REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA AT VIHIGA
SUCCESSION CAUSE NO E007 OF 2024
(FORMERLY KAKAMEGA HCSC NO. 461 OF 1998)
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF ESTERA LUNG’AZO LIONO (DECEASED)
TERESA KHAVERE LUZAKA……….……………………………..……PETITIONER
VERSUS
THOMAS KHASIANI……………………………………….….……….1 ST OBJECTOR
MARY KHAVERE INDECHE………………………………………….2 ND OBJECTOR
RULING
INTRODUCTION
1. In their Chamber Summons application dated on 16 th May 2025 and filed on 19 th May 2025, the Objectors herein sought orders to annul the Grant of Letters of Administration Intestate and the Certificate of Confirmation of Grant that were issued to the Petitioner herein on 14 th January 1999 and 29 th April 2002 respectively, the revocation of the registration of Land Parcel LR No. Kakamega/Shiru/568 (hereinafter referred to as “the subject property) in the Petitioner’s name, to restrain any interference of the subject property; and to rectify the Land Register to reflect their interests.
2. The 2 nd Objector swore an Affidavit in support of the application on 16 th May 2025. She averred that she was a beneficiary of the estate, and that the application had sought cancellation of the Title that was issued to the Petitioner as the same had been acquired irregularly and restoration of the subject property into the name of Estera Lung’azo Liono (hereinafter referred to as “the deceased”). She stated that the subject property was first registered in 1976 in the deceased’s name who held it as caretaker, with the first Title Deed being issued on 12 th October 1988.
3. She further averred that the Petitioner obtained the deceased’s Death Certificate dated 20 th March 1997 and commenced succession proceedings in September 1998. She averred that a caution was subsequently lodged against the property on 3 rd October 2001 by Festus Magale Mutoga (now deceased), whom she described as a rightful beneficiary. She further stated that although the Petitioner was registered as proprietor on 3 rd March 1999, the Certificate of Title was not issued to her until 10 th May 2013, which was before the Grant of Letters of Confirmation was confirmed.
4. The Objectors filed their Written Submissions dated 16 th December 2025 and filed on 19 th January 2026. However, the Petitioner did not file and serve her response and her Written Submissions by 24 th November 2025 and 26 th January 2026 respectively as was directed by the court on 3 rd November 2025. This Ruling was based on the Objector’s affidavit evidence and their Written Submissions, which they relied upon in their entirety.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
5. The Objectors reiterated the averments in the 2 nd Objector’s Supporting Affidavit in their Written Submissions and argued that the transfer and registration, undertaken before confirmation and without full disclosure of material facts, amounted to fraud, misrepresentation and irregularity.
6. They submitted that the registration of the subject property before confirmation of the Grant of Letters of Administration Intestate contravened Sections 55, 82(b)(ii) and 45(1) of the Law of Succession Act, which prohibited distribution, disposal of, or intermeddling with, the estate of a deceased person before lawful authority was granted. They relied on in Re Estate of Alois Rotich Chepkong (Deceased) and In Re Estate of M’Ajogi M’Ikiugu (Deceased) [2017] eKLR , w here the courts held that a personal representative could not deal with or distribute the assets of an estate before confirmation of the Grant, and that any dealings undertaken in contravention of the Law of Succession Act could constitute a basis for revocation of the. They argued that any transaction that was undertaken in violation of these provisions was illegal, null and void, and could not confer valid title.
7. They asserted that although fraud required strict proof, they had discharged the evidential burden by demonstrating that the Petitioner obtained registration of the property before confirmation of the Grant. They relied on Kinyanjui Kamau vs George Kamau [2015] eKLR where the court held that allegations of fraud must be specifically pleaded and strictly proved and the case of Fondo vs Mutiso & Another (Civil Appeal Nos. E267 of 2021 and E953 of 2022) [2025] where the court reiterated the requirement for proof of fraud to the required standard. They urged the court to find that the Petitioner’s failure to challenge their evidence confirmed the irregularity surrounding the acquisition of the title. They urged the court to find that the Petitioner’s failure to challenge their evidence confirmed the irregularity in the acquisition of the title.
8. They relied on Section 26(1) of the Land Registration Act and submitted that, although a certificate of title was prima facie evidence of ownership, it remained subject to challenge where it was acquired through fraud, misrepresentation, or an illegal, unprocedural or corrupt process.
9. They relied on the case of Frann Investment Limited vs Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission & 6 Others, Civil Appeal No. E038 of 2021 [2024] KECA 714 (KLR) , where it was held that the principle of indefeasibility of title did not protect a proprietor who acquired title unlawfully. The court therein affirmed that although a registered title enjoyed protection under the law, such protection was not absolute and cannot shield a person whose title was obtained through fraud, illegality, or an unlawful acquisition. Consequently, a proprietor who derived title from an illegal transaction cannot rely on registration as a defence to retain property acquired contrary to the law.
10. They further submitted that the registration of the subject property before confirmation of the Grant contravened Sections 45, 55 and 82(b)(ii) of the Law of Succession Act. They argued that the circumstances surrounding the registration of the property justified revocation of the Grant under Section 76 of the Law of Succession Act.
11. They relied on in Re Estate of Alois Rotich Chepkong (Deceased) and In Re Estate of M’Ajogi M’Ikiugu (Deceased) [2017] eKLR w here the courts held that a personal representative could not deal with or distribute the assets of an estate before confirmation of the Grant, and that any dealings undertaken in contravention of the Law of Succession Act could constitute a basis for revocation of the Grant.
12. They placed reliance on Section 76 of the Law of Succession Act and argued that a grant could be revoked if it was obtained by concealment or misrepresentation. They relied on in Re Estate of Edward M. Mutsotso (Deceased ) which held that could only revoke a confirmed grant once any of the grounds set out in Section 76 of the Law of Succession Act were established.
13. They averred that the Petitioner failed to disclose material facts during the administration of the estate and acted contrary to the provisions of the Law of Succession Act. They urged the court to revoke the Grant, cancel the title issued to the Petitioner and issue appropriate orders preserving the estate pending fresh administration.
14. They further submitted that the Grant of Letters of Administration was obtained through concealment of material facts, false statements and defective proceedings. They argued that the Petitioner had failed to administer the estate lawfully and had instead appropriated estate property to herself contrary to the provisions of the Law of Succession Act.
15. They relied on Section 45(1) of the Law of Succession Act and implored this court to restrain further dealings with the subject property as there was a credible risk of interference. They were emphatic that injunctive orders were necessary to preserve the estate and prevent further interference with the subject property pending its lawful distribution.
16. They urged the court to revoke the Grant, cancel the title issued to the Petitioner and issue appropriate orders preserving the estate pending fresh administration. They submitted that costs followed the event and thus urged this court to grant them costs as the Petitioner had acquired the subject property irregularly and failing to respond despite having been served.
17. In this regard, they r eferred this court to the case of Haraf Traders Limited vs Narok County Government [2022] eKLR where it was held that costs were intended to compensate the successful party for the trouble taken in prosecuting or defending the case.
18. The affidavit evidence on record established the following that the subject property was first registered on 1 st March 1976 in the name of Esitela Rung’asa of ID 7612475/70 and the first Title Deed issued to him on 12 th October 1988. The record also contained a reference to the Title Deed having been registered and issued on 12 th October 1988 to Estela Lung’azo (deceased). The Petitioner commenced succession proceedings in September 1998 and was issued with a Grant of Letters of Administration on 14 th January 1999.
19. The Petitioner caused the subject property to be registered in her own name on 3 rd March 1999, some two (2) months after the Grant issued and well before its confirmation. As was correctly stated by the Objectors, Festo Magale Mutoga (now deceased), holder of ID number 1440423, registered a caution against the subject property on 3 rd October 2001. The extract of the title document confirmed entry of this caution in his name. A Certificate of Official search dated 15 th April 2002 also confirmed that the Petitioner was, by then, recorded as proprietor of the subject property.
20. The Objectors contended that the circumstances surrounding the registration of the subject property disclosed concealment of material facts and justified revocation of the Grant.
21. Section 76 of the Law of Succession Act, which governs revocation and annulment of grants of letters of administration and certificates of confirmation, provides that: -
“A grant of representation, whether or not confirmed, may at any time be revoked or annulled if the court decides, either on application by any interested party or of its own motion—
(a) that the proceedings to obtain the grant were defective in substance;
(b) that the grant was obtained fraudulently by the making of a false statement or by the concealment from the court of something material to the case;
(c) that the grant was obtained by means of an untrue allegation of a fact essential in point of law to justify the grant notwithstanding that the allegation was made in ignorance or inadvertently;
(d) that the person to whom the grant was made has failed, after due notice and without reasonable cause either-
(i) to apply for confirmation of the grant within one year from the date thereof, or such longer period as the court order or allow; or
(ii) to proceed diligently with the administration of the estate; or
(iii) to produce to the court, within the time prescribed, any such inventory or account of administration as is required by the provisions of paragraphs (e) and (g) of section 83 or has produced any such inventory or account which is false in any material particular; or
(iv) that the grant has become useless and inoperative through subsequent circumstances.”
22. An order for revocation could be made only if one of these statutory grounds was established. A similar finding was arrived at in the case of Re Estate of LAK-(Deceased) [2014] eKLR where the court held that revocation of a Grant was not automatic but depended on proof of one or more of the grounds expressly provided under Section 76 of the Law of Succession Act.
23. Although the Objectors moved the court under Section 76 of the Law of Succession Act, it appeared to this court that substantive issue resolved around the questions relating to ownership and proprietary interests in the subject property. They challenged the Petitioner’s registration as proprietor and sought cancellation of the title deed, rectification of the land register and restoration of the property to the estate. They also questioned the circumstances under which the deceased held the property and asserted that other persons had beneficial interests over the land.
24. This court found and held that determining whether the Petitioner acquired a valid proprietary interest, whether the registration was fraudulent or irregular, and whether any trust or beneficial interest existed would require determination of questions relating to ownership and title to land as the Objectors herein were direct beneficiaries of the deceased’s estate as per the letter from the Chief of 26 th August 1998 and they were also not listed in the Petition of Grant of Letters of Administration that was lodged in court on 25 th September 1998. The issue would have been different if the objection had been raised by the beneficiaries of the deceased and satisfied this of the existence of any ground or grounds that were set out in Section 76 of the Law of Succession.
25. It was irrespective that the Petitioner transferred the subject property into her name before the Grant of Letters of Administration Intestate was confirmed. The direct beneficiaries of the deceased had not complained. This court found that the Objectors herein had no locus standi to seek revocation of the Grant of Letters of Administration Intestate and the Certificate of Confirmation as they did not demonstrate that they were the deceased’s beneficiaries within the degree of consanguinity contemplated in Section 39(1) and (2) of the Law of Succession Act that states as follows:-
1. Where an intestate has left no surviving spouse or children, the net intestate estate shall devolve upon the kindred of the intestate in the following order of priority—
a. father; or if dead
b. mother; or if dead
c. brothers and sisters, and any child or children of deceased brothers and sisters, in equal shares; or if none
d. half-brothers and half-sisters and any child or children of deceased half-brothers and half-sisters, in equal shares; or if none
e. the relatives who are in the nearest degree of consanguinity up to and including the sixth degree, in equal shares.
2. Failing survival by any of the persons mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (e) of subsection (1), the net intestate estate shall devolve upon the State, and be paid into the Consolidated Fund.
26. Article 162(2)(b) of the Constitution establishes the Environment and Land Court as the court with jurisdiction to determine disputes relating to the environment, use and occupation of, and title to land. It states as follows:-
“Parliament shall establish courts with the status of the High Court to hear and determine disputes relating to the environment and the use and occupation of, and title to, land.
27. Further, Section 13 (2) of the Environment and Land Court Act further grants that court jurisdiction over disputes relating to title, tenure, ownership and interests in land. It provides as follows:-
“In exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 162(2)(b) of the Constitution, the Court shall have power to hear and determine disputes—
a. relating to environmental planning and protection, climate issues, land use planning, title, tenure, boundaries, rates, rents, valuations, mining, minerals and other natural resources;
b. relating to compulsory acquisition of land;
c. relating to land administration and management;
d. relating to public, private and community land and contracts, choses in action or other instruments granting any enforceable interests in land; and
e. any other dispute relating to environment and land.”
28. The jurisdiction of the Probate Court was principally concerned with matters relating to identification of beneficiaries, administration and distribution of the estate of a deceased person. It did not extend to determining contested proprietary rights over land. Such findings fell outside the jurisdiction of this court sitting as a Probate Court.
29. The court consequently found that the orders sought by the Objectors could not be granted within these proceedings.
DISPOSITION
30. For the foregoing reasons, the upshot of this court’s decision was that the Objectors’ Chamber Summons dated 16 th May 2025 and filed on 19 th May 2025 was not merited and the same be and is hereby dismissed with costs to the Petitioner.
31. It is so ordered.
DATED and DELIVERED at VIHIGA this 30 th day of July 2026’
J. KAMAU
JUDGE
HCSC NO E007 OF 20242
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA AT VIHIGA
SUCCESSION CAUSE NO E007 OF 2024
(FORMERLY KAKAMEGA HCSC NO. 461 OF 1998)
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF ESTERA LUNG’AZO LIONO (DECEASED)
TERESA KHAVERE LUZAKA……….……………………………..……PETITIONER
VERSUS
THOMAS KHASIANI……………………………………….….……….1 ST OBJECTOR
MARY KHAVERE INDECHE………………………………………….2 ND OBJECTOR
RULING
INTRODUCTION
1. In their Chamber Summons application dated on 16 th May 2025 and filed on 19 th May 2025, the Objectors herein sought orders to annul the Grant of Letters of Administration Intestate and the Certificate of Confirmation of Grant that were issued to the Petitioner herein on 14 th January 1999 and 29 th April 2002 respectively, the revocation of the registration of Land Parcel LR No. Kakamega/Shiru/568 (hereinafter referred to as “the subject property) in the Petitioner’s name, to restrain any interference of the subject property; and to rectify the Land Register to reflect their interests.
2. The 2 nd Objector swore an Affidavit in support of the application on 16 th May 2025. She averred that she was a beneficiary of the estate, and that the application had sought cancellation of the Title that was issued to the Petitioner as the same had been acquired irregularly and restoration of the subject property into the name of Estera Lung’azo Liono (hereinafter referred to as “the deceased”). She stated that the subject property was first registered in 1976 in the deceased’s name who held it as caretaker, with the first Title Deed being issued on 12 th October 1988.
3. She further averred that the Petitioner obtained the deceased’s Death Certificate dated 20 th March 1997 and commenced succession proceedings in September 1998. She averred that a caution was subsequently lodged against the property on 3 rd October 2001 by Festus Magale Mutoga (now deceased), whom she described as a rightful beneficiary. She further stated that although the Petitioner was registered as proprietor on 3 rd March 1999, the Certificate of Title was not issued to her until 10 th May 2013, which was before the Grant of Letters of Confirmation was confirmed.
4. The Objectors filed their Written Submissions dated 16 th December 2025 and filed on 19 th January 2026. However, the Petitioner did not file and serve her response and her Written Submissions by 24 th November 2025 and 26 th January 2026 respectively as was directed by the court on 3 rd November 2025. This Ruling was based on the Objector’s affidavit evidence and their Written Submissions, which they relied upon in their entirety.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
5. The Objectors reiterated the averments in the 2 nd Objector’s Supporting Affidavit in their Written Submissions and argued that the transfer and registration, undertaken before confirmation and without full disclosure of material facts, amounted to fraud, misrepresentation and irregularity.
6. They submitted that the registration of the subject property before confirmation of the Grant of Letters of Administration Intestate contravened Sections 55, 82(b)(ii) and 45(1) of the Law of Succession Act, which prohibited distribution, disposal of, or intermeddling with, the estate of a deceased person before lawful authority was granted. They relied on in Re Estate of Alois Rotich Chepkong (Deceased) and In Re Estate of M’Ajogi M’Ikiugu (Deceased) [2017] eKLR , w here the courts held that a personal representative could not deal with or distribute the assets of an estate before confirmation of the Grant, and that any dealings undertaken in contravention of the Law of Succession Act could constitute a basis for revocation of the. They argued that any transaction that was undertaken in violation of these provisions was illegal, null and void, and could not confer valid title.
7. They asserted that although fraud required strict proof, they had discharged the evidential burden by demonstrating that the Petitioner obtained registration of the property before confirmation of the Grant. They relied on Kinyanjui Kamau vs George Kamau [2015] eKLR where the court held that allegations of fraud must be specifically pleaded and strictly proved and the case of Fondo vs Mutiso & Another (Civil Appeal Nos. E267 of 2021 and E953 of 2022) [2025] where the court reiterated the requirement for proof of fraud to the required standard. They urged the court to find that the Petitioner’s failure to challenge their evidence confirmed the irregularity surrounding the acquisition of the title. They urged the court to find that the Petitioner’s failure to challenge their evidence confirmed the irregularity in the acquisition of the title.
8. They relied on Section 26(1) of the Land Registration Act and submitted that, although a certificate of title was prima facie evidence of ownership, it remained subject to challenge where it was acquired through fraud, misrepresentation, or an illegal, unprocedural or corrupt process.
9. They relied on the case of Frann Investment Limited vs Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission & 6 Others, Civil Appeal No. E038 of 2021 [2024] KECA 714 (KLR) , where it was held that the principle of indefeasibility of title did not protect a proprietor who acquired title unlawfully. The court therein affirmed that although a registered title enjoyed protection under the law, such protection was not absolute and cannot shield a person whose title was obtained through fraud, illegality, or an unlawful acquisition. Consequently, a proprietor who derived title from an illegal transaction cannot rely on registration as a defence to retain property acquired contrary to the law.
10. They further submitted that the registration of the subject property before confirmation of the Grant contravened Sections 45, 55 and 82(b)(ii) of the Law of Succession Act. They argued that the circumstances surrounding the registration of the property justified revocation of the Grant under Section 76 of the Law of Succession Act.
11. They relied on in Re Estate of Alois Rotich Chepkong (Deceased) and In Re Estate of M’Ajogi M’Ikiugu (Deceased) [2017] eKLR w here the courts held that a personal representative could not deal with or distribute the assets of an estate before confirmation of the Grant, and that any dealings undertaken in contravention of the Law of Succession Act could constitute a basis for revocation of the Grant.
12. They placed reliance on Section 76 of the Law of Succession Act and argued that a grant could be revoked if it was obtained by concealment or misrepresentation. They relied on in Re Estate of Edward M. Mutsotso (Deceased ) which held that could only revoke a confirmed grant once any of the grounds set out in Section 76 of the Law of Succession Act were established.
13. They averred that the Petitioner failed to disclose material facts during the administration of the estate and acted contrary to the provisions of the Law of Succession Act. They urged the court to revoke the Grant, cancel the title issued to the Petitioner and issue appropriate orders preserving the estate pending fresh administration.
14. They further submitted that the Grant of Letters of Administration was obtained through concealment of material facts, false statements and defective proceedings. They argued that the Petitioner had failed to administer the estate lawfully and had instead appropriated estate property to herself contrary to the provisions of the Law of Succession Act.
15. They relied on Section 45(1) of the Law of Succession Act and implored this court to restrain further dealings with the subject property as there was a credible risk of interference. They were emphatic that injunctive orders were necessary to preserve the estate and prevent further interference with the subject property pending its lawful distribution.
16. They urged the court to revoke the Grant, cancel the title issued to the Petitioner and issue appropriate orders preserving the estate pending fresh administration. They submitted that costs followed the event and thus urged this court to grant them costs as the Petitioner had acquired the subject property irregularly and failing to respond despite having been served.
17. In this regard, they r eferred this court to the case of Haraf Traders Limited vs Narok County Government [2022] eKLR where it was held that costs were intended to compensate the successful party for the trouble taken in prosecuting or defending the case.
18. The affidavit evidence on record established the following that the subject property was first registered on 1 st March 1976 in the name of Esitela Rung’asa of ID 7612475/70 and the first Title Deed issued to him on 12 th October 1988. The record also contained a reference to the Title Deed having been registered and issued on 12 th October 1988 to Estela Lung’azo (deceased). The Petitioner commenced succession proceedings in September 1998 and was issued with a Grant of Letters of Administration on 14 th January 1999.
19. The Petitioner caused the subject property to be registered in her own name on 3 rd March 1999, some two (2) months after the Grant issued and well before its confirmation. As was correctly stated by the Objectors, Festo Magale Mutoga (now deceased), holder of ID number 1440423, registered a caution against the subject property on 3 rd October 2001. The extract of the title document confirmed entry of this caution in his name. A Certificate of Official search dated 15 th April 2002 also confirmed that the Petitioner was, by then, recorded as proprietor of the subject property.
20. The Objectors contended that the circumstances surrounding the registration of the subject property disclosed concealment of material facts and justified revocation of the Grant.
21. Section 76 of the Law of Succession Act, which governs revocation and annulment of grants of letters of administration and certificates of confirmation, provides that: -
“A grant of representation, whether or not confirmed, may at any time be revoked or annulled if the court decides, either on application by any interested party or of its own motion—
(a) that the proceedings to obtain the grant were defective in substance;
(b) that the grant was obtained fraudulently by the making of a false statement or by the concealment from the court of something material to the case;
(c) that the grant was obtained by means of an untrue allegation of a fact essential in point of law to justify the grant notwithstanding that the allegation was made in ignorance or inadvertently;
(d) that the person to whom the grant was made has failed, after due notice and without reasonable cause either-
(i) to apply for confirmation of the grant within one year from the date thereof, or such longer period as the court order or allow; or
(ii) to proceed diligently with the administration of the estate; or
(iii) to produce to the court, within the time prescribed, any such inventory or account of administration as is required by the provisions of paragraphs (e) and (g) of section 83 or has produced any such inventory or account which is false in any material particular; or
(iv) that the grant has become useless and inoperative through subsequent circumstances.”
22. An order for revocation could be made only if one of these statutory grounds was established. A similar finding was arrived at in the case of Re Estate of LAK-(Deceased) [2014] eKLR where the court held that revocation of a Grant was not automatic but depended on proof of one or more of the grounds expressly provided under Section 76 of the Law of Succession Act.
23. Although the Objectors moved the court under Section 76 of the Law of Succession Act, it appeared to this court that substantive issue resolved around the questions relating to ownership and proprietary interests in the subject property. They challenged the Petitioner’s registration as proprietor and sought cancellation of the title deed, rectification of the land register and restoration of the property to the estate. They also questioned the circumstances under which the deceased held the property and asserted that other persons had beneficial interests over the land.
24. This court found and held that determining whether the Petitioner acquired a valid proprietary interest, whether the registration was fraudulent or irregular, and whether any trust or beneficial interest existed would require determination of questions relating to ownership and title to land as the Objectors herein were direct beneficiaries of the deceased’s estate as per the letter from the Chief of 26 th August 1998 and they were also not listed in the Petition of Grant of Letters of Administration that was lodged in court on 25 th September 1998. The issue would have been different if the objection had been raised by the beneficiaries of the deceased and satisfied this of the existence of any ground or grounds that were set out in Section 76 of the Law of Succession.
25. It was irrespective that the Petitioner transferred the subject property into her name before the Grant of Letters of Administration Intestate was confirmed. The direct beneficiaries of the deceased had not complained. This court found that the Objectors herein had no locus standi to seek revocation of the Grant of Letters of Administration Intestate and the Certificate of Confirmation as they did not demonstrate that they were the deceased’s beneficiaries within the degree of consanguinity contemplated in Section 39(1) and (2) of the Law of Succession Act that states as follows:-
1. Where an intestate has left no surviving spouse or children, the net intestate estate shall devolve upon the kindred of the intestate in the following order of priority—
a. father; or if dead
b. mother; or if dead
c. brothers and sisters, and any child or children of deceased brothers and sisters, in equal shares; or if none
d. half-brothers and half-sisters and any child or children of deceased half-brothers and half-sisters, in equal shares; or if none
e. the relatives who are in the nearest degree of consanguinity up to and including the sixth degree, in equal shares.
2. Failing survival by any of the persons mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (e) of subsection (1), the net intestate estate shall devolve upon the State, and be paid into the Consolidated Fund.
26. Article 162(2)(b) of the Constitution establishes the Environment and Land Court as the court with jurisdiction to determine disputes relating to the environment, use and occupation of, and title to land. It states as follows:-
“Parliament shall establish courts with the status of the High Court to hear and determine disputes relating to the environment and the use and occupation of, and title to, land.
27. Further, Section 13 (2) of the Environment and Land Court Act further grants that court jurisdiction over disputes relating to title, tenure, ownership and interests in land. It provides as follows:-
“In exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 162(2)(b) of the Constitution, the Court shall have power to hear and determine disputes—
a. relating to environmental planning and protection, climate issues, land use planning, title, tenure, boundaries, rates, rents, valuations, mining, minerals and other natural resources;
b. relating to compulsory acquisition of land;
c. relating to land administration and management;
d. relating to public, private and community land and contracts, choses in action or other instruments granting any enforceable interests in land; and
e. any other dispute relating to environment and land.”
28. The jurisdiction of the Probate Court was principally concerned with matters relating to identification of beneficiaries, administration and distribution of the estate of a deceased person. It did not extend to determining contested proprietary rights over land. Such findings fell outside the jurisdiction of this court sitting as a Probate Court.
29. The court consequently found that the orders sought by the Objectors could not be granted within these proceedings.
DISPOSITION
30. For the foregoing reasons, the upshot of this court’s decision was that the Objectors’ Chamber Summons dated 16 th May 2025 and filed on 19 th May 2025 was not merited and the same be and is hereby dismissed with costs to the Petitioner.
31. It is so ordered.
DATED and DELIVERED at VIHIGA this 30 th day of July 2026’
J. KAMAU
JUDGE
HCSC NO E007 OF 20242