Introduction
1. The Petitioner, Hon. Bouse Mairura, is a Member of the County Assembly of Kisii representing Masimba Ward. By the Petition dated 4th November 2025, he challenges the summons issued to him by the 1st Respondent, the County Assembly of Kisii Committee of Powers and Privileges, requiring him to appear before the Committee on 6th November 2025.
2. The Petition is anchored on Articles 10, 27, 47, 48, 50, 185, 232 and 258 of the Constitution, sections 5, 15, 16, 17 and 18 of the County Assemblies Powers and Privileges Act, 2017, and section 4 of the Fair Administrative Action Act, 2015. The Petitioner contends that the summons and the intended disciplinary proceedings are unconstitutional, ultra vires, procedurally unfair and in breach of the mandatory statutory timelines under section 15 of the County Assemblies Powers and Privileges Act.
3. The Petitioner seeks, principally, declarations that the summons dated 28th October 2025 and the intended proceedings before the Committee on 6th November 2025 are unconstitutional and unlawful; a declaration that the 1st Respondent acted ultra vires in summoning him over an incident said to have occurred outside the precincts of the Kisii County Assembly; an order of certiorari to quash the summons and any proceedings or decisions arising therefrom; and an order of prohibition restraining the 1st Respondent from proceeding with any hearing or disciplinary action based on the impugned summons.
4. The Respondents oppose the Petition through the Replying Affidavit sworn by Norah Bosibori on 7th November 2025. They contend that the Petition is premature, speculative and an abuse of the court process. Their position is that the Committee has jurisdiction over the Petitioner’s conduct under Article 75 of the Constitution and section 16 of the County Assemblies Powers and Privileges Act; that the Petitioner was supplied with the material relied upon, namely the impugned communication reproduced in the charge; that he filed a written response; and that the Court should not, at this stage, conduct a merit review of proceedings pending before a constitutionally and statutorily mandated Committee.
5. The Petition was canvassed by written submissions. I have considered the Petition, the supporting affidavit, the annexures, the Respondents’ Replying Affidavit, the parties’ submissions and the authorities cited.
Factual Background
6. The material facts are largely common ground. On 16th October 2025, the Petitioner was invited by the Committee to respond to charges arising from statements allegedly made between 14th October 2025 and 15th October 2025. The letter of 16th October 2025 alleged that the Petitioner had spread false and misleading information touching on the integrity, independence and operations of the County Assembly of Kisii, through social media and a local radio station.
7. The charges were framed in two counts. Count I alleged that the Petitioner disseminated an audio recording to Egesa FM, a local radio station, alleging that Members of the County Assembly had signed an impeachment motion against the Governor of Kisii County. Count II related to a message allegedly posted on the official WhatsApp forum of Members of the Kisii County Assembly titled “THE KISII MCAS 22–27”.
8. The letter of 16th October 2025 informed the Petitioner that the charges were brought pursuant to the Constitution, the County Assemblies Powers and Privileges Act, 2017, the Leadership and Integrity Act, 2012, the Public Officer Ethics Act, 2003 and the Standing Orders of the Kisii County Assembly. It invited the Petitioner to submit a written response within seven days and to include any supporting documentation or evidence.
9. The Petitioner responded with his letter dated 22nd October 2025. He denied the allegations, contended that the alleged conduct did not occur within the precincts of the County Assembly, and requested to be supplied with the requisite evidence and statements in support of the allegations before any further action was taken.
10. Thereafter, by summons dated 28th October 2025, the Petitioner was required to appear before the Committee on Powers and Privileges on 6th November 2025 at 10.00 a.m. in the Speaker’s Boardroom to substantiate his written response dated 22nd October 2025 and to respond to questions that might arise during the hearing.
11. The Petitioner then approached this Court contending that the Committee had no jurisdiction; that the proceedings were outside the fourteen-day timeline under section 15(5) of the County Assemblies Powers and Privileges Act; that he had not been supplied with witness statements, documents or evidence; and that the process was in violation of Articles 47 and 50 of the Constitution.
Issues for Determination
12. Having considered the pleadings and submissions, the following issues arise for determination:
a. Whether this Court has jurisdiction to entertain the Petition at this stage;
b. Whether the Committee on Powers and Privileges has jurisdiction over the Petitioner’s alleged conduct;
c. Whether the Respondents breached the statutory timelines under section 15 of the County Assemblies Powers and Privileges Act;
d. Whether the Petitioner’s rights under Articles 47 and 50 of the Constitution were violated or threatened; and
e. Whether the Petitioner is entitled to the reliefs sought.
Jurisdiction of this Court and the Doctrine of Separation of Powers
13. The Respondents have submitted that this Petition is premature and that the Court should not interfere with an ongoing process before the Committee. The Petitioner, on the other hand, contends that this Court has jurisdiction under Articles 22, 23, 47, 50, 165 and 258 of the Constitution where a constitutional violation is alleged or threatened.
14. The starting point is Article 165(3)(b) and (d) of the Constitution. This Court has jurisdiction to determine whether a right or fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights has been denied, violated, infringed or threatened, and to determine whether anything said to be done under the authority of the Constitution or any law is inconsistent with, or in contravention of, the Constitution.
15. In the case of Owners of the Motor Vessel “Lillian S” v Caltex Oil (Kenya) Ltd [1989] eKLR, the Court of Appeal held that jurisdiction is everything and that where a court has no jurisdiction, it must down its tools. That principle applies not only to courts, but also to statutory bodies and committees exercising delegated public power. A committee created by statute cannot act outside the four corners of its enabling law.
16. The Supreme Court in Samuel Kamau Macharia & another v Kenya Commercial Bank Ltd & 2 others [2012] eKLR restated the same principle in constitutional terms. The Court held that a court’s jurisdiction flows from the Constitution or legislation or both, and that a court cannot arrogate to itself jurisdiction exceeding that which is conferred upon it by law. In respect to the instant case, the Committee on Powers and Privileges can only exercise the mandate conferred upon it by the Constitution, the County Assemblies Powers and Privileges Act, 2017, and the relevant Standing Orders.
17. However, the Court’s jurisdiction under Article 165 must be exercised with due regard to the separation of powers of the arms of government. The doctrine of separation of powers does not immunise State organs from judicial scrutiny. It requires courts to exercise restraint, especially where another organ is acting within its constitutional or statutory remit.
18. In Justus Kariuki Mate & another v Martin Nyaga Wambora & another, Supreme Court Petition No. 32 of 2014, [2017] eKLR, the Supreme Court held that no arm of government is above the law, but courts must exercise restraint where the Constitution allocates specific mandates to other State organs. The Court cautioned that no governmental agency should encumber another so as to stall the constitutional motions of the other, and that the judicial organ must practise the greatest care in determining whether intervention is warranted.
19. That position was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Mike Mbuvi Sonko v Clerk, County Assembly of Nairobi City & 11 others, Petition No. 11 (E008) of 2022, [2022] KESC 26 (KLR). The Supreme Court held that removal and disciplinary proceedings constitutionally assigned to legislative bodies should not lightly be interrupted by courts, provided the process is conducted within the Constitution and the law. The Court emphasised that courts should not convert themselves into appellate bodies over every procedural action taken by legislative organs unless a clear constitutional breach is demonstrated.
20. The principle emerging from those authorities is therefore twofold. First, this Court has jurisdiction to intervene where a constitutional or statutory violation is alleged or threatened. Secondly, that jurisdiction must be exercised with restraint where the impugned process is still ongoing before a body clothed with constitutional or statutory authority.
21. In the present case, the Petitioner alleges a lack of jurisdiction, breach of statutory timelines, and violation of Articles 47 and 50 of the Constitution. Those are justiciable questions. The Court therefore has jurisdiction to determine whether the process is constitutionally and statutorily compliant. However, this Court must not descend into the merits of the charges, the truth or falsity of the impugned statements, the credibility of the Petitioner’s defence, or the sufficiency of the evidence. Those matters belong, at first instance, to the Committee.
Whether the Committee has Jurisdiction over the Petitioner’s Alleged Conduct
22. The Petitioner argues that the alleged incident occurred outside the precincts of the County Assembly and that section 16 of the County Assemblies Powers and Privileges Act only applies to conduct within the precincts of the Assembly. The Respondents contend that the Committee’s jurisdiction is wider and that the Act covers conduct by a Member that reflects adversely on the dignity or integrity of the County Assembly or is contrary to the best interests of the Assembly or its Members.
23. Article 196(3) of the Constitution requires Parliament to enact legislation providing for the powers, privileges and immunities of county assemblies, their committees and members. The County Assemblies Powers and Privileges Act, 2017, was enacted to give effect to that Article. The preamble of the said Act states that it is an Act to provide for the powers, privileges and immunities of county assemblies, their committees and members, and to make provision regulating admittance to and conduct within the precincts of county assemblies and for connected purposes.
24. The position of Member of County Assembly is that of honour and Members of County Assemblies are State officers under Chapter Six of the Constitution. Section 15 establishes the Committee of Powers and Privileges. Section 16 defines conduct constituting breach of privilege. It is true that parts of the Act regulate conduct within the precincts of a county assembly. However, section 16 is not, in its language, confined only to physical misconduct committed within the chamber, committee rooms or precincts of the Assembly. The principle in Samuel Kamau Macharia & another v Kenya Commercial Bank Ltd & 2 others [2012] eKLR assists the Court at this point. The Committee cannot assume jurisdiction merely because it considers a matter important. Its jurisdiction must flow from the Constitution or statute. In the present case, that jurisdiction is traceable to Article 196(3), Article 75 of the Constitution, and sections 15 and 16 of the County Assemblies Powers and Privileges Act.
25. Article 75 of the Constitution is also material. It requires a State officer to behave, whether in public and official life, in private life, or in association with other persons, in a manner that avoids demeaning the office the officer holds. Article 75(2) provides that a person who contravenes that standard is subject to the applicable disciplinary procedure for the relevant office. A Member of the County Assembly is a State officer. His or her conduct outside the Assembly may, depending on the facts, bear upon the dignity of the office and the integrity of the institution.
26. The alleged statements in this matter, whether made on the radio or on the official WhatsApp forum of Members of the Kisii County Assembly, are alleged to have touched on the integrity, independence and operations of the County Assembly of Kisii. Whether those allegations are true is not for this Court to determine at this stage. What matters is whether the subject matter is one which the Committee is legally capable of inquiring into.
27. The Court is enjoined to interpret section 16 textually, contextually and purposively. The Petitioner’s construction would mean that a Member may engage in conduct outside the precincts which seriously undermines the dignity, integrity or operations of the Assembly, and yet the Assembly would be powerless to inquire into it. Such an interpretation would defeat the purpose of privilege law, which is not merely to regulate physical conduct within legislative buildings, but also to protect the institutional dignity, independence and proper functioning of the Assembly.
28. In my view, conduct which, in the opinion of the Committee, is intended or likely to reflect adversely on the dignity or integrity of a county assembly or its members, or is contrary to the best interests of a county assembly or its members, would fall under the category of “connected purposes” under the Act.
29. I therefore find that the 1st Respondent did not act ultra vires merely by summoning the Petitioner over statements allegedly made through a radio station and a WhatsApp forum, where those statements were alleged to touch on the integrity and operations of the County Assembly, which are well within its jurisdiction.
Whether the Statutory Timelines under Section 15 were Breached
30. The Petitioner contends that the investigation commenced on 16th October 2025, but the summons required him to appear on 6th November 2025, outside the fourteen-day timeline under section 15(5) of the County Assemblies Powers and Privileges Act. The Respondents contend that the inquiry was still ongoing and that section 15(6) permits the Committee to table its findings within fourteen days of the conclusion of the inquiry.
31. Section 15(5) provides that the Committee shall, either of its own motion or as a result of a complaint made by any person, inquire into the conduct of a Member whose conduct is alleged to constitute a breach of privilege in terms of section 16, within fourteen days of receipt of a complaint.
32. Section 15(6) then provides that the Committee shall, within fourteen days of the conclusion of an inquiry, table its findings in the relevant county assembly together with such recommendations as it considers appropriate. Section 15(7) provides that the county assembly shall consider the report and may take appropriate action against the Member concerned.
33. The proper approach to statutory interpretation is now settled. In Association of Retirement Benefits Schemes v Attorney General & 3 others [2017] KEHC 8534 (KLR), the Court emphasised that the starting point is the language of the statute itself, but that statutory text must be read in its context and in light of the purpose of the legislation. The Court must avoid an interpretation that defeats the statutory object or produces an absurd or impracticable result.
34. The same approach was taken in Kimanthi v Attorney General & another, Constitutional Petition No. 2 of 2024, [2025] KEHC 11098 (KLR), where the Court reiterated that statutory provisions should not be read in isolation. The statute must be read as a whole, with each provision interpreted in a manner that gives coherent effect to the intention of the legislature.
35. Applying those principles, section 15(5) cannot be read in isolation from section 15(6). Section 15(5) obligates the Committee to inquire into the complaint within fourteen days of receipt of the complaint. Section 15(6), however, expressly contemplates that the inquiry may thereafter be concluded, and that within fourteen days of such conclusion, the Committee shall table its findings and recommendations.
36. The Petitioner’s interpretation would mean that once a complaint is received, the entire inquiry, hearing, consideration, deliberation and reporting must be completed within fourteen days. That construction is not supported by the text of section 15 as a whole. It would also undermine procedural fairness because a Member may require time to receive allegations, seek additional evidence, if need be, adequately prepare a response and appear before the Committee.
37. The decision in Kimutai v Lenyongopeta & 2 others, together with the authorities cited therein on purposive interpretation, reinforces the principle that the Court must adopt a construction that promotes the legislative purpose and avoids absurdity. A construction that compels the Committee to complete every inquiry within fourteen days, irrespective of the complexity of the matter or the need to accord the affected Member a fair opportunity to respond, would undermine both the statute and the right to fair administrative action.
38. On the facts, the letter inviting the Petitioner to respond was dated 16th October 2025. The Petitioner responded on 22nd October 2025. The summons was issued on 28th October 2025, requiring him to appear on 6th November 2025. The material before the Court does not establish that the Committee failed to commence an inquiry within fourteen days. The invitation to respond and the subsequent summons were steps taken in furtherance of the inquiry.
39. I therefore find that the Petitioner has not established breach of the fourteen-day timeline under section 15(5). The argument that the process is a nullity for being outside the statutory timeline is not made out.
Whether Articles 47 and 50 were Violated or Threatened
40. The Petitioner contends that he was supplied only with a charge sheet and was not given witness statements, documentary evidence or materials that the Respondents intended to rely upon. He submits that this violated Articles 47 and 50 of the Constitution and section 4 of the Fair Administrative Action Act.
41. Article 47 guarantees every person the right to administrative action that is expeditious, efficient, lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair. Where a right or fundamental freedom is likely to be adversely affected by administrative action, the person has the right to be given written reasons for the action.
42. Section 4(3) of the Fair Administrative Action Act provides that where administrative action is likely to adversely affect the rights or fundamental freedoms of a person, the administrator shall give the affected person prior and adequate notice of the nature and reasons for the proposed administrative action; an opportunity to be heard and to make representations; notice of a right to review or internal appeal where applicable; notice of the right to legal representation where applicable; notice of the right to cross-examine where applicable; and information, materials and evidence to be relied upon in making the decision.
43. In Judicial Service Commission v Mbalu Mutava & another, Civil Appeal No. 52 of 2014, [2015] eKLR, the Court of Appeal described Article 47 as a transformative provision that constitutionalises administrative justice. The Court held that administrative action by public bodies must meet the standards of lawfulness, reasonableness and procedural fairness. The Court also made clear that the content of procedural fairness is context-specific and depends on the nature of the decision, the statutory framework and the consequences likely to follow.
44. That authority is directly relevant here. The Committee is not exercising private discretion. It is exercising public power over an elected State officer. Its process must therefore comply with Article 47 and section 4 of the Fair Administrative Action Act. The Petitioner was entitled to know the case he was required to meet and to be afforded a reasonable opportunity to respond.
45. The Petitioner also relied on Republic v Data Protection Commissioner; Pande & another (Ex parte); Credit Bank PLC (Interested Party) [2024] KEHC 14698 (KLR). In that case, the Court emphasised that a person likely to be affected by an administrative decision must be informed of the substance of the case against him and of the procedure to be adopted. The principle from that case is that a hearing is unfair when the affected person is left in the dark about the allegations, the evidence, or the process.
46. It is trite that the right to a fair hearing is fundamental. However, the question is whether, on the facts of this case and at this stage of the process, the Petitioner has demonstrated a completed or imminent violation warranting the quashing of the summons or prohibition of the proceedings.
47. The letter dated 16th October 2025 set out the two counts, the particulars of the alleged misconduct, and the provisions allegedly breached. In relation to Count II, the words complained of were reproduced. The summons dated 28th October 2025 required the Petitioner to attend before the Committee to substantiate his written response and answer any questions that might arise during the hearing.
48. The material before this Court shows that the Petitioner was informed of the broad nature of the charges, the dates of the alleged conduct, the media or platform through which the statements were allegedly made, and the particulars of the offending communication. He was invited to respond and did respond. The Court has not been shown any witness statements, recordings, transcripts, screenshots or other documents which the Committee intends to rely upon but has deliberately withheld.
49. The facts are therefore distinguishable from cases where an adverse administrative decision had already been made without notice, without disclosure of the case to be met, or without an opportunity to respond. Here, the process had not culminated in a final decision. The summons was part of the ongoing inquiry.
50. Article 47 imposes a continuing obligation. The fact that the process is ongoing does not give the Committee liberty to proceed unfairly. If the Committee intends to rely on any additional evidence, including a recording, transcript, screenshot, witness statement, complaint or document which has not been supplied, it must furnish the same to the Petitioner before producing or using the same in its proceedings or before making any adverse decision. The Petitioner must also be given a reasonable opportunity to adequately respond to such evidence.
51. Article 50(1), on the other hand, guarantees the right to a fair and public hearing before a court or, where appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or body. The Committee is not a court. Its process is disciplinary and administrative in nature, although it may have serious consequences. Article 50(1) therefore informs the content of fairness, but the applicable framework is principally Article 47 and section 4 of the Fair Administrative Action Act.
52. The authorities cited on fair hearing do not support the proposition that every preliminary inquiry must assume the form of a full trial. They support the position that where a body is likely to make a decision adverse to a person, the affected person must know the case against him, be given a fair opportunity to respond, and be supplied with the evidence relied upon. The process must be fair, but it need not be judicialised.
53. I therefore find that the Petitioner has not established a violation of Articles 47 or 50 of the Constitution.
Whether the Petitioner is Entitled to the Reliefs Sought
54. The Petitioner seeks declaratory orders, certiorari and prohibition. These are discretionary public law remedies. The Court must consider whether illegality, irrationality, procedural unfairness, excess of jurisdiction or constitutional violation has been established.
55. Having considered the pleadings, the affidavits, the statutory framework and the cited authorities, I have found that the Committee has jurisdiction to inquire into the alleged conduct. The Committee’s mandate is not confined only to physical conduct occurring within the precincts of the County Assembly. Where the alleged conduct is said to affect the dignity, integrity or proper functioning of the Assembly, the Committee is legally entitled to inquire into the matter under sections 15 and 16 of the County Assemblies Powers and Privileges Act.
56. I have also found that the Petitioner has not demonstrated breach of the statutory timeline under section 15(5). Properly construed, section 15(5) requires the Committee to commence inquiry within fourteen days of receipt of a complaint. It does not require the Committee to complete the entire inquiry, hearing, deliberation and reporting within fourteen days of the initial complaint. Section 15(6) separately regulates the period within which findings and recommendations are to be tabled after the conclusion of the inquiry.
57. Further, based on the evidence before the Court, there is no violation of Articles 47 and 50 which would warrant the quashing of the summons or prohibition of the Committee’s proceedings. The Petitioner was notified of the charges and invited to respond. He did respond. The process had not culminated in a final decision by the time the Court was moved. In the case of Justus Kariuki Mate & another v Martin Nyaga Wambora & another [2017] eKLR and Mike Mbuvi Sonko v Clerk, County Assembly of Nairobi City & 11 others [2022] KESC 26 (KLR), the Court must not stop an ongoing process before a legislative body merely because the affected party apprehends an adverse outcome. Judicial intervention is warranted where there is a clear violation of the Constitution or statute, not where the Court is invited to supervise each procedural step of an incomplete process.
58. The prayer for a declaration that the summons dated 28th October 2025 and the intended proceedings are unconstitutional therefore fails for being speculative.
59. The prayer for a declaration that the 1st Respondent acted ultra vires in summoning the Petitioner over conduct allegedly occurring outside the precincts of the Assembly also fails, as the Committee’s jurisdiction under section 16 is not confined to physical conduct within the precincts where the alleged conduct is said to affect the dignity, integrity or interests of the County Assembly or its Members.
60. The prayer for certiorari to quash the summons dated 28th October 2025 fails because the summons was issued pursuant to an ongoing inquiry within the Committee’s statutory mandate.
61. Prohibition orders restrain unlawful proceedings or proceedings in excess of jurisdiction. Such orders are not issued merely because a party anticipates an adverse outcome or because the party disagrees with being called upon to answer allegations. This prayer must also fail.
Disposition
62. For the foregoing reasons, I find that
a. the Petition dated 4th November 2025 is without merit and the same is dismissed .
b. The 1st Respondent may proceed with the inquiry against the Petitioner in accordance with the law.
c. Considering that the Petition raised issues touching on the discipline of an elected representative, the powers of county assemblies and the scope of fair administrative action, each party shall bear its own costs.
d. Right of Appeal.
63. It is so ordered.
DELIVERED VIRTUALLY VIA TEAMS PLATFORM ON THIS 21ST DAY OF MAY 2026 IN THE PRESENCE OF MISS OLOO FOR THE PETITIONER AND MR OCHIENG OGINGA FOR THE RESPONDENT.
CA – KIPCHIRCHIR
1. The Petitioner, Hon. Bouse Mairura, is a Member of the County Assembly of Kisii representing Masimba Ward. By the Petition dated 4th November 2025, he challenges the summons issued to him by the 1st Respondent, the County Assembly of Kisii Committee of Powers and Privileges, requiring him to appear before the Committee on 6th November 2025.
2. The Petition is anchored on Articles 10, 27, 47, 48, 50, 185, 232 and 258 of the Constitution, sections 5, 15, 16, 17 and 18 of the County Assemblies Powers and Privileges Act, 2017, and section 4 of the Fair Administrative Action Act, 2015. The Petitioner contends that the summons and the intended disciplinary proceedings are unconstitutional, ultra vires, procedurally unfair and in breach of the mandatory statutory timelines under section 15 of the County Assemblies Powers and Privileges Act.
3. The Petitioner seeks, principally, declarations that the summons dated 28th October 2025 and the intended proceedings before the Committee on 6th November 2025 are unconstitutional and unlawful; a declaration that the 1st Respondent acted ultra vires in summoning him over an incident said to have occurred outside the precincts of the Kisii County Assembly; an order of certiorari to quash the summons and any proceedings or decisions arising therefrom; and an order of prohibition restraining the 1st Respondent from proceeding with any hearing or disciplinary action based on the impugned summons.
4. The Respondents oppose the Petition through the Replying Affidavit sworn by Norah Bosibori on 7th November 2025. They contend that the Petition is premature, speculative and an abuse of the court process. Their position is that the Committee has jurisdiction over the Petitioner’s conduct under Article 75 of the Constitution and section 16 of the County Assemblies Powers and Privileges Act; that the Petitioner was supplied with the material relied upon, namely the impugned communication reproduced in the charge; that he filed a written response; and that the Court should not, at this stage, conduct a merit review of proceedings pending before a constitutionally and statutorily mandated Committee.
5. The Petition was canvassed by written submissions. I have considered the Petition, the supporting affidavit, the annexures, the Respondents’ Replying Affidavit, the parties’ submissions and the authorities cited.
Factual Background
6. The material facts are largely common ground. On 16th October 2025, the Petitioner was invited by the Committee to respond to charges arising from statements allegedly made between 14th October 2025 and 15th October 2025. The letter of 16th October 2025 alleged that the Petitioner had spread false and misleading information touching on the integrity, independence and operations of the County Assembly of Kisii, through social media and a local radio station.
7. The charges were framed in two counts. Count I alleged that the Petitioner disseminated an audio recording to Egesa FM, a local radio station, alleging that Members of the County Assembly had signed an impeachment motion against the Governor of Kisii County. Count II related to a message allegedly posted on the official WhatsApp forum of Members of the Kisii County Assembly titled “THE KISII MCAS 22–27”.
8. The letter of 16th October 2025 informed the Petitioner that the charges were brought pursuant to the Constitution, the County Assemblies Powers and Privileges Act, 2017, the Leadership and Integrity Act, 2012, the Public Officer Ethics Act, 2003 and the Standing Orders of the Kisii County Assembly. It invited the Petitioner to submit a written response within seven days and to include any supporting documentation or evidence.
9. The Petitioner responded with his letter dated 22nd October 2025. He denied the allegations, contended that the alleged conduct did not occur within the precincts of the County Assembly, and requested to be supplied with the requisite evidence and statements in support of the allegations before any further action was taken.
10. Thereafter, by summons dated 28th October 2025, the Petitioner was required to appear before the Committee on Powers and Privileges on 6th November 2025 at 10.00 a.m. in the Speaker’s Boardroom to substantiate his written response dated 22nd October 2025 and to respond to questions that might arise during the hearing.
11. The Petitioner then approached this Court contending that the Committee had no jurisdiction; that the proceedings were outside the fourteen-day timeline under section 15(5) of the County Assemblies Powers and Privileges Act; that he had not been supplied with witness statements, documents or evidence; and that the process was in violation of Articles 47 and 50 of the Constitution.
Issues for Determination
12. Having considered the pleadings and submissions, the following issues arise for determination:
a. Whether this Court has jurisdiction to entertain the Petition at this stage;
b. Whether the Committee on Powers and Privileges has jurisdiction over the Petitioner’s alleged conduct;
c. Whether the Respondents breached the statutory timelines under section 15 of the County Assemblies Powers and Privileges Act;
d. Whether the Petitioner’s rights under Articles 47 and 50 of the Constitution were violated or threatened; and
e. Whether the Petitioner is entitled to the reliefs sought.
Jurisdiction of this Court and the Doctrine of Separation of Powers
13. The Respondents have submitted that this Petition is premature and that the Court should not interfere with an ongoing process before the Committee. The Petitioner, on the other hand, contends that this Court has jurisdiction under Articles 22, 23, 47, 50, 165 and 258 of the Constitution where a constitutional violation is alleged or threatened.
14. The starting point is Article 165(3)(b) and (d) of the Constitution. This Court has jurisdiction to determine whether a right or fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights has been denied, violated, infringed or threatened, and to determine whether anything said to be done under the authority of the Constitution or any law is inconsistent with, or in contravention of, the Constitution.
15. In the case of Owners of the Motor Vessel “Lillian S” v Caltex Oil (Kenya) Ltd [1989] eKLR, the Court of Appeal held that jurisdiction is everything and that where a court has no jurisdiction, it must down its tools. That principle applies not only to courts, but also to statutory bodies and committees exercising delegated public power. A committee created by statute cannot act outside the four corners of its enabling law.
16. The Supreme Court in Samuel Kamau Macharia & another v Kenya Commercial Bank Ltd & 2 others [2012] eKLR restated the same principle in constitutional terms. The Court held that a court’s jurisdiction flows from the Constitution or legislation or both, and that a court cannot arrogate to itself jurisdiction exceeding that which is conferred upon it by law. In respect to the instant case, the Committee on Powers and Privileges can only exercise the mandate conferred upon it by the Constitution, the County Assemblies Powers and Privileges Act, 2017, and the relevant Standing Orders.
17. However, the Court’s jurisdiction under Article 165 must be exercised with due regard to the separation of powers of the arms of government. The doctrine of separation of powers does not immunise State organs from judicial scrutiny. It requires courts to exercise restraint, especially where another organ is acting within its constitutional or statutory remit.
18. In Justus Kariuki Mate & another v Martin Nyaga Wambora & another, Supreme Court Petition No. 32 of 2014, [2017] eKLR, the Supreme Court held that no arm of government is above the law, but courts must exercise restraint where the Constitution allocates specific mandates to other State organs. The Court cautioned that no governmental agency should encumber another so as to stall the constitutional motions of the other, and that the judicial organ must practise the greatest care in determining whether intervention is warranted.
19. That position was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Mike Mbuvi Sonko v Clerk, County Assembly of Nairobi City & 11 others, Petition No. 11 (E008) of 2022, [2022] KESC 26 (KLR). The Supreme Court held that removal and disciplinary proceedings constitutionally assigned to legislative bodies should not lightly be interrupted by courts, provided the process is conducted within the Constitution and the law. The Court emphasised that courts should not convert themselves into appellate bodies over every procedural action taken by legislative organs unless a clear constitutional breach is demonstrated.
20. The principle emerging from those authorities is therefore twofold. First, this Court has jurisdiction to intervene where a constitutional or statutory violation is alleged or threatened. Secondly, that jurisdiction must be exercised with restraint where the impugned process is still ongoing before a body clothed with constitutional or statutory authority.
21. In the present case, the Petitioner alleges a lack of jurisdiction, breach of statutory timelines, and violation of Articles 47 and 50 of the Constitution. Those are justiciable questions. The Court therefore has jurisdiction to determine whether the process is constitutionally and statutorily compliant. However, this Court must not descend into the merits of the charges, the truth or falsity of the impugned statements, the credibility of the Petitioner’s defence, or the sufficiency of the evidence. Those matters belong, at first instance, to the Committee.
Whether the Committee has Jurisdiction over the Petitioner’s Alleged Conduct
22. The Petitioner argues that the alleged incident occurred outside the precincts of the County Assembly and that section 16 of the County Assemblies Powers and Privileges Act only applies to conduct within the precincts of the Assembly. The Respondents contend that the Committee’s jurisdiction is wider and that the Act covers conduct by a Member that reflects adversely on the dignity or integrity of the County Assembly or is contrary to the best interests of the Assembly or its Members.
23. Article 196(3) of the Constitution requires Parliament to enact legislation providing for the powers, privileges and immunities of county assemblies, their committees and members. The County Assemblies Powers and Privileges Act, 2017, was enacted to give effect to that Article. The preamble of the said Act states that it is an Act to provide for the powers, privileges and immunities of county assemblies, their committees and members, and to make provision regulating admittance to and conduct within the precincts of county assemblies and for connected purposes.
24. The position of Member of County Assembly is that of honour and Members of County Assemblies are State officers under Chapter Six of the Constitution. Section 15 establishes the Committee of Powers and Privileges. Section 16 defines conduct constituting breach of privilege. It is true that parts of the Act regulate conduct within the precincts of a county assembly. However, section 16 is not, in its language, confined only to physical misconduct committed within the chamber, committee rooms or precincts of the Assembly. The principle in Samuel Kamau Macharia & another v Kenya Commercial Bank Ltd & 2 others [2012] eKLR assists the Court at this point. The Committee cannot assume jurisdiction merely because it considers a matter important. Its jurisdiction must flow from the Constitution or statute. In the present case, that jurisdiction is traceable to Article 196(3), Article 75 of the Constitution, and sections 15 and 16 of the County Assemblies Powers and Privileges Act.
25. Article 75 of the Constitution is also material. It requires a State officer to behave, whether in public and official life, in private life, or in association with other persons, in a manner that avoids demeaning the office the officer holds. Article 75(2) provides that a person who contravenes that standard is subject to the applicable disciplinary procedure for the relevant office. A Member of the County Assembly is a State officer. His or her conduct outside the Assembly may, depending on the facts, bear upon the dignity of the office and the integrity of the institution.
26. The alleged statements in this matter, whether made on the radio or on the official WhatsApp forum of Members of the Kisii County Assembly, are alleged to have touched on the integrity, independence and operations of the County Assembly of Kisii. Whether those allegations are true is not for this Court to determine at this stage. What matters is whether the subject matter is one which the Committee is legally capable of inquiring into.
27. The Court is enjoined to interpret section 16 textually, contextually and purposively. The Petitioner’s construction would mean that a Member may engage in conduct outside the precincts which seriously undermines the dignity, integrity or operations of the Assembly, and yet the Assembly would be powerless to inquire into it. Such an interpretation would defeat the purpose of privilege law, which is not merely to regulate physical conduct within legislative buildings, but also to protect the institutional dignity, independence and proper functioning of the Assembly.
28. In my view, conduct which, in the opinion of the Committee, is intended or likely to reflect adversely on the dignity or integrity of a county assembly or its members, or is contrary to the best interests of a county assembly or its members, would fall under the category of “connected purposes” under the Act.
29. I therefore find that the 1st Respondent did not act ultra vires merely by summoning the Petitioner over statements allegedly made through a radio station and a WhatsApp forum, where those statements were alleged to touch on the integrity and operations of the County Assembly, which are well within its jurisdiction.
Whether the Statutory Timelines under Section 15 were Breached
30. The Petitioner contends that the investigation commenced on 16th October 2025, but the summons required him to appear on 6th November 2025, outside the fourteen-day timeline under section 15(5) of the County Assemblies Powers and Privileges Act. The Respondents contend that the inquiry was still ongoing and that section 15(6) permits the Committee to table its findings within fourteen days of the conclusion of the inquiry.
31. Section 15(5) provides that the Committee shall, either of its own motion or as a result of a complaint made by any person, inquire into the conduct of a Member whose conduct is alleged to constitute a breach of privilege in terms of section 16, within fourteen days of receipt of a complaint.
32. Section 15(6) then provides that the Committee shall, within fourteen days of the conclusion of an inquiry, table its findings in the relevant county assembly together with such recommendations as it considers appropriate. Section 15(7) provides that the county assembly shall consider the report and may take appropriate action against the Member concerned.
33. The proper approach to statutory interpretation is now settled. In Association of Retirement Benefits Schemes v Attorney General & 3 others [2017] KEHC 8534 (KLR), the Court emphasised that the starting point is the language of the statute itself, but that statutory text must be read in its context and in light of the purpose of the legislation. The Court must avoid an interpretation that defeats the statutory object or produces an absurd or impracticable result.
34. The same approach was taken in Kimanthi v Attorney General & another, Constitutional Petition No. 2 of 2024, [2025] KEHC 11098 (KLR), where the Court reiterated that statutory provisions should not be read in isolation. The statute must be read as a whole, with each provision interpreted in a manner that gives coherent effect to the intention of the legislature.
35. Applying those principles, section 15(5) cannot be read in isolation from section 15(6). Section 15(5) obligates the Committee to inquire into the complaint within fourteen days of receipt of the complaint. Section 15(6), however, expressly contemplates that the inquiry may thereafter be concluded, and that within fourteen days of such conclusion, the Committee shall table its findings and recommendations.
36. The Petitioner’s interpretation would mean that once a complaint is received, the entire inquiry, hearing, consideration, deliberation and reporting must be completed within fourteen days. That construction is not supported by the text of section 15 as a whole. It would also undermine procedural fairness because a Member may require time to receive allegations, seek additional evidence, if need be, adequately prepare a response and appear before the Committee.
37. The decision in Kimutai v Lenyongopeta & 2 others, together with the authorities cited therein on purposive interpretation, reinforces the principle that the Court must adopt a construction that promotes the legislative purpose and avoids absurdity. A construction that compels the Committee to complete every inquiry within fourteen days, irrespective of the complexity of the matter or the need to accord the affected Member a fair opportunity to respond, would undermine both the statute and the right to fair administrative action.
38. On the facts, the letter inviting the Petitioner to respond was dated 16th October 2025. The Petitioner responded on 22nd October 2025. The summons was issued on 28th October 2025, requiring him to appear on 6th November 2025. The material before the Court does not establish that the Committee failed to commence an inquiry within fourteen days. The invitation to respond and the subsequent summons were steps taken in furtherance of the inquiry.
39. I therefore find that the Petitioner has not established breach of the fourteen-day timeline under section 15(5). The argument that the process is a nullity for being outside the statutory timeline is not made out.
Whether Articles 47 and 50 were Violated or Threatened
40. The Petitioner contends that he was supplied only with a charge sheet and was not given witness statements, documentary evidence or materials that the Respondents intended to rely upon. He submits that this violated Articles 47 and 50 of the Constitution and section 4 of the Fair Administrative Action Act.
41. Article 47 guarantees every person the right to administrative action that is expeditious, efficient, lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair. Where a right or fundamental freedom is likely to be adversely affected by administrative action, the person has the right to be given written reasons for the action.
42. Section 4(3) of the Fair Administrative Action Act provides that where administrative action is likely to adversely affect the rights or fundamental freedoms of a person, the administrator shall give the affected person prior and adequate notice of the nature and reasons for the proposed administrative action; an opportunity to be heard and to make representations; notice of a right to review or internal appeal where applicable; notice of the right to legal representation where applicable; notice of the right to cross-examine where applicable; and information, materials and evidence to be relied upon in making the decision.
43. In Judicial Service Commission v Mbalu Mutava & another, Civil Appeal No. 52 of 2014, [2015] eKLR, the Court of Appeal described Article 47 as a transformative provision that constitutionalises administrative justice. The Court held that administrative action by public bodies must meet the standards of lawfulness, reasonableness and procedural fairness. The Court also made clear that the content of procedural fairness is context-specific and depends on the nature of the decision, the statutory framework and the consequences likely to follow.
44. That authority is directly relevant here. The Committee is not exercising private discretion. It is exercising public power over an elected State officer. Its process must therefore comply with Article 47 and section 4 of the Fair Administrative Action Act. The Petitioner was entitled to know the case he was required to meet and to be afforded a reasonable opportunity to respond.
45. The Petitioner also relied on Republic v Data Protection Commissioner; Pande & another (Ex parte); Credit Bank PLC (Interested Party) [2024] KEHC 14698 (KLR). In that case, the Court emphasised that a person likely to be affected by an administrative decision must be informed of the substance of the case against him and of the procedure to be adopted. The principle from that case is that a hearing is unfair when the affected person is left in the dark about the allegations, the evidence, or the process.
46. It is trite that the right to a fair hearing is fundamental. However, the question is whether, on the facts of this case and at this stage of the process, the Petitioner has demonstrated a completed or imminent violation warranting the quashing of the summons or prohibition of the proceedings.
47. The letter dated 16th October 2025 set out the two counts, the particulars of the alleged misconduct, and the provisions allegedly breached. In relation to Count II, the words complained of were reproduced. The summons dated 28th October 2025 required the Petitioner to attend before the Committee to substantiate his written response and answer any questions that might arise during the hearing.
48. The material before this Court shows that the Petitioner was informed of the broad nature of the charges, the dates of the alleged conduct, the media or platform through which the statements were allegedly made, and the particulars of the offending communication. He was invited to respond and did respond. The Court has not been shown any witness statements, recordings, transcripts, screenshots or other documents which the Committee intends to rely upon but has deliberately withheld.
49. The facts are therefore distinguishable from cases where an adverse administrative decision had already been made without notice, without disclosure of the case to be met, or without an opportunity to respond. Here, the process had not culminated in a final decision. The summons was part of the ongoing inquiry.
50. Article 47 imposes a continuing obligation. The fact that the process is ongoing does not give the Committee liberty to proceed unfairly. If the Committee intends to rely on any additional evidence, including a recording, transcript, screenshot, witness statement, complaint or document which has not been supplied, it must furnish the same to the Petitioner before producing or using the same in its proceedings or before making any adverse decision. The Petitioner must also be given a reasonable opportunity to adequately respond to such evidence.
51. Article 50(1), on the other hand, guarantees the right to a fair and public hearing before a court or, where appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or body. The Committee is not a court. Its process is disciplinary and administrative in nature, although it may have serious consequences. Article 50(1) therefore informs the content of fairness, but the applicable framework is principally Article 47 and section 4 of the Fair Administrative Action Act.
52. The authorities cited on fair hearing do not support the proposition that every preliminary inquiry must assume the form of a full trial. They support the position that where a body is likely to make a decision adverse to a person, the affected person must know the case against him, be given a fair opportunity to respond, and be supplied with the evidence relied upon. The process must be fair, but it need not be judicialised.
53. I therefore find that the Petitioner has not established a violation of Articles 47 or 50 of the Constitution.
Whether the Petitioner is Entitled to the Reliefs Sought
54. The Petitioner seeks declaratory orders, certiorari and prohibition. These are discretionary public law remedies. The Court must consider whether illegality, irrationality, procedural unfairness, excess of jurisdiction or constitutional violation has been established.
55. Having considered the pleadings, the affidavits, the statutory framework and the cited authorities, I have found that the Committee has jurisdiction to inquire into the alleged conduct. The Committee’s mandate is not confined only to physical conduct occurring within the precincts of the County Assembly. Where the alleged conduct is said to affect the dignity, integrity or proper functioning of the Assembly, the Committee is legally entitled to inquire into the matter under sections 15 and 16 of the County Assemblies Powers and Privileges Act.
56. I have also found that the Petitioner has not demonstrated breach of the statutory timeline under section 15(5). Properly construed, section 15(5) requires the Committee to commence inquiry within fourteen days of receipt of a complaint. It does not require the Committee to complete the entire inquiry, hearing, deliberation and reporting within fourteen days of the initial complaint. Section 15(6) separately regulates the period within which findings and recommendations are to be tabled after the conclusion of the inquiry.
57. Further, based on the evidence before the Court, there is no violation of Articles 47 and 50 which would warrant the quashing of the summons or prohibition of the Committee’s proceedings. The Petitioner was notified of the charges and invited to respond. He did respond. The process had not culminated in a final decision by the time the Court was moved. In the case of Justus Kariuki Mate & another v Martin Nyaga Wambora & another [2017] eKLR and Mike Mbuvi Sonko v Clerk, County Assembly of Nairobi City & 11 others [2022] KESC 26 (KLR), the Court must not stop an ongoing process before a legislative body merely because the affected party apprehends an adverse outcome. Judicial intervention is warranted where there is a clear violation of the Constitution or statute, not where the Court is invited to supervise each procedural step of an incomplete process.
58. The prayer for a declaration that the summons dated 28th October 2025 and the intended proceedings are unconstitutional therefore fails for being speculative.
59. The prayer for a declaration that the 1st Respondent acted ultra vires in summoning the Petitioner over conduct allegedly occurring outside the precincts of the Assembly also fails, as the Committee’s jurisdiction under section 16 is not confined to physical conduct within the precincts where the alleged conduct is said to affect the dignity, integrity or interests of the County Assembly or its Members.
60. The prayer for certiorari to quash the summons dated 28th October 2025 fails because the summons was issued pursuant to an ongoing inquiry within the Committee’s statutory mandate.
61. Prohibition orders restrain unlawful proceedings or proceedings in excess of jurisdiction. Such orders are not issued merely because a party anticipates an adverse outcome or because the party disagrees with being called upon to answer allegations. This prayer must also fail.
Disposition
62. For the foregoing reasons, I find that
a. the Petition dated 4th November 2025 is without merit and the same is dismissed .
b. The 1st Respondent may proceed with the inquiry against the Petitioner in accordance with the law.
c. Considering that the Petition raised issues touching on the discipline of an elected representative, the powers of county assemblies and the scope of fair administrative action, each party shall bear its own costs.
d. Right of Appeal.
63. It is so ordered.
DELIVERED VIRTUALLY VIA TEAMS PLATFORM ON THIS 21ST DAY OF MAY 2026 IN THE PRESENCE OF MISS OLOO FOR THE PETITIONER AND MR OCHIENG OGINGA FOR THE RESPONDENT.
CA – KIPCHIRCHIR