REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA AT NAIROBI
JUDICIAL REVIEW DIVISION
JUDICIAL REVIEW APPLICATION NO. 148 OF 2013
ISAIAH OCHANDA……………………………………………….APPLICANT
VERSUS
THE HON. ATTORNEY GENERAL………………………1 ST RESPONDENT
PRINCIPAL SECRETARY
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE…………………………………2 ND RESPONDENT
RULING
1. This ruling is pursuant to this Court’s directions issued on 28 th April 2025 where the court directed as follows:
“ THIS MATTER coming up on 28/04/2025 for directions before Honourable Lady Justice R.E. Aburili.
UPON HEARING the Counsel for the Plaintiff/Applicant and the Counsel for the Defendant/Respondent;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. THAT the exparte applicant to forthwith file a statement of payment received from D.O.D of the decretal sum plus interest.
2. THAT Upon which, the Deputy Registrar shall work out the interest payable as at the time of payment of the decretal sum, for the purposes of reconciling of the accounts.
3. THAT Once the DR completes the exercise, she will file the calculations before the court for further directions.
4. THAT mention on 10/06/2025 before this court to confirm compliance. GIVEN under my hand and seal of the Honourable court this 28/04/2025.
2. Following these directions, the Deputy Registrar, Hon Emmie Chelule filed a report dated 22 nd July 2025 with calculations showing pending payments arising from the decree dated 29 th June 2011.The report read thus:
“ Pursuant to the Court Order dated 28 th April 2025 by Hon Lady Justice R.E. Aburili directing that the Deputy Registrar works out the interest payable as at the time of payment of the decretal sums for the purposes of reconciling of the accounts.
The Ex parte Applicant in compliance with the Court's directions filed their statement of payments made dated the 5 th May 2025.
• Initial decretal amount from the decree dated 29/06/2011 19,078,191.78
• Interest from 3 rd March 2011 to 24 th March 2022: the 1 st payment was made vide voucher dated 24/03/2022 and reference No.AG/JRDOD/239/12Number of days from 03.03.2011-24.03.2011=4039 daysInterest 19,078,191.78 x12/100 x 4039/365=25,412,151.45Decretal=19,078,191.78+25,412,151.45=44,490,343.23
44,490,343.23-12,852,000.00(less paid)=31,638,343.23
• Interest on balance: 31,638,343.23 from 25 th March 2022 to 23/4/2024
• 2 nd payment made on the 23/4/2024 as per the Discharge voucher voucher31,638,343.23x12/100x761/365=7,972,862.49Decretal 31,638,343.23 + 7,972,862.49 = 39,611,205.72
39,611,205.72-399,518.00(less paid)=39,211,687.72
• Interest on above 39,211,687.72 from 24/04/2024 to 26/06/2024(63 days)39,211,687.72x12/100x63/365=799,918.42Decretal39,211,687.72+799,918.42=40,011,606.1540,011,606.15-11,588,876.70(lesspaid)=28,422,729.45
• Balance owed as at21/07/2025Number of days as from 27/06/2024-21/07/2025(389days)Interest on balance 28,422,729.45x 12/100x 389/365 =3,649,478.46Decretal = 28,422,729.45+ 3,649,478.46 = 32,072,207.91
3. The Respondent filed a response dated 21 st October 2025, contesting the report and calculations by the deputy Registrar, contending that there was no legal basis upon which the Report stands. The respondent argues that the claim for the majority of the interest is statute-barred; the calculation is founded on an erroneous premise and the enforcement thereof would be against public justice and equity.
4. The Respondent further contends that the claim for the principal decretal sum is time-barred pursuant to section 4(4) of the Limitation of Actions Act. That according to the limitation period under Section 4(4) above, an action to recover any sum of money payable under a judgment or decree must be commenced within six (6) years from the date on which the cause of action accrued. It is argued that in the present matter, the decree was issued on 29 th June 2011 and the applicable limitation period expired by 29 th June 2017.
5. The Respondents also argue that the Deputy Registrar’s report calculates interest accruing from 3 rd March 2011 continuously until 21 st July 2025 with serial payments reducing balances over time. However, that this calculation overlooks the statutory limitation period, beyond which the claim especially for interest is statute-barred and unenforceable.
6. The Respondent further contends that while the principal sum confirmed by the decree is immediately enforceable, the statutory limitation applies to the entire claim including interest beyond the limitation period and that any interest claimed beyond six years from the date of the decree is barred under Kenyan law.
7. Additionally, that the claim for outstanding balances inclusive of interest amounting to over Kshs. 32 million as at July 2025 exceeds the limitation period and should be struck out or limited to the principal decretal amount plus interest accrued within the statutory period. It is argued that enforcement of such extended interest claims is contrary to Section 4(4) of the Limitation of Actions Act and established case law.
8. The Respondent contends that the proper calculation in view of section 4(4) of the Limitation of Actions Act is as follows:
General damages Kes 1,000,000
Interest @12% w.e.f. 02.03.2011
1,000,000 x 12/100 x 6 Kes 720,000
Special damages Kes 6,500,000
Interest @12% w.e.f. 28.04.1996 to 01.03.2011
6,500,000 x 12/100 x 7,613/365 Kes 16,268,876.71
Costs Kes 351,518
Total Decretal Amount Kes 24,840,394.71
Amount Paid Kes 24,840,394.70
Balance Kes 0.01
9. The Respondent further argues that the original decretal sum was Kshs. 7,500,000.00, however that according to the Registrar’s calculations, the total sum sought to be recovered, being the principal plus interest amounts to nearly Kshs. 57,000,000. According to the respondent judgment debtor, this is an astronomical figure representing more than eight times the original judgment debt.
10. The Respondents maintains that from the court records, it has already paid Kshs. 24,840,394.70, and that this amount exceeds the original principal decretal sum threefold. That to demand a further Kenya Shillings 32,072,207.91 is unconscionable and amounts to unjust enrichment.
11. The Respondent urges this Court to consider the public interest in this matter as it is not a dispute between two private entities since the 2 nd Respondent represents a public body, from which any decretal sum is deferred against tax payer money.
12. The judgment debtor respondent cites Article 201 of the Constitution and asserts that it would be an affront to the constitutional principles laid down in the said Article for this Court to sanction a payment that is so grotesquely disproportionate to the original liability.
13. The Respondent further argues that it would be manifestly inequitable and contrary to justice to compel Kenyan taxpayers to bear the burden of an extrapolated judgment, which risks unjust enrichment and excessive litigation. Further contention is that the interest claimed has shifted from compensatory to punitive and unfairly penalizing the public. It urges this Court, guided by Section 4(4) of the Limitation of Actions Act, to set aside the Deputy Registrar’s report, recognize that the Claimant has already been adequately compensated and bring finality to this matter to protect the public purse and preserve the integrity of the judicial process.
14. In response to the respondent’s contestation of the Deputy Registrar’s report, the Applicant filed a response dated 21 st October 2025.The Applicant argues that the recovery of the decretal amount and interest is not barred under section 4(4) of the Limitation of Actions Act (Cap 22, Laws of Kenya). that Judgement was delivered in favour of the applicant on the 2 nd May 2011 and the attendant decree issued on the 29 th June 2011, for Ksh. 19,078,191.78/=, plus costs and interest until payment in full.
15. He argues that the certificate of taxation was issued on 10 th October 2011, for Kshs. 351,518.90 and a certificate of order against the government issued on 14 th November 2011, for Ksh. 22,916,828.34/=. It is also the Applicant’s case that Interest on the decretal sum at 12% per annum was Ksh. 2,750,019.40/=.
16. Further, that interest (simple) up for 14 th November 2021, when the first payment was to be paid was Ksh. 27,500,194/= and that therefore the decretal sum plus interest as at 2021 was Ksh. 50,417,022.34/=. That less the first payment of Ksh. 12,852,000/= made in March 2022, the balance is Ksh. 37,565,022.34/=.
17. The Applicant further states that interest on balance after the first payment and between 2022-2024 is Ksh. 5,500,038.80/= and that as such, the Total outstanding as at 2024 was Ksh 43,065,061.14/=, less the second payment of Ksh. 399,518/=, paid in April 2024, the balance remained Ksh 42,665,543.44/=. That less the last payment of Kshs.11,588,876.70 paid on August 2024, the balance outstanding as at 5 th May 2025 was Kshs.31,076,666.44
18. According to the Applicant, the Respondent made a first payment of Kshs. 12,852,000/- in March 2022 and the last payment of Kshs. 11,588,876/- in August 2024, both of which constitute clear and unequivocal acknowledgment of the decretal debt within the meaning of section 23 of the Limitation of Actions Act. It is argued that less the last payment of Ksh. 11,588,876.70/= paid in August 2024, the balance outstanding as at 5 th May 2025 is Ksh.31,076,666.44/=.
19. The applicant further argues that by reason of these acknowledgments, any limitation period under section 4(4) was revived and extended and the decree remains alive and enforceable until the decretal sum is fully satisfied. It is argued that since the delivery of judgment, the applicant has diligently and continuously pursued execution including filing multiple applications for payment and enforcement and has never slept on the decree to warrant an allegation of inaction or inertia.
20. The Applicant states that the Respondent's reliance on section 4(4) of the Act, suggesting that no interest may be recovered after six years is misconceived, as interest awarded in a judgment forms an integral part of the decretal sum and is not a separate cause of action.
21. It is further argued that the Court of Appeal has indeed held that a decree continues to accrue interest until the decretal amount is fully satisfied, provided the decree-holder remains active in enforcement. Further, that the Respondent's partial payments in 2022 and in 2024 reaffirmed liability and revived the limitation period afresh, making their present plea of statutory bar legally untenable, and that as such, interest herein continues to accrue day to day until payment in full, as was held in Kenya Bus Services Ltd v Ben Simiyu [2007] eKLR. He also relied on the cases of Kiprotich v Gachihi [2016] eKLR and Kenya Commercial Bank v Osebe [1982KLR 296 on recovery of interest.
22. In his written submissions dated 4 th November 2025, the applicant contends that he has not slept on the decree but has diligently pursued recovery through several execution applications over 13 years, and that the law does not extinguish a decree merely because of delay where the decree-holder remains active in execution.
23. The Respondent filed written submissions dated 6 th November 2025 arguing that the Deputy Registrar’s report failed to heed the express provisions of the Limitation of Actions Act (Cap 22) and settled jurisprudence thereby arriving at a figure that is not only statute-barred but also contrary to equity, public policy and constitutional dictates. It is also submitted that it is trite law that interest on a judgment debt is recoverable only for six years from the date it became due, and that beyond this, such interest becomes unenforceable by operation of statute.
24. The Respondents further submit that the decree in this matter was issued on 29 th June 2011 and that consequently, the last recoverable interest would have accrued by 29 th June 2017, beyond which the claim is statute-barred.
25. The Respondents rely on the case of Makwata Construction and Engineering Company Ltd v Limuru Girls School [2024] KEHC , where the court is said to have cited section 4(4) of the Limitations of Actions Act and held that interest on a judgment debt cannot be recovered after six years from the date it became due.
26. They also submit that numerous other judgments have reiterated the application of Section 4(4) of the Limitation of Actions Act on the capping of interest at 6 years. That these cases include the Court of Appeal in Lachhman v. Trikam [1987] eKLR and Kenya Hotel Properties Ltd v. Willesden Investments Ltd [2009] eKLR , where the courts are said to have held that interest on a judgment debt must be claimed within the statutory period, failing which the claim becomes stale and unenforceable.
27. The respondents also rely on the case of Lowsley v. Forbes (t/a L E Design Services) [1999] 1 AC 329 (HL) , where the House of Lords is said to have declared that while the judgment sum itself may be enforceable for twelve years, interest recoverable thereunder is strictly limited to six years. That therefore in this case, the Deputy Registrar’s computation of interest beyond six years from 2011 is manifestly contrary to both statute and precedent.
28. It is also submitted that the cumulative figure of KES 57,000,000 (Kes 24m paid already plus the Registrar's amount of Kes 33m) arising from the original judgment debt of KES 7,500,000 is exorbitant, unconscionable and inconsistent with the equitable purpose of interest as compensation rather than punishment and/or unjust enrichment.
29. The respondents also relied on the Supreme Court decision in Samuel Kamau Macharia v. Kenya Commercial Bank & 2 Others [2012] eKLR where the apex Court is said to have underscored that courts must interpret and apply the law in a manner that fosters substantive justice and prevents abuse of the judicial process.
30. The Respondents further rely on the case of Abdulhamid Ebrahim Ahmed v. Municipal Council of Mombasa [2004] eKLR , where the Court is said to have warned against permitting claims that would “offend the conscience of equity and good conscience,” observing that interest must not become a vehicle of oppression or unjust enrichment.
31. It is also submitted that the 2 nd Respondent is a public entity bound by the Constitutional principles enunciated by Article 201 of the Constitution namely prudence, accountability and responsible financial management in the use of public resources. That suffice it to say that in the discharge of its function this Court is similarly guided.
32. The Respondents rely on the case of Republic v. Attorney General & Another Ex parte James Alfred Koroso [2013] eKLR where the court is said to have reaffirmed that public funds must be expended with strict adherence to the Constitution and that courts should be vigilant against orders that may “unduly enrich” individuals at the expense of the taxpayer. The Privy Council in Attorney General v. Blake [2001] 1 AC 268 (UKHL) is also said to have cautioned that restitutionary or excessive awards that go beyond compensation constitute unjust enrichment and are inconsistent with equitable principles of damages.
33. The Respondents also submit that it would be manifestly unjust and contrary to public policy for this Honourable Court to sanction payment of over Kshs. 32,000,000 in purported arrears of interest especially where the Respondents have already paid three times the principal judgment debit.
34. According to the respondents, the doctrine of finality in litigation is a cornerstone of justice. The Respondents also submit that endless re-litigation and perpetual accrual of interest undermine the very purpose of decrees and the sanctity of judicial pronouncements.
35. They also rely on the case of Njenga v. Njenga [1991] KLR 401 , where the court is said to have held that “litigation must come to an end,” and that courts must prevent the abuse of their process by perpetual revival of extinguished claims. A similar position is said to have been taken in the case of Re W (A Child) [2010] EWCA Civ 57 , where the English Court of Appeal is said to have reaffirmed that it is in the public interest that disputes be resolved conclusively and efficiently.
36. The Respondents maintain that the lawful computation, consistent with Section 4(4) of the Limitation of Actions Act, is as follows:
General damages KES 1,000,000
Interest @12% WEF 02.03.2011
1,000,000 x 12/100 x 6 KES 720,000
Special damages KES 6,500,000
Interest @12% WEF 28.04.1996 to 01.03.2011
6,500,000 x 12/100 x 7,613/365 KES 16,268,876.71
COSTS KES 351,518
TOTAL DECRETAL AMOUNT KES 24,840,394.71
AMOUNT PAID KES 24,840,394.70
BALANCE KES 0.01
Balance rounded off to the nearest cent Kes 0.00
37. The Respondents contend that the judgment debt has already been fully settled and that any further claim is unlawful. They argue that the Deputy Registrar’s Report of 22 nd July 2025 wrongly computed the outstanding amount at over Kshs. 32,000,000, contrary to statute and equity, because interest on a judgment debt is only recoverable for 6 years under Section 4(4) of the Limitation of Actions Act, thus, no interest could lawfully accrue after June 2017.
38. They also submit that enforcing the impugned computation, raising the total payable to nearly to Kshs.57,000,000 million from an original Kshs 7,500,000 would cause unjust enrichment, violate principles of prudent public finance management and amount to abuse of process. They therefore urge the Court to set aside the Report, affirm that the lawful sum of Kshs.24,840,394.70 has been fully paid, and mark the matter as settled and closed.
Analysis and Determination
43. I have carefully considered the parties’ affidavits, the impugned report of the Deputy Registrar dated 22 nd July 2025, the rival submissions, and the applicable statutory and judicial authorities.
44. The issues for determination are:
a. Whether the computation adopted by the Deputy Registrar is lawful and specifically, whether interest on the decretal sum continued to accrue beyond the six-year period considering the provisions of Section 4(4) of the Limitation of Actions Act
b. Whether the Respondents’ part-payments in 2022 and 2024 revived the limitation period under Section 23 of the Limitation of Actions Act so as to keep the decree alive for purposes of further accrual of interest.
c. The other issue is whether enforcing the Deputy Registrar’s computation would amount to unjust enrichment
d. What orders should this Court make
Whether interest on the decretal sum continued to accrue beyond the six-year period in view of the provisions of Section 4(4) of the Limitation of Actions Act
45. The Respondents argue that interest on the judgment debt is recoverable only within six (6) years from the date it became due and that therefore no interest could lawfully accrue after June 2017, given that the decree was issued in June 2011. They rely on Section 4(4) of the Limitation of Actions Act and several authorities.
44. The Applicant’s on the other hand, contends that interest continues to accrue until the decretal sum is fully settled, provided the decree-holder remains active in execution. The Applicant argues that interest is part of the judgment debt, not a separate cause of action and that therefore the limitation under Section 4(4) cannot extinguish ongoing accruals so long as execution efforts are not abandoned.
45. There are conflicting decisions on this issue of whether section 4(4) of the Limitation of Actions Act bars charging of interest on decretal sum after lapse of six years. In Kisya Investments Limited v Attorney General & another (Civil Suit 2832 of 1990) [2023] KEHC 3741 (KLR) (Civ) (24 April 2023) (Ruling), Sergon J stated as follows:
“16. The second issue is whether the Applicant is barred under Section 4(4) of the Limitation of Actions Act from further charging interest. The Applicant pointed out that the Respondent is not permitted to charge interest after the lapse of six years from the date it is due.
17. There is no dispute that the Plaintiff was awarded Judgment in the sum of Kshs 31,222,071/35 plus interest on September 10, 1997. The principal sum was to attract interest from the date of Judgment until full payment.
18. Its trite law that the outstanding amount would continue to attract interest so long as the Judgment sum remains unsettled. There is evidence indicating that the Plaintiff has failed to settle the Judgment sum. The law did not intend to stop the charging of interest on the outstanding amount even after the lapse of six years. The record shows that the Plaintiff has made part payment of the Judgment sum.
19. The period to levy interest did not stop. It is a continuing period so long as the Judgment remains unsettled.
46. The learned Judge in the above case did not refer to any other judicial pronouncement that interpreted the provisions of section 4(4) of the Limitation of Actions Act alongside section 23(3) of the same Act. It follows that the decision remains persuasive and that this Court must interpret section 26 of the Civil Procedure Act alongside the Limitation of Actions Act, first by reproducing the provisions of the two statutes here.
47. Section 26 of the Civil procedure Act provides as follows:
“26. Interests
(1) Where and in so far as a decree is for the payment of money, the court may, in the decree, order interest at such rate as the court deems reasonable to be paid on the principal sum adjudged from the date of the suit to the date of the decree in addition to any interest adjudged on such principal sum for any period before the institution of the suit, with further interest at such rate as the court deems reasonable on the aggregate sum so adjudged from the date of the decree to the date of payment or to such earlier date as the court thinks fit.
(2) Where such a decree is silent with respect to the payment of further interest on such aggregate sum as aforesaid from the date of the decree to the date of payment or other earlier date, the court shall be deemed to have ordered interest at 6 per cent per annum.
48. There is no dispute that interest is ordinarily an incident of the judgment in money decrees and that it continues to run until satisfaction of decree as stipulated in section 26 of the Civil procedure Act. However, the legislative framework under Section 4(4) of the Limitation of Actions Act expressly limits the period within which “interest on a judgment” may be recovered. This statutory cap is a substantive limitation enacted by Parliament and not merely a procedural bar. The section reads as follows:
“4(4)An action may not be brought upon a judgment after the end of twelve years from the date on which the judgment was delivered, or (where the judgment or a subsequent order directs any payment of money or the delivery of any property to be made at a certain date or at recurring periods) the date of the default in making the payment or delivery in question, and no arrears of interest in respect of a judgment debt may be recovered after the expiration of six years from the date on which the interest became due.”[emphasis added]
49. In Civil Appeal No 3 of 1964 Dhanesvar Mehta vs Minalal M.Shah (1965) E.A.321 the Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa held:
“The overriding purpose of all limitation statutes is based on the maxim interest reipulbicaeut sit finis litium, and it has been the policy of the court to lean against stale claims……”
50. In the case of Assia Pharmaceuticals Ltd v Kenya Alliance Insurance Co. Ltd [2021] KEHC 19 (KLR ) the High Court stated as follows on this subject of limitation of actions:
“The law of limitation is found upon maxims such as “Interest Reipublicae Ut Sit Finis Litium” which means that litigation must come to an end in the interest of society as a whole, and “vigilantibus non dormientibus Jura subveniunt” which means that the law assists those that are vigilant with their rights, and not those that sleep thereupon. The law of limitation identifies the need for limiting litigation by striking a balance between the interests of the state and the litigant.
27.Section 4 (4) of the Limitation of Actions Act provides that: -(4)An action may not be brought upon a judgment after the end of twelve years from the date on which the judgment was delivered, or (where the judgment or a subsequent order directs any payment of money or the delivery of any property to be made at a certain date or at recurring periods) the date of the default in making the payment or delivery in question , and no arrears of interest in respect of a judgment debt may be recovered after the expiration of six years from the date on which the interest became due.
28. The last part of the above provision is instructive. It provides that “no arrears of interest in respect of a judgment debt may be recovered after the expiration of six years from the date on which the interest became due.” The judgment is dated June 2, 2004, 17 years ago. From the applicant’s own admission, the last payment was made on August 13, 2014. Even though the applicant was not clear, the sum of Kshs. 7,507,243/= was in respect of the principal sum. What is clear is that without providing a clear tabulation as to how the amount being claimed is arrived at, the applicant states that the amount of Kshs. 24,023,177.60 being pursued comprises of accrued interests.
29.One thing is clear from a reading of section 4(4) cited above, that is, recovery of interest on a court judgment may not be recovered after the expiry of 6 years. When the Limitation of Actions Act or any other statute prescribe a period of limitation for initiating legal proceedings, any legal action has to be brought within such prescribed period. As it is imperative to give finality to administrative as well as judicial decisions in the interests of justice, no court or tribunal can entertain any petition/suit/application made after the expiry of the limitation period, unless sufficient cause for delay has been proved by the petitioner/plaintiff/applicant. Therefore, those who sleep over their rights have no right to agitate for them after the lapse of the prescribed period.
30.The Limitation of Actions Act provides the limitation periods for different claims. Regarding claims for interests on court judgments, it provides six years from the date the interest became due for actions relating to arrears of interest with regard to a judgment debt. It is important to mention that the word “action ” in section 4(4) of the Limitation of Actions Act has been judicially construed to include execution proceedings. This position was appreciated by the Court of Appeal in Njuguna v Njau, 13 Malakwen Arap Maswai v Paul Koskei 14 and M’ikiara M’rinkanya & another v Gilbert Kabeere M’mbijiwe . 15 In these three decisions, the Court of Appeal construed the word “action” in section 4 (4) of the Act as including all kinds of civil proceedings including execution proceedings. 13 [1981] KLR 225. 14 Eldoret Civil Appeal No 230 of 2001 (unreported 15 [2007] eKLR.
31.The other important point to note is the nomenclature of section 4(4). The word “may” has been appears in the said provision. The use of the said word means that provision is not couched in mandatory terms. This position was enunciated by the Court of Appeal in M’ikiara M’rinkanya & another v Gilbert Kabeere M’mbijiwe (supra) that: -“The main ground of appeal is that the learned judge failed to appreciate the meaning and essence of section 4 (4) of the Act and the authority cited to him. This appeal raises the question of the true construction of section 4 (4) of the Act. Firstly, there is the problem of the construction of the words “may not” in the phase:- “An action may not be brought …...” The learned Judge construed the phrase “may not” as giving the court discretion whether or not to allow the enforcement of a judgment after the expiration of twelve years from the date of delivery. But does the court have any discretion in law? It is noticeable that the phrase “may not” is not confined to section 4 (4) of the Act only. The same phrase is used throughout in Part II of the Act in relation to the other causes of action. It is also used in the whole of section 4 of the Act in relation to actions founded on contract and other related actions. It is used in section 4 (2) of the Act in relation to actions founded on tort and in section 4 (3) regarding actions for accounts. It is also used in section 7 in relation to actions to recover land and in section 8 in actions to recover rent. It is again used in relation to other causes of action in sections 10 (3), 19 (1), 19 (2) of the Act. The use of the phrase “may not” does not however give the court absolute discretion whether or not to apply the limitation periods prescribed for various causes of action. If the legislature intended to give absolute discretion to the courts it would have expressly provided so in the Act. The Act should be construed as a whole in order to discover the legal meaning of the phrase. After prescribing limitation periods for various actions, the legislature provided safety mechanism or escape routes from the rigours of the Act to avoid injustice by providing for the extension of limitation periods in the restricted cases specified in part III of the Act. These include cases where a person to whom the cause of action accrues is under disability. Indeed, section 3 of the Act provides that part II of the Act which specifies various limitation periods is subject to part III which provides for extension of the periods of limitation. It provides:
“ Thi
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA AT NAIROBI
JUDICIAL REVIEW DIVISION
JUDICIAL REVIEW APPLICATION NO. 148 OF 2013
ISAIAH OCHANDA……………………………………………….APPLICANT
VERSUS
THE HON. ATTORNEY GENERAL………………………1 ST RESPONDENT
PRINCIPAL SECRETARY
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE…………………………………2 ND RESPONDENT
RULING
1. This ruling is pursuant to this Court’s directions issued on 28 th April 2025 where the court directed as follows:
“ THIS MATTER coming up on 28/04/2025 for directions before Honourable Lady Justice R.E. Aburili.
UPON HEARING the Counsel for the Plaintiff/Applicant and the Counsel for the Defendant/Respondent;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. THAT the exparte applicant to forthwith file a statement of payment received from D.O.D of the decretal sum plus interest.
2. THAT Upon which, the Deputy Registrar shall work out the interest payable as at the time of payment of the decretal sum, for the purposes of reconciling of the accounts.
3. THAT Once the DR completes the exercise, she will file the calculations before the court for further directions.
4. THAT mention on 10/06/2025 before this court to confirm compliance. GIVEN under my hand and seal of the Honourable court this 28/04/2025.
2. Following these directions, the Deputy Registrar, Hon Emmie Chelule filed a report dated 22 nd July 2025 with calculations showing pending payments arising from the decree dated 29 th June 2011.The report read thus:
“ Pursuant to the Court Order dated 28 th April 2025 by Hon Lady Justice R.E. Aburili directing that the Deputy Registrar works out the interest payable as at the time of payment of the decretal sums for the purposes of reconciling of the accounts.
The Ex parte Applicant in compliance with the Court's directions filed their statement of payments made dated the 5 th May 2025.
• Initial decretal amount from the decree dated 29/06/2011 19,078,191.78
• Interest from 3 rd March 2011 to 24 th March 2022: the 1 st payment was made vide voucher dated 24/03/2022 and reference No.AG/JRDOD/239/12Number of days from 03.03.2011-24.03.2011=4039 daysInterest 19,078,191.78 x12/100 x 4039/365=25,412,151.45Decretal=19,078,191.78+25,412,151.45=44,490,343.23
44,490,343.23-12,852,000.00(less paid)=31,638,343.23
• Interest on balance: 31,638,343.23 from 25 th March 2022 to 23/4/2024
• 2 nd payment made on the 23/4/2024 as per the Discharge voucher voucher31,638,343.23x12/100x761/365=7,972,862.49Decretal 31,638,343.23 + 7,972,862.49 = 39,611,205.72
39,611,205.72-399,518.00(less paid)=39,211,687.72
• Interest on above 39,211,687.72 from 24/04/2024 to 26/06/2024(63 days)39,211,687.72x12/100x63/365=799,918.42Decretal39,211,687.72+799,918.42=40,011,606.1540,011,606.15-11,588,876.70(lesspaid)=28,422,729.45
• Balance owed as at21/07/2025Number of days as from 27/06/2024-21/07/2025(389days)Interest on balance 28,422,729.45x 12/100x 389/365 =3,649,478.46Decretal = 28,422,729.45+ 3,649,478.46 = 32,072,207.91
3. The Respondent filed a response dated 21 st October 2025, contesting the report and calculations by the deputy Registrar, contending that there was no legal basis upon which the Report stands. The respondent argues that the claim for the majority of the interest is statute-barred; the calculation is founded on an erroneous premise and the enforcement thereof would be against public justice and equity.
4. The Respondent further contends that the claim for the principal decretal sum is time-barred pursuant to section 4(4) of the Limitation of Actions Act. That according to the limitation period under Section 4(4) above, an action to recover any sum of money payable under a judgment or decree must be commenced within six (6) years from the date on which the cause of action accrued. It is argued that in the present matter, the decree was issued on 29 th June 2011 and the applicable limitation period expired by 29 th June 2017.
5. The Respondents also argue that the Deputy Registrar’s report calculates interest accruing from 3 rd March 2011 continuously until 21 st July 2025 with serial payments reducing balances over time. However, that this calculation overlooks the statutory limitation period, beyond which the claim especially for interest is statute-barred and unenforceable.
6. The Respondent further contends that while the principal sum confirmed by the decree is immediately enforceable, the statutory limitation applies to the entire claim including interest beyond the limitation period and that any interest claimed beyond six years from the date of the decree is barred under Kenyan law.
7. Additionally, that the claim for outstanding balances inclusive of interest amounting to over Kshs. 32 million as at July 2025 exceeds the limitation period and should be struck out or limited to the principal decretal amount plus interest accrued within the statutory period. It is argued that enforcement of such extended interest claims is contrary to Section 4(4) of the Limitation of Actions Act and established case law.
8. The Respondent contends that the proper calculation in view of section 4(4) of the Limitation of Actions Act is as follows:
General damages Kes 1,000,000
Interest @12% w.e.f. 02.03.2011
1,000,000 x 12/100 x 6 Kes 720,000
Special damages Kes 6,500,000
Interest @12% w.e.f. 28.04.1996 to 01.03.2011
6,500,000 x 12/100 x 7,613/365 Kes 16,268,876.71
Costs Kes 351,518
Total Decretal Amount Kes 24,840,394.71
Amount Paid Kes 24,840,394.70
Balance Kes 0.01
9. The Respondent further argues that the original decretal sum was Kshs. 7,500,000.00, however that according to the Registrar’s calculations, the total sum sought to be recovered, being the principal plus interest amounts to nearly Kshs. 57,000,000. According to the respondent judgment debtor, this is an astronomical figure representing more than eight times the original judgment debt.
10. The Respondents maintains that from the court records, it has already paid Kshs. 24,840,394.70, and that this amount exceeds the original principal decretal sum threefold. That to demand a further Kenya Shillings 32,072,207.91 is unconscionable and amounts to unjust enrichment.
11. The Respondent urges this Court to consider the public interest in this matter as it is not a dispute between two private entities since the 2 nd Respondent represents a public body, from which any decretal sum is deferred against tax payer money.
12. The judgment debtor respondent cites Article 201 of the Constitution and asserts that it would be an affront to the constitutional principles laid down in the said Article for this Court to sanction a payment that is so grotesquely disproportionate to the original liability.
13. The Respondent further argues that it would be manifestly inequitable and contrary to justice to compel Kenyan taxpayers to bear the burden of an extrapolated judgment, which risks unjust enrichment and excessive litigation. Further contention is that the interest claimed has shifted from compensatory to punitive and unfairly penalizing the public. It urges this Court, guided by Section 4(4) of the Limitation of Actions Act, to set aside the Deputy Registrar’s report, recognize that the Claimant has already been adequately compensated and bring finality to this matter to protect the public purse and preserve the integrity of the judicial process.
14. In response to the respondent’s contestation of the Deputy Registrar’s report, the Applicant filed a response dated 21 st October 2025.The Applicant argues that the recovery of the decretal amount and interest is not barred under section 4(4) of the Limitation of Actions Act (Cap 22, Laws of Kenya). that Judgement was delivered in favour of the applicant on the 2 nd May 2011 and the attendant decree issued on the 29 th June 2011, for Ksh. 19,078,191.78/=, plus costs and interest until payment in full.
15. He argues that the certificate of taxation was issued on 10 th October 2011, for Kshs. 351,518.90 and a certificate of order against the government issued on 14 th November 2011, for Ksh. 22,916,828.34/=. It is also the Applicant’s case that Interest on the decretal sum at 12% per annum was Ksh. 2,750,019.40/=.
16. Further, that interest (simple) up for 14 th November 2021, when the first payment was to be paid was Ksh. 27,500,194/= and that therefore the decretal sum plus interest as at 2021 was Ksh. 50,417,022.34/=. That less the first payment of Ksh. 12,852,000/= made in March 2022, the balance is Ksh. 37,565,022.34/=.
17. The Applicant further states that interest on balance after the first payment and between 2022-2024 is Ksh. 5,500,038.80/= and that as such, the Total outstanding as at 2024 was Ksh 43,065,061.14/=, less the second payment of Ksh. 399,518/=, paid in April 2024, the balance remained Ksh 42,665,543.44/=. That less the last payment of Kshs.11,588,876.70 paid on August 2024, the balance outstanding as at 5 th May 2025 was Kshs.31,076,666.44
18. According to the Applicant, the Respondent made a first payment of Kshs. 12,852,000/- in March 2022 and the last payment of Kshs. 11,588,876/- in August 2024, both of which constitute clear and unequivocal acknowledgment of the decretal debt within the meaning of section 23 of the Limitation of Actions Act. It is argued that less the last payment of Ksh. 11,588,876.70/= paid in August 2024, the balance outstanding as at 5 th May 2025 is Ksh.31,076,666.44/=.
19. The applicant further argues that by reason of these acknowledgments, any limitation period under section 4(4) was revived and extended and the decree remains alive and enforceable until the decretal sum is fully satisfied. It is argued that since the delivery of judgment, the applicant has diligently and continuously pursued execution including filing multiple applications for payment and enforcement and has never slept on the decree to warrant an allegation of inaction or inertia.
20. The Applicant states that the Respondent's reliance on section 4(4) of the Act, suggesting that no interest may be recovered after six years is misconceived, as interest awarded in a judgment forms an integral part of the decretal sum and is not a separate cause of action.
21. It is further argued that the Court of Appeal has indeed held that a decree continues to accrue interest until the decretal amount is fully satisfied, provided the decree-holder remains active in enforcement. Further, that the Respondent's partial payments in 2022 and in 2024 reaffirmed liability and revived the limitation period afresh, making their present plea of statutory bar legally untenable, and that as such, interest herein continues to accrue day to day until payment in full, as was held in Kenya Bus Services Ltd v Ben Simiyu [2007] eKLR. He also relied on the cases of Kiprotich v Gachihi [2016] eKLR and Kenya Commercial Bank v Osebe [1982KLR 296 on recovery of interest.
22. In his written submissions dated 4 th November 2025, the applicant contends that he has not slept on the decree but has diligently pursued recovery through several execution applications over 13 years, and that the law does not extinguish a decree merely because of delay where the decree-holder remains active in execution.
23. The Respondent filed written submissions dated 6 th November 2025 arguing that the Deputy Registrar’s report failed to heed the express provisions of the Limitation of Actions Act (Cap 22) and settled jurisprudence thereby arriving at a figure that is not only statute-barred but also contrary to equity, public policy and constitutional dictates. It is also submitted that it is trite law that interest on a judgment debt is recoverable only for six years from the date it became due, and that beyond this, such interest becomes unenforceable by operation of statute.
24. The Respondents further submit that the decree in this matter was issued on 29 th June 2011 and that consequently, the last recoverable interest would have accrued by 29 th June 2017, beyond which the claim is statute-barred.
25. The Respondents rely on the case of Makwata Construction and Engineering Company Ltd v Limuru Girls School [2024] KEHC , where the court is said to have cited section 4(4) of the Limitations of Actions Act and held that interest on a judgment debt cannot be recovered after six years from the date it became due.
26. They also submit that numerous other judgments have reiterated the application of Section 4(4) of the Limitation of Actions Act on the capping of interest at 6 years. That these cases include the Court of Appeal in Lachhman v. Trikam [1987] eKLR and Kenya Hotel Properties Ltd v. Willesden Investments Ltd [2009] eKLR , where the courts are said to have held that interest on a judgment debt must be claimed within the statutory period, failing which the claim becomes stale and unenforceable.
27. The respondents also rely on the case of Lowsley v. Forbes (t/a L E Design Services) [1999] 1 AC 329 (HL) , where the House of Lords is said to have declared that while the judgment sum itself may be enforceable for twelve years, interest recoverable thereunder is strictly limited to six years. That therefore in this case, the Deputy Registrar’s computation of interest beyond six years from 2011 is manifestly contrary to both statute and precedent.
28. It is also submitted that the cumulative figure of KES 57,000,000 (Kes 24m paid already plus the Registrar's amount of Kes 33m) arising from the original judgment debt of KES 7,500,000 is exorbitant, unconscionable and inconsistent with the equitable purpose of interest as compensation rather than punishment and/or unjust enrichment.
29. The respondents also relied on the Supreme Court decision in Samuel Kamau Macharia v. Kenya Commercial Bank & 2 Others [2012] eKLR where the apex Court is said to have underscored that courts must interpret and apply the law in a manner that fosters substantive justice and prevents abuse of the judicial process.
30. The Respondents further rely on the case of Abdulhamid Ebrahim Ahmed v. Municipal Council of Mombasa [2004] eKLR , where the Court is said to have warned against permitting claims that would “offend the conscience of equity and good conscience,” observing that interest must not become a vehicle of oppression or unjust enrichment.
31. It is also submitted that the 2 nd Respondent is a public entity bound by the Constitutional principles enunciated by Article 201 of the Constitution namely prudence, accountability and responsible financial management in the use of public resources. That suffice it to say that in the discharge of its function this Court is similarly guided.
32. The Respondents rely on the case of Republic v. Attorney General & Another Ex parte James Alfred Koroso [2013] eKLR where the court is said to have reaffirmed that public funds must be expended with strict adherence to the Constitution and that courts should be vigilant against orders that may “unduly enrich” individuals at the expense of the taxpayer. The Privy Council in Attorney General v. Blake [2001] 1 AC 268 (UKHL) is also said to have cautioned that restitutionary or excessive awards that go beyond compensation constitute unjust enrichment and are inconsistent with equitable principles of damages.
33. The Respondents also submit that it would be manifestly unjust and contrary to public policy for this Honourable Court to sanction payment of over Kshs. 32,000,000 in purported arrears of interest especially where the Respondents have already paid three times the principal judgment debit.
34. According to the respondents, the doctrine of finality in litigation is a cornerstone of justice. The Respondents also submit that endless re-litigation and perpetual accrual of interest undermine the very purpose of decrees and the sanctity of judicial pronouncements.
35. They also rely on the case of Njenga v. Njenga [1991] KLR 401 , where the court is said to have held that “litigation must come to an end,” and that courts must prevent the abuse of their process by perpetual revival of extinguished claims. A similar position is said to have been taken in the case of Re W (A Child) [2010] EWCA Civ 57 , where the English Court of Appeal is said to have reaffirmed that it is in the public interest that disputes be resolved conclusively and efficiently.
36. The Respondents maintain that the lawful computation, consistent with Section 4(4) of the Limitation of Actions Act, is as follows:
General damages KES 1,000,000
Interest @12% WEF 02.03.2011
1,000,000 x 12/100 x 6 KES 720,000
Special damages KES 6,500,000
Interest @12% WEF 28.04.1996 to 01.03.2011
6,500,000 x 12/100 x 7,613/365 KES 16,268,876.71
COSTS KES 351,518
TOTAL DECRETAL AMOUNT KES 24,840,394.71
AMOUNT PAID KES 24,840,394.70
BALANCE KES 0.01
Balance rounded off to the nearest cent Kes 0.00
37. The Respondents contend that the judgment debt has already been fully settled and that any further claim is unlawful. They argue that the Deputy Registrar’s Report of 22 nd July 2025 wrongly computed the outstanding amount at over Kshs. 32,000,000, contrary to statute and equity, because interest on a judgment debt is only recoverable for 6 years under Section 4(4) of the Limitation of Actions Act, thus, no interest could lawfully accrue after June 2017.
38. They also submit that enforcing the impugned computation, raising the total payable to nearly to Kshs.57,000,000 million from an original Kshs 7,500,000 would cause unjust enrichment, violate principles of prudent public finance management and amount to abuse of process. They therefore urge the Court to set aside the Report, affirm that the lawful sum of Kshs.24,840,394.70 has been fully paid, and mark the matter as settled and closed.
Analysis and Determination
43. I have carefully considered the parties’ affidavits, the impugned report of the Deputy Registrar dated 22 nd July 2025, the rival submissions, and the applicable statutory and judicial authorities.
44. The issues for determination are:
a. Whether the computation adopted by the Deputy Registrar is lawful and specifically, whether interest on the decretal sum continued to accrue beyond the six-year period considering the provisions of Section 4(4) of the Limitation of Actions Act
b. Whether the Respondents’ part-payments in 2022 and 2024 revived the limitation period under Section 23 of the Limitation of Actions Act so as to keep the decree alive for purposes of further accrual of interest.
c. The other issue is whether enforcing the Deputy Registrar’s computation would amount to unjust enrichment
d. What orders should this Court make
Whether interest on the decretal sum continued to accrue beyond the six-year period in view of the provisions of Section 4(4) of the Limitation of Actions Act
45. The Respondents argue that interest on the judgment debt is recoverable only within six (6) years from the date it became due and that therefore no interest could lawfully accrue after June 2017, given that the decree was issued in June 2011. They rely on Section 4(4) of the Limitation of Actions Act and several authorities.
44. The Applicant’s on the other hand, contends that interest continues to accrue until the decretal sum is fully settled, provided the decree-holder remains active in execution. The Applicant argues that interest is part of the judgment debt, not a separate cause of action and that therefore the limitation under Section 4(4) cannot extinguish ongoing accruals so long as execution efforts are not abandoned.
45. There are conflicting decisions on this issue of whether section 4(4) of the Limitation of Actions Act bars charging of interest on decretal sum after lapse of six years. In Kisya Investments Limited v Attorney General & another (Civil Suit 2832 of 1990) [2023] KEHC 3741 (KLR) (Civ) (24 April 2023) (Ruling), Sergon J stated as follows:
“16. The second issue is whether the Applicant is barred under Section 4(4) of the Limitation of Actions Act from further charging interest. The Applicant pointed out that the Respondent is not permitted to charge interest after the lapse of six years from the date it is due.
17. There is no dispute that the Plaintiff was awarded Judgment in the sum of Kshs 31,222,071/35 plus interest on September 10, 1997. The principal sum was to attract interest from the date of Judgment until full payment.
18. Its trite law that the outstanding amount would continue to attract interest so long as the Judgment sum remains unsettled. There is evidence indicating that the Plaintiff has failed to settle the Judgment sum. The law did not intend to stop the charging of interest on the outstanding amount even after the lapse of six years. The record shows that the Plaintiff has made part payment of the Judgment sum.
19. The period to levy interest did not stop. It is a continuing period so long as the Judgment remains unsettled.
46. The learned Judge in the above case did not refer to any other judicial pronouncement that interpreted the provisions of section 4(4) of the Limitation of Actions Act alongside section 23(3) of the same Act. It follows that the decision remains persuasive and that this Court must interpret section 26 of the Civil Procedure Act alongside the Limitation of Actions Act, first by reproducing the provisions of the two statutes here.
47. Section 26 of the Civil procedure Act provides as follows:
“26. Interests
(1) Where and in so far as a decree is for the payment of money, the court may, in the decree, order interest at such rate as the court deems reasonable to be paid on the principal sum adjudged from the date of the suit to the date of the decree in addition to any interest adjudged on such principal sum for any period before the institution of the suit, with further interest at such rate as the court deems reasonable on the aggregate sum so adjudged from the date of the decree to the date of payment or to such earlier date as the court thinks fit.
(2) Where such a decree is silent with respect to the payment of further interest on such aggregate sum as aforesaid from the date of the decree to the date of payment or other earlier date, the court shall be deemed to have ordered interest at 6 per cent per annum.
48. There is no dispute that interest is ordinarily an incident of the judgment in money decrees and that it continues to run until satisfaction of decree as stipulated in section 26 of the Civil procedure Act. However, the legislative framework under Section 4(4) of the Limitation of Actions Act expressly limits the period within which “interest on a judgment” may be recovered. This statutory cap is a substantive limitation enacted by Parliament and not merely a procedural bar. The section reads as follows:
“4(4)An action may not be brought upon a judgment after the end of twelve years from the date on which the judgment was delivered, or (where the judgment or a subsequent order directs any payment of money or the delivery of any property to be made at a certain date or at recurring periods) the date of the default in making the payment or delivery in question, and no arrears of interest in respect of a judgment debt may be recovered after the expiration of six years from the date on which the interest became due.”[emphasis added]
49. In Civil Appeal No 3 of 1964 Dhanesvar Mehta vs Minalal M.Shah (1965) E.A.321 the Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa held:
“The overriding purpose of all limitation statutes is based on the maxim interest reipulbicaeut sit finis litium, and it has been the policy of the court to lean against stale claims……”
50. In the case of Assia Pharmaceuticals Ltd v Kenya Alliance Insurance Co. Ltd [2021] KEHC 19 (KLR ) the High Court stated as follows on this subject of limitation of actions:
“The law of limitation is found upon maxims such as “Interest Reipublicae Ut Sit Finis Litium” which means that litigation must come to an end in the interest of society as a whole, and “vigilantibus non dormientibus Jura subveniunt” which means that the law assists those that are vigilant with their rights, and not those that sleep thereupon. The law of limitation identifies the need for limiting litigation by striking a balance between the interests of the state and the litigant.
27.Section 4 (4) of the Limitation of Actions Act provides that: -(4)An action may not be brought upon a judgment after the end of twelve years from the date on which the judgment was delivered, or (where the judgment or a subsequent order directs any payment of money or the delivery of any property to be made at a certain date or at recurring periods) the date of the default in making the payment or delivery in question , and no arrears of interest in respect of a judgment debt may be recovered after the expiration of six years from the date on which the interest became due.
28. The last part of the above provision is instructive. It provides that “no arrears of interest in respect of a judgment debt may be recovered after the expiration of six years from the date on which the interest became due.” The judgment is dated June 2, 2004, 17 years ago. From the applicant’s own admission, the last payment was made on August 13, 2014. Even though the applicant was not clear, the sum of Kshs. 7,507,243/= was in respect of the principal sum. What is clear is that without providing a clear tabulation as to how the amount being claimed is arrived at, the applicant states that the amount of Kshs. 24,023,177.60 being pursued comprises of accrued interests.
29.One thing is clear from a reading of section 4(4) cited above, that is, recovery of interest on a court judgment may not be recovered after the expiry of 6 years. When the Limitation of Actions Act or any other statute prescribe a period of limitation for initiating legal proceedings, any legal action has to be brought within such prescribed period. As it is imperative to give finality to administrative as well as judicial decisions in the interests of justice, no court or tribunal can entertain any petition/suit/application made after the expiry of the limitation period, unless sufficient cause for delay has been proved by the petitioner/plaintiff/applicant. Therefore, those who sleep over their rights have no right to agitate for them after the lapse of the prescribed period.
30.The Limitation of Actions Act provides the limitation periods for different claims. Regarding claims for interests on court judgments, it provides six years from the date the interest became due for actions relating to arrears of interest with regard to a judgment debt. It is important to mention that the word “action ” in section 4(4) of the Limitation of Actions Act has been judicially construed to include execution proceedings. This position was appreciated by the Court of Appeal in Njuguna v Njau, 13 Malakwen Arap Maswai v Paul Koskei 14 and M’ikiara M’rinkanya & another v Gilbert Kabeere M’mbijiwe . 15 In these three decisions, the Court of Appeal construed the word “action” in section 4 (4) of the Act as including all kinds of civil proceedings including execution proceedings. 13 [1981] KLR 225. 14 Eldoret Civil Appeal No 230 of 2001 (unreported 15 [2007] eKLR.
31.The other important point to note is the nomenclature of section 4(4). The word “may” has been appears in the said provision. The use of the said word means that provision is not couched in mandatory terms. This position was enunciated by the Court of Appeal in M’ikiara M’rinkanya & another v Gilbert Kabeere M’mbijiwe (supra) that: -“The main ground of appeal is that the learned judge failed to appreciate the meaning and essence of section 4 (4) of the Act and the authority cited to him. This appeal raises the question of the true construction of section 4 (4) of the Act. Firstly, there is the problem of the construction of the words “may not” in the phase:- “An action may not be brought …...” The learned Judge construed the phrase “may not” as giving the court discretion whether or not to allow the enforcement of a judgment after the expiration of twelve years from the date of delivery. But does the court have any discretion in law? It is noticeable that the phrase “may not” is not confined to section 4 (4) of the Act only. The same phrase is used throughout in Part II of the Act in relation to the other causes of action. It is also used in the whole of section 4 of the Act in relation to actions founded on contract and other related actions. It is used in section 4 (2) of the Act in relation to actions founded on tort and in section 4 (3) regarding actions for accounts. It is also used in section 7 in relation to actions to recover land and in section 8 in actions to recover rent. It is again used in relation to other causes of action in sections 10 (3), 19 (1), 19 (2) of the Act. The use of the phrase “may not” does not however give the court absolute discretion whether or not to apply the limitation periods prescribed for various causes of action. If the legislature intended to give absolute discretion to the courts it would have expressly provided so in the Act. The Act should be construed as a whole in order to discover the legal meaning of the phrase. After prescribing limitation periods for various actions, the legislature provided safety mechanism or escape routes from the rigours of the Act to avoid injustice by providing for the extension of limitation periods in the restricted cases specified in part III of the Act. These include cases where a person to whom the cause of action accrues is under disability. Indeed, section 3 of the Act provides that part II of the Act which specifies various limitation periods is subject to part III which provides for extension of the periods of limitation. It provides:
“ Thi
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