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that PW1 sustained grievous harm.
25. The second issue is whether the grievous harm was unlawfully inflicted. PW1’s evidence was that he was walking home when a person emerged from among trees beside the road and stabbed him. There was no evidence of consent, accident, self-defence or any other lawful justification for the infliction of the injury. The circumstances described by PW1 were those of an unlawful assault. I therefore find that the grievous harm was unlawfully inflicted.
26. The third and central issue is whether the appellant was reliably identified as the assailant. This is the issue on which the conviction substantially turns. The appellant's submissions of 24th August 2026 challenge the identification on grounds that the incident occurred at night, the appellant's hiding place was dark, the lighting conditions were inadequately established, no description was given before his arrest, and no identification parade was held. The respondent's submissions of 25th August 2026 counter that PW1 knew the appellant as a friend and relative, and that moonlight and security lighting enabled him to see and recognise him.
27. PW1 testified that the appellant lay among trees at a dark spot beside the road before emerging to stab him, and later explained that moonlight and security lighting from neighbouring plots were present. Absent from the evidence, however, is any detailed account of the lighting conditions at the precise point and moment of identification: the intensity or direction of the moonlight, the distance from which it illuminated the appellant, and the strength and direction of the security lights and how they fell on his face.
28. In Maitanyi v Republic [1986] KECA 39 (KLR), the Court of Appeal held that where identification occurs in difficult circumstances, the court must scrutinise the nature, size and position of the available light, and consider whether the witness gave a description at the earliest opportunity, the purpose being to determine objectively whether the conditions afforded a genuine opportunity for accurate identification. That standard applies squarely here. The incident occurred at about 10.00 p.m.; the appellant was allegedly concealed among trees in a dark spot; the evidence of moonlight and security lighting was too general to establish that his face was actually illuminated at the material time; the attack occurred suddenly, and the evidence does not establish how long PW1 observed him, the distance between them at the critical moment, or the extent to which the available light illuminated him.
29. Recognition evidence attracts the same caution. In Wamunga v Republic [1989] KECA 47 (KLR), the Court of Appeal held that even recognition of a person known to the witness is not infallible, and the court must still examine the circumstances to exclude the possibility of error. The respondent's reliance on PW1's prior acquaintance with the appellant is relevant but not determinative on this authority: familiarity does not dispense with the need to show the circumstances permitted reliable recognition.
30. The evidence that the complainant referred to his assailant as "Ken" shortly after the attack, given by PW3, PW5 and PW6, is relevant but does not independently establish that the appellant was the "Ken" referred to; indeed, PW5 stated he did not know which Ken was meant. The naming does not resolve the underlying question of visual identification: it can only support PW1's identification if that identification was itself reliable, and cannot cure the deficiencies already identified.
31. The fourth issue is whether the evidence concerning the knife, footprints and alleged admission supplied sufficient independent support for the identification. The appellant submitted that it did not, pointing out that the knife was not subjected to DNA or fingerprint examination, that it was recovered by civilians rather than from his person, and that no scientific comparison was made between the alleged footprints and his footwear. He also challenged the alleged admissions on account of the circumstances in which they were said to have been made.
32. PW4 and PW8 testified that the appellant eventually led them to a place where a knife with a blue handle was recovered, produced as Prosecution Exhibit 6. The knife was not, however, subjected to fingerprint, DNA or other forensic examination. No evidence was produced linking the blood on it to the complainant, and no fingerprint or other scientific evidence linked it to the appellant.
33. The footprint evidence is similarly inconclusive. PW6 stated that footprints were followed from the scene towards the appellant's home and that his shoe appeared to correspond with them, but no expert examined the footprints and no scientific comparison was undertaken. This evidence cannot establish a reliable forensic link between the appellant and the scene.
34. PW6, PW7 and PW10 referred to statements allegedly made by the appellant after his apprehension. Section 25A of the Evidence Act renders a confession inadmissible unless made in court before a judge or magistrate, or before a police officer not below the rank of Chief Inspector, not being the investigating officer, in the presence of a third party of the accused's choice, conditions none of these statements meet, having been made to civilians. These circumstances make it unsafe to attach substantial weight to the alleged statements as independent evidence of guilt.
35. The fifth issue is whether the failure to call the alleged phone owner weakened the prosecution case. The respondent correctly submits that the prosecution need not call every person with some knowledge of the matter, provided the evidence called suffices to establish the charge (Keter v Republic [2007] 1 EA 135). Although the alleged phone dispute referenced by both PW1 and PW10 was not independently corroborated, and the phone itself was not produced, motive was not an ingredient of the offence, and this omission does not undermine the sufficiency of the prosecution case.
36. I turn to the appellant's defence and the allegation of a frame-up. He stated that he was at home on the material night, ate supper at about 9.30 p.m. and went to sleep, denying that he met or stabbed the complainant. He further stated that he was later awakened, assaulted and threatened by the complainant's father and other persons before being taken away.
37. DW2, the appellant's mother, corroborated that he had been at home before she retired to sleep, but conceded she did not know whether he left thereafter, and her evidence therefore did not account for his whereabouts throughout the material period.
38. The appellant bore no burden to prove his innocence; the burden remained on the prosecution throughout to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Given the deficiencies already found in the identification evidence, the appellant's denial of involvement is not displaced by the prosecution case and raises a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.
39. This brings me to the safety of the conviction and sentence. Having analysed the evidence above, I find that the appellant's identity as the assailant was not established beyond reasonable doubt, and the conviction under section 234 of the Penal Code is accordingly unsafe and the sentence necessarily falls with it.
40. In the end, the appeal is allowed. The conviction of the appellant, Kenneth Kibutu Woki, for grievous harm contrary to section 234 of the Penal Code is quashed, and the sentence of life imprisonment imposed on 22nd October 2024 is set aside. The appellant shall be set at liberty forthwith, unless otherwise lawfully held.