1. The Notice of Motion dated 26th June 2026 is presented under Articles 10 (2) and 159 of the Constitution of Kenya (2010) and Section 5(1) of the Judicature Act. The application seeks the following orders
a. Spent
b. That the 1st Respondent be cited for contempt or be found to be in contempt of court for disobeying the orders made on 9th July 2025 and 2 October 2025.
c. That upon finding in (b) above, the 1st Respondent be punished appropriately for disobeying court orders in issue.
2. The application is premised on the grounds on the face of the application and the affidavits sworn Nora Mbagathi and Hussein Khalid in support. It is averred that on 9th July 2025 Hon. Mugambi J issued interim orders as follows-
That pending the hearing and determination of this application a conservatory order is hereby issued restraining the 1st Respondent i.e. ( Inspector General of Police) or any other officer subordinate to him from mounting barricades, police road blocks that block entry of members of public from accessing the central business district within Nairobi County or streets within the Central business District or any other public road without issuing a timely advisory/ notice prior to the emergency barricading of roads to allow the citizens/ members of public plan their activities accordingly.
3. It is further averred that on 25th June 2026, and in the face of a valid, subsisting, and unambiguous court order, an order of which the 1st respondent had due and sufficient notice, the respondents nonetheless proceeded to close all major roads leading into the city at Roysambu, Kangemi, Ngong Road, City Mortuary Roundabout, Integrity Centre, Uhuru Highway/ Haile Selaasie Roundabout, Moi Avenue, Parliament Road and Harambee Avenue, Bunyala Road roundabout, Karen Village, Masai Lodge Junction, Roysambu roundabout, Allsops roundabout, Kitengela, Ruiru, Githurai and Kimbo.
4. People were unable to go beyond the barricades. It is submitted that the actions of the respondents constitute a direct and deliberate violation of the Court orders.
5. In his affidavit, Hussein Khalid states that he left his home at Athi River heading to the Central Business District and was surprised to find a barricade at Kitengela Roundabout; the police officers manning the barricade told him and other travellers that no vehicles heading to town would be allowed to pass. He abandoned the vehicle and got onto a boda boda and attempted to access the Central Business District via the backroads. He found police barricades at Mlolongo, Syokimau, SGR Corner, Southern Bypass, and Bunyala Roundabout.
6. He was surprised to find the barricades, as he was aware of the subsisting Court order referred to above. Further, on 24th June 2026, the Cabinet Secretary for Interior, while flanked by the Inspector General of Police, addressed the media and assured Kenyans that 25th June 2026 would be an ordinary day, with protesters being escorted along the routes. He supports the application.
7. Issa Mohammed Mohamud, Assistant Inspector General and Regional Commander for Nairobi Area. He avers that he swears the affidavit on the authority of the Office of the Inspector General. He further avers that the scope of the orders did not bar the police from carrying out their statutory mandates to mount security checkpoints, roadblocks or traffic diversions.
8. He avers that the true intent and spirit of the court order underscored the operational need for transparency, public predictability, and the issuance of prior public notices or advisories whenever planned structural road closures are contemplated, especially during public demonstrations or processions.
9. He depones that no notice was issued of an intention to hold a public demonstration, as required by law, and that therefore the security checkpoints mounted on 25th June 2026 were entirely unplanned, non-structural, and spontaneous, mounted in response to real-time threats to public safety, as assessed on the ground by individual field and station commanders at specific locales. Significantly, he avers that the deployments on the ground were not part of a general, top-down operational decision generated by the office of the Inspector General.
10. He depones further that genuine demonstrators and ordinary members of the public were permitted to proceed as the security checkpoints were designed to filter out lawless elements and provocateurs intent on causing destruction. He reiterates that the checkpoints constitute a normal police procedure fully sanctioned under the National Police Service Act, the National Police Standing Orders and the Public Order Act and are within the permissible legal parameters preserved by Hon. Justice Mugambi’s orders.
11. In a further affidavit sworn on 8th July 2026 by Nora Mbagathi, the applicant responds to the affidavit of Issa Mohammed Mohamud. The first point of attack is that no reason has been given as to why the Inspector General did not swear the affidavit, yet he is the one cited for contempt. The orders in issue were directed at him, and the conduct in question is his, in relation to those orders and to officers subordinate to him. The applicant therefore concludes that the 1st respondent has not given this court reasons as to why he should not be held in contempt.
12. Further, it is contended that the impugned affidavit fails to demonstrate compliance with the Court orders; the issue is whether the Inspector General issued a timely advisory or notice to enable members of the public to plan their activities accordingly. It is averred that the depositions contradict the posture of the Cabinet Secretary for Interior, who issued a statement the previous day, flanked by the Inspector General. It is averred that from that statement it was evident that the security agencies were aware of the intended demonstrations that were planned for the next day. It is argued that statutory powers must be exercised consistently with the Constitution and in obedience to lawful court orders.
13. She depones that contrary to the assertions by the respondents, the effect of the deployments was that members of the public were prevented from entering the Central Business District and other parts of Nairobi. Commuters were turned back, and long-distance travellers were stranded; health workers experienced difficulty accessing hospitals and businesses were disrupted. She asserts that the evidence of Hussein Khalid remains unchallenged.
14. The application as canvassed via written submissions.
SUMMARY OF APPLICANT’S SUBMISSIONS
15. The applicant’s submissions are dated 8th July 2026. It is submitted that disobedience strikes at the very root of the rule of law, and for this reason the dignity and authority of the courts should be respected and protected at all costs. Reference is made to the decision in Sheila Cassat Issenberg & Anor v Antony Machatha Kinyanjui [2021] KEHC 5692 (KLR) and A.D.C v D.P.N [2017] KEHC 8672 (KLR).
16. Further, the applicant faults the 1st respondent for failing to respond to the charge in person and refers to the decisions in Katiba Institute & Anor v Attorney General & 7 Others [2026] KEHC 8639 (KLR) and Osango & 2 Others v Ganda (Sued as a Legal Representative of the Estate of Walter Ogada Onoka (Deceased) & 2 Others) (Environment and Land Appeal E046 of 2024), where the Courts emphasised that the obligation to comply attaches to an individual.
17. The applicants relies on the decision in Samwel M.N. Mweru & Others v National Land Commission & 2 Others [2020] KEHC 9233 (KLR) on the legal threshold to be met in an application for contempt. The applicant faults the respondent for venturing to interpret the Court order so as to validate their actions and references the decision in Ben Njoroge Mithamo & Anor v Solictor General &b Another [2015] KEHC 3858 (KLR).
18. The applicant relies on the decision in Fred Matiangi, the Cabinet Secretary, Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government v Miguna Miguna & 4 Others [ 2018] KECA 789 (KLR) to emphasise that Court orders are binding. The applicant concludes by urging that a sanction is desirable as disobedience of court orders should not be countenanced.
SUMMARY OF THE RESPONDENT’S SUBMISSIONS
19. The submissions of the respondents are dated 10th July 2026. The Respondents contend that the contempt application is fundamentally misconceived, as the Replying Affidavit sworn by the Nairobi Regional Police Commander satisfies the evidentiary threshold required in quasi criminal proceedings. They argue that under Article 245 of the Constitution and Sections 8 and 8A of the National Police Service Act, operational command is decentralized, and only officers with direct, personal knowledge may depose to field level facts. In their view, contempt requires proof of wilful disobedience, consistent with the standard articulated in Osango & 2 others v Ogada KEELC 6877, and the Inspector General cannot be cited absent evidence of personal authorisation of the alleged acts.
20. The Respondents further rely on the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Dande & 3 others v Inspector General, National Police Service & 5 others [2023] KESC 40 (KLR), asserting that the Inspector General’s mandate is multifaceted and insulated from vicarious liability for spontaneous actions of regulating officers. They submit that the statutory architecture of Section 5 of the Public Order Act places regulatory responsibility exclusively on localized OCSs, and that no statutory notices were issued for the 25 June 2026 events. Consequently, any assembly on that day was unlawful by operation of Section 5(10), and the police were acting within their mandate to prevent disorder.
21. The Respondents place reliance on Boniface Mwangi v Inspector General of Police & 4 Others [2017] KEHC 8412, where the High Court affirmed that the Regulating Officer and not the Inspector General bears exclusive statutory responsibility for managing public assemblies. They argue that the Applicant has not demonstrated compliance with Section 5 notification requirements, nor shown that the Inspector General issued any directive contrary to Hon. Justice Mugambi’s conservatory orders. In their assessment, the Supporting and Further Supporting Affidavits of Nora Mbagathi fail to establish any factual nexus between the Inspector General and the alleged road closures, particularly given the absence of evidence of total blockades.
22. Finally, the Respondents emphasize the stringent standard of proof applicable to contempt, citing Gatharia K. Mutikika v Baharini Farm Limited [1985] KLR 227, and the caution expressed in Carey v Laiken, 2015 SCC 17. They submit that the Applicant’s case rests on unsubstantiated media reports and lacks the strict proof required to deprive a public office holder of liberty. Invoking Samwel Kamau Macharia v Kenya Commercial Bank Limited [2012] eKLR and Jeniffer v Equity Bank of Kenya Limited [2025] KEELC 5740, they argue that this Court cannot expand its jurisdiction to impose institutional liability where neither the Constitution nor statute provides for it. Accordingly, they urge the Court to dismiss the application as legally hollow and unsupported by evidence.
ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION
23. Having reviewed the pleadings on record, the rival submissions, and the relevant authorities, I discern the issue for determination to be whether-
a. The 1st Respondent is in contempt of the Orders of the Court issued on 9th July 2025 by Hon. Justice Mugambi.
24. The applicant raises, as a preliminary issue, the competence and adequacy of the affidavit sworn by Issa Mohammed Mohamud in response to the contempt charge facing the 1st Respondent. In that affidavit, Issa Mohammed Mohamud depones at paragraph 2 that he has been authorised by the office of the Inspector General of Police to swear the replying affidavit “on its behalf.” In doing so, the Respondent seeks, quite ingeniously, to distinguish between the office of the Inspector General and the individual who holds that office. The distinction is artificial. It is also constitutionally untenable.
25. In Akoyo v Permanent Secretary, State Department for Devolution; Attorney General (Interested Party) (Application 440 of 2018) [2023] KEHC 23189 (KLR) (Judicial Review) (6 October 2023) (Ruling) the Court clarified that reference to an office necessarily implicates the individual holding the office-
[66] As to whether the person holding the office of accounting officer to whom reference has been made in section 21(1) of the Government Proceedings Act should be named in the proceedings by his personal name instead of the title attributed to his office, I would simply say that there is no law that supports
the position the respondent has taken. On the contrary, sections 43 and 45 of the Interpretation and General Provisions Act, cap. 2 imply that the officers should be identified by their offices.
[67]. Section 43 is on powers and duties of the holder of an office. It states as follows:
43. Where a written law confers a power or imposes a duty on the holder of an office as such, then, unless a contrary intention appears, the power may be exercised, and the duty shall be performed by the person for the time being holding that office.
26. The order in question was clearly addressed at the Inspector General, that is, the person holding the office and officers subordinate to him. In his response to the charge of contempt, the Inspector General deems it sufficient that the Officer who has administrative authority in the Nairobi region renders his defence and is confident that the affidavit of the subordinate to whom he has delegated operational mandate in the Nairobi Region will exonerate him from the charge. I will therefore accept the affidavit of Issa Mohammed Mohamud as the response the Inspector General offers to the charge of contempt. For the avoidance of doubt, I must also state, with clarity, that contempt is a personal obligation. The choice to respond through a subordinate does not dilute the personal responsibility imposed by the Court’s order.
27. In Pheko and Others v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 2) (CCT19/11) [2015] ZACC 10, the South African Constitutional Court pronounced that-
[32] …in determining contempt in relation to a court order requiring a person or legal entity before it to do or not do something, the following elements need to be established on a balance of probabilities-
a. The must order exist
b. The order must have been duly served on, or brought to the notice of the alleged contemnor
c. There must have been non-compliance with the order; and
d. The non-compliance must have been wilful or mala fide’
28. The Court when to state that
[36] Therefore the presumption rightly exists when the first three elements of the test for contempt have been established, mala fides and wilfulness are presumed unless the contemnor is able to lead sufficient evidence to create reasonable doubt as to their existence.
29. Similarly, the test and elements are well settled in Kenya and was succinctly articulated in Samuel M. N. Mweru & Others v National Land Commission & 2 others [2020] KEHC 9233 (KLR) as follows:
[40]. It is an established principle of law that in order to succeed in civil contempt proceedings, the applicant has to prove (i) the terms of the order, (ii) Knowledge of these terms by the Respondent, (iii). Failure by the Respondent to comply with the terms of the order. Upon proof of these requirements the presence of willfulness and bad faith on the part of the Respondent would normally be inferred, but the Respondent could rebut this inference by contrary proof on a balance of probabilities. Perhaps the most comprehensive of the elements of civil contempt was stated by the learned authors of the book Contempt in Modern New Zealand who succinctly stated:-
"There are essentially four elements that must be proved to make the case for civil contempt. The applicant must prove to the required standard (in civil contempt cases which is higher than civil cases) that:-
i. the terms of the order (or injunction or undertaking) were clear and unambiguous and were binding on the defendant;
ii. the defendant had knowledge of or proper notice of the terms of the order;
iii. the defendant has acted in breach of the terms of the order; and
iv. the defendant's conduct was deliberate.
30. In this case, it is common ground that the Court issued interim orders directed at the Inspector General and requiring that the Inspector General issues ‘ a timely advisory/notice prior to the emergency barricading of roads to allow the Citizens/members of public to plan their activities accordingly.”
31. The 1st respondent was aware of the order as at paragraphs 4 and 5 of the affidavit of Issa Mohammed Mohamud, he states that he understood that-
[4] THAT ….the conservatory order issued by Hon. Lawrence Mugambi on 9th July 2025, did not impose an absolute ban on the police from executing their statutory mandates to mount security checkpoints, road blocks or traffic diversions.
[5] THAT…the true intent and spirit of the court order underscored the operational need for transparency, public predictability and the issuance of prior public notices or advisories whenever pre- planned , structural road closures are contemplated especially during public demonstrations or processions.
32. When this interpretation or understanding by the Inspector General is juxtaposed against what the Court actually said, it is evident that the 1st respondent misinterpreted the Court Order and therefore proceeded to execute his mandate in a manner that aligned with his interpretation of the order and not in accordance with what the Order actually provided. In place of what the Court said requiring that the notice issues prior to the mounting of emergency barricades, the 1st respondent determines he is required to issue advisories whenever ‘pre-planned, structural road closures are contemplated’.
33. The Respondents’ submissions proceed under a fundamental misapprehension; that this case is about the enforcement of Article 37 rights. By reframing the dispute as one concerning unregulated assembly, the Respondents sidestepped the true constitutional question, the citizens’ right to freedom of movement under Article 39, and the Inspector General’s positive duty, imposed by the conservatory order, to issue timely public advisories whenever road closures or restricted access were contemplated. Article 10 reinforces this duty by requiring transparency, accountability, and respect for human rights in all exercises of public power.
34. Issa Mohammed Mohamud attempts to exonerate the Inspector General by urging that there was no notice given of the demonstrations on 25th June 2026 and that, therefore, the reaction of the police was spontaneous and in response to intelligence reports received. If the Inspector General elects to delegate his defence to a subordinate, he must at least ensure that the subordinate is candid. The affidavit before the Court does not reflect candour; it reflects an attempt to distance the Inspector General from facts plainly within his knowledge.
35. It is not disputed that the Inspector General flanked the Cabinet Secretary, at the issuance of a statement on 24th June 2026. In that statement, the Minister stated that the ‘Police’ had received a notification from some citizens who wanted to engage in a public demonstration. This is in the 1st paragraph of the statement, even assuming that the first time the Inspector General was hearing of this was when he was standing there next to the Cabinet Secretary; for our purposes it is sufficient to establish that on the 24th June 2026 ( the day before the planned protests), the Inspector General and his subordinates were aware that there were intended demonstrations.
36. The Cabinet Secretary then went on to caution that the government would not tolerate criminal elements who were bent on exploiting the legitimate protests and advised that the Director of Criminal Investigations was on high alert and that those responsible would face the full force of the law.
37. At paragraph 3 of that statement, the Cabinet Secretary stated that the next day would be a normal business and school day. Children were free to go to school and people to go about their businesses. At the end of reading the statement , the Inspector General retreated alongside the Cabinet Secretary, Kenyans therefore went to sleep knowing that they would go about their normal business the next day.
38. It is therefore disingenuous on the part of the Inspector General’s star witness to now seek to persuade the Court that the decision to erect the road blocks or check points, as asserted, was hurried and unforeseen.
39. The orders of the Court were plain and straighforward. The 1st respondent was required to issue notice, immediately a decision was made to erect check points the Inspector General was required to communicate the same to the public so that the people would in the words of the Court ‘arrange their affairs’. The order of the Court expressly required the notice prior to the ‘emergency barricading’ of roads.
40. Article 244 commands the National Police Service to comply with constitutional standards of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the conservatory order deliberately imposed a positive obligation upon the Inspector General and his subordinates to issue advisories whenever road closures or checkpoints were contemplated. No evidence has been tendered that any attempt, however minimal, was made to notify the public that certain roads would have restricted access. The suggestion that the checkpoints did not hinder movement is untenable; the absence of notice itself constitutes the violation, for citizens cannot meaningfully exercise their freedom of movement when confronted with sudden, unexplained barriers.
41. The order was directed at the Inspector General; the responsibility was his to ensure an advisory was issued; and the Constitution does not permit him to say, “my officers acted on their own.” Operational procedures cannot override a court order, and the failure to issue advisories, despite foreknowledge of restricted movement, constitutes wilful disobedience.
42. I will add that the failure by the Inspector General to personally respond to the charge of contempt is the clearest indication that he did not appreciate the obligation placed upon him to ensure that the Court’s order was complied with. A party who understands the gravity of a court order, and the constitutional weight behind it, does not remain silent when called upon to account for compliance. In the face of a valid and unambiguous order, the Inspector General was expected to demonstrate, with clarity and candour, how he ensured adherence to the Court’s instructions. His silence speaks loudly. It reveals not merely an administrative lapse, but a constitutional failure to grasp that the duty imposed upon him was personal, direct, and non delegable. The Court expected that when confronted with a situation where the police deemed it necessary to erect what the Respondents refer to as “checkpoints,” the Inspector General would personally sign off and confirm that such action complied with the Court’s order. His failure to do so can only be interpreted as non compliance
43. The witness of the Inspector General does not address this salient issue. He offers no explanation of compliance or effort towards compliance.
44. Article 10 of the Constitution binds all State organs to the national values of the rule of law, human dignity, equity, human rights, transparency, and accountability, and these values demand fidelity to judicial authority. The concept of the rule of law lies at the very heart of constitutional governance, for without obedience to judicial orders, the rule of law becomes a hollow promise. Kenyan jurisprudence has consistently affirmed this principle. In Republic v Attorney General & 9 others Ex parte Evanson Jidraph Kamau & another [2014] KEHC 3732 (KLR), the Court held that
…obedience of court orders is a cardinal principle of the rule of law… an order standing good for purposes of enforcement until it is perfected on appeal or review. No matter how judicious an order of the court is, if it is not complied with, it remains a worthless paper directive with no practical effect.
45. This position aligns with Gatharia K. Mutikika v Baharini Farm Ltd [1985] KLR 227, which emphasised the gravity of contempt jurisdiction. South Africa’s Supreme Court of Appeal in Fakie NO v CCII Systems (Pty) Ltd [2006] ZASCA 52 similarly held that compliance with court orders is indispensable to constitutional democracy. This Court therefore approaches the present application with the solemn understanding that its authority must be upheld, not for institutional pride, but to preserve constitutional order.
46. At this moment in our country’s constitutional history, the Court must put its foot down. Article 24 requires that any limitation of rights be reasonable, justifiable, and procedurally fair. Indiscriminate lockdowns of the Central Business District, without notice or justification, cannot be reconciled with constitutional standards. When Court orders are ignored, the Constitution itself is diminished. In Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance v Cabinet Secretary for Devolution and Planning & 3 others [2017] eKLR the court held as follows:
The Court does not, and ought not to be seen to make orders in vain; otherwise the Court would be exposed to ridicule, and no agency of the constitutional order would then be left in place to serve as a guarantee for legality, and for the rights of all people. A Court order is binding on the party against whom it is addressed and until set aside remains valid and is to be complied with.
47. Black’s Law Dictionary (Ninth Edition) defines contempt of court as:-
Conduct that defies the authority or dignity of a court. Because such conduct interferes with the administration of justice, it is punishable usually by fine or imprisonment.
48. As early as 1778, Chief Justice McKean of the United States, when dealing with a case of a party in Civil litigation who refused to answer interrogatories stated:-
Since however, the question seems to resolve itself into this, whether you shall bend to the law, or the law shall bend to you, it is our duty to determine that the former shall be the case.
49. In Johnson Vs Grant (1923) SC 789 at 790 Clyde L J noted:-
The phrase ‘contempt of court’ does not in the least describe the true nature of the class of offence with which we are here concerned.... The offence consists in interfering with the administration of the law; in impending and perverting the course of justice...... it is not the dignity of court which is offended, a petty and misleading view of the issues involved, it is the fundamental supremacy of the law which is challenged.
50. In the case of Teachers Service Commission V Kenya National Union Of Teachers & 2 Others [2013] eKLR Ndolo J ( as she then was ) observed that:-
[38]. The reason why courts will punish for contempt of court then is to safeguard the rule of law which is fundamental in the administration of justice. It has nothing to do with the integrity of the judiciary or the court or even the personal ego of the presiding judge. Neither is it about placating the applicant who moves the court by taking out contempt proceedings. It is about preserving and safeguarding the rule of law.
51. In view of the Inspector General’s failure to comply with a clear, positive order of the Court notwithstanding his foreknowledge of the planned demonstrations, his presence at the press conference where assurances were given that the following day would be a normal day for school going children and business people, the subsequent mounting of roadblocks and checkpoints and the total absence of any attempt to issue advisories, the threshold for contempt is met.
52. I therefore find the Inspector General in contempt of the Order of the Court issued on 9th July 2025 for failing to issue an advisory prior to the emergency barricading of roads. I hereby direct that Douglas Kanja Kirocho attend Court on the 28th of September 2026 for mitigation and sentencing
DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED VIRTUALLY AT NAIROBI THIS 17TH SEPTEMBER 2026
a. Spent
b. That the 1st Respondent be cited for contempt or be found to be in contempt of court for disobeying the orders made on 9th July 2025 and 2 October 2025.
c. That upon finding in (b) above, the 1st Respondent be punished appropriately for disobeying court orders in issue.
2. The application is premised on the grounds on the face of the application and the affidavits sworn Nora Mbagathi and Hussein Khalid in support. It is averred that on 9th July 2025 Hon. Mugambi J issued interim orders as follows-
That pending the hearing and determination of this application a conservatory order is hereby issued restraining the 1st Respondent i.e. ( Inspector General of Police) or any other officer subordinate to him from mounting barricades, police road blocks that block entry of members of public from accessing the central business district within Nairobi County or streets within the Central business District or any other public road without issuing a timely advisory/ notice prior to the emergency barricading of roads to allow the citizens/ members of public plan their activities accordingly.
3. It is further averred that on 25th June 2026, and in the face of a valid, subsisting, and unambiguous court order, an order of which the 1st respondent had due and sufficient notice, the respondents nonetheless proceeded to close all major roads leading into the city at Roysambu, Kangemi, Ngong Road, City Mortuary Roundabout, Integrity Centre, Uhuru Highway/ Haile Selaasie Roundabout, Moi Avenue, Parliament Road and Harambee Avenue, Bunyala Road roundabout, Karen Village, Masai Lodge Junction, Roysambu roundabout, Allsops roundabout, Kitengela, Ruiru, Githurai and Kimbo.
4. People were unable to go beyond the barricades. It is submitted that the actions of the respondents constitute a direct and deliberate violation of the Court orders.
5. In his affidavit, Hussein Khalid states that he left his home at Athi River heading to the Central Business District and was surprised to find a barricade at Kitengela Roundabout; the police officers manning the barricade told him and other travellers that no vehicles heading to town would be allowed to pass. He abandoned the vehicle and got onto a boda boda and attempted to access the Central Business District via the backroads. He found police barricades at Mlolongo, Syokimau, SGR Corner, Southern Bypass, and Bunyala Roundabout.
6. He was surprised to find the barricades, as he was aware of the subsisting Court order referred to above. Further, on 24th June 2026, the Cabinet Secretary for Interior, while flanked by the Inspector General of Police, addressed the media and assured Kenyans that 25th June 2026 would be an ordinary day, with protesters being escorted along the routes. He supports the application.
7. Issa Mohammed Mohamud, Assistant Inspector General and Regional Commander for Nairobi Area. He avers that he swears the affidavit on the authority of the Office of the Inspector General. He further avers that the scope of the orders did not bar the police from carrying out their statutory mandates to mount security checkpoints, roadblocks or traffic diversions.
8. He avers that the true intent and spirit of the court order underscored the operational need for transparency, public predictability, and the issuance of prior public notices or advisories whenever planned structural road closures are contemplated, especially during public demonstrations or processions.
9. He depones that no notice was issued of an intention to hold a public demonstration, as required by law, and that therefore the security checkpoints mounted on 25th June 2026 were entirely unplanned, non-structural, and spontaneous, mounted in response to real-time threats to public safety, as assessed on the ground by individual field and station commanders at specific locales. Significantly, he avers that the deployments on the ground were not part of a general, top-down operational decision generated by the office of the Inspector General.
10. He depones further that genuine demonstrators and ordinary members of the public were permitted to proceed as the security checkpoints were designed to filter out lawless elements and provocateurs intent on causing destruction. He reiterates that the checkpoints constitute a normal police procedure fully sanctioned under the National Police Service Act, the National Police Standing Orders and the Public Order Act and are within the permissible legal parameters preserved by Hon. Justice Mugambi’s orders.
11. In a further affidavit sworn on 8th July 2026 by Nora Mbagathi, the applicant responds to the affidavit of Issa Mohammed Mohamud. The first point of attack is that no reason has been given as to why the Inspector General did not swear the affidavit, yet he is the one cited for contempt. The orders in issue were directed at him, and the conduct in question is his, in relation to those orders and to officers subordinate to him. The applicant therefore concludes that the 1st respondent has not given this court reasons as to why he should not be held in contempt.
12. Further, it is contended that the impugned affidavit fails to demonstrate compliance with the Court orders; the issue is whether the Inspector General issued a timely advisory or notice to enable members of the public to plan their activities accordingly. It is averred that the depositions contradict the posture of the Cabinet Secretary for Interior, who issued a statement the previous day, flanked by the Inspector General. It is averred that from that statement it was evident that the security agencies were aware of the intended demonstrations that were planned for the next day. It is argued that statutory powers must be exercised consistently with the Constitution and in obedience to lawful court orders.
13. She depones that contrary to the assertions by the respondents, the effect of the deployments was that members of the public were prevented from entering the Central Business District and other parts of Nairobi. Commuters were turned back, and long-distance travellers were stranded; health workers experienced difficulty accessing hospitals and businesses were disrupted. She asserts that the evidence of Hussein Khalid remains unchallenged.
14. The application as canvassed via written submissions.
SUMMARY OF APPLICANT’S SUBMISSIONS
15. The applicant’s submissions are dated 8th July 2026. It is submitted that disobedience strikes at the very root of the rule of law, and for this reason the dignity and authority of the courts should be respected and protected at all costs. Reference is made to the decision in Sheila Cassat Issenberg & Anor v Antony Machatha Kinyanjui [2021] KEHC 5692 (KLR) and A.D.C v D.P.N [2017] KEHC 8672 (KLR).
16. Further, the applicant faults the 1st respondent for failing to respond to the charge in person and refers to the decisions in Katiba Institute & Anor v Attorney General & 7 Others [2026] KEHC 8639 (KLR) and Osango & 2 Others v Ganda (Sued as a Legal Representative of the Estate of Walter Ogada Onoka (Deceased) & 2 Others) (Environment and Land Appeal E046 of 2024), where the Courts emphasised that the obligation to comply attaches to an individual.
17. The applicants relies on the decision in Samwel M.N. Mweru & Others v National Land Commission & 2 Others [2020] KEHC 9233 (KLR) on the legal threshold to be met in an application for contempt. The applicant faults the respondent for venturing to interpret the Court order so as to validate their actions and references the decision in Ben Njoroge Mithamo & Anor v Solictor General &b Another [2015] KEHC 3858 (KLR).
18. The applicant relies on the decision in Fred Matiangi, the Cabinet Secretary, Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government v Miguna Miguna & 4 Others [ 2018] KECA 789 (KLR) to emphasise that Court orders are binding. The applicant concludes by urging that a sanction is desirable as disobedience of court orders should not be countenanced.
SUMMARY OF THE RESPONDENT’S SUBMISSIONS
19. The submissions of the respondents are dated 10th July 2026. The Respondents contend that the contempt application is fundamentally misconceived, as the Replying Affidavit sworn by the Nairobi Regional Police Commander satisfies the evidentiary threshold required in quasi criminal proceedings. They argue that under Article 245 of the Constitution and Sections 8 and 8A of the National Police Service Act, operational command is decentralized, and only officers with direct, personal knowledge may depose to field level facts. In their view, contempt requires proof of wilful disobedience, consistent with the standard articulated in Osango & 2 others v Ogada KEELC 6877, and the Inspector General cannot be cited absent evidence of personal authorisation of the alleged acts.
20. The Respondents further rely on the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Dande & 3 others v Inspector General, National Police Service & 5 others [2023] KESC 40 (KLR), asserting that the Inspector General’s mandate is multifaceted and insulated from vicarious liability for spontaneous actions of regulating officers. They submit that the statutory architecture of Section 5 of the Public Order Act places regulatory responsibility exclusively on localized OCSs, and that no statutory notices were issued for the 25 June 2026 events. Consequently, any assembly on that day was unlawful by operation of Section 5(10), and the police were acting within their mandate to prevent disorder.
21. The Respondents place reliance on Boniface Mwangi v Inspector General of Police & 4 Others [2017] KEHC 8412, where the High Court affirmed that the Regulating Officer and not the Inspector General bears exclusive statutory responsibility for managing public assemblies. They argue that the Applicant has not demonstrated compliance with Section 5 notification requirements, nor shown that the Inspector General issued any directive contrary to Hon. Justice Mugambi’s conservatory orders. In their assessment, the Supporting and Further Supporting Affidavits of Nora Mbagathi fail to establish any factual nexus between the Inspector General and the alleged road closures, particularly given the absence of evidence of total blockades.
22. Finally, the Respondents emphasize the stringent standard of proof applicable to contempt, citing Gatharia K. Mutikika v Baharini Farm Limited [1985] KLR 227, and the caution expressed in Carey v Laiken, 2015 SCC 17. They submit that the Applicant’s case rests on unsubstantiated media reports and lacks the strict proof required to deprive a public office holder of liberty. Invoking Samwel Kamau Macharia v Kenya Commercial Bank Limited [2012] eKLR and Jeniffer v Equity Bank of Kenya Limited [2025] KEELC 5740, they argue that this Court cannot expand its jurisdiction to impose institutional liability where neither the Constitution nor statute provides for it. Accordingly, they urge the Court to dismiss the application as legally hollow and unsupported by evidence.
ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION
23. Having reviewed the pleadings on record, the rival submissions, and the relevant authorities, I discern the issue for determination to be whether-
a. The 1st Respondent is in contempt of the Orders of the Court issued on 9th July 2025 by Hon. Justice Mugambi.
24. The applicant raises, as a preliminary issue, the competence and adequacy of the affidavit sworn by Issa Mohammed Mohamud in response to the contempt charge facing the 1st Respondent. In that affidavit, Issa Mohammed Mohamud depones at paragraph 2 that he has been authorised by the office of the Inspector General of Police to swear the replying affidavit “on its behalf.” In doing so, the Respondent seeks, quite ingeniously, to distinguish between the office of the Inspector General and the individual who holds that office. The distinction is artificial. It is also constitutionally untenable.
25. In Akoyo v Permanent Secretary, State Department for Devolution; Attorney General (Interested Party) (Application 440 of 2018) [2023] KEHC 23189 (KLR) (Judicial Review) (6 October 2023) (Ruling) the Court clarified that reference to an office necessarily implicates the individual holding the office-
[66] As to whether the person holding the office of accounting officer to whom reference has been made in section 21(1) of the Government Proceedings Act should be named in the proceedings by his personal name instead of the title attributed to his office, I would simply say that there is no law that supports
the position the respondent has taken. On the contrary, sections 43 and 45 of the Interpretation and General Provisions Act, cap. 2 imply that the officers should be identified by their offices.
[67]. Section 43 is on powers and duties of the holder of an office. It states as follows:
43. Where a written law confers a power or imposes a duty on the holder of an office as such, then, unless a contrary intention appears, the power may be exercised, and the duty shall be performed by the person for the time being holding that office.
26. The order in question was clearly addressed at the Inspector General, that is, the person holding the office and officers subordinate to him. In his response to the charge of contempt, the Inspector General deems it sufficient that the Officer who has administrative authority in the Nairobi region renders his defence and is confident that the affidavit of the subordinate to whom he has delegated operational mandate in the Nairobi Region will exonerate him from the charge. I will therefore accept the affidavit of Issa Mohammed Mohamud as the response the Inspector General offers to the charge of contempt. For the avoidance of doubt, I must also state, with clarity, that contempt is a personal obligation. The choice to respond through a subordinate does not dilute the personal responsibility imposed by the Court’s order.
27. In Pheko and Others v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 2) (CCT19/11) [2015] ZACC 10, the South African Constitutional Court pronounced that-
[32] …in determining contempt in relation to a court order requiring a person or legal entity before it to do or not do something, the following elements need to be established on a balance of probabilities-
a. The must order exist
b. The order must have been duly served on, or brought to the notice of the alleged contemnor
c. There must have been non-compliance with the order; and
d. The non-compliance must have been wilful or mala fide’
28. The Court when to state that
[36] Therefore the presumption rightly exists when the first three elements of the test for contempt have been established, mala fides and wilfulness are presumed unless the contemnor is able to lead sufficient evidence to create reasonable doubt as to their existence.
29. Similarly, the test and elements are well settled in Kenya and was succinctly articulated in Samuel M. N. Mweru & Others v National Land Commission & 2 others [2020] KEHC 9233 (KLR) as follows:
[40]. It is an established principle of law that in order to succeed in civil contempt proceedings, the applicant has to prove (i) the terms of the order, (ii) Knowledge of these terms by the Respondent, (iii). Failure by the Respondent to comply with the terms of the order. Upon proof of these requirements the presence of willfulness and bad faith on the part of the Respondent would normally be inferred, but the Respondent could rebut this inference by contrary proof on a balance of probabilities. Perhaps the most comprehensive of the elements of civil contempt was stated by the learned authors of the book Contempt in Modern New Zealand who succinctly stated:-
"There are essentially four elements that must be proved to make the case for civil contempt. The applicant must prove to the required standard (in civil contempt cases which is higher than civil cases) that:-
i. the terms of the order (or injunction or undertaking) were clear and unambiguous and were binding on the defendant;
ii. the defendant had knowledge of or proper notice of the terms of the order;
iii. the defendant has acted in breach of the terms of the order; and
iv. the defendant's conduct was deliberate.
30. In this case, it is common ground that the Court issued interim orders directed at the Inspector General and requiring that the Inspector General issues ‘ a timely advisory/notice prior to the emergency barricading of roads to allow the Citizens/members of public to plan their activities accordingly.”
31. The 1st respondent was aware of the order as at paragraphs 4 and 5 of the affidavit of Issa Mohammed Mohamud, he states that he understood that-
[4] THAT ….the conservatory order issued by Hon. Lawrence Mugambi on 9th July 2025, did not impose an absolute ban on the police from executing their statutory mandates to mount security checkpoints, road blocks or traffic diversions.
[5] THAT…the true intent and spirit of the court order underscored the operational need for transparency, public predictability and the issuance of prior public notices or advisories whenever pre- planned , structural road closures are contemplated especially during public demonstrations or processions.
32. When this interpretation or understanding by the Inspector General is juxtaposed against what the Court actually said, it is evident that the 1st respondent misinterpreted the Court Order and therefore proceeded to execute his mandate in a manner that aligned with his interpretation of the order and not in accordance with what the Order actually provided. In place of what the Court said requiring that the notice issues prior to the mounting of emergency barricades, the 1st respondent determines he is required to issue advisories whenever ‘pre-planned, structural road closures are contemplated’.
33. The Respondents’ submissions proceed under a fundamental misapprehension; that this case is about the enforcement of Article 37 rights. By reframing the dispute as one concerning unregulated assembly, the Respondents sidestepped the true constitutional question, the citizens’ right to freedom of movement under Article 39, and the Inspector General’s positive duty, imposed by the conservatory order, to issue timely public advisories whenever road closures or restricted access were contemplated. Article 10 reinforces this duty by requiring transparency, accountability, and respect for human rights in all exercises of public power.
34. Issa Mohammed Mohamud attempts to exonerate the Inspector General by urging that there was no notice given of the demonstrations on 25th June 2026 and that, therefore, the reaction of the police was spontaneous and in response to intelligence reports received. If the Inspector General elects to delegate his defence to a subordinate, he must at least ensure that the subordinate is candid. The affidavit before the Court does not reflect candour; it reflects an attempt to distance the Inspector General from facts plainly within his knowledge.
35. It is not disputed that the Inspector General flanked the Cabinet Secretary, at the issuance of a statement on 24th June 2026. In that statement, the Minister stated that the ‘Police’ had received a notification from some citizens who wanted to engage in a public demonstration. This is in the 1st paragraph of the statement, even assuming that the first time the Inspector General was hearing of this was when he was standing there next to the Cabinet Secretary; for our purposes it is sufficient to establish that on the 24th June 2026 ( the day before the planned protests), the Inspector General and his subordinates were aware that there were intended demonstrations.
36. The Cabinet Secretary then went on to caution that the government would not tolerate criminal elements who were bent on exploiting the legitimate protests and advised that the Director of Criminal Investigations was on high alert and that those responsible would face the full force of the law.
37. At paragraph 3 of that statement, the Cabinet Secretary stated that the next day would be a normal business and school day. Children were free to go to school and people to go about their businesses. At the end of reading the statement , the Inspector General retreated alongside the Cabinet Secretary, Kenyans therefore went to sleep knowing that they would go about their normal business the next day.
38. It is therefore disingenuous on the part of the Inspector General’s star witness to now seek to persuade the Court that the decision to erect the road blocks or check points, as asserted, was hurried and unforeseen.
39. The orders of the Court were plain and straighforward. The 1st respondent was required to issue notice, immediately a decision was made to erect check points the Inspector General was required to communicate the same to the public so that the people would in the words of the Court ‘arrange their affairs’. The order of the Court expressly required the notice prior to the ‘emergency barricading’ of roads.
40. Article 244 commands the National Police Service to comply with constitutional standards of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the conservatory order deliberately imposed a positive obligation upon the Inspector General and his subordinates to issue advisories whenever road closures or checkpoints were contemplated. No evidence has been tendered that any attempt, however minimal, was made to notify the public that certain roads would have restricted access. The suggestion that the checkpoints did not hinder movement is untenable; the absence of notice itself constitutes the violation, for citizens cannot meaningfully exercise their freedom of movement when confronted with sudden, unexplained barriers.
41. The order was directed at the Inspector General; the responsibility was his to ensure an advisory was issued; and the Constitution does not permit him to say, “my officers acted on their own.” Operational procedures cannot override a court order, and the failure to issue advisories, despite foreknowledge of restricted movement, constitutes wilful disobedience.
42. I will add that the failure by the Inspector General to personally respond to the charge of contempt is the clearest indication that he did not appreciate the obligation placed upon him to ensure that the Court’s order was complied with. A party who understands the gravity of a court order, and the constitutional weight behind it, does not remain silent when called upon to account for compliance. In the face of a valid and unambiguous order, the Inspector General was expected to demonstrate, with clarity and candour, how he ensured adherence to the Court’s instructions. His silence speaks loudly. It reveals not merely an administrative lapse, but a constitutional failure to grasp that the duty imposed upon him was personal, direct, and non delegable. The Court expected that when confronted with a situation where the police deemed it necessary to erect what the Respondents refer to as “checkpoints,” the Inspector General would personally sign off and confirm that such action complied with the Court’s order. His failure to do so can only be interpreted as non compliance
43. The witness of the Inspector General does not address this salient issue. He offers no explanation of compliance or effort towards compliance.
44. Article 10 of the Constitution binds all State organs to the national values of the rule of law, human dignity, equity, human rights, transparency, and accountability, and these values demand fidelity to judicial authority. The concept of the rule of law lies at the very heart of constitutional governance, for without obedience to judicial orders, the rule of law becomes a hollow promise. Kenyan jurisprudence has consistently affirmed this principle. In Republic v Attorney General & 9 others Ex parte Evanson Jidraph Kamau & another [2014] KEHC 3732 (KLR), the Court held that
…obedience of court orders is a cardinal principle of the rule of law… an order standing good for purposes of enforcement until it is perfected on appeal or review. No matter how judicious an order of the court is, if it is not complied with, it remains a worthless paper directive with no practical effect.
45. This position aligns with Gatharia K. Mutikika v Baharini Farm Ltd [1985] KLR 227, which emphasised the gravity of contempt jurisdiction. South Africa’s Supreme Court of Appeal in Fakie NO v CCII Systems (Pty) Ltd [2006] ZASCA 52 similarly held that compliance with court orders is indispensable to constitutional democracy. This Court therefore approaches the present application with the solemn understanding that its authority must be upheld, not for institutional pride, but to preserve constitutional order.
46. At this moment in our country’s constitutional history, the Court must put its foot down. Article 24 requires that any limitation of rights be reasonable, justifiable, and procedurally fair. Indiscriminate lockdowns of the Central Business District, without notice or justification, cannot be reconciled with constitutional standards. When Court orders are ignored, the Constitution itself is diminished. In Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance v Cabinet Secretary for Devolution and Planning & 3 others [2017] eKLR the court held as follows:
The Court does not, and ought not to be seen to make orders in vain; otherwise the Court would be exposed to ridicule, and no agency of the constitutional order would then be left in place to serve as a guarantee for legality, and for the rights of all people. A Court order is binding on the party against whom it is addressed and until set aside remains valid and is to be complied with.
47. Black’s Law Dictionary (Ninth Edition) defines contempt of court as:-
Conduct that defies the authority or dignity of a court. Because such conduct interferes with the administration of justice, it is punishable usually by fine or imprisonment.
48. As early as 1778, Chief Justice McKean of the United States, when dealing with a case of a party in Civil litigation who refused to answer interrogatories stated:-
Since however, the question seems to resolve itself into this, whether you shall bend to the law, or the law shall bend to you, it is our duty to determine that the former shall be the case.
49. In Johnson Vs Grant (1923) SC 789 at 790 Clyde L J noted:-
The phrase ‘contempt of court’ does not in the least describe the true nature of the class of offence with which we are here concerned.... The offence consists in interfering with the administration of the law; in impending and perverting the course of justice...... it is not the dignity of court which is offended, a petty and misleading view of the issues involved, it is the fundamental supremacy of the law which is challenged.
50. In the case of Teachers Service Commission V Kenya National Union Of Teachers & 2 Others [2013] eKLR Ndolo J ( as she then was ) observed that:-
[38]. The reason why courts will punish for contempt of court then is to safeguard the rule of law which is fundamental in the administration of justice. It has nothing to do with the integrity of the judiciary or the court or even the personal ego of the presiding judge. Neither is it about placating the applicant who moves the court by taking out contempt proceedings. It is about preserving and safeguarding the rule of law.
51. In view of the Inspector General’s failure to comply with a clear, positive order of the Court notwithstanding his foreknowledge of the planned demonstrations, his presence at the press conference where assurances were given that the following day would be a normal day for school going children and business people, the subsequent mounting of roadblocks and checkpoints and the total absence of any attempt to issue advisories, the threshold for contempt is met.
52. I therefore find the Inspector General in contempt of the Order of the Court issued on 9th July 2025 for failing to issue an advisory prior to the emergency barricading of roads. I hereby direct that Douglas Kanja Kirocho attend Court on the 28th of September 2026 for mitigation and sentencing
DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED VIRTUALLY AT NAIROBI THIS 17TH SEPTEMBER 2026