1. The deceased person whose estate is the subject of these proceedings is Hamida Amin Ahmed. She died on 25th October 1996 at Ikanga. At the time of her death, she was 37 years old.
2. The petitioner/respondent petitioned for the grant of letters of administration intestate on 19th September 2012 in his capacity as the husband of the deceased. He listed himself, his two sons, Ahmed Amin Ahmed and Sajeed Amin Ahmed, and his daughter, Sakina Amin Ahmed, as the only beneficiaries of her estate. According to the petition, the deceased had 2 properties, to wit: a half share in Title No. Kisumu/Korando/1837 and a 1/6 share in Title No. Mombasa/Block XVII/846. In support of the said contention, he annexed the title deeds for the 2 properties.
3. The grant of representation was issued to the petitioner/respondent on 13th February 2013. Thereafter, the petitioner/respondent took no further action. On 30th November 2018, the grant was revoked by M Thande J, and the file was closed. Following the filing of an application dated 19th June 2024, the Court's orders dated 30th November 2018 were set aside. Subsequently, the grant issued to the petitioner/respondent on 18th February 2013 was confirmed on 31st July 2024. A certificate confirming the grant was subsequently issued on 6th August 2024.
4. Mr Samuel Meja Asudi, whom I shall hereafter refer to as the objector/applicant, is aggrieved by the said decision. He filed a summons seeking revocation of the grant dated 9th July 2025, on the ground, as far as I can tell, that it was obtained through misrepresentation and concealment of material facts from the Court. He averred that he was the son of Mr Asudi Osano (deceased), whom he claimed was the bona fide purchaser of the land, Title No Kisumu/Korando/1837, and that he inherited it from him. He accused the petitioner/respondent of taking advantage of the fact that the objector/applicant is old to deny him access to the land.
5. The application is opposed. The petitioner/respondent filed a replying affidavit, sworn in Mombasa on 27th October 2025, in which he averred that the objector/applicant was found by the Environment & Land Court to be entitled to only one half of Title No Kisumu/Korando/1837, identified in the judgment as the lower half. He deposed that it hadn’t been shown that he committed any fraud or concealed any material information from the Court. In any case, he averred, the dispute was one regarding title to land and, as such, only the Environment & Land Court could determine it. He stated that the deceased was his wife and, as such, he had every right to file the succession proceedings.
6. The summons for revocation of the grant was canvassed by way of written submissions. I shall briefly set out the parties' submissions below.
7. The submissions of the objector/applicant are dated 12th January 2026. The applicant’s counsel identified issues for determination as being
i. Whether Title No Kisumu/Korando/1837 formed part of the deceased’s estate; and
ii. Whether the grant should be revoked.
8. Regarding the first issue, it was urged that the objector/applicant only sold half the said land to one Shantilal Patel, which appears to have subsequently been sold to the deceased vide a process the objector/applicant avers was illegal. It was submitted that it was wrong for the petitioner/respondent to claim the whole of the land.
9. Counsel for the objector/applicant urged that the grant was obtained fraudulently as it wasn’t disclosed that the entirety of Title No Kisumu/Korando/1837 did not form part of the estate of the deceased person. Counsel submitted that the petitioner/respondent came to Court with unclean hands.
10. On the other hand, the petitioner/respondent, through the firm, Abdullahi Yusuf & Co. Advocates, filed written submissions dated 21st January 2026. The petitioner/respondent contended that the issue for determination was whether the summons for revocation of the grant should be allowed on the grounds pleaded by the applicant.
11. It was urged that the objector/applicant’s interest was only in respect of half of the suit land. Counsel submitted that a proper reading of the judgment of the Kisumu ELC Court to the effect that:
“That, flowing from the foregoing, the Court finds that the plaintiffs have failed to prove their case against the defendant to the standard required of a balance of probabilities. The plaintiffs’ case is therefore dismissed with costs.”
It was urged that this meant the title to the said property was not cancelled, and, equally, that no proprietary rights in either half portion or the entire land were vested in the objector/applicant.
12. Counsel averred that the Family Court had no jurisdiction to determine questions of title to land. Regarding fraud, counsel averred, based on the holding in re Estate of Julius Ndubi Javan (deceased) [2011] eKLR, that allegations of fraud must be specifically pleaded and strictly proved. Further relying on the case of re Estate of KK (deceased) [2017] eKLR, it was urged that for a grant to be revoked on account of misrepresentation or fraud, there must be evidence of deliberate dishonesty and intention to deceive the Court, on the part of the respondent.
13. I have considered the summons for revocation of the grant, the responses thereto, the written submissions of the parties, as well as the judgment of Kibunja J in Kisumu ELC No 46 of 2013 and the Court of Appeal in Juneja (Suing as the Legal Representative of the Estate of Hamida Amin Juneja) & another v Meja & another [2023] KECA 1241 (KLR). The latter was delivered on 6th October 2023.
14. In my view, the following facts are not contested:
1. The petitioner/respondent is the husband of the deceased half of
2. The parties were engaged in litigation at the ELC and Court of Appeal, and in both courts, the petitioner/respondent’s suit and appeal, respectively, were dismissed;
3. The two Courts recognised that whatever claim the plaintiffs or appellants, in the respective courts, had was statute-barred in respect of half of the suit property occupied by the objector/applicant; and
4. The title of the petitioner/respondent and his co-owner was not cancelled.
15. With the foregoing findings in mind, I must now determine whether the application has merit. The power of the Court to revoke a grant is set out in section 76 of the Law of Succession Act. The said provision has been the subject of a plethora of decisions of the High Court to such an extent that I am of the view that no new ground may be broken. I will, however, rely on a decision of the High Court of Kenya, which, in my view, provides a succinct summary of when the Court may revoke a grant. In the case of In re Estate of Mukhobi Namonya (Deceased) [2020] KEHC 9045 (KLR), Musyoka, J stated as follows:-
“Under section 76 of the Act, a grant of representation is liable to revocation on three general grounds. The first ground would be where the process of obtaining the grant was attended by glaring difficulties, such as where the same was defective, say because the person who obtained representation was not qualified to be appointed as personal representative, or the procedural requirements were not met for some reason or other. It could also be because the petitioner used fraud or misrepresentation or concealed important information in order to obtain the grant. The second general ground is where the grant is obtained procedurally, but the administrator subsequently runs into difficulties during the process of administration of the estate. Such difficulties include his failure or omission to apply for confirmation of his grant within the period allowed in law, or where he fails to exercise diligence in administration of the estate, such as where he omits to collect or get in an asset, or where he fails to render accounts as and when he is required to do so by the law. The third general ground is where the grant has become inoperative or useless on account of subsequent circumstances, such as where the sole administrator died or loses the soundness of his mind or is adjudged bankrupt.”
16. Courts must, however, be careful not to invoke the power to revoke a grant, in exercise of their discretion, without sufficient justification. In the case of Albert Imbuga Kisigwa v Recho Kavai Kisigwa [2016] KEHC 1528 (KLR), it was held that:
“13. Power to revoke a grant is a discretionary power that must be exercised judiciously and only on sound grounds. It is not a discretion to be exercised whimsically or capriciously. There must be evidence of wrongdoing for the court to invoke section 76 and order to revoke or annul a grant. And when a court is called upon to exercise this discretion, it must take into account interests of all beneficiaries entitled to the deceased’s estate and ensure that the action taken will be for the interest of justice.”
17. The objector/applicant has stated that the petitioner/respondent obtained the grant fraudulently without disclosing material information. However, this bold assertion is not supported by sufficient evidence. Firstly, it appears to me that the petitioner/respondent relied on the contents of the certificates of title, which have not been revoked. Secondly, the certificate of confirmation of grant refers to the deceased’s interest as half of the contested property. At the time the grant was issued on 13th February 2013, neither of the two decisions of the ELC and the Court of Appeal had been issued. In the circumstances, I am unable to agree that the petitioner/respondent committed fraud or withheld material information.
18. I must state that allegations of fraud must be specifically pleaded and strictly proved. In the case of Kinyanjui Kamau v George Kamau [2015] eKLR, the Court stated that:
“It is trite law that any allegations of fraud must be pleaded and strictly proved. See Ndolo vs Ndolo (2008) 1 KLR (G & F) 742 wherein the Court stated that: “...We start by saying that it was the respondent who was alleging that the will was a forgery and the burden to prove that allegation lay squarely on him. Since the respondent was making a serious charge of forgery or fraud, the standard of proof required of him was obviously higher than that required in ordinary civil cases, namely, proof upon a balance of probabilities. In cases where fraud is alleged, it is not enough to simply infer fraud from the facts.”
19. Although any interested party can apply to have a grant revoked under section 76 of the Law of Succession Act, it would appear to me that the instant application is misguided. The same, in essence, is a suit for recovery of land by a disputant who contends that the land is his, not the deceased person. As a matter of fact, the Family Court is just the latest forum in this never-ending saga between the parties. The main issue is title to land. This raises a jurisdictional question.
20. Under Article 162(2)(b) as read with Article 165(5)(b) of the Constitution of Kenya, the High Court is denied jurisdiction to hear and determine suits whose subject matter is the use, occupation, and title to land. The jurisdiction to determine such matters falls within the ambit of the Environment & Land Court. The said Court previously heard the dispute between the parties herein. Upon an anxious review of the evidence, the suit filed by the petitioner/respondent was dismissed. The appeal against the said decision was dismissed by the Court of Appeal.
21. It cannot be gainsaid that jurisdiction is everything in litigation. Courts may determine only matters within their jurisdiction. In the case of Owners of the Motor Vessel “Lillian S" v Caltex Oil (Kenya) Ltd [1989] KECA 48 (KLR), Nyarangi, JA, stated as follows:
“Jurisdiction is everything. Without it, a court has no power to make one more step. Where a court has no jurisdiction, there would be no basis for a continuation of proceedings pending other evidence. A court of law downs tools in respect of the matter before it, the moment it holds the opinion that it is without jurisdiction.”
22. Since the dispute is one of title to land, this Court cannot take any further step and must lay down its tools.
23. What flows from the foregoing is that, in my view, the summons for revocation of the grant has no merit. The same is dismissed.
24. In my view, the findings of the ELC Court (that I have previously quoted) and the Court of Appeal to the effect that:
“Consequently, the Learned Trial Judge cannot be faulted for reaching the conclusion that the respondents had factually established on a preponderance of evidence that they had been in occupation of half of the suit property since at least 1989, and that this debarred the appellants from bringing a suit with respect to that half of the suit property.”
demonstrate the ineluctable fact that the remedy that the objector/applicant seeks lies elsewhere, not in the Family Court; he would be wise to pursue his remedies in the appropriate forum.
25. Given the nature of the proceedings, it is my view that an order as to costs would not be helpful; the parties will therefore bear their own costs.
26. It is so ordered.
Dated and signed in Nairobi, this 9th day of April 2026. Delivered virtually through Microsoft TEAMS.
2. The petitioner/respondent petitioned for the grant of letters of administration intestate on 19th September 2012 in his capacity as the husband of the deceased. He listed himself, his two sons, Ahmed Amin Ahmed and Sajeed Amin Ahmed, and his daughter, Sakina Amin Ahmed, as the only beneficiaries of her estate. According to the petition, the deceased had 2 properties, to wit: a half share in Title No. Kisumu/Korando/1837 and a 1/6 share in Title No. Mombasa/Block XVII/846. In support of the said contention, he annexed the title deeds for the 2 properties.
3. The grant of representation was issued to the petitioner/respondent on 13th February 2013. Thereafter, the petitioner/respondent took no further action. On 30th November 2018, the grant was revoked by M Thande J, and the file was closed. Following the filing of an application dated 19th June 2024, the Court's orders dated 30th November 2018 were set aside. Subsequently, the grant issued to the petitioner/respondent on 18th February 2013 was confirmed on 31st July 2024. A certificate confirming the grant was subsequently issued on 6th August 2024.
4. Mr Samuel Meja Asudi, whom I shall hereafter refer to as the objector/applicant, is aggrieved by the said decision. He filed a summons seeking revocation of the grant dated 9th July 2025, on the ground, as far as I can tell, that it was obtained through misrepresentation and concealment of material facts from the Court. He averred that he was the son of Mr Asudi Osano (deceased), whom he claimed was the bona fide purchaser of the land, Title No Kisumu/Korando/1837, and that he inherited it from him. He accused the petitioner/respondent of taking advantage of the fact that the objector/applicant is old to deny him access to the land.
5. The application is opposed. The petitioner/respondent filed a replying affidavit, sworn in Mombasa on 27th October 2025, in which he averred that the objector/applicant was found by the Environment & Land Court to be entitled to only one half of Title No Kisumu/Korando/1837, identified in the judgment as the lower half. He deposed that it hadn’t been shown that he committed any fraud or concealed any material information from the Court. In any case, he averred, the dispute was one regarding title to land and, as such, only the Environment & Land Court could determine it. He stated that the deceased was his wife and, as such, he had every right to file the succession proceedings.
6. The summons for revocation of the grant was canvassed by way of written submissions. I shall briefly set out the parties' submissions below.
7. The submissions of the objector/applicant are dated 12th January 2026. The applicant’s counsel identified issues for determination as being
i. Whether Title No Kisumu/Korando/1837 formed part of the deceased’s estate; and
ii. Whether the grant should be revoked.
8. Regarding the first issue, it was urged that the objector/applicant only sold half the said land to one Shantilal Patel, which appears to have subsequently been sold to the deceased vide a process the objector/applicant avers was illegal. It was submitted that it was wrong for the petitioner/respondent to claim the whole of the land.
9. Counsel for the objector/applicant urged that the grant was obtained fraudulently as it wasn’t disclosed that the entirety of Title No Kisumu/Korando/1837 did not form part of the estate of the deceased person. Counsel submitted that the petitioner/respondent came to Court with unclean hands.
10. On the other hand, the petitioner/respondent, through the firm, Abdullahi Yusuf & Co. Advocates, filed written submissions dated 21st January 2026. The petitioner/respondent contended that the issue for determination was whether the summons for revocation of the grant should be allowed on the grounds pleaded by the applicant.
11. It was urged that the objector/applicant’s interest was only in respect of half of the suit land. Counsel submitted that a proper reading of the judgment of the Kisumu ELC Court to the effect that:
“That, flowing from the foregoing, the Court finds that the plaintiffs have failed to prove their case against the defendant to the standard required of a balance of probabilities. The plaintiffs’ case is therefore dismissed with costs.”
It was urged that this meant the title to the said property was not cancelled, and, equally, that no proprietary rights in either half portion or the entire land were vested in the objector/applicant.
12. Counsel averred that the Family Court had no jurisdiction to determine questions of title to land. Regarding fraud, counsel averred, based on the holding in re Estate of Julius Ndubi Javan (deceased) [2011] eKLR, that allegations of fraud must be specifically pleaded and strictly proved. Further relying on the case of re Estate of KK (deceased) [2017] eKLR, it was urged that for a grant to be revoked on account of misrepresentation or fraud, there must be evidence of deliberate dishonesty and intention to deceive the Court, on the part of the respondent.
13. I have considered the summons for revocation of the grant, the responses thereto, the written submissions of the parties, as well as the judgment of Kibunja J in Kisumu ELC No 46 of 2013 and the Court of Appeal in Juneja (Suing as the Legal Representative of the Estate of Hamida Amin Juneja) & another v Meja & another [2023] KECA 1241 (KLR). The latter was delivered on 6th October 2023.
14. In my view, the following facts are not contested:
1. The petitioner/respondent is the husband of the deceased half of
2. The parties were engaged in litigation at the ELC and Court of Appeal, and in both courts, the petitioner/respondent’s suit and appeal, respectively, were dismissed;
3. The two Courts recognised that whatever claim the plaintiffs or appellants, in the respective courts, had was statute-barred in respect of half of the suit property occupied by the objector/applicant; and
4. The title of the petitioner/respondent and his co-owner was not cancelled.
15. With the foregoing findings in mind, I must now determine whether the application has merit. The power of the Court to revoke a grant is set out in section 76 of the Law of Succession Act. The said provision has been the subject of a plethora of decisions of the High Court to such an extent that I am of the view that no new ground may be broken. I will, however, rely on a decision of the High Court of Kenya, which, in my view, provides a succinct summary of when the Court may revoke a grant. In the case of In re Estate of Mukhobi Namonya (Deceased) [2020] KEHC 9045 (KLR), Musyoka, J stated as follows:-
“Under section 76 of the Act, a grant of representation is liable to revocation on three general grounds. The first ground would be where the process of obtaining the grant was attended by glaring difficulties, such as where the same was defective, say because the person who obtained representation was not qualified to be appointed as personal representative, or the procedural requirements were not met for some reason or other. It could also be because the petitioner used fraud or misrepresentation or concealed important information in order to obtain the grant. The second general ground is where the grant is obtained procedurally, but the administrator subsequently runs into difficulties during the process of administration of the estate. Such difficulties include his failure or omission to apply for confirmation of his grant within the period allowed in law, or where he fails to exercise diligence in administration of the estate, such as where he omits to collect or get in an asset, or where he fails to render accounts as and when he is required to do so by the law. The third general ground is where the grant has become inoperative or useless on account of subsequent circumstances, such as where the sole administrator died or loses the soundness of his mind or is adjudged bankrupt.”
16. Courts must, however, be careful not to invoke the power to revoke a grant, in exercise of their discretion, without sufficient justification. In the case of Albert Imbuga Kisigwa v Recho Kavai Kisigwa [2016] KEHC 1528 (KLR), it was held that:
“13. Power to revoke a grant is a discretionary power that must be exercised judiciously and only on sound grounds. It is not a discretion to be exercised whimsically or capriciously. There must be evidence of wrongdoing for the court to invoke section 76 and order to revoke or annul a grant. And when a court is called upon to exercise this discretion, it must take into account interests of all beneficiaries entitled to the deceased’s estate and ensure that the action taken will be for the interest of justice.”
17. The objector/applicant has stated that the petitioner/respondent obtained the grant fraudulently without disclosing material information. However, this bold assertion is not supported by sufficient evidence. Firstly, it appears to me that the petitioner/respondent relied on the contents of the certificates of title, which have not been revoked. Secondly, the certificate of confirmation of grant refers to the deceased’s interest as half of the contested property. At the time the grant was issued on 13th February 2013, neither of the two decisions of the ELC and the Court of Appeal had been issued. In the circumstances, I am unable to agree that the petitioner/respondent committed fraud or withheld material information.
18. I must state that allegations of fraud must be specifically pleaded and strictly proved. In the case of Kinyanjui Kamau v George Kamau [2015] eKLR, the Court stated that:
“It is trite law that any allegations of fraud must be pleaded and strictly proved. See Ndolo vs Ndolo (2008) 1 KLR (G & F) 742 wherein the Court stated that: “...We start by saying that it was the respondent who was alleging that the will was a forgery and the burden to prove that allegation lay squarely on him. Since the respondent was making a serious charge of forgery or fraud, the standard of proof required of him was obviously higher than that required in ordinary civil cases, namely, proof upon a balance of probabilities. In cases where fraud is alleged, it is not enough to simply infer fraud from the facts.”
19. Although any interested party can apply to have a grant revoked under section 76 of the Law of Succession Act, it would appear to me that the instant application is misguided. The same, in essence, is a suit for recovery of land by a disputant who contends that the land is his, not the deceased person. As a matter of fact, the Family Court is just the latest forum in this never-ending saga between the parties. The main issue is title to land. This raises a jurisdictional question.
20. Under Article 162(2)(b) as read with Article 165(5)(b) of the Constitution of Kenya, the High Court is denied jurisdiction to hear and determine suits whose subject matter is the use, occupation, and title to land. The jurisdiction to determine such matters falls within the ambit of the Environment & Land Court. The said Court previously heard the dispute between the parties herein. Upon an anxious review of the evidence, the suit filed by the petitioner/respondent was dismissed. The appeal against the said decision was dismissed by the Court of Appeal.
21. It cannot be gainsaid that jurisdiction is everything in litigation. Courts may determine only matters within their jurisdiction. In the case of Owners of the Motor Vessel “Lillian S" v Caltex Oil (Kenya) Ltd [1989] KECA 48 (KLR), Nyarangi, JA, stated as follows:
“Jurisdiction is everything. Without it, a court has no power to make one more step. Where a court has no jurisdiction, there would be no basis for a continuation of proceedings pending other evidence. A court of law downs tools in respect of the matter before it, the moment it holds the opinion that it is without jurisdiction.”
22. Since the dispute is one of title to land, this Court cannot take any further step and must lay down its tools.
23. What flows from the foregoing is that, in my view, the summons for revocation of the grant has no merit. The same is dismissed.
24. In my view, the findings of the ELC Court (that I have previously quoted) and the Court of Appeal to the effect that:
“Consequently, the Learned Trial Judge cannot be faulted for reaching the conclusion that the respondents had factually established on a preponderance of evidence that they had been in occupation of half of the suit property since at least 1989, and that this debarred the appellants from bringing a suit with respect to that half of the suit property.”
demonstrate the ineluctable fact that the remedy that the objector/applicant seeks lies elsewhere, not in the Family Court; he would be wise to pursue his remedies in the appropriate forum.
25. Given the nature of the proceedings, it is my view that an order as to costs would not be helpful; the parties will therefore bear their own costs.
26. It is so ordered.
Dated and signed in Nairobi, this 9th day of April 2026. Delivered virtually through Microsoft TEAMS.