1. By a Notice of Motion dated 4th June 2026, brought under Sections 45, 47 and 79 of the Law of Succession Act, Rules 49 and 73 of the Probate and Administration Rules, and all enabling provisions of the law, the Applicant seeks orders that: this application be certified urgent and service be dispensed with in the first instance; the Court finds that the Respondents have been intermeddling with the estate of the deceased, and particularly the parcel of land registered as KERICHO/KAPSUSER/790; a temporary injunction do issue restraining the Respondents, their servants, agents or any other person under their authority from offering for sale, advertising, selling, auctioning, disposing of, transferring, alienating, plucking tea, building on, or developing the said parcel, or in any way interfering with it, pending the hearing and determination of the application inter partes and of the Petition; that the OCS, Jericho Police Station, do ensure compliance with the orders; and that costs of the application be borne by the Respondents.
2. The Applicant's case, as set out in his Supporting Affidavit and Written Submissions, is that he is a son of the deceased and the administrator of her estate, a grant of letters of administration having been issued to him, though not yet confirmed. He avers that the Respondents, who are his own sons and grandchildren of the deceased, have unlawfully entered upon the estate land, harvested and sold tea without authority, chased away workers he had engaged to manage the estate, and thereby occasioned him loss, including impairing his ability to service loans he holds with a SACCO and with KTDA. He contends that the Respondents, not being administrators and having no grant or court order authorising them to deal with the property, are intermeddlers within the meaning of Section 45 of the Law of Succession Act, and that they are, in any event, not established dependants or beneficiaries of the estate within the meaning of Section 29 of the Act, having adduced no evidence that they were maintained by the deceased immediately prior to her death. He relies on In the Matter of the Estate of M'Mugambi M'Itunga (Deceased) [2017] eKLR, In the Matter of the Estate of Veronica Njoki Wakagoto (Deceased) [2013] eKLR, and Virginia Edith Wambui Otieno v Joash Ochieng Ougo & Another [1987] eKLR, for the proposition that no person may deal with the property of a deceased person save under lawful authority, and that the estate must be preserved pending confirmation of grant and full determination of the succession cause.
3. The Respondents oppose the application through a Replying Affidavit sworn by the 1st Respondent on 9th June 2026, a Supplementary Affidavit sworn on 15th June 2026, and Written Submissions dated 13th July 2026. Their case is that they are not strangers to the estate but grandsons of the deceased and sons of the Applicant, and that they were born and raised on the suit land, which has been their home since birth and remains the home of other minor dependants of the estate. They depose that the tea proceeds they have realised have been applied to the upkeep of the family and the school fees of their younger siblings, who are also the Applicant's children and dependants of the estate, and they exhibit evidence of such payments. They deny intermeddling, and instead allege that it is the Applicant who has intermeddled with the estate — by allegedly selling portions of the estate land, permitting construction of a church on it, and using the loan documents he annexed to demonstrate not estate expenditure but his own personal borrowing. They further allege that the Applicant excluded family members, including his brother Geoffrey Kipkemoi Tanui, from the succession process, and that he forged their signatures to transfer funds held at a SACCO into his own name. They contend that the application does not meet the threshold in Giella v Cassman Brown & Co Ltd [1973] EA 358, and pray that the Notice of Motion be dismissed with costs.
Analysis and Determination
4. It is common ground that the deceased, Esther Tabutany Koske, died on 1st May 2022, and was at her death the registered proprietor of the parcel of land known as KERICHO/KAPSUSER/790. It is further common ground that the Applicant is a son of the deceased and holds a grant of letters of administration in respect of her estate, which grant has not yet been confirmed, and that the Respondents are the Applicant's own sons and grandsons of the deceased, who have resided on the suit land together with other minor dependants of the estate. What is sharply disputed is the characterisation of the Respondents' continued occupation and use of the land, their standing as beneficiaries or dependants of the estate, the circumstances surrounding the succession process, and the propriety of dealings with estate funds and property by both sides.
5. Four issues arise for determination: (a) whether the Respondents have established themselves as dependants or beneficiaries of the estate within the meaning of Section 29 of the Law of Succession Act; (b) whether, in light of that finding, the Respondents' conduct amounts to intermeddling with the estate within the meaning of Section 45 of the Act; (c) whether the Applicant has satisfied the conditions for grant of a temporary injunction; and (d) who should bear the costs of the application.
6. Section 45(1) of the Law of Succession Act provides that, save as authorised by the Act, any other written law, or a grant of representation, no person shall take possession of, dispose of, or otherwise intermeddle with the free property of a deceased person, and Section 45(2) renders such intermeddling both a criminal offence and a basis for personal liability for loss occasioned to the estate — see In re Estate of Mathayo Arwa (Deceased) (Succession Cause 101 of 2009) [2025] KEHC 2899 (KLR). Section 79 vests the property of a deceased person in the personal representative upon grant of representation, and, as was observed in Alexander Mutunga Wathome v Peter Lavu Tumbo & Another (Machakos Succession Cause No. 80 of 2011) [2015] eKLR, a person can only represent the estate of a deceased person once a grant has been made, that representative alone having power under Section 82 to enforce causes of action on the estate's behalf. Section 47 confers wide jurisdiction on this Court to entertain applications and determine disputes arising under the Act, and Rule 73 of the Probate and Administration Rules preserves the Court's inherent power to make such orders as the interests of justice require. As Musyoka J observed in In re Estate of Veronica Njoki Wakagoto (Deceased) [2013] eKLR, the effect of Section 45 is that the property of a dead person cannot lawfully be dealt with by anybody unless authorised by law to do so. The term 'intermeddle' is not defined in the Act, but in Benson Mutuma Muriungi v CEO Kenya Police Sacco & Another [2016] eKLR and In re Estate of M'Ngarithi M'Miriti [2017] eKLR, the courts held that it refers to any act done in relation to the free property of a deceased person without lawful authority, a category that is not closed but certainly includes taking possession or occupation of, disposing of, distributing, or otherwise interfering with such property. This Court also bears in mind, following Re Estate of Benson Maingi Mulwa (Deceased) [2021] eKLR (Odunga J), that intermeddling can be committed even by a person who is, or claims to be, interested in the estate, and that an application to restrain it need not await the consent of every other beneficiary.
7. Turning to whether the Respondents have established dependant or beneficiary status, Section 29 of the Law of Succession Act provides that, for the purposes of Part III of the Act, 'dependant' means, in relevant part, the wife or wives and children of the deceased, whether or not maintained by the deceased immediately prior to death, and, by Section 29(b), such of the deceased's grandchildren 'as were being maintained by the deceased immediately prior to his death.' Unlike a child of the deceased under Section 29(a), a grandchild does not qualify as a dependant merely by virtue of the relationship; maintenance by the deceased immediately prior to death must be established. This distinction has been applied consistently: in Mbae v Kathomi & 2 Others (Miscellaneous Succession Cause E017 of 2022) [2025] KEHC 4600 (KLR), the Court held that a claimant who had not proved the condition under Section 29(b) that she was being maintained by the deceased prior to death could not succeed in a claim for dependency; and in In re Estate of PKM (Deceased) (Civil Appeal E115 of 2022) [2023] KEHC 24031 (KLR), citing Re Estate of Jackson Nicholas Kyengo Mulwa (Deceased) [2021] eKLR, the Court reiterated that a claimant must show that he or she was in fact a dependant of the deceased, and not merely related to him or her.
8. Applying that principle here, the Respondents are grandsons, not children, of the deceased, and so fall to be assessed under Section 29(b), which requires proof of maintenance by the deceased immediately prior to her death on 1st May 2022. Nothing in the Replying Affidavit or the Supplementary Affidavit avers that the deceased was maintaining the Respondents immediately prior to her death; to the contrary, their own averments are that they were living on the land as their ancestral home, raised by their parents, and that it was only after the death of their mother, Edinah Chepkorir Tanui, in February 2025 — nearly three years after the deceased herself died — that their present difficulties with the Applicant, their father, arose. On the material before this Court, the Respondents have not discharged the burden of establishing that they were dependants of the deceased within the meaning of Section 29(b), and are not, at this stage, established beneficiaries or dependants of her estate entitled to resist this application on that footing. This finding is made solely for the purposes of the present interlocutory application; it is without prejudice to the Respondents' right to place fuller evidence of maintenance before the Court at confirmation of grant, or to bring a substantive application under Sections 26 and 29 of the Act for reasonable provision, should the evidence support it.
9. It follows that the Respondents' occupation and exploitation of the estate land cannot, at this stage, be justified as the exercise of an established beneficiary's rights. Applying Muriungi and M'Ngarithi M'Miriti [2017] eKLR, the harvesting and sale of tea from the estate land, and the exclusion of the Applicant's own workers from it, without a grant or court authority and without established beneficiary status, falls within the scope of conduct Section 45 was enacted to prevent. This Court respectfully agrees with the approach taken in In re Estate of King'ong'o Gachagua (Deceased) (Probate & Administration 564 of 2006) [2024] KEHC 13035 (KLR), where injunctive orders issued against parties found to have intermeddled with estate land pending conclusion of the succession cause, and in In re Estate of Nom Okaro Muluka (Deceased) (Succession Cause 441 of 2004) [2024] KEHC 3021 (KLR), on the range of conduct capable of amounting to intermeddling.
10. The test for a temporary injunction, common ground between the parties, is that set out in Giella v Cassman Brown & Co Ltd [1973] EA 358: the Applicant must establish a prima facie case with a probability of success, that he stands to suffer irreparable injury not capable of adequate compensation in damages, and, if the Court remains in doubt, that the balance of convenience favours the grant of the order.
11. As to a prima facie case, for the reasons given in paragraphs 7 to 9 above, the Applicant has made out a prima facie case that the Respondents, not being established beneficiaries or dependants of the estate and holding no grant or court authority of their own, have intermeddled with the estate by harvesting and disposing of tea and excluding the Applicant's workers from the land. He has equally made out a prima facie case, on the Respondents' own averments, that the corpus of the estate ought to be preserved against any dealing that would diminish or alienate it irreversibly, since the Respondents themselves complain, without this Court making any finding on the truth of the allegation, that the Applicant has sold portions of the estate land and permitted construction of a church upon it. A case for a preservatory order is accordingly made out against both sides, though the case against the Respondents extends further, to their continued harvesting and disposal of tea without authority.
12. As to irreparable harm, continued harvesting and sale of tea by persons not shown to hold any lawful entitlement to it, with no account being rendered to the estate, is a form of ongoing loss that will be difficult to reconstruct or quantify with precision the longer it continues, particularly in the absence of records of what has been picked, sold, and for what value — see the concern expressed in In re Estate of Mathayo Arwa (Deceased) (supra) as to the seriousness with which the Act treats unauthorised dealing with estate property. That risk of unquantifiable, continuing loss to the estate outweighs any hardship to the Respondents in being restrained, pending confirmation of grant, from an activity they have not shown any established legal entitlement to carry out.
13. As to the balance of convenience, it favours preserving the estate intact and free from further unauthorised dealing by any party pending confirmation of grant, while reserving for confirmation or full hearing the questions properly left for that stage — including the allegations that family members were excluded from the succession process, that signatures were forged to transfer SACCO funds, that the Applicant has sold estate land or permitted construction upon it, and whatever fuller evidence the Respondents may adduce as to dependency under Section 29(b). None of these serious and squarely disputed allegations can, or should, be resolved on affidavit at this interlocutory stage; but restraining further dealing with the tea by persons not shown to be authorised to deal with it is a proportionate step to preserve the position pending that determination.
14. On costs, the Applicant has succeeded substantially in establishing both the basis for a preservatory order against dealing with the land generally and the basis for restraining the Respondents' further dealing with the tea. Costs of this application shall accordingly follow the event and be borne by the Respondents.
Disposition
15. For the foregoing reasons, I make the following orders:
(a). On the material before this Court, the Respondents have not established that they were dependants of the deceased within the meaning of Section 29(b) of the Law of Succession Act, and are not, at this stage, recognised beneficiaries or dependants of her estate; this finding is made for the purposes of this application only and is without prejudice to the Respondents' right to adduce fuller evidence at confirmation of grant or in a substantive application under Sections 26 and 29 of the Act;
(b). A temporary injunction is hereby issued restraining the Respondents, their servants, agents, or any person acting under their authority, from offering for sale, advertising, selling, auctioning, disposing of, transferring, alienating, plucking or otherwise dealing in tea grown on, building upon, developing, or in any manner interfering with the parcel of land known as KERICHO/KAPSUSER/790, or excluding the Applicant's lawfully engaged workers from it, pending confirmation of grant and further orders of this Court;
(c). A temporary injunction is further issued restraining the Applicant, and each of his agents or servants, from selling, transferring, charging, alienating, subdividing, or carrying out any further construction or development upon the said parcel of land, pending confirmation of grant and further orders of this Court;
(d). The Applicant, as administrator, shall maintain and file in this cause, every three (3) months, a written account of any proceeds realised from the estate land and their application, pending confirmation of grant;
(e). The allegations of exclusion of beneficiaries from the succession process, forgery, unlawful sale of estate land, and unauthorised construction upon it, are reserved for determination at the confirmation of grant or full hearing of the succession cause, and no finding is made on them in this Ruling;
(f) The Applicant shall continue to maintain the Respondents on their all their basic needs as and when they fall due inclusive of any arears due.
(g). The OCS, Jericho Police Station, shall ensure compliance with orders (b) and (c) above;
(h). Costs of this application shall be borne by the Respondents.
2. The Applicant's case, as set out in his Supporting Affidavit and Written Submissions, is that he is a son of the deceased and the administrator of her estate, a grant of letters of administration having been issued to him, though not yet confirmed. He avers that the Respondents, who are his own sons and grandchildren of the deceased, have unlawfully entered upon the estate land, harvested and sold tea without authority, chased away workers he had engaged to manage the estate, and thereby occasioned him loss, including impairing his ability to service loans he holds with a SACCO and with KTDA. He contends that the Respondents, not being administrators and having no grant or court order authorising them to deal with the property, are intermeddlers within the meaning of Section 45 of the Law of Succession Act, and that they are, in any event, not established dependants or beneficiaries of the estate within the meaning of Section 29 of the Act, having adduced no evidence that they were maintained by the deceased immediately prior to her death. He relies on In the Matter of the Estate of M'Mugambi M'Itunga (Deceased) [2017] eKLR, In the Matter of the Estate of Veronica Njoki Wakagoto (Deceased) [2013] eKLR, and Virginia Edith Wambui Otieno v Joash Ochieng Ougo & Another [1987] eKLR, for the proposition that no person may deal with the property of a deceased person save under lawful authority, and that the estate must be preserved pending confirmation of grant and full determination of the succession cause.
3. The Respondents oppose the application through a Replying Affidavit sworn by the 1st Respondent on 9th June 2026, a Supplementary Affidavit sworn on 15th June 2026, and Written Submissions dated 13th July 2026. Their case is that they are not strangers to the estate but grandsons of the deceased and sons of the Applicant, and that they were born and raised on the suit land, which has been their home since birth and remains the home of other minor dependants of the estate. They depose that the tea proceeds they have realised have been applied to the upkeep of the family and the school fees of their younger siblings, who are also the Applicant's children and dependants of the estate, and they exhibit evidence of such payments. They deny intermeddling, and instead allege that it is the Applicant who has intermeddled with the estate — by allegedly selling portions of the estate land, permitting construction of a church on it, and using the loan documents he annexed to demonstrate not estate expenditure but his own personal borrowing. They further allege that the Applicant excluded family members, including his brother Geoffrey Kipkemoi Tanui, from the succession process, and that he forged their signatures to transfer funds held at a SACCO into his own name. They contend that the application does not meet the threshold in Giella v Cassman Brown & Co Ltd [1973] EA 358, and pray that the Notice of Motion be dismissed with costs.
Analysis and Determination
4. It is common ground that the deceased, Esther Tabutany Koske, died on 1st May 2022, and was at her death the registered proprietor of the parcel of land known as KERICHO/KAPSUSER/790. It is further common ground that the Applicant is a son of the deceased and holds a grant of letters of administration in respect of her estate, which grant has not yet been confirmed, and that the Respondents are the Applicant's own sons and grandsons of the deceased, who have resided on the suit land together with other minor dependants of the estate. What is sharply disputed is the characterisation of the Respondents' continued occupation and use of the land, their standing as beneficiaries or dependants of the estate, the circumstances surrounding the succession process, and the propriety of dealings with estate funds and property by both sides.
5. Four issues arise for determination: (a) whether the Respondents have established themselves as dependants or beneficiaries of the estate within the meaning of Section 29 of the Law of Succession Act; (b) whether, in light of that finding, the Respondents' conduct amounts to intermeddling with the estate within the meaning of Section 45 of the Act; (c) whether the Applicant has satisfied the conditions for grant of a temporary injunction; and (d) who should bear the costs of the application.
6. Section 45(1) of the Law of Succession Act provides that, save as authorised by the Act, any other written law, or a grant of representation, no person shall take possession of, dispose of, or otherwise intermeddle with the free property of a deceased person, and Section 45(2) renders such intermeddling both a criminal offence and a basis for personal liability for loss occasioned to the estate — see In re Estate of Mathayo Arwa (Deceased) (Succession Cause 101 of 2009) [2025] KEHC 2899 (KLR). Section 79 vests the property of a deceased person in the personal representative upon grant of representation, and, as was observed in Alexander Mutunga Wathome v Peter Lavu Tumbo & Another (Machakos Succession Cause No. 80 of 2011) [2015] eKLR, a person can only represent the estate of a deceased person once a grant has been made, that representative alone having power under Section 82 to enforce causes of action on the estate's behalf. Section 47 confers wide jurisdiction on this Court to entertain applications and determine disputes arising under the Act, and Rule 73 of the Probate and Administration Rules preserves the Court's inherent power to make such orders as the interests of justice require. As Musyoka J observed in In re Estate of Veronica Njoki Wakagoto (Deceased) [2013] eKLR, the effect of Section 45 is that the property of a dead person cannot lawfully be dealt with by anybody unless authorised by law to do so. The term 'intermeddle' is not defined in the Act, but in Benson Mutuma Muriungi v CEO Kenya Police Sacco & Another [2016] eKLR and In re Estate of M'Ngarithi M'Miriti [2017] eKLR, the courts held that it refers to any act done in relation to the free property of a deceased person without lawful authority, a category that is not closed but certainly includes taking possession or occupation of, disposing of, distributing, or otherwise interfering with such property. This Court also bears in mind, following Re Estate of Benson Maingi Mulwa (Deceased) [2021] eKLR (Odunga J), that intermeddling can be committed even by a person who is, or claims to be, interested in the estate, and that an application to restrain it need not await the consent of every other beneficiary.
7. Turning to whether the Respondents have established dependant or beneficiary status, Section 29 of the Law of Succession Act provides that, for the purposes of Part III of the Act, 'dependant' means, in relevant part, the wife or wives and children of the deceased, whether or not maintained by the deceased immediately prior to death, and, by Section 29(b), such of the deceased's grandchildren 'as were being maintained by the deceased immediately prior to his death.' Unlike a child of the deceased under Section 29(a), a grandchild does not qualify as a dependant merely by virtue of the relationship; maintenance by the deceased immediately prior to death must be established. This distinction has been applied consistently: in Mbae v Kathomi & 2 Others (Miscellaneous Succession Cause E017 of 2022) [2025] KEHC 4600 (KLR), the Court held that a claimant who had not proved the condition under Section 29(b) that she was being maintained by the deceased prior to death could not succeed in a claim for dependency; and in In re Estate of PKM (Deceased) (Civil Appeal E115 of 2022) [2023] KEHC 24031 (KLR), citing Re Estate of Jackson Nicholas Kyengo Mulwa (Deceased) [2021] eKLR, the Court reiterated that a claimant must show that he or she was in fact a dependant of the deceased, and not merely related to him or her.
8. Applying that principle here, the Respondents are grandsons, not children, of the deceased, and so fall to be assessed under Section 29(b), which requires proof of maintenance by the deceased immediately prior to her death on 1st May 2022. Nothing in the Replying Affidavit or the Supplementary Affidavit avers that the deceased was maintaining the Respondents immediately prior to her death; to the contrary, their own averments are that they were living on the land as their ancestral home, raised by their parents, and that it was only after the death of their mother, Edinah Chepkorir Tanui, in February 2025 — nearly three years after the deceased herself died — that their present difficulties with the Applicant, their father, arose. On the material before this Court, the Respondents have not discharged the burden of establishing that they were dependants of the deceased within the meaning of Section 29(b), and are not, at this stage, established beneficiaries or dependants of her estate entitled to resist this application on that footing. This finding is made solely for the purposes of the present interlocutory application; it is without prejudice to the Respondents' right to place fuller evidence of maintenance before the Court at confirmation of grant, or to bring a substantive application under Sections 26 and 29 of the Act for reasonable provision, should the evidence support it.
9. It follows that the Respondents' occupation and exploitation of the estate land cannot, at this stage, be justified as the exercise of an established beneficiary's rights. Applying Muriungi and M'Ngarithi M'Miriti [2017] eKLR, the harvesting and sale of tea from the estate land, and the exclusion of the Applicant's own workers from it, without a grant or court authority and without established beneficiary status, falls within the scope of conduct Section 45 was enacted to prevent. This Court respectfully agrees with the approach taken in In re Estate of King'ong'o Gachagua (Deceased) (Probate & Administration 564 of 2006) [2024] KEHC 13035 (KLR), where injunctive orders issued against parties found to have intermeddled with estate land pending conclusion of the succession cause, and in In re Estate of Nom Okaro Muluka (Deceased) (Succession Cause 441 of 2004) [2024] KEHC 3021 (KLR), on the range of conduct capable of amounting to intermeddling.
10. The test for a temporary injunction, common ground between the parties, is that set out in Giella v Cassman Brown & Co Ltd [1973] EA 358: the Applicant must establish a prima facie case with a probability of success, that he stands to suffer irreparable injury not capable of adequate compensation in damages, and, if the Court remains in doubt, that the balance of convenience favours the grant of the order.
11. As to a prima facie case, for the reasons given in paragraphs 7 to 9 above, the Applicant has made out a prima facie case that the Respondents, not being established beneficiaries or dependants of the estate and holding no grant or court authority of their own, have intermeddled with the estate by harvesting and disposing of tea and excluding the Applicant's workers from the land. He has equally made out a prima facie case, on the Respondents' own averments, that the corpus of the estate ought to be preserved against any dealing that would diminish or alienate it irreversibly, since the Respondents themselves complain, without this Court making any finding on the truth of the allegation, that the Applicant has sold portions of the estate land and permitted construction of a church upon it. A case for a preservatory order is accordingly made out against both sides, though the case against the Respondents extends further, to their continued harvesting and disposal of tea without authority.
12. As to irreparable harm, continued harvesting and sale of tea by persons not shown to hold any lawful entitlement to it, with no account being rendered to the estate, is a form of ongoing loss that will be difficult to reconstruct or quantify with precision the longer it continues, particularly in the absence of records of what has been picked, sold, and for what value — see the concern expressed in In re Estate of Mathayo Arwa (Deceased) (supra) as to the seriousness with which the Act treats unauthorised dealing with estate property. That risk of unquantifiable, continuing loss to the estate outweighs any hardship to the Respondents in being restrained, pending confirmation of grant, from an activity they have not shown any established legal entitlement to carry out.
13. As to the balance of convenience, it favours preserving the estate intact and free from further unauthorised dealing by any party pending confirmation of grant, while reserving for confirmation or full hearing the questions properly left for that stage — including the allegations that family members were excluded from the succession process, that signatures were forged to transfer SACCO funds, that the Applicant has sold estate land or permitted construction upon it, and whatever fuller evidence the Respondents may adduce as to dependency under Section 29(b). None of these serious and squarely disputed allegations can, or should, be resolved on affidavit at this interlocutory stage; but restraining further dealing with the tea by persons not shown to be authorised to deal with it is a proportionate step to preserve the position pending that determination.
14. On costs, the Applicant has succeeded substantially in establishing both the basis for a preservatory order against dealing with the land generally and the basis for restraining the Respondents' further dealing with the tea. Costs of this application shall accordingly follow the event and be borne by the Respondents.
Disposition
15. For the foregoing reasons, I make the following orders:
(a). On the material before this Court, the Respondents have not established that they were dependants of the deceased within the meaning of Section 29(b) of the Law of Succession Act, and are not, at this stage, recognised beneficiaries or dependants of her estate; this finding is made for the purposes of this application only and is without prejudice to the Respondents' right to adduce fuller evidence at confirmation of grant or in a substantive application under Sections 26 and 29 of the Act;
(b). A temporary injunction is hereby issued restraining the Respondents, their servants, agents, or any person acting under their authority, from offering for sale, advertising, selling, auctioning, disposing of, transferring, alienating, plucking or otherwise dealing in tea grown on, building upon, developing, or in any manner interfering with the parcel of land known as KERICHO/KAPSUSER/790, or excluding the Applicant's lawfully engaged workers from it, pending confirmation of grant and further orders of this Court;
(c). A temporary injunction is further issued restraining the Applicant, and each of his agents or servants, from selling, transferring, charging, alienating, subdividing, or carrying out any further construction or development upon the said parcel of land, pending confirmation of grant and further orders of this Court;
(d). The Applicant, as administrator, shall maintain and file in this cause, every three (3) months, a written account of any proceeds realised from the estate land and their application, pending confirmation of grant;
(e). The allegations of exclusion of beneficiaries from the succession process, forgery, unlawful sale of estate land, and unauthorised construction upon it, are reserved for determination at the confirmation of grant or full hearing of the succession cause, and no finding is made on them in this Ruling;
(f) The Applicant shall continue to maintain the Respondents on their all their basic needs as and when they fall due inclusive of any arears due.
(g). The OCS, Jericho Police Station, shall ensure compliance with orders (b) and (c) above;
(h). Costs of this application shall be borne by the Respondents.