REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA AT MACHAKOS
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. E085 OF 2023
KELVIN KYALO GEORGE.....................................................................APPELLANT
-VERSUS-
REPUBLIC ........................................................................................RESPONDENT
JUDGEMENT
1. The Appellant Kelvin Kyalo George was charged with one Count of Malicious Damage to Property contrary to Section 339 (l) of the Penal Code. The particulars are that on 7th day of May 2022 at Mathathi village Mulingana Sub Location in Kangundo Sub-County within Machakos County maliciously damaged four solar lights all valued at Kshs.60,000 the property of John Kyalo Musyimi contrary to section 339 (l) of the Penal Code.
2. The Appellant was availed in court on 9/5/2023 where the charges were explained to him in Kiswahili, a language he understood and he pleaded "false ". A plea of not guilty was entered and the trial court proceeded to award the Appellant bond terms and a mention date.
3. On 21st June 2023 when the case came up for mention, the Appellant informed the trial court that he wished to accept his charges. The police file was not availed before court and a further mention date was given. At further mention on 6th July 2023, the Appellant still indicated that he wished to accept the charges. The record reflects that the gravity of the sentence was explained to the Appellant. The charges were thereafter read over to the Appellant and he stated "it is true A plea of guilty was entered and the facts were read out to the Appellant.
4. The Prosecution read the facts to the Appellant that on 7/5/2023 at noon the complainant was telephoned by his caretaker and informed that Appellant went into his homestead awhile armed with a panga and destroyed 4 solar lights valued at Kshs.60,000/=. The complainant rushed to his homestead and confirmed the destruction. Him and the caretaker reported the incident at Kakuyuni police station. The scene was visited and photographed. The Appellant was arrested and charged. The Prosecution produced the photos of the destruction as PExt.1a-d.
5. The Appellant responded that the facts were true.
6. He was thus convicted on his own plea of guilt. The prosecutor indicated that the Appellant had previous records. He had been sentenced to 6 months' probation for the offence of creating disturbance and 6 months' probation for another offence of malicious damage.
7. The learned magistrate sentenced the Appellant to 4 years in prison for the offence of malicious damage contrary to Section 339(1) of the Penal Code. In her ruling, the learned magistrate noted that the Appellant had not learned his lesson from the previous records.
8. Being dissatisfied with the decision of the trial court, the appellant has lodged the instant appeal against both the conviction and sentence in an undated memorandum of appeal. The appellant has raised four grounds of appeal namely that:
i. the learned trial magistrate erred in law and facts by convicting him while failing to observe and find that he was unrepresented a violation that the trial court took advantage of by commencing a trial process
ii. the learned magistrate erred in law and facts by failing to consider and find that there was no warning administered to him regarding the conviction and sentence
iii. the learned magistrate erred in law and fact in failing to refer to the conspicuous material contradictions in the prosecution's evidence which contradictions ought to have created a reasonable doubt resolved in favour of the Appellant vide an acquittal
iv. the trial court imposed four (4) years imprisonment which is manifestly harsh and excessive without noticing that the value of the property does not amount to the sentence imposed.
9. Reasons wherefore, the appellant prays that the appeal succeeds in its entirety, conviction quashed and sentence set aside.
10. The appeal was directed to be canvassed by was of written submissions. Only the Appellant’s rebuttal submissions dated 6th February 2025 can be traced in the CTS, no submissions were traced therein and none are in the court file. The Respondent’s submissions are dated 19th October 2024.
11. This is a first appeal. The duty of the first appellate court is to reconsider and e-evaluate the evidence before the trial court and make its own conclusions but bearing in mind that it did not see or hear the witnesses (see Okeno –vs- Republic 1972 EA).
12. The Appellant was charged with the offence of malicious damage to property contrary to Section 339 (1) of the Penal Code. Section 339(1) provides:
339(1)
“Any person who wilfully and unlawfully destroys or damages any property is guilty of an offence which unless otherwise stated is a misdemeanour and is liable if no other punishment provides, for imprisonment for five years”.
13. From a plain reading of the provision the ingredients of the offence of malicious damage are:
a. That the property was damaged.
b. The same was damaged wilfully and unlawfully
c. The accused person participated in damaging the property.
14. The use of the term ‘unlawful’ in the offence denotes contrary to law. Therefore, when a person does something unlawfully it means he or she has done that thing in a manner contrary to law. ‘wilfully’ means an act deliberately done intentionally not by accident or inadvertence so that the mind of the person who does the act is with it.
15. Upon considering the appeal and parties’ respective submissions, I find that the issues for consideration are as follows:-
i) Whether the trial magistrate erred in law and fact by convicting the
Appellant while failing to observe that he was not represented.
ii) Whether the trial magistrate erred by not explicitly not explaining the consequences of the “plea of guilt” and failed to consider the contradiction in the prosecution case which would have rendered an acquittal.
iii) Whether the trial magistrate erred in law by imposing a manifestly harsh and excessive sentence against the Appellant.
i) Whether the trial magistrate erred in law and fact by convicting the Appellant while failing to observe that he was not represented.
16. The Appellant submitted that his right was violated as he was not represented at trial. The record shows that the Appellant was arraigned in court on 9/5/2023 to take plea. He appeared on court on several other occasions and never at any point did he raise an issue of not having an advocate or wanting to be represented. Further, he pleaded guilty out of his own violation on 6/7/2023. The law does not require for an adult facing such charges to be represented thus the trial court did not make any error to proceed without counsel on record. This argument by the Appellant is therefore disregarded by the court.
ii) Whether the trial magistrate erred by not explicitly not explaining the consequences of the “plea of guilt” and failed to consider the contradiction in the prosecution case which would have rendered an acquittal.
17. Section 207 of the CPC outlines the procedure that is to be followed during plea taking. It provides that:
(1) The substance of the charge shall be stated to the accused person by the court, and he shall be asked whether he pleads not guilty, guilty or guilty subject to a plea agreement.
(2) If the accused person admits the truth of the charge otherwise than by a plea agreement his admission shall be recorded as nearly as possible in the words used by him, and the court shall convict him and pass sentence upon or make an order against him, unless there appears to it sufficient cause to the contrary:
Provided that after conviction and before passing sentence or making any order the court may permit or require the complainant to outline to the court the facts upon which the charge is founded.
18. This Section provides that when an accused person pleads guilty the admission should be recorded as nearly as possible in the words he used and the accused sentenced. The complainant is also awarded an opportunity to outline to the court the facts upon which the charge is founded. In Jackson Wambua v Republic [20221 eKLR, Odunga J (as he was then) in quoting Ombena v Republic [1981] eKLR indicated that the Court of Appeal outlined the manner of recording plea of guilty by quoting:
"In Adan v Republic [1973] EA 445, the Court of Appeal laid down in the simplest and plainest terms the manner in which pleas of guilty should be recorded and the steps which should be followed. It is appropriate to set out the holding in full 'Held:
(i) the charge and all the essential ingredients of the offence should be explained to the accused in his language or in a language he understands;
(ii) the accused's own words should be recorded and if they are an admission, a plea of guilty should be recorded;
(iii) the prosecution should then immediately state the facts and the accused should be given an opportunity to dispute or explain the facts or to add any relevant facts;
(iv) if the accused does not agree with the facts or raises any question of his guilt his reply, must he recorded and change of plea entered;
(v) if there is no change of plea a conviction should be recorded and a statement of the facts relevant to sentence together with the accused’s reply should be recorded.
19. Justice Odunga further quoted K N vs. Republic [2016] eKLR, that:
“We think the court should also explain to the accused person the natural consequence of pleading guilty, the conviction and likely sentence”.
20. The same is supported by W. Korir, J in Abdallah Mohammed vs. Republic [2018] eKLR where he expressed himself as hereunder:
"A plea of guilty can only be entered in respect of an offence known to the law...ln a case where an accused person who is undefended pleads guilty to a charge, the court has a duty to ensure that the plea is unequivocal. As pointed out, the Appellant had no legal representation and the trial court ought to have taken steps to ensure that the Appellant understood every element of the charge and the facts read out to him. He also ought to have been warned, and that warning captured on record, that the offence he was about to plead to carried a prison sentence of not less than fifteen years. In my view, extra caution includes the question as to whether or not the facts as read out are true and whether the accused person would wish to make any comment. In fact, an accused person should be asked what he means by saying that the charge read to him is true. His explanation should then be captured on the record so as to form part of his plea. From the record, it is apparent that the Appellant was just but a lad aged 21 years and the trial court ought to have gone the extra mile to ensure he understood the consequences of entering a plea of guilty. '
21. Odunga J, held in Jackson Wambua v Republic [20221 eKLR that
"In this case the Court informed the Appellant that the charge facing him was a serious one. In my view that was not sufficient. The Court ought to go further and informed the accused what the seriousness of the offence was. Where the seriousness is the sentence which the accused is liable to face, the Court ought to point out that sentence. If it is the fine, then the Court ought to inform the accused of the fine. In this case the minimum prescribed fine is, on the face of it, heavy. Accordingly, the Appellant ought to have been informed of this.”
22. My perusal at the trial court’s proceedings on plea taking confirms that the procedure was duly followed when the Appellant pleaded guilty. The gravity of the sentence was explained to him before the charges were read over to him. The Appellant's plea of guilt is recorded in Kiswahili, a language he confirmed to understand and he responded that it is true. Once the prosecution re-read out the facts, the Appellant thereafter indicated the facts were true.
23. Section 348 of the Criminal Procedure Act bars appeals from subordinate courts where an accused was convicted upon of guilty except on the extent and legality of sentence by providing that:
"No appeal shall be allowed in the case of an accused person who has pleaded guilty and has been convicted on that plea by a subordinate court, except as to the extent and legality of the sentence. '
24. In the case of Olel v Republic [1989] KLR 444, it was held that:-
“Where a plea is unequivocal, an appeal against conviction does not lie. Section 348 of the Criminal Procedure Code (cap 75) does not merely limit the right of appeal in such cases but bars it completely.”
25. It is therefore my considered view that the provisions of Section 207 (l) and (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code were followed by the learned magistrate. Following the authorities quoted above, the learned magistrate also took further caution to explain to the Appellant the gravity of the offence and the sentence he would face should he wish to plead guilty.
This ground of appeal is also found to lack in merit and the same is disallowed.
iii) Whether the trial magistrate erred in law by imposing a manifestly harsh and excessive sentence against the Appellant.
26. The Appellant was sentenced to 4 years imprisonment. Section 339(1) of the Penal Code provides that:
“Any person who wilfully and unlawfully destroys or damages any property is guilty of an offence, which, unless otherwise stated, is a misdemeanour, and is liable, if no other punishment is provided, to imprisonment for five years”.
27. See Timothy Mutuku Kitonyi v Republic [2021] eKLR Criminal Appeal No. E017 of 2020 where Odunga J quoted the case of Simon Kiama Ndiagui vs. Republic (2017) eKLR, where Ngaah J. held that:-
"In order to convict the court must be satisfied that, first, some property was destroyed; second, that a person destroyed the property; third that the destruction was wilful and therefore there must be proof of intent; and fourth, the court must also be satisfied that the destruction was unlawful."
28. Thus, the ingredients to prove the offence of malicious damage to property are:
i. property was destroyed
ii. a person destroyed the property
iii. the destruction was wilful thus have proof of intent
iv. the destruction was unlawful
29. The Appellant having pleaded guilty to the charge and particulars thereof that he wilfully walked into the compound of the complainant and using a panga unlawfully destroyed the property of the complainant. The prosecution produced photos as evidence in proof of the damage that the Appellant caused to the complainant's property. These facts show that the Appellant wilfully and unlawfully destroyed the Appellant's property. The ingredients of the offence of malicious damage were therefore proved.
30. Section 339(1) of the Penal Code provides the sentence as five (5) years for such an offence. The prosecution informed the court that the Appellant was serving two other different sentences of 6 months' probation for an offence of creating disturbance and 6 months' probation for malicious damage. He was thus sentenced to 4 years in jail. The learned magistrate stated that the Appellant seemed to have not learned his lesson and thus repeated the offence of malicious damage. He knew it was wrong and unlawful and he could get charged and convicted for his unlawful actions of destroying people's property without reasons. I agree with the trial magistrate on this and I find that the sentence was therefore proper and deserving.
31. Accordingly, I find the appeal herein to be lacking in merit and dismiss it in its entirety.
JUDGMENT WRITTEN, DATED & SIGNED AT MACHAKOS THIS 28TH MAY 2025
NOEL I. ADAGI
JUDGE
DELIVERED VIRTUALLY ON TEAMS AT MACHAKOS THIS 28TH MAY 2025
In the presence of:
From Garissa Medium Prison............... Appellant
Ms Agatha......... for Respondent
Milly........... Court Assistant
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA AT MACHAKOS
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. E085 OF 2023
KELVIN KYALO GEORGE.....................................................................APPELLANT
-VERSUS-
REPUBLIC ........................................................................................RESPONDENT
JUDGEMENT
1. The Appellant Kelvin Kyalo George was charged with one Count of Malicious Damage to Property contrary to Section 339 (l) of the Penal Code. The particulars are that on 7th day of May 2022 at Mathathi village Mulingana Sub Location in Kangundo Sub-County within Machakos County maliciously damaged four solar lights all valued at Kshs.60,000 the property of John Kyalo Musyimi contrary to section 339 (l) of the Penal Code.
2. The Appellant was availed in court on 9/5/2023 where the charges were explained to him in Kiswahili, a language he understood and he pleaded "false ". A plea of not guilty was entered and the trial court proceeded to award the Appellant bond terms and a mention date.
3. On 21st June 2023 when the case came up for mention, the Appellant informed the trial court that he wished to accept his charges. The police file was not availed before court and a further mention date was given. At further mention on 6th July 2023, the Appellant still indicated that he wished to accept the charges. The record reflects that the gravity of the sentence was explained to the Appellant. The charges were thereafter read over to the Appellant and he stated "it is true A plea of guilty was entered and the facts were read out to the Appellant.
4. The Prosecution read the facts to the Appellant that on 7/5/2023 at noon the complainant was telephoned by his caretaker and informed that Appellant went into his homestead awhile armed with a panga and destroyed 4 solar lights valued at Kshs.60,000/=. The complainant rushed to his homestead and confirmed the destruction. Him and the caretaker reported the incident at Kakuyuni police station. The scene was visited and photographed. The Appellant was arrested and charged. The Prosecution produced the photos of the destruction as PExt.1a-d.
5. The Appellant responded that the facts were true.
6. He was thus convicted on his own plea of guilt. The prosecutor indicated that the Appellant had previous records. He had been sentenced to 6 months' probation for the offence of creating disturbance and 6 months' probation for another offence of malicious damage.
7. The learned magistrate sentenced the Appellant to 4 years in prison for the offence of malicious damage contrary to Section 339(1) of the Penal Code. In her ruling, the learned magistrate noted that the Appellant had not learned his lesson from the previous records.
8. Being dissatisfied with the decision of the trial court, the appellant has lodged the instant appeal against both the conviction and sentence in an undated memorandum of appeal. The appellant has raised four grounds of appeal namely that:
i. the learned trial magistrate erred in law and facts by convicting him while failing to observe and find that he was unrepresented a violation that the trial court took advantage of by commencing a trial process
ii. the learned magistrate erred in law and facts by failing to consider and find that there was no warning administered to him regarding the conviction and sentence
iii. the learned magistrate erred in law and fact in failing to refer to the conspicuous material contradictions in the prosecution's evidence which contradictions ought to have created a reasonable doubt resolved in favour of the Appellant vide an acquittal
iv. the trial court imposed four (4) years imprisonment which is manifestly harsh and excessive without noticing that the value of the property does not amount to the sentence imposed.
9. Reasons wherefore, the appellant prays that the appeal succeeds in its entirety, conviction quashed and sentence set aside.
10. The appeal was directed to be canvassed by was of written submissions. Only the Appellant’s rebuttal submissions dated 6th February 2025 can be traced in the CTS, no submissions were traced therein and none are in the court file. The Respondent’s submissions are dated 19th October 2024.
11. This is a first appeal. The duty of the first appellate court is to reconsider and e-evaluate the evidence before the trial court and make its own conclusions but bearing in mind that it did not see or hear the witnesses (see Okeno –vs- Republic 1972 EA).
12. The Appellant was charged with the offence of malicious damage to property contrary to Section 339 (1) of the Penal Code. Section 339(1) provides:
339(1)
“Any person who wilfully and unlawfully destroys or damages any property is guilty of an offence which unless otherwise stated is a misdemeanour and is liable if no other punishment provides, for imprisonment for five years”.
13. From a plain reading of the provision the ingredients of the offence of malicious damage are:
a. That the property was damaged.
b. The same was damaged wilfully and unlawfully
c. The accused person participated in damaging the property.
14. The use of the term ‘unlawful’ in the offence denotes contrary to law. Therefore, when a person does something unlawfully it means he or she has done that thing in a manner contrary to law. ‘wilfully’ means an act deliberately done intentionally not by accident or inadvertence so that the mind of the person who does the act is with it.
15. Upon considering the appeal and parties’ respective submissions, I find that the issues for consideration are as follows:-
i) Whether the trial magistrate erred in law and fact by convicting the
Appellant while failing to observe that he was not represented.
ii) Whether the trial magistrate erred by not explicitly not explaining the consequences of the “plea of guilt” and failed to consider the contradiction in the prosecution case which would have rendered an acquittal.
iii) Whether the trial magistrate erred in law by imposing a manifestly harsh and excessive sentence against the Appellant.
i) Whether the trial magistrate erred in law and fact by convicting the Appellant while failing to observe that he was not represented.
16. The Appellant submitted that his right was violated as he was not represented at trial. The record shows that the Appellant was arraigned in court on 9/5/2023 to take plea. He appeared on court on several other occasions and never at any point did he raise an issue of not having an advocate or wanting to be represented. Further, he pleaded guilty out of his own violation on 6/7/2023. The law does not require for an adult facing such charges to be represented thus the trial court did not make any error to proceed without counsel on record. This argument by the Appellant is therefore disregarded by the court.
ii) Whether the trial magistrate erred by not explicitly not explaining the consequences of the “plea of guilt” and failed to consider the contradiction in the prosecution case which would have rendered an acquittal.
17. Section 207 of the CPC outlines the procedure that is to be followed during plea taking. It provides that:
(1) The substance of the charge shall be stated to the accused person by the court, and he shall be asked whether he pleads not guilty, guilty or guilty subject to a plea agreement.
(2) If the accused person admits the truth of the charge otherwise than by a plea agreement his admission shall be recorded as nearly as possible in the words used by him, and the court shall convict him and pass sentence upon or make an order against him, unless there appears to it sufficient cause to the contrary:
Provided that after conviction and before passing sentence or making any order the court may permit or require the complainant to outline to the court the facts upon which the charge is founded.
18. This Section provides that when an accused person pleads guilty the admission should be recorded as nearly as possible in the words he used and the accused sentenced. The complainant is also awarded an opportunity to outline to the court the facts upon which the charge is founded. In Jackson Wambua v Republic [20221 eKLR, Odunga J (as he was then) in quoting Ombena v Republic [1981] eKLR indicated that the Court of Appeal outlined the manner of recording plea of guilty by quoting:
"In Adan v Republic [1973] EA 445, the Court of Appeal laid down in the simplest and plainest terms the manner in which pleas of guilty should be recorded and the steps which should be followed. It is appropriate to set out the holding in full 'Held:
(i) the charge and all the essential ingredients of the offence should be explained to the accused in his language or in a language he understands;
(ii) the accused's own words should be recorded and if they are an admission, a plea of guilty should be recorded;
(iii) the prosecution should then immediately state the facts and the accused should be given an opportunity to dispute or explain the facts or to add any relevant facts;
(iv) if the accused does not agree with the facts or raises any question of his guilt his reply, must he recorded and change of plea entered;
(v) if there is no change of plea a conviction should be recorded and a statement of the facts relevant to sentence together with the accused’s reply should be recorded.
19. Justice Odunga further quoted K N vs. Republic [2016] eKLR, that:
“We think the court should also explain to the accused person the natural consequence of pleading guilty, the conviction and likely sentence”.
20. The same is supported by W. Korir, J in Abdallah Mohammed vs. Republic [2018] eKLR where he expressed himself as hereunder:
"A plea of guilty can only be entered in respect of an offence known to the law...ln a case where an accused person who is undefended pleads guilty to a charge, the court has a duty to ensure that the plea is unequivocal. As pointed out, the Appellant had no legal representation and the trial court ought to have taken steps to ensure that the Appellant understood every element of the charge and the facts read out to him. He also ought to have been warned, and that warning captured on record, that the offence he was about to plead to carried a prison sentence of not less than fifteen years. In my view, extra caution includes the question as to whether or not the facts as read out are true and whether the accused person would wish to make any comment. In fact, an accused person should be asked what he means by saying that the charge read to him is true. His explanation should then be captured on the record so as to form part of his plea. From the record, it is apparent that the Appellant was just but a lad aged 21 years and the trial court ought to have gone the extra mile to ensure he understood the consequences of entering a plea of guilty. '
21. Odunga J, held in Jackson Wambua v Republic [20221 eKLR that
"In this case the Court informed the Appellant that the charge facing him was a serious one. In my view that was not sufficient. The Court ought to go further and informed the accused what the seriousness of the offence was. Where the seriousness is the sentence which the accused is liable to face, the Court ought to point out that sentence. If it is the fine, then the Court ought to inform the accused of the fine. In this case the minimum prescribed fine is, on the face of it, heavy. Accordingly, the Appellant ought to have been informed of this.”
22. My perusal at the trial court’s proceedings on plea taking confirms that the procedure was duly followed when the Appellant pleaded guilty. The gravity of the sentence was explained to him before the charges were read over to him. The Appellant's plea of guilt is recorded in Kiswahili, a language he confirmed to understand and he responded that it is true. Once the prosecution re-read out the facts, the Appellant thereafter indicated the facts were true.
23. Section 348 of the Criminal Procedure Act bars appeals from subordinate courts where an accused was convicted upon of guilty except on the extent and legality of sentence by providing that:
"No appeal shall be allowed in the case of an accused person who has pleaded guilty and has been convicted on that plea by a subordinate court, except as to the extent and legality of the sentence. '
24. In the case of Olel v Republic [1989] KLR 444, it was held that:-
“Where a plea is unequivocal, an appeal against conviction does not lie. Section 348 of the Criminal Procedure Code (cap 75) does not merely limit the right of appeal in such cases but bars it completely.”
25. It is therefore my considered view that the provisions of Section 207 (l) and (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code were followed by the learned magistrate. Following the authorities quoted above, the learned magistrate also took further caution to explain to the Appellant the gravity of the offence and the sentence he would face should he wish to plead guilty.
This ground of appeal is also found to lack in merit and the same is disallowed.
iii) Whether the trial magistrate erred in law by imposing a manifestly harsh and excessive sentence against the Appellant.
26. The Appellant was sentenced to 4 years imprisonment. Section 339(1) of the Penal Code provides that:
“Any person who wilfully and unlawfully destroys or damages any property is guilty of an offence, which, unless otherwise stated, is a misdemeanour, and is liable, if no other punishment is provided, to imprisonment for five years”.
27. See Timothy Mutuku Kitonyi v Republic [2021] eKLR Criminal Appeal No. E017 of 2020 where Odunga J quoted the case of Simon Kiama Ndiagui vs. Republic (2017) eKLR, where Ngaah J. held that:-
"In order to convict the court must be satisfied that, first, some property was destroyed; second, that a person destroyed the property; third that the destruction was wilful and therefore there must be proof of intent; and fourth, the court must also be satisfied that the destruction was unlawful."
28. Thus, the ingredients to prove the offence of malicious damage to property are:
i. property was destroyed
ii. a person destroyed the property
iii. the destruction was wilful thus have proof of intent
iv. the destruction was unlawful
29. The Appellant having pleaded guilty to the charge and particulars thereof that he wilfully walked into the compound of the complainant and using a panga unlawfully destroyed the property of the complainant. The prosecution produced photos as evidence in proof of the damage that the Appellant caused to the complainant's property. These facts show that the Appellant wilfully and unlawfully destroyed the Appellant's property. The ingredients of the offence of malicious damage were therefore proved.
30. Section 339(1) of the Penal Code provides the sentence as five (5) years for such an offence. The prosecution informed the court that the Appellant was serving two other different sentences of 6 months' probation for an offence of creating disturbance and 6 months' probation for malicious damage. He was thus sentenced to 4 years in jail. The learned magistrate stated that the Appellant seemed to have not learned his lesson and thus repeated the offence of malicious damage. He knew it was wrong and unlawful and he could get charged and convicted for his unlawful actions of destroying people's property without reasons. I agree with the trial magistrate on this and I find that the sentence was therefore proper and deserving.
31. Accordingly, I find the appeal herein to be lacking in merit and dismiss it in its entirety.
JUDGMENT WRITTEN, DATED & SIGNED AT MACHAKOS THIS 28TH MAY 2025
NOEL I. ADAGI
JUDGE
DELIVERED VIRTUALLY ON TEAMS AT MACHAKOS THIS 28TH MAY 2025
In the presence of:
From Garissa Medium Prison............... Appellant
Ms Agatha......... for Respondent
Milly........... Court Assistant