1. This is a ruling on an application for stay of execution dated 26th November 2025 brought under Section 1A, 1B, 3, 3A of the Civil Procedure Act, Section 47 of the Law of Succession Act, Section 7 of the Appellate Jurisdiction Act, Rule 73 of the Probate and Administration Rules and Order 42 Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules.
2. The gravamen of the matter is that by a ruling dated 22nd September 2025, this court declared that the Purchasers were not entitled to any share of the estate of the deceased.
3. The application is premised on the grounds therein and is supported by an affidavit sworn by the Applicant who avers that Alex Jimmy Mukabwa, Patrick Ongaya and Newton Amiani possess a liability interest in the estate of the deceased for the reason that they are purchasers of certain portions of land comprised in L.R. No. KAKAMEGA/IGUHU/1149 which forms part of the estate of the deceased.
4. The Applicant avers that she was aggrieved by the decision of this court and filed a Notice of Appeal dated 13th October 2025. She further depones that the intended appeal is weighty, important and raises arguable issues and that being the Administrator of the estate of the deceased, she has a religious and lawful duty to ensure equal and fair distribution of the estate.
5. The Applicant avers that unless the orders sought are granted, there is a real risk that the estate will be distributed in a manner that will irreversibly prejudice the intended appeal.
6. The Respondent opposed the application vide Grounds of Opposition dated 9th December 2025. The Respondents oppose the application on the grounds that it is bad in law, a non-starter, misconceived and unsustainable as the Applicant already filed a Notice of Appeal on 13th October 2025; that the application does not disclose any reasonable grounds; that the Applicant has not demonstrated sufficient cause to warrant the grant of the orders sought; that the application is fatally defective in form and substance as the Applicant is seeking to remedy an illegality; that litigation must come to an end, and should not assist the indolent; that the application is meant to further delay the conclusion of this matter; and that the application is devoid of merit and ought to be dismissed with costs.
7. The application was canvassed through written submissions which I have duly considered.
8. The issues that arise from the application are as follows:-
(a) Whether the Applicant should be granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal.
(b) Whether the application is merited.
9. According to the Applicant’s submissions, it is common ground that appeals in succession matters are not as a matter of right but require leave by the court exercising its original jurisdiction. The Applicant relies on the decision of In re Estate of Murungi Rutere (Deceased) [2022] KEHC 10453 (KLR) where the Court held that:-
“The considerations that this court should take into account in granting or refusing the leave prayed for was laid out in the case of Rhoda Wairimu Karanja & another v Mary Wangui Karanja & another [2014] eKLR where the Court of Appeal held that:
“In view of these and given the adversarial nature of litigation in our system of justice, it would be unconscionable to allow as final the decision of a single judge, and limit the right of appeal to the High Court, especially now when the court hierarchy has been opened by the creation of the Supreme Court as an apex court.
We think we have said enough to demonstrate that under the Law of Succession Act, there is no express automatic right of appeal to the Court of Appeal; that an appeal will lie to the Court of Appeal from the decision of the High Court, exercising original jurisdiction with leave of the High Court or where the application for leave is refused with leave of this Court. Leave to appeal will normally be granted where prima facie it appears that there are grounds which merit serious judicial consideration. [Emphasis added]
Considering the above authority it follows that leave to appeal should normally be granted where prima facie it appears that there are grounds which merit serious judicial consideration by the Court of Appeal.”
10. The Applicant argues that Article 48 of the Constitution requires the court to uphold a party’s right to access justice which includes the protection of the Applicant’s right to appeal to the Court of Appeal.
11. As an auxiliary, the Applicant posits that in any event, without prejudice to the foregoing, the Supreme Court in Petition No. E029 of 2024, Eiud Mwendia v. Kevin Muchira affirmed that the requirement of leave is not a prerequisite to filing an appeal against the decisions of the High Court rendered in exercise of its original jurisdiction.
12. The Respondents did not submit on the above issue.
13. Having said that, pursuant to the decision of the Supreme Court in Eliud Mwendia Wandi v. Kevin Wanjohi Muchira (Suing as the Administrator ad Litem of Jane Muthoni Muchira [2026] KESC 29 (KLR), the question as to whether the Applicant has an automatic right of appeal was finally settled thus bringing to an end the previous conflicting judicial decisions in view of the fact that the Law of Succession Act provides for appeals from Magistrate’s Court to the High Court but is silent on appeals from the High Courts exercising original jurisdiction to the Court of Appeal. In the premises, it is not necessary for this Court to grant leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal.
14. Regarding the second issue, the Applicant submits that she has an arguable appeal and deserves an order of stay of execution. She relied on the case of In re Estate of John Macharia Ngethe (Deceased) [2019] KEHC 382 (KLR) where Nyakundi J. held:-
“I accept that the applicant feels aggrieved that it would be a terrible injustice and unconscionable, though I am not sure that she has an arguable case on the merits albeit academic to me I am persuaded to grant leave to have the issue heard and determined on appeal.
With regard to stay under Order 42 Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules, the grounds adduced by the applicant in her affidavit that to the best of her information and belief that she has good chances of success on appeal persuades me to exercise discretion to grant stay of execution of the judgement that would otherwise render the appeal nugatory. Therefore the applicant’s notice motion dated 28th October, 2019 is hereby allowed.
She asserts that the intended appeal raises weighty, important and arguable issues with high chances as proferred in the draft Memorandum of Appeal.
15. On their part, the Respondents submit that this court lacks jurisdiction to hear and determine the application as it is functus officio. They argue that the Applicant ought to have filed the application in the proper forum being the Court of Appeal under Rule 5 (2) (b) of the Court of Appeal Rules and that the Applicant is intent on by-passing the pre-requisites for stay in the Court of Appeal in view of the lenient conditions set out under Order 42 Rule 6 (2) of the Civil Procedure Rules.
16. The principles that govern the grant of orders of stay of execution are set out in Order 42 Rule 6 (1) and (2) of the Civil Procedure Rules 2010 which are applicable to Probate matters by virtue of Rule 63 of the Probate and Administration Rules which provides:-
(1)Save as is in the Act or in these Rules otherwise provided, and subject to any order of the court or a registrar in any particular case for reasons to be recorded, the following provisions of the Civil Procedure Rules, namely Order 5, rule 2 to 34 and Orders 11, 16, 19, 26, 40, 45 and 50 (Cap. 21, Sub. Leg.), together with the High Court (Practice and Procedure) Rules (Cap. 8, Sub. Leg.), shall apply so far as relevant to proceedings under these Rules.(2)Subject to the provisions of the Act and of these Rules and of any amendments thereto the practice and procedure in all matters arising thereunder in relation to intestate and testamentary succession and the administration of estates of deceased persons shall be those existing and in force immediately prior to the coming into operation of these Rules.”
17. Order 42 Rule 6 (1) and (2) of the Civil Procedure Rules provide:-
“(1)No appeal or second appeal shall operate as a stay of execution or proceedings under a decree or order appealed from except in so far as the court appealed from may order but, the court appealed from may for sufficient cause order stay of execution of such decree or order, and whether the application for such stay shall have been granted or refused by the court appealed from, the court to which such appeal is preferred shall be at liberty, on application being made, to consider such application and to make such order thereon as may to it seem just, and any person aggrieved by an order of stay made by the court from whose decision the appeal is preferred may apply to the appellate court to have such order set aside.
(2)No order for stay of execution shall be made under subrule (1) unless—
(a)the court is satisfied that substantial loss may result to the applicant unless the order is made and that the application has been made without unreasonable delay; and
(b)such security as the court orders for the due performance of such decree or order as may ultimately be binding on him has been given by the applicant.”
18. Guided by the above rules, the matters for consideration when determining an application for stay are:-
(a) Whether the application was filed without unreasonable delay.
(b) Whether the Applicant stands to suffer substantial loss.
(c) Whether the Applicant has given security for due performance of such decree or order as shall issue on appeal.
19. I note that the Notice of Appeal was filed twenty (20) days after the impugned ruling. Under Rule 75 (1) of the Court of Appeal Rules, a person intending to appeal against a decision in a civil suit must lodge a Notice of Appeal within fourteen (14) days. A Notice of Appeal filed out of time is therefore defective.
20. A valid Notice of Appeal is the substratum upon which an application for stay of execution is founded and its existence is what grants the court jurisdiction to grant the order of stay of execution. In light of the defective Notice of Appeal, the application for stay of execution is equally defective and untenable. As such, the court cannot determine whether the Applicant has an arguable appeal.
21. In Jaber Mohsen Ali & Another v. Priscillah Boit & Another [2014] KEELC 132 (KLR), the Court held that:-
“…The question that arises is whether this application has been filed after unreasonable delay. What is unreasonable delay is dependent on the surrounding circumstances of each case. Even one day after judgment could be unreasonable delay depending on the judgment of the court and any order given thereafter...”
22. The impugned ruling was delivered on 22nd September 2025 and the application was filed more than sixty (60) days after. The delay of 60 days has not been explained and considering the fact that the Applicant is the Administratix, and the matter has been pending in court since 2006 albeit having been re-activated, I hold and find the delay to be inordinate.
23. As to whether the Applicant stands to suffer substantial loss, the case of James Wangalwa & Another v. Agnes Naliaka Cheseto [2012] KEHC 1094 (KLR) is instructive. The Court in the said case held:-
“The applicant must establish other factors which show that the execution will create a state of affairs that will irreparably affect or negate the very essential core of the Applicant as the successful party in the appeal. This is what substantial loss would entail, a question that was aptly discussed in the case of Silverstein N. Chesoni [2002] 1KLR 867, and also in the case of Mukuma V Abuoga quoted above. The last case, referring to the exercise of discretion by the High Court and the Court of Appeal in the granting stay of execution, under Order 42 of the CPR and Rule 5(2) (b) of the Court of Appeal Rules, respectively, emphasized the centrality of substantial loss thus:
“…the issue of substantial loss is the cornerstone of both jurisdictions. Substantial loss is what has to be prevented by preserving the status quo because such loss would render the appeal nugatory.”
See also Kenya Shell Limited v. Benjamin Karuga Kibiru & Another [1986] KECA 94 (KLR).
24. In RWW v. EKW [2019] KEHC 6523 (KLR), the Court stated that:-
“The purpose of an application for stay of execution pending an appeal is to preserve the subject matter in dispute so that the rights of the appellant who is exercising the undoubted right of appeal are safeguarded and the appeal if successful, is not rendered nugatory. However, in doing so, the court should weigh this right against the success of a litigant who should not be deprived of the fruits of his/her judgment. The court is also called upon to ensure that no party suffers prejudice that cannot be compensated by an award of costs.”
25. What would render an appeal nugatory was considered in Kenya Industrial Estate Limited & Another v. Matilda Tenge Mwachia [2021] KECA 1012 (KLR) when the Court held that:-
“On the nugatory aspect, whether or not an appeal will be rendered nugatory depends on whether or not what is sought to be stayed if allowed to happen is reversible; or if it is not reversible whether damages will reasonably compensate the party aggrieved.”
26. The Applicant has submitted that if the orders sought are not granted, the appeal shall be rendered nugatory. However, she has not averred in what way the appeal shall be rendered nugatory. She is not the party who was adversely affected by the ruling and cannot claim substantial loss in the event the confirmed Grant is implemented as there is no material evidence adduced by her in support of the claim that she stands to suffer substantial loss if implementation of the Grant proceeds.
27. Regarding the last condition, the Applicant did not offer security for due performance. In Mwaura Karuga t/a Limit Enterprises v. Kenya Bus Services Ltd & 4 others [2015] KEHC 4051 (KLR), it was held that:-
“…The security must be one which shall achieve due performance of the decree which might ultimately be binding on the applicant. The rule does not, therefore, envisage just any security. The words ‘’ultimately be binding’ are deliberately used and are useful here, for they refer to the entire decree as will be payable at the time the appeal is lost. That is the presumption of law here. Therefore, the ultimate decree envisaged under order 42 rule 6 (2) (b) of the Civil Procedure Rules includes costs and interest on the judgment sum unless the latter two were not granted-which is seldom. The security to be given is measured on that yardstick…”
28. Notwithstanding the fact that the Applicant did not offer security for due performance, the court has a wide discretion in considering an application for stay and can make such orders as it deems fit regarding security. See John Gachanja v. Francis Mwuriira alias Francis Muthika & Another [2016] KEHC 7140 (KLR) where the Court stated that:-
“…There is doubt the Applicant has shown that substantial loss would occur unless stay is granted. However, I will guided by a greater sense of justice. Courts of law have said that, with the entry of the overriding principle in our law and the anchorage of substantive justice in the Constitution as a principle of justice, courts should always take the wider sense of justice in interpreting the prescriptions of law designed for grant of relief…”
29. However, since the Applicant has failed to satisfy the other conditions for an order of stay, the issue of security is rendered moot.
30. After carefully considering the application dated 26th November 2025, I find that the same lacks merit as, apart from the Applicant not having met the prerequisite conditions, the application is founded on a non-existent appeal. It is therefore dismissed with no order as to costs this being a family matter.
2. The gravamen of the matter is that by a ruling dated 22nd September 2025, this court declared that the Purchasers were not entitled to any share of the estate of the deceased.
3. The application is premised on the grounds therein and is supported by an affidavit sworn by the Applicant who avers that Alex Jimmy Mukabwa, Patrick Ongaya and Newton Amiani possess a liability interest in the estate of the deceased for the reason that they are purchasers of certain portions of land comprised in L.R. No. KAKAMEGA/IGUHU/1149 which forms part of the estate of the deceased.
4. The Applicant avers that she was aggrieved by the decision of this court and filed a Notice of Appeal dated 13th October 2025. She further depones that the intended appeal is weighty, important and raises arguable issues and that being the Administrator of the estate of the deceased, she has a religious and lawful duty to ensure equal and fair distribution of the estate.
5. The Applicant avers that unless the orders sought are granted, there is a real risk that the estate will be distributed in a manner that will irreversibly prejudice the intended appeal.
6. The Respondent opposed the application vide Grounds of Opposition dated 9th December 2025. The Respondents oppose the application on the grounds that it is bad in law, a non-starter, misconceived and unsustainable as the Applicant already filed a Notice of Appeal on 13th October 2025; that the application does not disclose any reasonable grounds; that the Applicant has not demonstrated sufficient cause to warrant the grant of the orders sought; that the application is fatally defective in form and substance as the Applicant is seeking to remedy an illegality; that litigation must come to an end, and should not assist the indolent; that the application is meant to further delay the conclusion of this matter; and that the application is devoid of merit and ought to be dismissed with costs.
7. The application was canvassed through written submissions which I have duly considered.
8. The issues that arise from the application are as follows:-
(a) Whether the Applicant should be granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal.
(b) Whether the application is merited.
9. According to the Applicant’s submissions, it is common ground that appeals in succession matters are not as a matter of right but require leave by the court exercising its original jurisdiction. The Applicant relies on the decision of In re Estate of Murungi Rutere (Deceased) [2022] KEHC 10453 (KLR) where the Court held that:-
“The considerations that this court should take into account in granting or refusing the leave prayed for was laid out in the case of Rhoda Wairimu Karanja & another v Mary Wangui Karanja & another [2014] eKLR where the Court of Appeal held that:
“In view of these and given the adversarial nature of litigation in our system of justice, it would be unconscionable to allow as final the decision of a single judge, and limit the right of appeal to the High Court, especially now when the court hierarchy has been opened by the creation of the Supreme Court as an apex court.
We think we have said enough to demonstrate that under the Law of Succession Act, there is no express automatic right of appeal to the Court of Appeal; that an appeal will lie to the Court of Appeal from the decision of the High Court, exercising original jurisdiction with leave of the High Court or where the application for leave is refused with leave of this Court. Leave to appeal will normally be granted where prima facie it appears that there are grounds which merit serious judicial consideration. [Emphasis added]
Considering the above authority it follows that leave to appeal should normally be granted where prima facie it appears that there are grounds which merit serious judicial consideration by the Court of Appeal.”
10. The Applicant argues that Article 48 of the Constitution requires the court to uphold a party’s right to access justice which includes the protection of the Applicant’s right to appeal to the Court of Appeal.
11. As an auxiliary, the Applicant posits that in any event, without prejudice to the foregoing, the Supreme Court in Petition No. E029 of 2024, Eiud Mwendia v. Kevin Muchira affirmed that the requirement of leave is not a prerequisite to filing an appeal against the decisions of the High Court rendered in exercise of its original jurisdiction.
12. The Respondents did not submit on the above issue.
13. Having said that, pursuant to the decision of the Supreme Court in Eliud Mwendia Wandi v. Kevin Wanjohi Muchira (Suing as the Administrator ad Litem of Jane Muthoni Muchira [2026] KESC 29 (KLR), the question as to whether the Applicant has an automatic right of appeal was finally settled thus bringing to an end the previous conflicting judicial decisions in view of the fact that the Law of Succession Act provides for appeals from Magistrate’s Court to the High Court but is silent on appeals from the High Courts exercising original jurisdiction to the Court of Appeal. In the premises, it is not necessary for this Court to grant leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal.
14. Regarding the second issue, the Applicant submits that she has an arguable appeal and deserves an order of stay of execution. She relied on the case of In re Estate of John Macharia Ngethe (Deceased) [2019] KEHC 382 (KLR) where Nyakundi J. held:-
“I accept that the applicant feels aggrieved that it would be a terrible injustice and unconscionable, though I am not sure that she has an arguable case on the merits albeit academic to me I am persuaded to grant leave to have the issue heard and determined on appeal.
With regard to stay under Order 42 Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules, the grounds adduced by the applicant in her affidavit that to the best of her information and belief that she has good chances of success on appeal persuades me to exercise discretion to grant stay of execution of the judgement that would otherwise render the appeal nugatory. Therefore the applicant’s notice motion dated 28th October, 2019 is hereby allowed.
She asserts that the intended appeal raises weighty, important and arguable issues with high chances as proferred in the draft Memorandum of Appeal.
15. On their part, the Respondents submit that this court lacks jurisdiction to hear and determine the application as it is functus officio. They argue that the Applicant ought to have filed the application in the proper forum being the Court of Appeal under Rule 5 (2) (b) of the Court of Appeal Rules and that the Applicant is intent on by-passing the pre-requisites for stay in the Court of Appeal in view of the lenient conditions set out under Order 42 Rule 6 (2) of the Civil Procedure Rules.
16. The principles that govern the grant of orders of stay of execution are set out in Order 42 Rule 6 (1) and (2) of the Civil Procedure Rules 2010 which are applicable to Probate matters by virtue of Rule 63 of the Probate and Administration Rules which provides:-
(1)Save as is in the Act or in these Rules otherwise provided, and subject to any order of the court or a registrar in any particular case for reasons to be recorded, the following provisions of the Civil Procedure Rules, namely Order 5, rule 2 to 34 and Orders 11, 16, 19, 26, 40, 45 and 50 (Cap. 21, Sub. Leg.), together with the High Court (Practice and Procedure) Rules (Cap. 8, Sub. Leg.), shall apply so far as relevant to proceedings under these Rules.(2)Subject to the provisions of the Act and of these Rules and of any amendments thereto the practice and procedure in all matters arising thereunder in relation to intestate and testamentary succession and the administration of estates of deceased persons shall be those existing and in force immediately prior to the coming into operation of these Rules.”
17. Order 42 Rule 6 (1) and (2) of the Civil Procedure Rules provide:-
“(1)No appeal or second appeal shall operate as a stay of execution or proceedings under a decree or order appealed from except in so far as the court appealed from may order but, the court appealed from may for sufficient cause order stay of execution of such decree or order, and whether the application for such stay shall have been granted or refused by the court appealed from, the court to which such appeal is preferred shall be at liberty, on application being made, to consider such application and to make such order thereon as may to it seem just, and any person aggrieved by an order of stay made by the court from whose decision the appeal is preferred may apply to the appellate court to have such order set aside.
(2)No order for stay of execution shall be made under subrule (1) unless—
(a)the court is satisfied that substantial loss may result to the applicant unless the order is made and that the application has been made without unreasonable delay; and
(b)such security as the court orders for the due performance of such decree or order as may ultimately be binding on him has been given by the applicant.”
18. Guided by the above rules, the matters for consideration when determining an application for stay are:-
(a) Whether the application was filed without unreasonable delay.
(b) Whether the Applicant stands to suffer substantial loss.
(c) Whether the Applicant has given security for due performance of such decree or order as shall issue on appeal.
19. I note that the Notice of Appeal was filed twenty (20) days after the impugned ruling. Under Rule 75 (1) of the Court of Appeal Rules, a person intending to appeal against a decision in a civil suit must lodge a Notice of Appeal within fourteen (14) days. A Notice of Appeal filed out of time is therefore defective.
20. A valid Notice of Appeal is the substratum upon which an application for stay of execution is founded and its existence is what grants the court jurisdiction to grant the order of stay of execution. In light of the defective Notice of Appeal, the application for stay of execution is equally defective and untenable. As such, the court cannot determine whether the Applicant has an arguable appeal.
21. In Jaber Mohsen Ali & Another v. Priscillah Boit & Another [2014] KEELC 132 (KLR), the Court held that:-
“…The question that arises is whether this application has been filed after unreasonable delay. What is unreasonable delay is dependent on the surrounding circumstances of each case. Even one day after judgment could be unreasonable delay depending on the judgment of the court and any order given thereafter...”
22. The impugned ruling was delivered on 22nd September 2025 and the application was filed more than sixty (60) days after. The delay of 60 days has not been explained and considering the fact that the Applicant is the Administratix, and the matter has been pending in court since 2006 albeit having been re-activated, I hold and find the delay to be inordinate.
23. As to whether the Applicant stands to suffer substantial loss, the case of James Wangalwa & Another v. Agnes Naliaka Cheseto [2012] KEHC 1094 (KLR) is instructive. The Court in the said case held:-
“The applicant must establish other factors which show that the execution will create a state of affairs that will irreparably affect or negate the very essential core of the Applicant as the successful party in the appeal. This is what substantial loss would entail, a question that was aptly discussed in the case of Silverstein N. Chesoni [2002] 1KLR 867, and also in the case of Mukuma V Abuoga quoted above. The last case, referring to the exercise of discretion by the High Court and the Court of Appeal in the granting stay of execution, under Order 42 of the CPR and Rule 5(2) (b) of the Court of Appeal Rules, respectively, emphasized the centrality of substantial loss thus:
“…the issue of substantial loss is the cornerstone of both jurisdictions. Substantial loss is what has to be prevented by preserving the status quo because such loss would render the appeal nugatory.”
See also Kenya Shell Limited v. Benjamin Karuga Kibiru & Another [1986] KECA 94 (KLR).
24. In RWW v. EKW [2019] KEHC 6523 (KLR), the Court stated that:-
“The purpose of an application for stay of execution pending an appeal is to preserve the subject matter in dispute so that the rights of the appellant who is exercising the undoubted right of appeal are safeguarded and the appeal if successful, is not rendered nugatory. However, in doing so, the court should weigh this right against the success of a litigant who should not be deprived of the fruits of his/her judgment. The court is also called upon to ensure that no party suffers prejudice that cannot be compensated by an award of costs.”
25. What would render an appeal nugatory was considered in Kenya Industrial Estate Limited & Another v. Matilda Tenge Mwachia [2021] KECA 1012 (KLR) when the Court held that:-
“On the nugatory aspect, whether or not an appeal will be rendered nugatory depends on whether or not what is sought to be stayed if allowed to happen is reversible; or if it is not reversible whether damages will reasonably compensate the party aggrieved.”
26. The Applicant has submitted that if the orders sought are not granted, the appeal shall be rendered nugatory. However, she has not averred in what way the appeal shall be rendered nugatory. She is not the party who was adversely affected by the ruling and cannot claim substantial loss in the event the confirmed Grant is implemented as there is no material evidence adduced by her in support of the claim that she stands to suffer substantial loss if implementation of the Grant proceeds.
27. Regarding the last condition, the Applicant did not offer security for due performance. In Mwaura Karuga t/a Limit Enterprises v. Kenya Bus Services Ltd & 4 others [2015] KEHC 4051 (KLR), it was held that:-
“…The security must be one which shall achieve due performance of the decree which might ultimately be binding on the applicant. The rule does not, therefore, envisage just any security. The words ‘’ultimately be binding’ are deliberately used and are useful here, for they refer to the entire decree as will be payable at the time the appeal is lost. That is the presumption of law here. Therefore, the ultimate decree envisaged under order 42 rule 6 (2) (b) of the Civil Procedure Rules includes costs and interest on the judgment sum unless the latter two were not granted-which is seldom. The security to be given is measured on that yardstick…”
28. Notwithstanding the fact that the Applicant did not offer security for due performance, the court has a wide discretion in considering an application for stay and can make such orders as it deems fit regarding security. See John Gachanja v. Francis Mwuriira alias Francis Muthika & Another [2016] KEHC 7140 (KLR) where the Court stated that:-
“…There is doubt the Applicant has shown that substantial loss would occur unless stay is granted. However, I will guided by a greater sense of justice. Courts of law have said that, with the entry of the overriding principle in our law and the anchorage of substantive justice in the Constitution as a principle of justice, courts should always take the wider sense of justice in interpreting the prescriptions of law designed for grant of relief…”
29. However, since the Applicant has failed to satisfy the other conditions for an order of stay, the issue of security is rendered moot.
30. After carefully considering the application dated 26th November 2025, I find that the same lacks merit as, apart from the Applicant not having met the prerequisite conditions, the application is founded on a non-existent appeal. It is therefore dismissed with no order as to costs this being a family matter.