(Being an Appeal from the Ruling of the Magistrates Court at Kwale Hon. Kiongo Kagenyo, Resident Magistrate delivered on 14th June 2023 in Kwale Magistrates CMCC No. E162 of 2022)
1. The appellant filed this appeal through the memorandum of appeal dated 29th July 2025 praying for orders that the ruling delivered on 14th June 2023 in Kwale Magistrates’ Court CC No. E162 of 2022 be reviewed and/or set aside and be substituted with an order allowing the application dated 5th December 2022 with costs to the appellant.
2. The impugned ruling dismissed an application dated 5th December 2022 by the appellant herein seeking to be joined as an Interested Party (IP) in Kwale Magistrates’ Court CC No. E162 of 2022 Kenya Alliance Insurance Company Limited v. Charles Simiyu Bunyasi.
3. By way of background which facts are discernible from the parties’ pleadings and depositions in their various affidavits before the trial court, the Kenya Alliance Insurance Company Limited, the 1st respondent herein is the insurer of the 2nd respondent Charles Simiyu Bunyasi’s motor vehicle registration number KCN 766R (the insured).
4. The appellant (elsewhere herein referred to as the victim) sued Charles Simiyu Bunyasi, the 2nd respondent herein and one Moses Juma Wamalwa in Kwale SRMCC No. E117 of 2022 seeking compensation for an accident that was alleged to have occurred on 23rd April 2022 involving the insured’s motor vehicle registration number KCN 766R and the appellant herein who was a pillion passenger aboard motor cycle registration number KMFV 079S along Kinango Kwale road.
5. The insurer Kenya Alliance Insurance Company Limited, the 1st appellant herein on its part instituted a disclaimer suit against its insured Charles Simiyu Bunyasi seeking a declaration that the insurer was not bound to satisfy and/or indemnify the insured against any claim in respect of death, bodily injury to any person, damage to property/or any claim whatsoever arising out of the accident that was alleged to have occurred on 23rd April 2022 along Kinango Kwale road involving the insured’s motor vehicle registration number KCN 766R.
6. The appellant herein filed an application by way of notice of motion dated 5th December 2022 seeking for orders, inter alia that he be enjoined in the disclaimer suit between the insurer and the insured as an Interested Party and to be allowed to participate in the proceedings and to file and serve pleadings within 14 days of being so joined, to oppose the disclaimer suit.
7. Neither of the parties in the disclaimer suit filed a response to the application. In a ruling delivered on 14th June 2023, the trial court dismissed the appellant’s application finding that the cause of action in the disclaimer suit was out of a contractual relationship while the cause of action in the suit between the appellant herein and the 2nd respondent was based on the tort of negligence and the suit was yet to be determined. The trial court further found that in no way was the presence of the appellant going to help the court to determine the issues arising from the contract. Further that since the primary suit was yet to be determined, the appellant’s stake in the disclaimer suit was only an imagination and speculative with no identifiable or real stake or a cursory interest.
8. The appellant was dissatisfied with that decision and has filed the present appeal based on the following grounds.
a. The learned trial magistrate erred in law and in fact by dismissing the appellant’s application without any legal basis.
b. The learned trial magistrate erred in law and in fact in failing to consider the prejudice which the appellant will suffer if not allowed to participate in the proceedings.
c. The learned trial magistrate erred in law and in fact in finding that the appellant’s presence in the suit was not necessary to enable it to effectively and completely adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit.
d. The learned trial magistrate erred in law and in fact in finding that the appellant’s interest in the suit is cursory.
e. The learned trial magistrate erred in law and in fact by failing to consider the averments in the appellant’s supporting affidavit I which he stated the interest he has in the suit.
f. The learned trial magistrate erred in law and in fact in failing to consider the relevant pertinent issues for joining a 3rd party (sic) to suit.
9. The appeal was canvassed by way of written submissions. Learned counsels for the appellant and the 1st respondent filed their respective submissions urging their respective positions on the matter.
10. This being a first appeal, the duty of the court is to consider, re-evaluate, and re-analyze the evidence and draw its own conclusions, bearing in mind that it did not see witnesses testifying and therefore give due allowance for that. In the case of Selle & another vs. Associated Motor Boat Co. Ltd & others [1968] E.A at page 126 it was held that:
“An appeal to this Court from a trial by the High Court is by way of retrial and the principles upon which this Court acts in such an appeal are well settled. Briefly put they are that this Court must reconsider the evidence, evaluate it itself and draw its own conclusions though it should always bear in mind that it has neither seen nor heard the witnesses and should make due allowance in this respect. In particular, this court is not bound necessarily to follow the trial judge’s findings of fact if it appears either that he has clearly failed on some point to take account of particular circumstances or probabilities materially to estimate the evidence or if the impression based on the demeanor of a witness is inconsistent with the evidence in the case generally (Abdul Hameed Saif v Ali Mohamed Sholan (1955), 22 E.A.C.A. 270)”.
11. I have considered the grounds of appeal as set out in the memorandum the record of appeal, the submissions for and against this appeal and the cited cases. The issue for determination is whether the learned trial Magistrate erred in dismissing the appellant’s application seeking to be joined to the suit as an IP.
12. Learned counsels for the parties have each made strong submissions backed by authorities urging their respective cases.
13. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted on grounds 1 and 3, then 2 and 5 together then 4 and 6 separately.
14. However, without much discussion, since the appeal is decided on different grounds, I wish to point out two issues. The learned trial magistrate relied on the doctrine of privity of contract to find that the appellant not being a party to the contract of insurance between the insurer and the insured, he had no business in a suit between them. Learned counsel for the respondent, citing many cases, also relies on that principle in support of the decision of the trial court.
15. The learned trial magistrate was correct to the extent that as a general rule the only persons who have rights or obligations under a contract are those who are privy or party to it. In other words, a contract can only be enforced by or against the persons who are parties to it, for a contract cannot confer rights or impose obligations on persons who are not party to it (see the case of KCB Bank Limited v Odhiambo t/a Karo Wholesalers & another [2023] KEHC 17948 (KLR)).
16. That finding was however not correct in so far as the learned trial magistrate did not consider the various exceptions to the principle of privity of contract. In the case of Aineah Liluyani Njirah v Agha Khan Health Services [2013] KECA 481 (KLR), the Court of Appeal discussed at length the development of the principle of privity of contract and the exceptions thereto. The Court said with respect to exceptions:
“In some countries, various pieces of legislations have already been passed with specific exceptions to the Privity rule, because there is recognition that it can cause hardship, especially for consumers ...
There are now many exceptions to the privity rule, both at common law and in the statute books. They developed in an ad hoc fashion as a response to specific situations where the courts or the legislatures ascertained a need to grant third parties the right to enforce a contract made for their benefit. [citing Judicial Studies Institute Journal: ClionaKelly, Privity of Contract-The Benefits of Reform [2008]]. Second, a third party should be able to enforce a term of the contract when the contract expressly states that the third party has a right of enforcement, regardless of whether or not the contract benefits the third party. Third, the third party should have a right to rely on a term of a contract which excludes or limits the liability of the third party, provided that was the intention of the parties.”
17. With respect to exceptions to the principle of privity of contract made by the law, in Kenya a good example is section 10 of the Insurance (Motor Vehicle Third Party Risks) Act, (Cap. 405) Laws of Kenya, which compels an insurer to satisfy judgment obtained by a third party against a person insured by the policy (see again KCB Bank Limited v Odhiambo t/a Karo Wholesalers & another [2023] KEHC 17948 (KLR) and Co-operative Insurance Company Limited v Secucentre Limited & another [2016] KEHC 5343 (KLR)).
18. With regard to 3rd party motor vehicle insurance, the contract of insurance is exempt from the doctrine of privity of contract as the essence of the contract is to protect 3rd parties. That is why under the Insurance (Motor Vehicles Third Party Risks) Act (Cap. 405) Laws of Kenya it is compulsory to take out 3rd party insurance by motor vehicle owners.
19. The respondent’s application before the trial court was premised on Order 1 Rule 10(2) and Rule 25 of the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR), sections 1A, 1B and 3C of the CPA (Cap. 21 Laws of Kenya) and section 10(4) of the Insurance (Motor Vehicle Third Party Risks) Act (Cap. 405) Laws of Kenya.
20. Order 1 Rule 10 (2) of the Civil Procedure Rules states;
2) The court may at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party, and on such terms as may appear to the court to be just, order that the name of any party improperly joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, be struck out, and that the name of any person who ought to have been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, or whose presence before the court may be necessary in order to enable the court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all questions involved in the suit, be added.
21. Section 10(4) of the Insurance (Motor Vehicle Third Party Risks) Act provides that:
(4) No sum shall be payable by an insurer under the foregoing provisions of this section if in an action commenced before, or within three months after, the commencement of the proceedings in which the judgment was given, he has obtained a declaration that, apart from any provision contained in the policy he is entitled to avoid it on the ground that it was obtained by the non-disclosure of a material fact, or by a representation of fact which was false in some material particular, or, if he has avoided the policy on that ground, that he was entitled so to do apart from any provision contained in it:
Provided that an insurer who has obtained such a declaration as aforesaid in an action shall not thereby become entitled to the benefit of this subsection as respects any judgment obtained in proceedings commenced before the commencement of that action, unless before or within fourteen days after the commencement of that action he has given notice thereof to the person who is the plaintiff in the said proceedings specifying the non-disclosure or false representation on which he proposes to rely, and any person to whom notice of such action is so given shall be entitled, if he thinks fit, to be made a party thereto.
22. The proviso to this sub-section is clear that an accident victim who has filed a suit against an insured is entitled, if he thinks fit, to be enjoined to the disclaimer suit between the insurer and the insured as the case was before the trial court. Such a victim is by dint of law a proper party to the disclaimer or declaratory suit. In that case, the appellant herein was entitled to be enjoined to the disclaimer suit as an IP. Once the IP is made aware of the proceedings and chooses to join the suit, he is able to move to intervene to protect his interests. His interest is not cursory as such as commended by the learned trial magistrate. The IP has a real stake in the outcome of the suit because having been made a party he will be bound by the outcome. In that case, it is in the interest of all parties and certainly the insurer so that it will not have to relitigate the issue of its liability to the insured if after obtaining judgment against the insured, the IP was to file a declaratory suit against the insurer.
23. I therefore agree with the submissions by the appellant in support of the appeal that the appellant has a direct, identifiable and protected interest in the disclaimer suit.
24. I have said enough to show that the decision of the learned trial magistrate to deny the motion for joinder of the appellant as an IP was in error and was for setting aside.
25. However, there are two other issues raised by the 1st respondent against the appeal. The first is that the appellant filed the appeal out of time without leave of the court contrary to section 79G of the CPA. The second one is that the order appealed against is not one from which an appeal arises as of right but only with leave of the court and the same was not obtained before filing the appeal.
26. The issue of leave to appeal against the order seeking joinder can be disposed of at once. The application before the trial court for joinder was filed under Order 1 Rule 10 CPR and Order 43 Rule 1 provides that Order 1 is among the Orders and rules under the provisions of section 75(1)(h) of the CPA where an appeal lies as of right. That submissions is therefore not well taken and is dismissed.
27. On the issue of the appeal being filed out of time, Section 79G of the Civil Procedure Act (Cap. 21) Laws of Kenya provides that:
“Every appeal from a subordinate court to the High Court shall be filed within a period of thirty days from the date of the decree or order appealed against, excluding from such period any time which the lower court may certify as having been requisite for the preparation and delivery to the appellant of a copy of the decree or order.
Provided that an appeal may be admitted out of time if the appellant satisfies the court that he had good and sufficient cause for not filing the appeal in time.”
28. The ruling appealed against was delivered on 14th June 2023. The memorandum of appeal herein was filed on 29th July 2025, a period of over two years after the ruling of the trial court was delivered. The appeal therefore offends the provisions of section 79G CPA.
29. The Supreme Court has dealt with the issue of an appeal filed out of time without leave in the case of County Executive of Kisumu v County Government of Kisumu & 8 others [2017] KESC 16 (KLR) and expressed itself as follows:
“No appeal can be filed out of time without leave of the Court. Such a filing renders the ‘document’ so filed a nullity and of no legal consequence. Consequently, this Court will not accept a document filed out of time without leave of the Court. It is unfortunate that Petition No. 10 of 2014 has been accorded a reference number in this Court’s Registry. This is irregular as that document is unknown in law and the same should be struck out.”
30. There is no indication by the appellant herein that leave to appeal out of time the ruling of the lower court was sought and obtained.
31. I therefore find that the appeal filed herein is incompetent and is struck out with costs to the 1st respondent.
32. Orders accordingly.
ANDAYI W. F.
JUDGE
Written, dated and signed and delivered on the Virtual platform, Microsoft Teams this 30th day of Marh, 2026.
In the presence of:
N/A for the Appellant.
N/A for the Respondents.
Ummu: Court assistant
1. The appellant filed this appeal through the memorandum of appeal dated 29th July 2025 praying for orders that the ruling delivered on 14th June 2023 in Kwale Magistrates’ Court CC No. E162 of 2022 be reviewed and/or set aside and be substituted with an order allowing the application dated 5th December 2022 with costs to the appellant.
2. The impugned ruling dismissed an application dated 5th December 2022 by the appellant herein seeking to be joined as an Interested Party (IP) in Kwale Magistrates’ Court CC No. E162 of 2022 Kenya Alliance Insurance Company Limited v. Charles Simiyu Bunyasi.
3. By way of background which facts are discernible from the parties’ pleadings and depositions in their various affidavits before the trial court, the Kenya Alliance Insurance Company Limited, the 1st respondent herein is the insurer of the 2nd respondent Charles Simiyu Bunyasi’s motor vehicle registration number KCN 766R (the insured).
4. The appellant (elsewhere herein referred to as the victim) sued Charles Simiyu Bunyasi, the 2nd respondent herein and one Moses Juma Wamalwa in Kwale SRMCC No. E117 of 2022 seeking compensation for an accident that was alleged to have occurred on 23rd April 2022 involving the insured’s motor vehicle registration number KCN 766R and the appellant herein who was a pillion passenger aboard motor cycle registration number KMFV 079S along Kinango Kwale road.
5. The insurer Kenya Alliance Insurance Company Limited, the 1st appellant herein on its part instituted a disclaimer suit against its insured Charles Simiyu Bunyasi seeking a declaration that the insurer was not bound to satisfy and/or indemnify the insured against any claim in respect of death, bodily injury to any person, damage to property/or any claim whatsoever arising out of the accident that was alleged to have occurred on 23rd April 2022 along Kinango Kwale road involving the insured’s motor vehicle registration number KCN 766R.
6. The appellant herein filed an application by way of notice of motion dated 5th December 2022 seeking for orders, inter alia that he be enjoined in the disclaimer suit between the insurer and the insured as an Interested Party and to be allowed to participate in the proceedings and to file and serve pleadings within 14 days of being so joined, to oppose the disclaimer suit.
7. Neither of the parties in the disclaimer suit filed a response to the application. In a ruling delivered on 14th June 2023, the trial court dismissed the appellant’s application finding that the cause of action in the disclaimer suit was out of a contractual relationship while the cause of action in the suit between the appellant herein and the 2nd respondent was based on the tort of negligence and the suit was yet to be determined. The trial court further found that in no way was the presence of the appellant going to help the court to determine the issues arising from the contract. Further that since the primary suit was yet to be determined, the appellant’s stake in the disclaimer suit was only an imagination and speculative with no identifiable or real stake or a cursory interest.
8. The appellant was dissatisfied with that decision and has filed the present appeal based on the following grounds.
a. The learned trial magistrate erred in law and in fact by dismissing the appellant’s application without any legal basis.
b. The learned trial magistrate erred in law and in fact in failing to consider the prejudice which the appellant will suffer if not allowed to participate in the proceedings.
c. The learned trial magistrate erred in law and in fact in finding that the appellant’s presence in the suit was not necessary to enable it to effectively and completely adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit.
d. The learned trial magistrate erred in law and in fact in finding that the appellant’s interest in the suit is cursory.
e. The learned trial magistrate erred in law and in fact by failing to consider the averments in the appellant’s supporting affidavit I which he stated the interest he has in the suit.
f. The learned trial magistrate erred in law and in fact in failing to consider the relevant pertinent issues for joining a 3rd party (sic) to suit.
9. The appeal was canvassed by way of written submissions. Learned counsels for the appellant and the 1st respondent filed their respective submissions urging their respective positions on the matter.
10. This being a first appeal, the duty of the court is to consider, re-evaluate, and re-analyze the evidence and draw its own conclusions, bearing in mind that it did not see witnesses testifying and therefore give due allowance for that. In the case of Selle & another vs. Associated Motor Boat Co. Ltd & others [1968] E.A at page 126 it was held that:
“An appeal to this Court from a trial by the High Court is by way of retrial and the principles upon which this Court acts in such an appeal are well settled. Briefly put they are that this Court must reconsider the evidence, evaluate it itself and draw its own conclusions though it should always bear in mind that it has neither seen nor heard the witnesses and should make due allowance in this respect. In particular, this court is not bound necessarily to follow the trial judge’s findings of fact if it appears either that he has clearly failed on some point to take account of particular circumstances or probabilities materially to estimate the evidence or if the impression based on the demeanor of a witness is inconsistent with the evidence in the case generally (Abdul Hameed Saif v Ali Mohamed Sholan (1955), 22 E.A.C.A. 270)”.
11. I have considered the grounds of appeal as set out in the memorandum the record of appeal, the submissions for and against this appeal and the cited cases. The issue for determination is whether the learned trial Magistrate erred in dismissing the appellant’s application seeking to be joined to the suit as an IP.
12. Learned counsels for the parties have each made strong submissions backed by authorities urging their respective cases.
13. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted on grounds 1 and 3, then 2 and 5 together then 4 and 6 separately.
14. However, without much discussion, since the appeal is decided on different grounds, I wish to point out two issues. The learned trial magistrate relied on the doctrine of privity of contract to find that the appellant not being a party to the contract of insurance between the insurer and the insured, he had no business in a suit between them. Learned counsel for the respondent, citing many cases, also relies on that principle in support of the decision of the trial court.
15. The learned trial magistrate was correct to the extent that as a general rule the only persons who have rights or obligations under a contract are those who are privy or party to it. In other words, a contract can only be enforced by or against the persons who are parties to it, for a contract cannot confer rights or impose obligations on persons who are not party to it (see the case of KCB Bank Limited v Odhiambo t/a Karo Wholesalers & another [2023] KEHC 17948 (KLR)).
16. That finding was however not correct in so far as the learned trial magistrate did not consider the various exceptions to the principle of privity of contract. In the case of Aineah Liluyani Njirah v Agha Khan Health Services [2013] KECA 481 (KLR), the Court of Appeal discussed at length the development of the principle of privity of contract and the exceptions thereto. The Court said with respect to exceptions:
“In some countries, various pieces of legislations have already been passed with specific exceptions to the Privity rule, because there is recognition that it can cause hardship, especially for consumers ...
There are now many exceptions to the privity rule, both at common law and in the statute books. They developed in an ad hoc fashion as a response to specific situations where the courts or the legislatures ascertained a need to grant third parties the right to enforce a contract made for their benefit. [citing Judicial Studies Institute Journal: ClionaKelly, Privity of Contract-The Benefits of Reform [2008]]. Second, a third party should be able to enforce a term of the contract when the contract expressly states that the third party has a right of enforcement, regardless of whether or not the contract benefits the third party. Third, the third party should have a right to rely on a term of a contract which excludes or limits the liability of the third party, provided that was the intention of the parties.”
17. With respect to exceptions to the principle of privity of contract made by the law, in Kenya a good example is section 10 of the Insurance (Motor Vehicle Third Party Risks) Act, (Cap. 405) Laws of Kenya, which compels an insurer to satisfy judgment obtained by a third party against a person insured by the policy (see again KCB Bank Limited v Odhiambo t/a Karo Wholesalers & another [2023] KEHC 17948 (KLR) and Co-operative Insurance Company Limited v Secucentre Limited & another [2016] KEHC 5343 (KLR)).
18. With regard to 3rd party motor vehicle insurance, the contract of insurance is exempt from the doctrine of privity of contract as the essence of the contract is to protect 3rd parties. That is why under the Insurance (Motor Vehicles Third Party Risks) Act (Cap. 405) Laws of Kenya it is compulsory to take out 3rd party insurance by motor vehicle owners.
19. The respondent’s application before the trial court was premised on Order 1 Rule 10(2) and Rule 25 of the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR), sections 1A, 1B and 3C of the CPA (Cap. 21 Laws of Kenya) and section 10(4) of the Insurance (Motor Vehicle Third Party Risks) Act (Cap. 405) Laws of Kenya.
20. Order 1 Rule 10 (2) of the Civil Procedure Rules states;
2) The court may at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party, and on such terms as may appear to the court to be just, order that the name of any party improperly joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, be struck out, and that the name of any person who ought to have been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, or whose presence before the court may be necessary in order to enable the court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all questions involved in the suit, be added.
21. Section 10(4) of the Insurance (Motor Vehicle Third Party Risks) Act provides that:
(4) No sum shall be payable by an insurer under the foregoing provisions of this section if in an action commenced before, or within three months after, the commencement of the proceedings in which the judgment was given, he has obtained a declaration that, apart from any provision contained in the policy he is entitled to avoid it on the ground that it was obtained by the non-disclosure of a material fact, or by a representation of fact which was false in some material particular, or, if he has avoided the policy on that ground, that he was entitled so to do apart from any provision contained in it:
Provided that an insurer who has obtained such a declaration as aforesaid in an action shall not thereby become entitled to the benefit of this subsection as respects any judgment obtained in proceedings commenced before the commencement of that action, unless before or within fourteen days after the commencement of that action he has given notice thereof to the person who is the plaintiff in the said proceedings specifying the non-disclosure or false representation on which he proposes to rely, and any person to whom notice of such action is so given shall be entitled, if he thinks fit, to be made a party thereto.
22. The proviso to this sub-section is clear that an accident victim who has filed a suit against an insured is entitled, if he thinks fit, to be enjoined to the disclaimer suit between the insurer and the insured as the case was before the trial court. Such a victim is by dint of law a proper party to the disclaimer or declaratory suit. In that case, the appellant herein was entitled to be enjoined to the disclaimer suit as an IP. Once the IP is made aware of the proceedings and chooses to join the suit, he is able to move to intervene to protect his interests. His interest is not cursory as such as commended by the learned trial magistrate. The IP has a real stake in the outcome of the suit because having been made a party he will be bound by the outcome. In that case, it is in the interest of all parties and certainly the insurer so that it will not have to relitigate the issue of its liability to the insured if after obtaining judgment against the insured, the IP was to file a declaratory suit against the insurer.
23. I therefore agree with the submissions by the appellant in support of the appeal that the appellant has a direct, identifiable and protected interest in the disclaimer suit.
24. I have said enough to show that the decision of the learned trial magistrate to deny the motion for joinder of the appellant as an IP was in error and was for setting aside.
25. However, there are two other issues raised by the 1st respondent against the appeal. The first is that the appellant filed the appeal out of time without leave of the court contrary to section 79G of the CPA. The second one is that the order appealed against is not one from which an appeal arises as of right but only with leave of the court and the same was not obtained before filing the appeal.
26. The issue of leave to appeal against the order seeking joinder can be disposed of at once. The application before the trial court for joinder was filed under Order 1 Rule 10 CPR and Order 43 Rule 1 provides that Order 1 is among the Orders and rules under the provisions of section 75(1)(h) of the CPA where an appeal lies as of right. That submissions is therefore not well taken and is dismissed.
27. On the issue of the appeal being filed out of time, Section 79G of the Civil Procedure Act (Cap. 21) Laws of Kenya provides that:
“Every appeal from a subordinate court to the High Court shall be filed within a period of thirty days from the date of the decree or order appealed against, excluding from such period any time which the lower court may certify as having been requisite for the preparation and delivery to the appellant of a copy of the decree or order.
Provided that an appeal may be admitted out of time if the appellant satisfies the court that he had good and sufficient cause for not filing the appeal in time.”
28. The ruling appealed against was delivered on 14th June 2023. The memorandum of appeal herein was filed on 29th July 2025, a period of over two years after the ruling of the trial court was delivered. The appeal therefore offends the provisions of section 79G CPA.
29. The Supreme Court has dealt with the issue of an appeal filed out of time without leave in the case of County Executive of Kisumu v County Government of Kisumu & 8 others [2017] KESC 16 (KLR) and expressed itself as follows:
“No appeal can be filed out of time without leave of the Court. Such a filing renders the ‘document’ so filed a nullity and of no legal consequence. Consequently, this Court will not accept a document filed out of time without leave of the Court. It is unfortunate that Petition No. 10 of 2014 has been accorded a reference number in this Court’s Registry. This is irregular as that document is unknown in law and the same should be struck out.”
30. There is no indication by the appellant herein that leave to appeal out of time the ruling of the lower court was sought and obtained.
31. I therefore find that the appeal filed herein is incompetent and is struck out with costs to the 1st respondent.
32. Orders accordingly.
ANDAYI W. F.
JUDGE
Written, dated and signed and delivered on the Virtual platform, Microsoft Teams this 30th day of Marh, 2026.
In the presence of:
N/A for the Appellant.
N/A for the Respondents.
Ummu: Court assistant