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JudgmentJEREMIAH ONG'AYO OKENYE AND ANN KWAMBOKA AND 7 Others VS ERICK KOECH12 min read

JEREMIAH ONG'AYO OKENYE AND ANN KWAMBOKA AND 7 Others VS ERICK KOECH

Environment and Land Court at Nakuru Environment and Land Court · · Antony O. Ombwayo

'BRIEF FACTS
The Applicants filed the instant application dated 15th April, 2025 seeking orders that  pending the hearing and determination of this suit, the Honourable be pleased to grant a temporary injunction against the Defendant/Respondent restraining Defendant/Respondent by himself his agents, servants and/or any person acting on behalf of the Defendant/Respondent from trespassing onto, committing acts of waste, cultivating and/or doing any form of farming, erecting permanent and/or temporary structures and/or interfering with the quiet and peaceful possession of the Plaintiffs/Applicants on the suit properties known as Njoro/Ngata Blocks 27/97, 27/98, 27/101, 27/104, 27/106, 27/110, 27/112, 27/113, 27/115, 27/116 and 27/117.
Moreover, that pending the hearing and determination of this Suit, this Honourable court be pleased to grant a temporary injunction against the Defendant/Respondent restraining the Defendant/Respondent by his agents, servants and/or any person acting on behalf of Defendant/Respondent from interfering and/or blocking the ingress and egress of the 3rd and 4th Plaintiffs/Applicants and/or their servants’ visitors from their suit property known as Njoro/Ngata Block 27/101 on foot or by use of a motor vehicle.
Furthermore, the applicants pray that pending the hearing and determination of this suit, this Honourable Court be pleased to grant a mandatory injunction against the Defendant/Respondent, his agents, servants and/or employees directing and/or compelling the Defendant/Respondent by himself, his agents, servants, employees and/or any person acting on behalf of the Defendant/Respondent to vacate forthwith from the Plaintiffs/Applicants several parcels of land known as Njoro/Ngata Blocks 27/97, 27/98, 27/101, 27/104, 27/106, 27/110, 27/113, 27/115, 27/116 and 27/117. Lastly, that the Officer Commanding, Menengai Police Station to ensure compliance of the court order issued herein and that costs of this application be provided for.
The Application is based on grounds set out and supported by the affidavit of Enoch Kipruto Saibei the 1st Applicant herein sworn on 15th April, 2025. He stated that vide a judgment issued in Nakuru ELC No. 410 of 2013 himself and the 2nd Applicant were declared as the legal owners of L.R No. 13287/45 (I.R No. 50175). He further stated that they processed registration and the land was converted to the RLA registered as Njoro/Ngata Block 27/6 and a transfer effected in their favour on 14th October, 2021. He stated that the entire parcel was later sub divided and transfers effected to individual purchasers.
He also stated that he was registered as the legal owner of Njoro/Ngata Block 27/112 and the 2nd Applicant as owner of L.R No. 27/116. He added that the 3rd to 9th Applicants were purchasers. He went on to state that he has been in occupation of the suit parcel for more than 12 years until on diverse dates between 31st January, 2025 and 9th February, 2025 the Respondent unlawfully invaded his parcel. He stated that the Respondent constructed an iron sheet structure at the suit parcel used by goons to guard the suit land. He stated that they filed a suit being Nakuru ELC No. E045 of 2025 which they later withdrew due to lack of jurisdiction. He stated that since withdrawal of the suit, the Respondent has been cultivating the land and evicted the Applicant and his family from the suit parcel. He further stated that the destruction of his properties should not be allowed. The applicants have title deeds which can only be revoked by the court. He went on to state that they have been deprived their properties without being heard and thus been subjected to mental anguish. He urged the court in the interest of justice to allow the application as prayed.
Response
The Respondent filed a replying affidavit sworn on 5th May, 2025 where he averred that the application was an abuse of the court process. He averred that he was in occupation of the suit property by virtue of being an employee. He further averred that Laban Kiptui (deceased) was the registered owner of the suit parcel. He averred that he has since planted maize on the land. He went on to aver that the Applicants had sued him in Nakuru ELC E045 of 2025 and his advocate while tracing the documents leading to issuance of the title to the Applicants established that the suit property had been subdivided. He averred that if the 1st and 2nd Applicants had been procedurally been issued with the title, the Land Registrar should have issued and forwarded a lease but that was not the case. He averred that the Applicants’ fraudulently acquired the suit land which was still under investigations by the DCI. He averred that the Applicants relied on the decree in Nakuru ELC 410 of 2013 and Judicial Review 463 of 2017 to legitimize their ownership of the suit property. He added that the estate of Laban Kiptui (deceased) was not a party to the above cases thus not bound by the decree. He averred that the Appellants contend that they bought the suit property from the deceased but Ms Mary Kiptui denied that the sale agreement and transfer forms were signed by the deceased. He also averred that the sale agreement and transfer was the basis to which the 1st and 2nd Applicants were declared as the owners of the property. He averred that there was no evidence from the land registry of how the Applicants acquired the suit property. He denied any form of destruction on the suit property and added that he has been in occupation. He averred that there was need for the court to conduct a site visit so as to establish the status of the land. He also averred that should the court be inclined to grant the injunctive orders, the Applicants should be ordered to deposit security for costs equivalent to the suit parcel current value. He averred that the Applicants failed to meet the threshold for award of the temporary injunction as sought.        
Submissions
Counsel for the Applicant filed his submissions dated 1st September, 2025. He submits that the Respondent had not produced any copy of Letters of Administration issued to Mrs. Mary Kiptui. He further submits that the Respondent was using the alleged Mrs. Mary as a ploy to justify his unlawful acts of destruction of the suit properties. It was his submission that the Respondent had not attached any document to support existence of the alleged Estate of Laban Kiptui. He added that the Respondent was an inter-meddler described under Section 45 of Succession Act. He relied on the case of Kamau Mucha V Ripples Ltd -Civil Application No. I86 of 1992 (Nai 77/92 UR). He submits that the Respondent is a trespasser who ought not to be allowed to benefit from the said acts of destruction on the suit property. He also submits that the Title Deeds held by the Applicants pursuant to Section 26 of the Land Act is a prima facie evidence of ownership. Counsel submits that it would be unjust to allow the Respondent to cling under the disguise of the status quo orders.
Analysis and Determination
This court has considered the application and supporting affidavit and is of the view that the main issue for determination is whether the Applicants are entitled to an order of temporary injunction. And mandatory injunction. 
The principles upon which the court should grant an injunction were set out in the case of Giella V Cassman Brown & Company Ltd 1973 EA 358 as follows:
“First, the applicant must show that he has a prima facie case with a probability of success. Secondly, an interlocutory injunction will not normally be granted unless the applicant might otherwise suffer irreparable injury which would not adequately be compensated by damages. Thirdly, if the court is in doubt, it will decide the application on a balance of convenience.”
In the case of Mrao V First American Bank of Kenya Limited (2003) eKLR Bosire JA (as he then was) stated as follows:
“A prima facie case is one which on the material presented to the court a tribunal properly directing itself will conclude that there exists a right which has apparently been infringed by the opposite party as to call for an explanation or rebuttal from the latter”
This court finds that the applicants have proved that the Respondent evicted them from the suit land and forcibly and violently took possession. The photographic evidence on record shows that the respondent used a lot of violence to evict the applicants who had been utilizing the land. There is evidence of a permanent house on the suit property where one of the applicants is residing but there is interference with his entry and exit.
There is evidence of a new iron sheet shed structure constructed by the respondent and that the respondent has since been cultivating the land.
The Respondent contends that he was in occupation of the suit land which belonged to the estate of Laban Kiptui (deceased). However, the wantom destruction of the property shows otherwise that respondent is an invader because if he has been in possession why would he destroy the fence and the trees.
He added that he was the employee of the deceased’s estate of Laban Mutai and denied any invasion of the suit property. This court has perused the court record and it is a fact that there is a copy of title of the suit land registered in the joint names of the Applicants. The Respondent alleges that the Applicants fraudulently acquired the suit land. However, according to the respondent, the property does not belong to him but a deceased person who is not a party and there is no evidence that the respondent is the administrator of the estate.
It is this court’s view that the applicants have demonstrated that they are the registered owners of the properties in dispute and that they were violently evicted from the suit parcel of land.
The Deputy Registrar on 26th June, 2025 conducted a site visit and from her report, it is clear that a larger part of the suit property was occupied by the Defendant who had planted barley while on the smaller part of the suit parcel, the 3rd Applicant’s had built his permanent home. However, there is sufficient evidence that the respondent used force in January 2025 to evict the applicants who were in possession pursuant to an order made by this court on 14th July 2016.
The law on mandatory injunctions is now settled.    There is a significant distinction  between the prohibitory injunction as envisaged in the “Locus Classicus” case of “Giella – Versus -  Cassman Brown, 1973 E.A. Page 358 and a Mandatory Injunction.
In the case of “Shepard Homes – Versus – Sandham (1970) 3 WLR Pg. 356 Case”  Megarry .J as he then was stated follows:-
“Whereas a Prohibitory Injunction merely requires abstention from acting, a Mandatory Injunction requires the taking of positive steps, and may require the dismantling or destruction of something already erected, or constructed. This will result in a consequent waste of time, money and materials. If it is ultimately established that the Defendant was entitled to retain the erection”.
It is trite that a Permanent Injunction fully determines the right of the Parties before the Court and is normally meant to perpetually restrain the commission of an act by the Plaintiff in order for the rights of the Plaintiff to be protected. This relief is given only after full hearing.
On the issue of mandatory injunction,  the Honorable Court must be very cautious and wary that the matter before court is not only an application for mandatory injunction, but is one which, if granted would amount to the grant of a major part of the relief claimed in the action. Such applications should be approached with great circumspect and caution and the relief granted only in a clear case lest the suit is finalized at the interlocutory stage and there is nothing left to be heard and determined at the chagrin of the opposing party. Certainly, that would not be equity, fair and just at all to the other party.
The circumstances under which the Court would grant a Mandatory Injunction was well stated out by the Court of Appeal in the Case of “Malier Unissa Karim –Versus - Edward Oluoch Odumbe (2015) eKLR as follows:-
“The test for granting a Mandatory Injunction is different from that enunciated in the “Giella –Versus - Cassman Brown case which is the locus classicus case of Prohibitory Injunctions. The threshold in Mandatory is higher than the case of Prohibitory Injunction and the Court of Appeal in the case of “Kenya Breweries Ltd-Vs- Washington Okeyo (2002) EA 109” had the occasion to discuss and consider the principles that govern the grant of a Mandatory Injunction was correctly stated in Vol. 24 Halsbury Laws of England 4th Edition Paragraph 948 which states as follows:-
“A Mandatory Injunction can be granted on an interlocutory application as well as at the hearing but in the absence of special circumstances, it will not normally be granted. However, it the case is clear and one which the Court thinks ought to be decided at once or if the act done is simple and summary one which can be easily remedied, or if the Defendant attempts to steal a match on the Plaintiff, a Mandatory Injunction will be granted on an Interlocutory application”.
The  Court of Appeal in the case of “Jay Super Power Cash and Carry Ltd –Versus - Nairobi City Council and 20 others CA 111/2002” held that:-
“This Court has recognized and held in the past that it is the trespasser who should give way pending the determination of the dispute and it is no answer that the alleged acts of trespass are compensable in damages. A wrong doer cannot keep what he has taken balance he can pay for it”.
The 24th  Halsbury Laws of England, Page 248, the case of Locabail International Finance Limited -  Versus -  Agro Export and others (1986) All ER 906, the court held thus:-
‘A mandatory injunction can be granted on an interlocutory application as well as at the hearing, but in the absence of special circumstances, it will not normally be granted. However, if the case is clear and one which the court thinks ought to be decided at once, or if the act done is a simple and summary one which can easily be remedies, or if the Defendant attempted to steal a march on the Plaintiff… ……..a Mandatory injunction will be granted on an interlocutory application.’
The basis for this rule on granting of Mandatory Injunction is plain. Megarry .J put is succinctly in a subsequent passage in the case of “Shepard Homes Case (Supra) as follows:-
“…..if mandatory injunction is granted on motion, there will be normally no question of granting a further mandatory injunction at the trial; what is done and the Plaintiff has, on motion, obtained once and for all the demolition or destruction that he seeks. Where an injunction is prohibitory, however, there will often still be a question at the trail whether the injunction should be dissolved or contained”
I have considered the evidence on record and the rival submissions and do find that the respondent took the law into his own hands by invading the property in dispute and evicting the applicants without following the laid down procedure. The property is registered in the names of the plaintiffs and not the defendant. The defendant alleges that he is an employee of the estate of the owner of the property but has not annexed to the affidavit the letters of administration intestate in respect of the said estate of Laban Kiptui issued to Mary Kiptui. The applicants have in their possession a decree of this court declaring that the property belongs to them .
In conclusion, I do find that the applicant have satisfied the court for the grant of mandatory injunction and I do order that pending the hearing of the suit, a mandatory injunction against the Defendant/Respondent, his agents, servants and/or employees directing and/or compelling the Defendant/Respondent by himself, his agents, servants, employees and/or any person acting on behalf of the Defendant/Respondent to vacate from the Plaintiffs/Applicants several parcels of land known as Njoro/Ngata Blocks 27/97, 27/98, 27/101, 27/104, 27/106, 27/110, 27/113, 27/115, 27/116 and 27/117 within the next 30 days and that the plaintiffs be put back in possession. That means, the status quo ante, to be maintained. The costs of the application to be in the cause.
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