'
The applicant vide a Notice of Motion dated 9 th day of September 2025 expressed to be brought under Articles 49(1)(h); 165(6) & (7) of the Constitution, Sections 123, 362 & 364 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and all other enabling provisions of the law moved this court seeking to have the court grant him the following ORDERS;-
THAT this application be certified as urgent and heard ex parte in the first instance (spent).
THAT this Honourable Court be pleased to grant leave that this Application be heard and determined during the current Court Vacation, the liberty of the Applicant being at stake and it being in the interest of justice that the matter be disposed of without delay (spent).
THAT this Honourable Court be pleased to call for and examine the record of Hon. Dolphina Alego, SRM; in Milimani MCCR E417 of 2025: Republic v Joshua Kimaita Kirera & David Omondi Opondo, and do revise, vary, and/or set aside the bail terms imposed on 15th September 2025.
THAT this Honourable Court be pleased to substitute the said terms with reasonable and affordable-bail conditions, taking into account the favourable pre-bail report, the absence of compelling reasons, and the applicable jurisprudence.
THAT this: Honourable Court do make such further or other orders as may be just and meet in the circumstances.
The application was based on the following grounds;-
THAT the Applicant is the 1st accused person in Milimani Chief Magistrate''s Court Criminal Case No. MCCR E417 of 2025: Republic v Joshua Kimaita Kirera & David Omondi Opondo, wherein he stands charged with the offence of forgery together with other allied counts.
THAT upon his arraignment before the Honourable Dolphina Alego, Senior Resident Magistrate on the 15th day of September 2025, Counsel for the Applicant duly moved the Court for release him on bail pending trial.
THAT the Prosecution did not oppose the said application, nor did it place before the Court any compelling reasons capable of justifying denial of the Applicant''s constitutional entitlement to bail under Article 49(1)(h) of the Constitution.
THAT notwithstanding the absence of prosecutorial opposition, the learned trial Magistrate proceeded to admit the Applicant to bail on onerous terms, to wit, a bond of Kenya Shillings Ten Million (Kshs.10,000,000/=) with three Kenyan sureties of a like sum, or in the alternative, cash bail of Kenya Shillings Five Million (Kshs:5;000,000/=), coupled with a condition for the deposit of the Applicant''s passports in Court
THAT the said bail terms are manifestly harsh, oppressive and unattainable to the Applicant, and therefore constitute in effect a constructive denial of bail, contrary to the letter and spirit of Article 49(1)(h) of the Constitution and Section 123(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code which expressly enjoin Courts to ensure that bail terms are not excessive.
THAT the pre-bail report availed to the Court was overwhelmingly favourable to the Applicant, confirming inter alia that he enjoys strong family and community ties, resides permanently within the jurisdiction of the Court, is of good moral character, has no antecedents of absconding, and is possessed of limited financial means all of which militate against the imposition of excessive terms.
THAT in setting the said terms, the learned trial Magistrate failed to give due and proper consideration to the Applicant''s personal and financial circumstances as disclosed in the pre-bail report, thereby falling into error in principle and in law.
THAT by reason of the impugned order, the Applicant remains in continued incarceration, suffering prejudice, curtailment of liberty, and violation of his fundamental rights and freedoms, despite there being no lawful or compelling basis for the same.
THAT it is a well-settled principle of law that the purpose of bail is to secure the attendance of an accused person at trial and not to inflict punishment prior to conviction; and that bail conditions which are set so high as to be beyond the reach of an accused amount to a denial of bail through the back door.
THAT unless this Honourable Court intervenes in exercise of its supervisory and revisionary jurisdiction under Article 165(6) & (7) of the Constitution, as read with Sections 362 and 364 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the Applicant will continue to endure unlawful and unjust deprivation of his liberty under oppressive bail conditions.
THAT it is in the interests of justice that this Honourable Court intervenes to revise the excessive bail terms imposed on the 15th day of September 2025, and substitute the same with reasonable, affordable, and proportionate terms, sufficient only to secure the Applicant''s attendance at his trial.
The application was unopposed by the office of the DPP. The view taken by Counsel for the state was that the terms are prima facie excessive and unreasonable thus a revision according to them was merited.
The court called for the lower court file in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Section 362 and 365 of the Criminal Procedure Code as read together with Article 165 (6) of the constitution.
The file was placed before this court and upon perusal, this court was able to confirm that indeed on the 15 th September 2025 the learned Honorable magistrate granted bond in the sum of Kshs.10 million plus three sureties of similar amount or in the alternative a cash bail of Kshs.5 Million plus three contact persons of Kenyan citizenship and a further condition that the accused person deposits his passport in court.
It is also important to point out that on the 9 th of September 2025 the learned honorable magistrate called for a pre-bail report in respect of the applicant which report was filed on 15 th September 2025 recommending that the accused be released on bail with reasonable conditions.
This court has perused the pre-bail report and at page 8 of the report, the Probation officer indicates that the applicant’s friend by the name Kinoti was willing to deposit his land Cruiser valued at Kshs.3 Million as security for the release of the applicant.
Further, this court has also noted that Dennis Patrick Kinoti, Gibson Mawelele Walutila and Fredrick Githinji Njogu were willing to offer themselves as guarantors in order to have the accused released from custody. The pre-bail report also confirms that the applicant has an unequivocally undertaken to abide by any conditions of bail that the court may impose.
The applicant in his supporting affidavit sworn on 15 th September 2025 deposed that the terms imposed by the learned honorable magistrate are unreasonably high and that he is unable to meet the same given his personal circumstances.
The applicant further contends that the terms are manifestly excessive, punitive and unattainable and that they essentially amount to a constructive denial of bail against the express provisions of Article 49 (1) (h) as read together with Section 123A of the Criminal Procedure Code.
The primary consideration in determining the issue of bail pending trial is whether the accused person would upon release return to the court for his trial. That consideration overrides all other considerations because if there is no guarantee that an accused person would return to face trial then the trial court would have no reason to release that person because to do so would be tantamount to aiding the accused person to evade trial.
In the case of WATORO –V- REPUBLIC (1991) KLR 220 at P.283 Porter J stated:
“… I think I have made it clear over a number of rulings in bail application that I take the view on authority that the paramount consideration in bail application is whether the Accused will turn up for his trial…”.
Article 49 (1) (h) of the Constitution envisages a situation where bail would be denied only if the prosecution establishes compelling reasons to justify denial of bail. In the instant case the prosecution did not oppose the applicants release on bail therefore it would be safe for this court to presume that the prosecution was satisfied from their own assessment that the applicant would return for his trial in any event
It is the view of this court that considering the position taken by the prosecution the learned honorable magistrate should have been quick to realize that all that was required of the court was to impose reasonable bail terms in the spirit of Article 49 of the Constitution.
The bail granted by a court should be based on an objective assessment by the court as to whether the accused would be able to meet the terms. Bail conditions should not be set in a manner that would render it impossible for an accused person to satisfy the conditions because that would amount to constructive denial of bail.
The applicant in this matter, his family and friends gave tentative indication of terms they could meet to the Probation officer who prepared the pre-bail report.
The record does not show the basis upon which the magistrate settled on the impugned terms that are manifestly over and above those that were suggested in the pre-bail report and it does not appear to me that the trial court gave much thought to the proposals made in the pre-bail report. This would have been important considering the applicant was not considered a flight risk by the state.
It is important to mention here that pre-bail reports should not just be called for without the intention of considering them in arriving at the terms and conditions for bail. Taxpayer’s money is spent in the preparation of those reports therefore they should count for something and if a court calls for a report, then there is a legitimate expectation on the part of the accused person, that the findings in the report would be considered although a court is not bound to adopt the report wholesomely.
It is not open for a court to simply ignore the report and proceed to set terms without giving reasons as to why, in the opinion of the court, the proposals made in the report have been ignored. This approach will promote transparency, integrity and accountability in line with the provisions of Article 10 (2) (b) & (c) of the constitution.
Further, Article 20 (4) of the Constitution enjoins the court in interpreting the Bill of Rights to promote the spirit, purport and the objects of the Bill of Rights.
A trial court that sets up manifestly excessive, unreasonable and unrealistic bail terms defeats the letter, objects and the spirit of Article 49 of the Constitution. Bail terms should be objectively reasonable if the objects of the constitution are to be met.
A trial court should not allow its mind to be clouded by the value of the subject matter in the setting of bail terms although that is a relevant consideration. It must be remembered that the conditions of bail are not meant to be a punishment to be visited upon an accused person because every accused person is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty thus to impose unconscionable terms would amount to pre-conviction punishment.
In Githinji & 2 others v Republic (Miscellaneous Criminal Application E006 of 2025) [2025] KEHC 2599 (KLR) (13 March 2025) (Ruling) Murithi, J had this to say:
“This court had occasion to consider the terms of bond and takes the view that bail/bond terms should not be the exact value of the subject matter of the criminal charge; it should be reasonable and not be punitive. See Cyril Kipruto Serem v Republic [2020] eKLR, that the bond terms are not meant to be “an approximation of the value of the subject matter of the criminal charge. It does not follow that the higher the value of the property subject of the trial the higher the bail bond terms. It is with respect faulty reasoning because, were it so, those poor offenders on charges, for example, of destruction or attempted fraudulent obtaining, of property of high value would never secure hefty bail and bond terms imposed. Terms of bond are not meant to punish the accused for any perceived guilt for the charges levelled against him. Nor are the terms meant to ensure he is detained awaiting trial to avoid his escape or to ensure punishment.”. T his court entirely agrees with the position taken by Murithi, J and in addition observes that there are offences of a grave nature such as murder, terrorism and drug trafficking related offences which on the face of information or a charge sheet may not bear any quantifiable sum of money yet the gravity of those offences cannot be ignored. It therefore makes perfect sense for courts to objectively apply their minds to the case before them, the personal circumstances of the accused and religiously apply the bail and bond guidelines set by the judiciary.
The Bail and Bond Policy Guidelines at paragraph 3.1 (d) underpins the right to reasonable bail and bond terms as follows:-
Bail or bond amounts and conditions shall be reasonable, given the importance of the right to liberty and the presumption of innocence. This means that bail or bond amounts and conditions shall be no more than is necessary to guarantee the appearance of an accused person for trial. Accordingly, bail or bond terms should not be excessive, that is, they should not be far grater than is necessary to guarantee that the accused person will appear for his or her trial. Conversely, bail or bond amounts should not be so low that the accused person would be enticed into forfeiting the bail or bond amount and fleeing. Secondly, bail or bond conditions should be appropriate to the offence committed and take into account the personal circumstances of the accused person. In the circumstances, what is reasonable will be determined by reference to the facts and circumstances prevailing in each case.
The trial court should also bear in mind the provisions of Section 123A of the Criminal Procedure Cod e which provides the matters for consideration in granting bail;-:
a.The nature and seriousness of the offense;
b.The character, antecedents, associations and community ties of the accused;
c.The likelihood of the accused attending court;
d.The public interest, security, and the need to prevent further crime; and
e.The accused person''s ability to meet bail terms.
It is clear under 123A (e) the ability of an accused person to meet bail terms is a key consideration. It follows therefore where an accused person such as the applicant in this case has expressly stated his circumstances and ability the court should not simply ignore that information.
The pre-bail report made it clear what was reasonably available to the applicant to secure his release. Obviously from the record, the learned honorable magistrate did not consider that. If the court had considered the contents of the report the terms and conditions imposed would have certainly been different.
In Kariuki v Republic (Criminal Case E012 of 2024) [2025] KEHC 4580 (KLR) (3 April 2025) (Ruling) the court held that in granting bail/bond, the court must ensure that bail or bond terms must not be excessive or unreasonable and should not be far greater than what is necessary to ensure or guarantee the accused person’s appearance before court.
The jurisdiction of this court under Article 165 (6) of the constitution permits the court to review orders made by a subordinate court to determine their legality, propriety, correctness and regularity. In exercising that power this court finds that the bail terms imposed by the learned honorable magistrate are unreasonably excessive and amount to a constructive denial of bail.
It is the view of this court that the orders are irregular, improper and incorrect for they go against the letter and spirit of Article 49 (1) (h) and Section 123A of the Criminal Procedure Code.
Accordingly, the orders are set aside and in place thereof the applicant shall be admitted to:
a bond of Kshs. 1Million plus one surety of similar amount.
In the alternative the applicant may deposit Cash Bail of KSH. 500,000
The applicant shall avail one of his guarantors who shall execute a personal bond of Kshs.500,000 undertaking to avail the applicant as and when required by the court.
The applicant shall deposit his passport in court
The applicant, his guarantor, his surety shall provide to the court their mobile telephone numbers which they shall retain in use throughout the period of the trial.
It is so ordered.
'
The applicant vide a Notice of Motion dated 9 th day of September 2025 expressed to be brought under Articles 49(1)(h); 165(6) & (7) of the Constitution, Sections 123, 362 & 364 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and all other enabling provisions of the law moved this court seeking to have the court grant him the following ORDERS;-
THAT this application be certified as urgent and heard ex parte in the first instance (spent).
THAT this Honourable Court be pleased to grant leave that this Application be heard and determined during the current Court Vacation, the liberty of the Applicant being at stake and it being in the interest of justice that the matter be disposed of without delay (spent).
THAT this Honourable Court be pleased to call for and examine the record of Hon. Dolphina Alego, SRM; in Milimani MCCR E417 of 2025: Republic v Joshua Kimaita Kirera & David Omondi Opondo, and do revise, vary, and/or set aside the bail terms imposed on 15th September 2025.
THAT this Honourable Court be pleased to substitute the said terms with reasonable and affordable-bail conditions, taking into account the favourable pre-bail report, the absence of compelling reasons, and the applicable jurisprudence.
THAT this: Honourable Court do make such further or other orders as may be just and meet in the circumstances.
The application was based on the following grounds;-
THAT the Applicant is the 1st accused person in Milimani Chief Magistrate''s Court Criminal Case No. MCCR E417 of 2025: Republic v Joshua Kimaita Kirera & David Omondi Opondo, wherein he stands charged with the offence of forgery together with other allied counts.
THAT upon his arraignment before the Honourable Dolphina Alego, Senior Resident Magistrate on the 15th day of September 2025, Counsel for the Applicant duly moved the Court for release him on bail pending trial.
THAT the Prosecution did not oppose the said application, nor did it place before the Court any compelling reasons capable of justifying denial of the Applicant''s constitutional entitlement to bail under Article 49(1)(h) of the Constitution.
THAT notwithstanding the absence of prosecutorial opposition, the learned trial Magistrate proceeded to admit the Applicant to bail on onerous terms, to wit, a bond of Kenya Shillings Ten Million (Kshs.10,000,000/=) with three Kenyan sureties of a like sum, or in the alternative, cash bail of Kenya Shillings Five Million (Kshs:5;000,000/=), coupled with a condition for the deposit of the Applicant''s passports in Court
THAT the said bail terms are manifestly harsh, oppressive and unattainable to the Applicant, and therefore constitute in effect a constructive denial of bail, contrary to the letter and spirit of Article 49(1)(h) of the Constitution and Section 123(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code which expressly enjoin Courts to ensure that bail terms are not excessive.
THAT the pre-bail report availed to the Court was overwhelmingly favourable to the Applicant, confirming inter alia that he enjoys strong family and community ties, resides permanently within the jurisdiction of the Court, is of good moral character, has no antecedents of absconding, and is possessed of limited financial means all of which militate against the imposition of excessive terms.
THAT in setting the said terms, the learned trial Magistrate failed to give due and proper consideration to the Applicant''s personal and financial circumstances as disclosed in the pre-bail report, thereby falling into error in principle and in law.
THAT by reason of the impugned order, the Applicant remains in continued incarceration, suffering prejudice, curtailment of liberty, and violation of his fundamental rights and freedoms, despite there being no lawful or compelling basis for the same.
THAT it is a well-settled principle of law that the purpose of bail is to secure the attendance of an accused person at trial and not to inflict punishment prior to conviction; and that bail conditions which are set so high as to be beyond the reach of an accused amount to a denial of bail through the back door.
THAT unless this Honourable Court intervenes in exercise of its supervisory and revisionary jurisdiction under Article 165(6) & (7) of the Constitution, as read with Sections 362 and 364 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the Applicant will continue to endure unlawful and unjust deprivation of his liberty under oppressive bail conditions.
THAT it is in the interests of justice that this Honourable Court intervenes to revise the excessive bail terms imposed on the 15th day of September 2025, and substitute the same with reasonable, affordable, and proportionate terms, sufficient only to secure the Applicant''s attendance at his trial.
The application was unopposed by the office of the DPP. The view taken by Counsel for the state was that the terms are prima facie excessive and unreasonable thus a revision according to them was merited.
The court called for the lower court file in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Section 362 and 365 of the Criminal Procedure Code as read together with Article 165 (6) of the constitution.
The file was placed before this court and upon perusal, this court was able to confirm that indeed on the 15 th September 2025 the learned Honorable magistrate granted bond in the sum of Kshs.10 million plus three sureties of similar amount or in the alternative a cash bail of Kshs.5 Million plus three contact persons of Kenyan citizenship and a further condition that the accused person deposits his passport in court.
It is also important to point out that on the 9 th of September 2025 the learned honorable magistrate called for a pre-bail report in respect of the applicant which report was filed on 15 th September 2025 recommending that the accused be released on bail with reasonable conditions.
This court has perused the pre-bail report and at page 8 of the report, the Probation officer indicates that the applicant’s friend by the name Kinoti was willing to deposit his land Cruiser valued at Kshs.3 Million as security for the release of the applicant.
Further, this court has also noted that Dennis Patrick Kinoti, Gibson Mawelele Walutila and Fredrick Githinji Njogu were willing to offer themselves as guarantors in order to have the accused released from custody. The pre-bail report also confirms that the applicant has an unequivocally undertaken to abide by any conditions of bail that the court may impose.
The applicant in his supporting affidavit sworn on 15 th September 2025 deposed that the terms imposed by the learned honorable magistrate are unreasonably high and that he is unable to meet the same given his personal circumstances.
The applicant further contends that the terms are manifestly excessive, punitive and unattainable and that they essentially amount to a constructive denial of bail against the express provisions of Article 49 (1) (h) as read together with Section 123A of the Criminal Procedure Code.
The primary consideration in determining the issue of bail pending trial is whether the accused person would upon release return to the court for his trial. That consideration overrides all other considerations because if there is no guarantee that an accused person would return to face trial then the trial court would have no reason to release that person because to do so would be tantamount to aiding the accused person to evade trial.
In the case of WATORO –V- REPUBLIC (1991) KLR 220 at P.283 Porter J stated:
“… I think I have made it clear over a number of rulings in bail application that I take the view on authority that the paramount consideration in bail application is whether the Accused will turn up for his trial…”.
Article 49 (1) (h) of the Constitution envisages a situation where bail would be denied only if the prosecution establishes compelling reasons to justify denial of bail. In the instant case the prosecution did not oppose the applicants release on bail therefore it would be safe for this court to presume that the prosecution was satisfied from their own assessment that the applicant would return for his trial in any event
It is the view of this court that considering the position taken by the prosecution the learned honorable magistrate should have been quick to realize that all that was required of the court was to impose reasonable bail terms in the spirit of Article 49 of the Constitution.
The bail granted by a court should be based on an objective assessment by the court as to whether the accused would be able to meet the terms. Bail conditions should not be set in a manner that would render it impossible for an accused person to satisfy the conditions because that would amount to constructive denial of bail.
The applicant in this matter, his family and friends gave tentative indication of terms they could meet to the Probation officer who prepared the pre-bail report.
The record does not show the basis upon which the magistrate settled on the impugned terms that are manifestly over and above those that were suggested in the pre-bail report and it does not appear to me that the trial court gave much thought to the proposals made in the pre-bail report. This would have been important considering the applicant was not considered a flight risk by the state.
It is important to mention here that pre-bail reports should not just be called for without the intention of considering them in arriving at the terms and conditions for bail. Taxpayer’s money is spent in the preparation of those reports therefore they should count for something and if a court calls for a report, then there is a legitimate expectation on the part of the accused person, that the findings in the report would be considered although a court is not bound to adopt the report wholesomely.
It is not open for a court to simply ignore the report and proceed to set terms without giving reasons as to why, in the opinion of the court, the proposals made in the report have been ignored. This approach will promote transparency, integrity and accountability in line with the provisions of Article 10 (2) (b) & (c) of the constitution.
Further, Article 20 (4) of the Constitution enjoins the court in interpreting the Bill of Rights to promote the spirit, purport and the objects of the Bill of Rights.
A trial court that sets up manifestly excessive, unreasonable and unrealistic bail terms defeats the letter, objects and the spirit of Article 49 of the Constitution. Bail terms should be objectively reasonable if the objects of the constitution are to be met.
A trial court should not allow its mind to be clouded by the value of the subject matter in the setting of bail terms although that is a relevant consideration. It must be remembered that the conditions of bail are not meant to be a punishment to be visited upon an accused person because every accused person is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty thus to impose unconscionable terms would amount to pre-conviction punishment.
In Githinji & 2 others v Republic (Miscellaneous Criminal Application E006 of 2025) [2025] KEHC 2599 (KLR) (13 March 2025) (Ruling) Murithi, J had this to say:
“This court had occasion to consider the terms of bond and takes the view that bail/bond terms should not be the exact value of the subject matter of the criminal charge; it should be reasonable and not be punitive. See Cyril Kipruto Serem v Republic [2020] eKLR, that the bond terms are not meant to be “an approximation of the value of the subject matter of the criminal charge. It does not follow that the higher the value of the property subject of the trial the higher the bail bond terms. It is with respect faulty reasoning because, were it so, those poor offenders on charges, for example, of destruction or attempted fraudulent obtaining, of property of high value would never secure hefty bail and bond terms imposed. Terms of bond are not meant to punish the accused for any perceived guilt for the charges levelled against him. Nor are the terms meant to ensure he is detained awaiting trial to avoid his escape or to ensure punishment.”. T his court entirely agrees with the position taken by Murithi, J and in addition observes that there are offences of a grave nature such as murder, terrorism and drug trafficking related offences which on the face of information or a charge sheet may not bear any quantifiable sum of money yet the gravity of those offences cannot be ignored. It therefore makes perfect sense for courts to objectively apply their minds to the case before them, the personal circumstances of the accused and religiously apply the bail and bond guidelines set by the judiciary.
The Bail and Bond Policy Guidelines at paragraph 3.1 (d) underpins the right to reasonable bail and bond terms as follows:-
Bail or bond amounts and conditions shall be reasonable, given the importance of the right to liberty and the presumption of innocence. This means that bail or bond amounts and conditions shall be no more than is necessary to guarantee the appearance of an accused person for trial. Accordingly, bail or bond terms should not be excessive, that is, they should not be far grater than is necessary to guarantee that the accused person will appear for his or her trial. Conversely, bail or bond amounts should not be so low that the accused person would be enticed into forfeiting the bail or bond amount and fleeing. Secondly, bail or bond conditions should be appropriate to the offence committed and take into account the personal circumstances of the accused person. In the circumstances, what is reasonable will be determined by reference to the facts and circumstances prevailing in each case.
The trial court should also bear in mind the provisions of Section 123A of the Criminal Procedure Cod e which provides the matters for consideration in granting bail;-:
a.The nature and seriousness of the offense;
b.The character, antecedents, associations and community ties of the accused;
c.The likelihood of the accused attending court;
d.The public interest, security, and the need to prevent further crime; and
e.The accused person''s ability to meet bail terms.
It is clear under 123A (e) the ability of an accused person to meet bail terms is a key consideration. It follows therefore where an accused person such as the applicant in this case has expressly stated his circumstances and ability the court should not simply ignore that information.
The pre-bail report made it clear what was reasonably available to the applicant to secure his release. Obviously from the record, the learned honorable magistrate did not consider that. If the court had considered the contents of the report the terms and conditions imposed would have certainly been different.
In Kariuki v Republic (Criminal Case E012 of 2024) [2025] KEHC 4580 (KLR) (3 April 2025) (Ruling) the court held that in granting bail/bond, the court must ensure that bail or bond terms must not be excessive or unreasonable and should not be far greater than what is necessary to ensure or guarantee the accused person’s appearance before court.
The jurisdiction of this court under Article 165 (6) of the constitution permits the court to review orders made by a subordinate court to determine their legality, propriety, correctness and regularity. In exercising that power this court finds that the bail terms imposed by the learned honorable magistrate are unreasonably excessive and amount to a constructive denial of bail.
It is the view of this court that the orders are irregular, improper and incorrect for they go against the letter and spirit of Article 49 (1) (h) and Section 123A of the Criminal Procedure Code.
Accordingly, the orders are set aside and in place thereof the applicant shall be admitted to:
a bond of Kshs. 1Million plus one surety of similar amount.
In the alternative the applicant may deposit Cash Bail of KSH. 500,000
The applicant shall avail one of his guarantors who shall execute a personal bond of Kshs.500,000 undertaking to avail the applicant as and when required by the court.
The applicant shall deposit his passport in court
The applicant, his guarantor, his surety shall provide to the court their mobile telephone numbers which they shall retain in use throughout the period of the trial.
It is so ordered.
'