Ruling in Janswat Singh Rai & 3 Others vs Attorney General & 5 OthersPetition No. E004 of 2026
REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA AT BUSIA
PETITION NO. E004 OF 2026
JASWANT SINGH RAI ......................................................1 ST PETITIONER
TEJVEER SINGH RAI .......................................................2 ND PETITIONER
ONKAR SINGH RAI ..........................................................3 RD PETITIONER
WEST KENYA SUGAR COMPANY ..................................4 TH PETITIONER
VERSUS
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL……..…..………………..….1 ST RESPONDENT
DIRECTORATE OF PUBLIC PROSECUTION …………2 ND RESPONDENT
KENYA NATIONAL HIGHWAYS AUTHORITY………....3 RD RESPONDENT
GOKHAN & MASTERSPACE JV LTD ………………….4 TH RESPONDENT
BOGE RAGAMA ……..……………………...........……….5 TH RESPONDENT
LYDIA IKONGE MASAKI ……..………………….……….6 TH RESPONDENT
RULING
1. The matter before Court concerns the constitutional challenge mounted by the Petitioners against the enforcement of provisions of the Traffic Act, Cap. 403, and particularly section 55(2) as read together with section 58(1) and (2), in relation to the use of laden tractors and trailers on public roads.
2. The 1 st , 2 nd and 3 rd Petitioners distinguish themselves from the 4 th Petitioner, West Kenya Sugar Company, by describing themselves as shareholders and/or directors of the 4 th Petitioner. The 4 th Petitioner is a corporate entity and has, throughout the proceedings, remained a distinct party from the individual Petitioners.
3. The Court has previously issued temporary conservatory orders. It is important, at the outset, to identify the beneficiaries and scope of those orders.
CONTEMPT APPLICATION
4. With regard to the contempt application dated 24 th July 2026, this Court recalls that the temporary conservatory orders were issued for the exclusive benefit of the 1 st , 2 nd and 3 rd Petitioners. Those orders did not purport to speak for, or extend protection to, the 4 th Petitioner.
5. The 1 st , 2 nd and 3 rd Petitioners have consistently distinguished themselves from the 4 th Petitioner. They describe themselves as shareholders and directors of the corporate entity. It therefore cannot simultaneously be asserted that the 4 th Petitioner is a separate corporate personality for purposes of the Petition and, at the same time, that it automatically enjoys orders issued to the individual Petitioners.
6. The Court has also not been presented with satisfactory proof of the existence, ownership and operational status of the alleged fleet of 2,000 tractors. The assertion that there are 2,000 tractors, whether owned by the 4 th Petitioner or otherwise, remains an assertion which has not been satisfactorily demonstrated by evidence placed before Court.
7. The germane issue giving rise to the contempt application is the incident of 9 th June 2026 involving tractor registration number KTTC 744A/ZE98SS, laden with sugarcane crop, at Kemodo along the Busia-Mumias road.
8. The tractor was alleged to have contravened sections 55 and 56 of the Traffic Act and the applicable Traffic Rules in respect of loading of the vehicle. The dimension report recorded, inter alia, that the right-hand projection was 0.75 metres and the left-hand projection was 2.25 metres, with the issue of exemption from those projections being raised.
9. The tractor was thereafter offloaded in an effort to achieve axle-load compliance. There was also a direction that the tractor be impounded and moved to the Busia weighbridge holding yard.
10. The vehicle dimension report identifies the owner of the tractor as the 4 th Petitioner. It does not identify the owner of the John Deke tractor or trailer in issue.
11. The relevant report is signed by persons alleged to be contemnors, some of whom are not substantial parties to these proceedings. Eventually, a notice to attend Court was issued to Earnes Mukoya Wakhanu for 12 th June 2026.
12. The alleged contravention of the Traffic Act was therefore a matter concerning the 4 th Petitioner and its driver and not the 1 st , 2 nd and 3 rd Petitioners personally.
13. The Court must clarify that, the orders upon which the contempt proceedings were founded were temporary orders pending the hearing and determination of the application. The orders were issued ex-parte by my predecessor brother judge and were not issued by this Court.
14. There is an old adage that "one cannot speak from both sides of the mouth." The 1 st , 2 nd and 3 rd Petitioners distinguish themselves from the 4 th Petitioner and have not purported to speak for it. The 4 th Petitioner was not the beneficiary of the temporary conservatory orders.
15. The ex-parte application upon which the conservatory orders were issued was presented principally in respect of the rights and protection of the individual Petitioners. The orders cannot, without more, be extended to a corporate entity which was not the beneficiary of the protection granted.
16. The impugned act of 9 th June 2026 did not cite or prosecute the 1 st , 2 nd or 3 rd Petitioners. It dealt with the 4 th Petitioner and its driver.
17. The Court directed the 1 st , 2 nd and 3 rd Petitioners to present to Court Mr. Earnes Mukoya Wakhanu. They did not do so. In the circumstances, the Court was entitled to take note of what appears to have been an arms-length approach to an incident directly concerning the 4 th Petitioner.
18. The central contest emerging from the contempt proceedings is whether a tractor, when in use on a public road with a trailer, is subject to the Traffic Act and whether the manner in which it is loaded exposes other road users to an extreme risk of accidents.
19. This question cannot be answered by merely invoking the corporate personality of the 4 th Petitioner. It raises a legitimate public-interest question as to the responsibility attaching to persons who control or direct a business whose vehicles are alleged to be operating in a manner that may endanger other road users.
20. The Court is not, however, at this stage making a final finding of individual criminal culpability against any of the Petitioners. That question must be determined in accordance with the evidence and the applicable law.
SERVICE AND EXTRACTION OF THE ORDERS
21. There is another fundamental difficulty with the contempt application.
22. No satisfactory evidence has been demonstrated that the conservatory order relied upon was extracted and served together with the requisite penal notice upon the persons alleged to have disobeyed it.
23. The requirement that an order forming the foundation of contempt proceedings be properly extracted and served, together with a penal notice where required, is not a mere technicality. It serves the important purpose of establishing knowledge of the order and informing the alleged contemnor of the consequences of non-compliance.
24. In the absence of satisfactory proof of service of the order and the penal notice, the foundation of the contempt application is materially defective.
25. I therefore find that, the failure to demonstrate proper extraction and service of the order is fatal to the contempt application.
26. The rights being enjoyed pursuant to the temporary conservatory orders had nothing to do with the 4 th Petitioner. Consequently, the 4 th Petitioner cannot rely upon those orders as a shield against lawful enforcement of the Traffic Act.
27. The contempt application dated 24 th July 2026 is therefore without merit and is dismissed.
THE STATUS OF THE 4 TH PETITIONER
28. The Court must now return to the substantive question arising from the Petition.
29. The 4 th Petitioner has, in effect, remained disinterested in the contestation over the conservatory orders while continuing to operate its alleged fleet of tractors.
30. This Court is concerned by the assertion that the 4 th Petitioner operates a fleet of approximately 2,000 tractors on public roads while simultaneously contesting the application of the Traffic Act to such vehicles.
31. The 4 th Petitioner is expected by law to fully comply with all laws governing the operation of its tractors and trailers on public roads. It is not permissible for a corporate entity to enjoy the economic benefits of operating a large commercial fleet while disregarding statutory requirements intended to protect public infrastructure and other road users.
32. The 4 th Petitioner must not expose the larger public to risks of accidents arising from unlawful or dangerous loading.
33. The arguments concerning the constitutionality of the relevant provisions of the Traffic Act can properly be undertaken at the hearing of the Petition.
34. Until a competent Court determines otherwise, statutory provisions enjoy the presumption of constitutionality and remain valid and enforceable.
35. The Petitioners cannot therefore obtain, merely by filing a constitutional challenge, a licence for the 4 th Petitioner to disregard provisions of the Traffic Act.
CORPORATE VEIL AND INDIVIDUAL CULPABILITY
36. A further question arising from the Petition is whether directors and shareholders of a body corporate can escape individual culpability where the corporate business is alleged to be deliberately refusing to comply with the law.
37. The Court does not at this stage answer that question finally. It is, however, a legitimate constitutional and statutory question raised by the circumstances of this Petition.
38. Another question arising is whether the corporate veil may automatically be lifted by a law-enforcement officer purporting to enforce the Traffic Act or the Kenya Roads Act, with the involvement of the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions, or whether such a step requires the intervention or sanction of a Court.
39. These are substantial questions which require proper consideration at the hearing of the Petition.
40. A corporate body enjoys legal rights and corresponding obligations. It is expected to comply with tax laws, labour laws, environmental laws and other regulatory requirements and to conduct itself as a responsible participant in society.
41. Where, however, a corporate entity is alleged to be acting in a manner that destroys public assets or exposes members of the public to a risk of accidents, the law must provide an effective mechanism for enforcement and accountability.
42. The mere existence of a corporate personality cannot be used as an automatic shield against lawful enforcement. Equally, the corporate veil cannot be disregarded arbitrarily or merely because a law-enforcement officer considers it convenient to do so.
43. That issue shall be determined upon the full hearing of the Petition.
PUBLIC INTEREST
44. The Court has balanced the interests of the Petitioners against the public interest.
45. The issue before Court is not merely a private commercial dispute. It concerns enforcement of traffic laws, protection of public roads and the safety of other road users.
46. The Court must therefore be careful not to issue orders that may have the effect of preventing the State from performing its constitutional and statutory duties while the legality of those duties is being challenged.
47. At the same time, the Court remains conscious that constitutional rights must be protected and that enforcement agencies must act within the law.
48. I therefore find that there are real and substantial constitutional issues requiring determination, including:
a. whether the provisions of the Traffic Act complained of apply to tractors and trailers in the circumstances presented by the Petitioners;
b. whether such provisions are constitutionally compliant;
c. whether directors and shareholders of the 4th Petitioner may incur individual criminal culpability for alleged offences involving the company's vehicles;
d. whether and in what circumstances the corporate veil may be lifted in enforcement of the Traffic Act and Kenya Roads Act; and
e. whether the manner in which the Respondents have undertaken enforcement violates any of the Petitioners' constitutional rights.
49. These questions cannot appropriately be conclusively determined at the interlocutory stage.
50. I am therefore constrained to maintain conservatory protection in favour of the 1 st , 2 nd and 3 rd Petitioners exclusively, while making it clear that such protection does not extend to the 4 th Petitioner.
ORDERS
51. Consequently, and for the reasons set out above, the Court makes the following orders:
a. The contempt application dated 24 th July 2026 is hereby dismissed.
b. For avoidance of doubt, the temporary conservatory orders previously issued by the Court were for the exclusive benefit of the 1 st , 2 nd and 3 rd Petitioners and did not extend to the 4 th Petitioner.
c. A conservatory order of prohibition is hereby issued restraining the Respondents from summoning, arresting or prosecuting the 1 st , 2 nd and 3 rd Petitioners over alleged contraventions of the Traffic Act and/or the Kenya Roads Act arising from allegations of using a laden tractor on a public road with dimensions exceeding the maximum provided by law, contrary to section 55(2) as read together with section 58(1) and (2) of the Traffic Act, pending the hearing and determination of the Petition.
d. Any ongoing criminal traffic prosecution against the 1 st , 2 nd and 3 rd Petitioners, whether exclusively or jointly with tractor drivers, arising from the matters complained of in this Petition, shall remain stayed pending the hearing and determination of the Petition.
e. For avoidance of doubt, the Orders in paragraphs 3 and 4 above do not extend to the 4 th Petitioner, its tractors, trailers, employees or drivers merely by reason of their association with the 1 st , 2 nd or 3 rd Petitioners.
f. The 4 th Petitioner shall fully comply with all laws relating to the operation of its fleet of tractors and trailers on public roads.
g. The 4 th Petitioner shall not operate its vehicles in a manner that exposes other road users or members of the public to avoidable risks of accidents.
h. Nothing in this ruling shall be construed as determining the constitutionality or otherwise of the impugned provisions of the Traffic Act. Those questions shall be determined upon the hearing of the Petition.
i. All the Petitioners shall file and serve their written submissions in support of the Petition within twenty-one (21) days from the date hereof.
j. The Respondents shall have a corresponding twenty-one (21) days thereafter within which to file and serve their written submissions in opposition to the Petition.
k. The Petition shall be mentioned after forty-two (42) days, or thereafter, for purposes of confirming compliance and fixing a date for judgment.
l. There shall be no order as to costs, the Court bearing in mind that the subject matter concerns enforcement, protection and enjoyment of fundamental rights and freedoms under the Constitution.
Orders accordingly.
Signed, Delivered Virtually on Teams platform
On this 17 th day of July , 2026
________________________
Hon. Mohochi S.M
Presiding Judge
Page 1 of 8
REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA AT BUSIA
PETITION NO. E004 OF 2026
JASWANT SINGH RAI ......................................................1 ST PETITIONER
TEJVEER SINGH RAI .......................................................2 ND PETITIONER
ONKAR SINGH RAI ..........................................................3 RD PETITIONER
WEST KENYA SUGAR COMPANY ..................................4 TH PETITIONER
VERSUS
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL……..…..………………..….1 ST RESPONDENT
DIRECTORATE OF PUBLIC PROSECUTION …………2 ND RESPONDENT
KENYA NATIONAL HIGHWAYS AUTHORITY………....3 RD RESPONDENT
GOKHAN & MASTERSPACE JV LTD ………………….4 TH RESPONDENT
BOGE RAGAMA ……..……………………...........……….5 TH RESPONDENT
LYDIA IKONGE MASAKI ……..………………….……….6 TH RESPONDENT
RULING
1. The matter before Court concerns the constitutional challenge mounted by the Petitioners against the enforcement of provisions of the Traffic Act, Cap. 403, and particularly section 55(2) as read together with section 58(1) and (2), in relation to the use of laden tractors and trailers on public roads.
2. The 1 st , 2 nd and 3 rd Petitioners distinguish themselves from the 4 th Petitioner, West Kenya Sugar Company, by describing themselves as shareholders and/or directors of the 4 th Petitioner. The 4 th Petitioner is a corporate entity and has, throughout the proceedings, remained a distinct party from the individual Petitioners.
3. The Court has previously issued temporary conservatory orders. It is important, at the outset, to identify the beneficiaries and scope of those orders.
CONTEMPT APPLICATION
4. With regard to the contempt application dated 24 th July 2026, this Court recalls that the temporary conservatory orders were issued for the exclusive benefit of the 1 st , 2 nd and 3 rd Petitioners. Those orders did not purport to speak for, or extend protection to, the 4 th Petitioner.
5. The 1 st , 2 nd and 3 rd Petitioners have consistently distinguished themselves from the 4 th Petitioner. They describe themselves as shareholders and directors of the corporate entity. It therefore cannot simultaneously be asserted that the 4 th Petitioner is a separate corporate personality for purposes of the Petition and, at the same time, that it automatically enjoys orders issued to the individual Petitioners.
6. The Court has also not been presented with satisfactory proof of the existence, ownership and operational status of the alleged fleet of 2,000 tractors. The assertion that there are 2,000 tractors, whether owned by the 4 th Petitioner or otherwise, remains an assertion which has not been satisfactorily demonstrated by evidence placed before Court.
7. The germane issue giving rise to the contempt application is the incident of 9 th June 2026 involving tractor registration number KTTC 744A/ZE98SS, laden with sugarcane crop, at Kemodo along the Busia-Mumias road.
8. The tractor was alleged to have contravened sections 55 and 56 of the Traffic Act and the applicable Traffic Rules in respect of loading of the vehicle. The dimension report recorded, inter alia, that the right-hand projection was 0.75 metres and the left-hand projection was 2.25 metres, with the issue of exemption from those projections being raised.
9. The tractor was thereafter offloaded in an effort to achieve axle-load compliance. There was also a direction that the tractor be impounded and moved to the Busia weighbridge holding yard.
10. The vehicle dimension report identifies the owner of the tractor as the 4 th Petitioner. It does not identify the owner of the John Deke tractor or trailer in issue.
11. The relevant report is signed by persons alleged to be contemnors, some of whom are not substantial parties to these proceedings. Eventually, a notice to attend Court was issued to Earnes Mukoya Wakhanu for 12 th June 2026.
12. The alleged contravention of the Traffic Act was therefore a matter concerning the 4 th Petitioner and its driver and not the 1 st , 2 nd and 3 rd Petitioners personally.
13. The Court must clarify that, the orders upon which the contempt proceedings were founded were temporary orders pending the hearing and determination of the application. The orders were issued ex-parte by my predecessor brother judge and were not issued by this Court.
14. There is an old adage that "one cannot speak from both sides of the mouth." The 1 st , 2 nd and 3 rd Petitioners distinguish themselves from the 4 th Petitioner and have not purported to speak for it. The 4 th Petitioner was not the beneficiary of the temporary conservatory orders.
15. The ex-parte application upon which the conservatory orders were issued was presented principally in respect of the rights and protection of the individual Petitioners. The orders cannot, without more, be extended to a corporate entity which was not the beneficiary of the protection granted.
16. The impugned act of 9 th June 2026 did not cite or prosecute the 1 st , 2 nd or 3 rd Petitioners. It dealt with the 4 th Petitioner and its driver.
17. The Court directed the 1 st , 2 nd and 3 rd Petitioners to present to Court Mr. Earnes Mukoya Wakhanu. They did not do so. In the circumstances, the Court was entitled to take note of what appears to have been an arms-length approach to an incident directly concerning the 4 th Petitioner.
18. The central contest emerging from the contempt proceedings is whether a tractor, when in use on a public road with a trailer, is subject to the Traffic Act and whether the manner in which it is loaded exposes other road users to an extreme risk of accidents.
19. This question cannot be answered by merely invoking the corporate personality of the 4 th Petitioner. It raises a legitimate public-interest question as to the responsibility attaching to persons who control or direct a business whose vehicles are alleged to be operating in a manner that may endanger other road users.
20. The Court is not, however, at this stage making a final finding of individual criminal culpability against any of the Petitioners. That question must be determined in accordance with the evidence and the applicable law.
SERVICE AND EXTRACTION OF THE ORDERS
21. There is another fundamental difficulty with the contempt application.
22. No satisfactory evidence has been demonstrated that the conservatory order relied upon was extracted and served together with the requisite penal notice upon the persons alleged to have disobeyed it.
23. The requirement that an order forming the foundation of contempt proceedings be properly extracted and served, together with a penal notice where required, is not a mere technicality. It serves the important purpose of establishing knowledge of the order and informing the alleged contemnor of the consequences of non-compliance.
24. In the absence of satisfactory proof of service of the order and the penal notice, the foundation of the contempt application is materially defective.
25. I therefore find that, the failure to demonstrate proper extraction and service of the order is fatal to the contempt application.
26. The rights being enjoyed pursuant to the temporary conservatory orders had nothing to do with the 4 th Petitioner. Consequently, the 4 th Petitioner cannot rely upon those orders as a shield against lawful enforcement of the Traffic Act.
27. The contempt application dated 24 th July 2026 is therefore without merit and is dismissed.
THE STATUS OF THE 4 TH PETITIONER
28. The Court must now return to the substantive question arising from the Petition.
29. The 4 th Petitioner has, in effect, remained disinterested in the contestation over the conservatory orders while continuing to operate its alleged fleet of tractors.
30. This Court is concerned by the assertion that the 4 th Petitioner operates a fleet of approximately 2,000 tractors on public roads while simultaneously contesting the application of the Traffic Act to such vehicles.
31. The 4 th Petitioner is expected by law to fully comply with all laws governing the operation of its tractors and trailers on public roads. It is not permissible for a corporate entity to enjoy the economic benefits of operating a large commercial fleet while disregarding statutory requirements intended to protect public infrastructure and other road users.
32. The 4 th Petitioner must not expose the larger public to risks of accidents arising from unlawful or dangerous loading.
33. The arguments concerning the constitutionality of the relevant provisions of the Traffic Act can properly be undertaken at the hearing of the Petition.
34. Until a competent Court determines otherwise, statutory provisions enjoy the presumption of constitutionality and remain valid and enforceable.
35. The Petitioners cannot therefore obtain, merely by filing a constitutional challenge, a licence for the 4 th Petitioner to disregard provisions of the Traffic Act.
CORPORATE VEIL AND INDIVIDUAL CULPABILITY
36. A further question arising from the Petition is whether directors and shareholders of a body corporate can escape individual culpability where the corporate business is alleged to be deliberately refusing to comply with the law.
37. The Court does not at this stage answer that question finally. It is, however, a legitimate constitutional and statutory question raised by the circumstances of this Petition.
38. Another question arising is whether the corporate veil may automatically be lifted by a law-enforcement officer purporting to enforce the Traffic Act or the Kenya Roads Act, with the involvement of the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions, or whether such a step requires the intervention or sanction of a Court.
39. These are substantial questions which require proper consideration at the hearing of the Petition.
40. A corporate body enjoys legal rights and corresponding obligations. It is expected to comply with tax laws, labour laws, environmental laws and other regulatory requirements and to conduct itself as a responsible participant in society.
41. Where, however, a corporate entity is alleged to be acting in a manner that destroys public assets or exposes members of the public to a risk of accidents, the law must provide an effective mechanism for enforcement and accountability.
42. The mere existence of a corporate personality cannot be used as an automatic shield against lawful enforcement. Equally, the corporate veil cannot be disregarded arbitrarily or merely because a law-enforcement officer considers it convenient to do so.
43. That issue shall be determined upon the full hearing of the Petition.
PUBLIC INTEREST
44. The Court has balanced the interests of the Petitioners against the public interest.
45. The issue before Court is not merely a private commercial dispute. It concerns enforcement of traffic laws, protection of public roads and the safety of other road users.
46. The Court must therefore be careful not to issue orders that may have the effect of preventing the State from performing its constitutional and statutory duties while the legality of those duties is being challenged.
47. At the same time, the Court remains conscious that constitutional rights must be protected and that enforcement agencies must act within the law.
48. I therefore find that there are real and substantial constitutional issues requiring determination, including:
a. whether the provisions of the Traffic Act complained of apply to tractors and trailers in the circumstances presented by the Petitioners;
b. whether such provisions are constitutionally compliant;
c. whether directors and shareholders of the 4th Petitioner may incur individual criminal culpability for alleged offences involving the company's vehicles;
d. whether and in what circumstances the corporate veil may be lifted in enforcement of the Traffic Act and Kenya Roads Act; and
e. whether the manner in which the Respondents have undertaken enforcement violates any of the Petitioners' constitutional rights.
49. These questions cannot appropriately be conclusively determined at the interlocutory stage.
50. I am therefore constrained to maintain conservatory protection in favour of the 1 st , 2 nd and 3 rd Petitioners exclusively, while making it clear that such protection does not extend to the 4 th Petitioner.
ORDERS
51. Consequently, and for the reasons set out above, the Court makes the following orders:
a. The contempt application dated 24 th July 2026 is hereby dismissed.
b. For avoidance of doubt, the temporary conservatory orders previously issued by the Court were for the exclusive benefit of the 1 st , 2 nd and 3 rd Petitioners and did not extend to the 4 th Petitioner.
c. A conservatory order of prohibition is hereby issued restraining the Respondents from summoning, arresting or prosecuting the 1 st , 2 nd and 3 rd Petitioners over alleged contraventions of the Traffic Act and/or the Kenya Roads Act arising from allegations of using a laden tractor on a public road with dimensions exceeding the maximum provided by law, contrary to section 55(2) as read together with section 58(1) and (2) of the Traffic Act, pending the hearing and determination of the Petition.
d. Any ongoing criminal traffic prosecution against the 1 st , 2 nd and 3 rd Petitioners, whether exclusively or jointly with tractor drivers, arising from the matters complained of in this Petition, shall remain stayed pending the hearing and determination of the Petition.
e. For avoidance of doubt, the Orders in paragraphs 3 and 4 above do not extend to the 4 th Petitioner, its tractors, trailers, employees or drivers merely by reason of their association with the 1 st , 2 nd or 3 rd Petitioners.
f. The 4 th Petitioner shall fully comply with all laws relating to the operation of its fleet of tractors and trailers on public roads.
g. The 4 th Petitioner shall not operate its vehicles in a manner that exposes other road users or members of the public to avoidable risks of accidents.
h. Nothing in this ruling shall be construed as determining the constitutionality or otherwise of the impugned provisions of the Traffic Act. Those questions shall be determined upon the hearing of the Petition.
i. All the Petitioners shall file and serve their written submissions in support of the Petition within twenty-one (21) days from the date hereof.
j. The Respondents shall have a corresponding twenty-one (21) days thereafter within which to file and serve their written submissions in opposition to the Petition.
k. The Petition shall be mentioned after forty-two (42) days, or thereafter, for purposes of confirming compliance and fixing a date for judgment.
l. There shall be no order as to costs, the Court bearing in mind that the subject matter concerns enforcement, protection and enjoyment of fundamental rights and freedoms under the Constitution.
Orders accordingly.
Signed, Delivered Virtually on Teams platform
On this 17 th day of July , 2026
________________________
Hon. Mohochi S.M
Presiding Judge
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