A. Introduction
1. This is an appeal against the Ruling of the learned trial Magistrate dismissing the Appellant's Summons for Revocation and/or Annulment of Grant dated 29th August 2024, filed under Section 76 of the Law of Succession Act, Cap 160.
2. The Appellant, Glenn Musi Nabiswa, contends that he purchased two acres out of the deceased's land, parcel No. East Bukusu/North Kanduyi/717, from the deceased himself on 31st July 1977, and has been in continuous occupation since then. He argues that the Respondent, Eliud Wanyama Wafula, who obtained a grant of letters of administration intestate on 18th August 2023 (confirmed 11th July 2024), concealed from the trial Court the fact that the Appellant was a "liability" — i.e., a creditor/purchaser — of the estate, and distributed the estate without providing for his interest.
3. The trial Magistrate dismissed the Application, holding that the question of a purchaser's interest in land is a matter for the Environment and Land Court ("ELC"), not the Succession Court, and that the grounds for revocation under Section 76 had not been made out.
B. The Grounds of Appeal
4. The Memorandum of Appeal dated 16th December 2024 raises two grounds, which may conveniently be taken together, as both parties have done in their submissions:
(i) That the trial Magistrate erred in law and fact in dismissing the Application dated 29th August 2024 against the weight of the evidence on record.
(ii) That the trial Magistrate erred in law and fact in failing to appreciate that the Appellant was a liability in the estate, having purchased his share directly from the deceased.
C. Submissions
Appellant's case
5. The Appellant submits that it is the duty of a first appellate Court to re-evaluate the evidence and reach its own conclusions, subject to the caveat that it neither saw the witnesses nor visited the locus in quo, citing Selle & Another v Associated Motor Boat Co. Ltd & Others [1968] EA 123 and Peters v Sunday Post Ltd [1958] EA 424.
6. He argues that he presented an unchallenged land purchase agreement dated 31st July 1977 and was, on the Respondent's own knowledge, in occupation of the suit property. He contends the Respondent's failure to disclose this fact to the trial Court in the course of petitioning for and distributing the grant amounted to "concealment ... of something material to the case" within Section 76(b) of the Act, which alone he says is sufficient to warrant revocation. He concedes, however, that the succession Court has no jurisdiction to determine the validity or enforceability of the 1977 agreement itself, accepting that this falls to the ELC.
Respondent's case
7. The Respondent submits that the trial Court correctly held that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain what is, in substance, a claim to proprietary/purchaser's interest in land — a matter reserved exclusively to the ELC under Article 162(2)(b) of the Constitution and Section 13 of the Environment and Land Court Act, No. 19 of 2011.
8. He further submits that the Appellant lacks locus standi to invoke Section 76, since a purchaser is not a "beneficiary," "dependant" under Section 29, "personal representative," or "heir," and his claim is contractual/proprietary rather than a succession claim properly so called. He submits that a bare claim of purchaser's interest is not itself one of the five statutory grounds for revocation under Section 76, and that revocation cannot be extended by implication to grounds not listed in the Section.
9. In support, the Respondent relies on: Owners of the Motor Vessel "Lilian S" v Caltex Oil (Kenya) Ltd [1989] eKLR (Court of Appeal); Samuel Kamau Macharia v Kenya Commercial Bank Limited & 2 Others [2012] eKLR (Supreme Court); In re Estate of Prisca Ong'ayo Nande (Deceased) [2020] eKLR (High Court, Musyoka J.); In re Estate of M'Ngariithi M'Miriti (Deceased) [2017] eKLR; and In re Estate of Gakunga Njoroge (Deceased) [2015] eKLR.
D. Duty of the First Appellate Court
10. Both parties correctly identify the applicable standard. This being a first appeal, I am obliged to re-examine and re-evaluate the evidence on the record afresh and reach my own independent conclusions, bearing in mind that I neither saw nor heard the witnesses, and giving allowance for that disadvantage — Selle & Another v Associated Motor Boat Co. Ltd & Others [1968] EA 123; Peters v Sunday Post Ltd [1958] EA 424. I have applied this standard to the whole of the record, including the affidavits, the proceedings of 25th January 2023, 29th April 2024 through 4th December 2024, and the Ruling itself.
E. Issues for Determination
11. Three issues arise:
(i) Whether the Succession Court (and by extension, this appellate Court) has jurisdiction to determine a claim of purchaser's/proprietary interest in land within succession proceedings;
(ii) Whether the Appellant had locus standi under Section 76 of the Law of Succession Act, and whether the statutory grounds for revocation were established on the record;
(iii) Whether the appeal is merited.
F. Analysis
Issue (i): Jurisdiction
12. The starting point is jurisdiction, for as the Court of Appeal held in the oft-cited passage from Owners of the Motor Vessel "Lilian S" v Caltex Oil (Kenya) Ltd [1989] eKLR:
"Jurisdiction is everything. Without it, a Court has no power to make one more step. Where a Court has no jurisdiction, there would be no basis for a continuation of proceedings pending other evidence. A Court of law downs its tools in respect of the matter before it the moment it holds the opinion that it is without jurisdiction."
13. The Supreme Court has similarly affirmed, in Samuel Kamau Macharia v Kenya Commercial Bank Limited & 2 Others [2012] eKLR, that jurisdiction flows only from the Constitution or statute, and cannot be conferred, extended, or assumed by judicial craft or by the consent of parties.
14. Article 162(2)(b) of the Constitution mandates Parliament to establish Courts of the status of the High Court to hear disputes relating to "the environment and the use and occupation of, and title to, land." Article 165(5)(b) expressly excludes such matters from the ordinary jurisdiction of the High Court. Parliament gave effect to this through the Environment and Land Court Act, No. 19 of 2011, Section 13 of which vests the ELC with jurisdiction over disputes relating to, among other things, "title, tenure ... and other natural resources" and "contracts, choses in action or other instruments granting any enforceable interests in land."
15. This principle has been applied directly in the succession context. In In re Estate of Prisca Ong'ayo Nande (Deceased) [2020] eKLR, Musyoka J. was confronted with materially identical facts: an Applicant claiming to have purchased land from the deceased and to be in occupation, seeking to be recognised as a "liability" of the estate and for a certificate of confirmation of grant to be revoked on that basis. The learned Judge held:
"I have no jurisdiction to make a finding one way or the other, with regard to whether the alleged sales were valid and resulted in the Applicant acquiring a stake in the estate. That is a matter which revolves around title to land. Under Articles 162(2) and 165(5) of the Constitution, I have no jurisdiction over that question. The parties are better off placing the issue before another forum for determination of the question."
16. That reasoning applies squarely to this appeal. The 1977 handwritten agreement produced by the Appellant does not even disclose the land parcel number, and its authenticity and legal effect were never — and could never properly have been — tested in the Succession Court. Whether the Appellant acquired an enforceable proprietary interest in parcel No. East Bukusu/North Kanduyi/717 is a question of sale, conveyance and title, which Sections 2 and 101 of the Land Registration Act, No. 3 of 2012, and Sections 2 and 150 of the Land Act, No. 6 of 2012, commit exclusively to the ELC.
17. The principle that Succession Courts are not the proper forum for resolving land ownership disputes was also affirmed in In re Estate of M'Ngariithi M'Miriti (Deceased) [2017] eKLR. I respectfully agree with and adopt that line of authority. Succession Courts exist to administer and distribute the net estate of a deceased person among those with a status-based claim (heirs, dependants, beneficiaries) — they are not Courts of general civil jurisdiction competent to adjudicate contested title or contractual claims by third-party purchasers.
18. I therefore find, in agreement with the trial Magistrate, that neither the trial Court nor this Court sitting on appeal has jurisdiction to pronounce on the validity of the Appellant's alleged 1977 purchase or on any resulting proprietary interest. That question must be litigated before the ELC.
Issue (ii): Locus standi and the statutory grounds under Section 76
19. Section 76 of the Law of Succession Act provides an exhaustive, closed list of grounds upon which a grant may be revoked or annulled:
(a) that the proceedings to obtain the grant were defective in substance; (b) that the grant was obtained fraudulently by the making of a false statement or by the concealment from the Court of something material to the case; (c) that the grant was obtained by means of an untrue allegation of a fact essential in point of law to justify the grant, whether made in ignorance or inadvertently; (d) failure, after due notice, to apply for confirmation, to proceed diligently with administration, or to render proper accounts; or (e) that the grant has become useless and inoperative through subsequent circumstances.
20. In In re Estate of Gakunga Njoroge (Deceased) [2015] eKLR, the Court held that revocation must strictly fall within these enumerated grounds and cannot be extended by implication. I agree. The provision is not a general reservoir of equitable discretion; it is a specific statutory power exercisable only upon proof of one of the listed matters.
21. The Appellant's real complaint is that he holds a purchaser's interest that was not catered for in the distribution. That is not, without more, "concealment ... of something material to the case" under Section 76(b). The two are analytically distinct: concealment under Section 76(b) speaks to matters material to the grant itself — for example, the existence of other heirs, a competing will, or facts bearing on who is entitled to apply for or receive the grant. A disputed, undocumented (as to parcel number) claim of a decades-old land purchase by a stranger to the succession, the validity of which the Succession Court has no power to determine, cannot be "material to the case" in the Section 76(b) sense, precisely because the Succession Court could do nothing with that fact even if it had been disclosed — it would still have had to send the Appellant to the ELC. It cannot be a reversible error to omit from a succession record a fact which, if included, would not have altered the Succession Court's jurisdiction or the outcome available to it.
22. I also accept the Respondent's submission on locus standi. Section 29 of the Law of Succession Act defines "dependants" for succession purposes, and the general scheme of the Act confines participation in confirmation and distribution to beneficiaries, dependants, and personal representatives. A purchaser asserting a contractual/proprietary claim against land forming part of the estate is, at most, a potential creditor or a stranger with a civil claim against the estate or against the beneficiaries who take the land subject to any proven encumbrance — he is not thereby converted into a person with standing to unpick a confirmed grant under Section 76. His remedy, if his purchase is proved before the ELC, is to enforce his interest against the property or against the estate in the appropriate forum; it is not to invoke Section 76 of the Law of Succession Act as a substitute for a land suit.
23. I note that the Appellant did in 2018 use the citation process (Succession Cause No. 336 of 2018) precisely because he wished to see the estate administered given his claimed occupation of part of the land. That citation cause appears to have lapsed without a grant issuing to him, and the matter was later revived by the Respondent as E206 of 2023, culminating in the grant now under challenge. Nothing on this record establishes that the Respondent's petition or the confirmation proceedings were procedurally defective, fraudulent, or based on an untrue allegation of fact essential in point of law — the touchstones of Section 76(a)–(c). The Appellant does not dispute that the Respondent, Mary Nakhumicha Wafula, George Wafula Nyongesa and Griffin Wafula Nyongesa are properly identified heirs of the deceased; his grievance is confined to the omission of his extraneous purchaser's claim.
Issue (iii): Whether the appeal is merited
24. Applying the Selle and Peters v Sunday Post standard, and having re-evaluated the record in full, I find no basis to disturb the trial Magistrate's findings. The trial Court correctly identified that:
(a) the Appellant's claim is, at its core, a claim of purchaser's/proprietary interest in registered land;
(b) such a claim falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Environment and Land Court under Article 162(2)(b) and Article 165(5) of the Constitution, and Section 13 of the Environment and Land Court Act; and
(c) the Appellant did not otherwise establish any of the closed statutory grounds for revocation under Section 76 of the Law of Succession Act.
25. It follows that Grounds 1 and 2 of the appeal, argued together as they raise the same substantive question, must fail. There was no error of law or of fact in the trial Magistrate's approach; if anything, the Ruling correctly declined to exercise a jurisdiction the Court did not have — precisely the discipline demanded by Owners of the Motor Vessel "Lilian S" and Samuel Kamau Macharia.
G. Disposition
26. For the foregoing reasons, I find that this appeal is without merit. It is accordingly dismissed.
27. As to costs, this being a dispute within a family/succession context involving a long-standing, unresolved claim of occupation, and noting that the trial Court dismissed the revocation Application "without costs," I decline to depart from that approach. Each party shall bear its own costs of this appeal.
28. For the avoidance of doubt, this judgment determines only the propriety of the trial Court's refusal to revoke the grant on the record before it. It does not, and cannot, determine the validity of the Appellant's claimed 1977 purchase of part of parcel No. East Bukusu/North Kanduyi/717, or any proprietary or occupational interest he may have therein. That question remains at large and is to be pursued, if at all, before the Environment and Land Court, against whichever party or parties are appropriate, unaffected by anything said in this judgment.
In the presence of:
Mr. Wamalwa Simiyu for the Appellant
Ms. Khisa for the Respondent
Irene Celang'at - Court Assistant
1. This is an appeal against the Ruling of the learned trial Magistrate dismissing the Appellant's Summons for Revocation and/or Annulment of Grant dated 29th August 2024, filed under Section 76 of the Law of Succession Act, Cap 160.
2. The Appellant, Glenn Musi Nabiswa, contends that he purchased two acres out of the deceased's land, parcel No. East Bukusu/North Kanduyi/717, from the deceased himself on 31st July 1977, and has been in continuous occupation since then. He argues that the Respondent, Eliud Wanyama Wafula, who obtained a grant of letters of administration intestate on 18th August 2023 (confirmed 11th July 2024), concealed from the trial Court the fact that the Appellant was a "liability" — i.e., a creditor/purchaser — of the estate, and distributed the estate without providing for his interest.
3. The trial Magistrate dismissed the Application, holding that the question of a purchaser's interest in land is a matter for the Environment and Land Court ("ELC"), not the Succession Court, and that the grounds for revocation under Section 76 had not been made out.
B. The Grounds of Appeal
4. The Memorandum of Appeal dated 16th December 2024 raises two grounds, which may conveniently be taken together, as both parties have done in their submissions:
(i) That the trial Magistrate erred in law and fact in dismissing the Application dated 29th August 2024 against the weight of the evidence on record.
(ii) That the trial Magistrate erred in law and fact in failing to appreciate that the Appellant was a liability in the estate, having purchased his share directly from the deceased.
C. Submissions
Appellant's case
5. The Appellant submits that it is the duty of a first appellate Court to re-evaluate the evidence and reach its own conclusions, subject to the caveat that it neither saw the witnesses nor visited the locus in quo, citing Selle & Another v Associated Motor Boat Co. Ltd & Others [1968] EA 123 and Peters v Sunday Post Ltd [1958] EA 424.
6. He argues that he presented an unchallenged land purchase agreement dated 31st July 1977 and was, on the Respondent's own knowledge, in occupation of the suit property. He contends the Respondent's failure to disclose this fact to the trial Court in the course of petitioning for and distributing the grant amounted to "concealment ... of something material to the case" within Section 76(b) of the Act, which alone he says is sufficient to warrant revocation. He concedes, however, that the succession Court has no jurisdiction to determine the validity or enforceability of the 1977 agreement itself, accepting that this falls to the ELC.
Respondent's case
7. The Respondent submits that the trial Court correctly held that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain what is, in substance, a claim to proprietary/purchaser's interest in land — a matter reserved exclusively to the ELC under Article 162(2)(b) of the Constitution and Section 13 of the Environment and Land Court Act, No. 19 of 2011.
8. He further submits that the Appellant lacks locus standi to invoke Section 76, since a purchaser is not a "beneficiary," "dependant" under Section 29, "personal representative," or "heir," and his claim is contractual/proprietary rather than a succession claim properly so called. He submits that a bare claim of purchaser's interest is not itself one of the five statutory grounds for revocation under Section 76, and that revocation cannot be extended by implication to grounds not listed in the Section.
9. In support, the Respondent relies on: Owners of the Motor Vessel "Lilian S" v Caltex Oil (Kenya) Ltd [1989] eKLR (Court of Appeal); Samuel Kamau Macharia v Kenya Commercial Bank Limited & 2 Others [2012] eKLR (Supreme Court); In re Estate of Prisca Ong'ayo Nande (Deceased) [2020] eKLR (High Court, Musyoka J.); In re Estate of M'Ngariithi M'Miriti (Deceased) [2017] eKLR; and In re Estate of Gakunga Njoroge (Deceased) [2015] eKLR.
D. Duty of the First Appellate Court
10. Both parties correctly identify the applicable standard. This being a first appeal, I am obliged to re-examine and re-evaluate the evidence on the record afresh and reach my own independent conclusions, bearing in mind that I neither saw nor heard the witnesses, and giving allowance for that disadvantage — Selle & Another v Associated Motor Boat Co. Ltd & Others [1968] EA 123; Peters v Sunday Post Ltd [1958] EA 424. I have applied this standard to the whole of the record, including the affidavits, the proceedings of 25th January 2023, 29th April 2024 through 4th December 2024, and the Ruling itself.
E. Issues for Determination
11. Three issues arise:
(i) Whether the Succession Court (and by extension, this appellate Court) has jurisdiction to determine a claim of purchaser's/proprietary interest in land within succession proceedings;
(ii) Whether the Appellant had locus standi under Section 76 of the Law of Succession Act, and whether the statutory grounds for revocation were established on the record;
(iii) Whether the appeal is merited.
F. Analysis
Issue (i): Jurisdiction
12. The starting point is jurisdiction, for as the Court of Appeal held in the oft-cited passage from Owners of the Motor Vessel "Lilian S" v Caltex Oil (Kenya) Ltd [1989] eKLR:
"Jurisdiction is everything. Without it, a Court has no power to make one more step. Where a Court has no jurisdiction, there would be no basis for a continuation of proceedings pending other evidence. A Court of law downs its tools in respect of the matter before it the moment it holds the opinion that it is without jurisdiction."
13. The Supreme Court has similarly affirmed, in Samuel Kamau Macharia v Kenya Commercial Bank Limited & 2 Others [2012] eKLR, that jurisdiction flows only from the Constitution or statute, and cannot be conferred, extended, or assumed by judicial craft or by the consent of parties.
14. Article 162(2)(b) of the Constitution mandates Parliament to establish Courts of the status of the High Court to hear disputes relating to "the environment and the use and occupation of, and title to, land." Article 165(5)(b) expressly excludes such matters from the ordinary jurisdiction of the High Court. Parliament gave effect to this through the Environment and Land Court Act, No. 19 of 2011, Section 13 of which vests the ELC with jurisdiction over disputes relating to, among other things, "title, tenure ... and other natural resources" and "contracts, choses in action or other instruments granting any enforceable interests in land."
15. This principle has been applied directly in the succession context. In In re Estate of Prisca Ong'ayo Nande (Deceased) [2020] eKLR, Musyoka J. was confronted with materially identical facts: an Applicant claiming to have purchased land from the deceased and to be in occupation, seeking to be recognised as a "liability" of the estate and for a certificate of confirmation of grant to be revoked on that basis. The learned Judge held:
"I have no jurisdiction to make a finding one way or the other, with regard to whether the alleged sales were valid and resulted in the Applicant acquiring a stake in the estate. That is a matter which revolves around title to land. Under Articles 162(2) and 165(5) of the Constitution, I have no jurisdiction over that question. The parties are better off placing the issue before another forum for determination of the question."
16. That reasoning applies squarely to this appeal. The 1977 handwritten agreement produced by the Appellant does not even disclose the land parcel number, and its authenticity and legal effect were never — and could never properly have been — tested in the Succession Court. Whether the Appellant acquired an enforceable proprietary interest in parcel No. East Bukusu/North Kanduyi/717 is a question of sale, conveyance and title, which Sections 2 and 101 of the Land Registration Act, No. 3 of 2012, and Sections 2 and 150 of the Land Act, No. 6 of 2012, commit exclusively to the ELC.
17. The principle that Succession Courts are not the proper forum for resolving land ownership disputes was also affirmed in In re Estate of M'Ngariithi M'Miriti (Deceased) [2017] eKLR. I respectfully agree with and adopt that line of authority. Succession Courts exist to administer and distribute the net estate of a deceased person among those with a status-based claim (heirs, dependants, beneficiaries) — they are not Courts of general civil jurisdiction competent to adjudicate contested title or contractual claims by third-party purchasers.
18. I therefore find, in agreement with the trial Magistrate, that neither the trial Court nor this Court sitting on appeal has jurisdiction to pronounce on the validity of the Appellant's alleged 1977 purchase or on any resulting proprietary interest. That question must be litigated before the ELC.
Issue (ii): Locus standi and the statutory grounds under Section 76
19. Section 76 of the Law of Succession Act provides an exhaustive, closed list of grounds upon which a grant may be revoked or annulled:
(a) that the proceedings to obtain the grant were defective in substance; (b) that the grant was obtained fraudulently by the making of a false statement or by the concealment from the Court of something material to the case; (c) that the grant was obtained by means of an untrue allegation of a fact essential in point of law to justify the grant, whether made in ignorance or inadvertently; (d) failure, after due notice, to apply for confirmation, to proceed diligently with administration, or to render proper accounts; or (e) that the grant has become useless and inoperative through subsequent circumstances.
20. In In re Estate of Gakunga Njoroge (Deceased) [2015] eKLR, the Court held that revocation must strictly fall within these enumerated grounds and cannot be extended by implication. I agree. The provision is not a general reservoir of equitable discretion; it is a specific statutory power exercisable only upon proof of one of the listed matters.
21. The Appellant's real complaint is that he holds a purchaser's interest that was not catered for in the distribution. That is not, without more, "concealment ... of something material to the case" under Section 76(b). The two are analytically distinct: concealment under Section 76(b) speaks to matters material to the grant itself — for example, the existence of other heirs, a competing will, or facts bearing on who is entitled to apply for or receive the grant. A disputed, undocumented (as to parcel number) claim of a decades-old land purchase by a stranger to the succession, the validity of which the Succession Court has no power to determine, cannot be "material to the case" in the Section 76(b) sense, precisely because the Succession Court could do nothing with that fact even if it had been disclosed — it would still have had to send the Appellant to the ELC. It cannot be a reversible error to omit from a succession record a fact which, if included, would not have altered the Succession Court's jurisdiction or the outcome available to it.
22. I also accept the Respondent's submission on locus standi. Section 29 of the Law of Succession Act defines "dependants" for succession purposes, and the general scheme of the Act confines participation in confirmation and distribution to beneficiaries, dependants, and personal representatives. A purchaser asserting a contractual/proprietary claim against land forming part of the estate is, at most, a potential creditor or a stranger with a civil claim against the estate or against the beneficiaries who take the land subject to any proven encumbrance — he is not thereby converted into a person with standing to unpick a confirmed grant under Section 76. His remedy, if his purchase is proved before the ELC, is to enforce his interest against the property or against the estate in the appropriate forum; it is not to invoke Section 76 of the Law of Succession Act as a substitute for a land suit.
23. I note that the Appellant did in 2018 use the citation process (Succession Cause No. 336 of 2018) precisely because he wished to see the estate administered given his claimed occupation of part of the land. That citation cause appears to have lapsed without a grant issuing to him, and the matter was later revived by the Respondent as E206 of 2023, culminating in the grant now under challenge. Nothing on this record establishes that the Respondent's petition or the confirmation proceedings were procedurally defective, fraudulent, or based on an untrue allegation of fact essential in point of law — the touchstones of Section 76(a)–(c). The Appellant does not dispute that the Respondent, Mary Nakhumicha Wafula, George Wafula Nyongesa and Griffin Wafula Nyongesa are properly identified heirs of the deceased; his grievance is confined to the omission of his extraneous purchaser's claim.
Issue (iii): Whether the appeal is merited
24. Applying the Selle and Peters v Sunday Post standard, and having re-evaluated the record in full, I find no basis to disturb the trial Magistrate's findings. The trial Court correctly identified that:
(a) the Appellant's claim is, at its core, a claim of purchaser's/proprietary interest in registered land;
(b) such a claim falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Environment and Land Court under Article 162(2)(b) and Article 165(5) of the Constitution, and Section 13 of the Environment and Land Court Act; and
(c) the Appellant did not otherwise establish any of the closed statutory grounds for revocation under Section 76 of the Law of Succession Act.
25. It follows that Grounds 1 and 2 of the appeal, argued together as they raise the same substantive question, must fail. There was no error of law or of fact in the trial Magistrate's approach; if anything, the Ruling correctly declined to exercise a jurisdiction the Court did not have — precisely the discipline demanded by Owners of the Motor Vessel "Lilian S" and Samuel Kamau Macharia.
G. Disposition
26. For the foregoing reasons, I find that this appeal is without merit. It is accordingly dismissed.
27. As to costs, this being a dispute within a family/succession context involving a long-standing, unresolved claim of occupation, and noting that the trial Court dismissed the revocation Application "without costs," I decline to depart from that approach. Each party shall bear its own costs of this appeal.
28. For the avoidance of doubt, this judgment determines only the propriety of the trial Court's refusal to revoke the grant on the record before it. It does not, and cannot, determine the validity of the Appellant's claimed 1977 purchase of part of parcel No. East Bukusu/North Kanduyi/717, or any proprietary or occupational interest he may have therein. That question remains at large and is to be pursued, if at all, before the Environment and Land Court, against whichever party or parties are appropriate, unaffected by anything said in this judgment.
In the presence of:
Mr. Wamalwa Simiyu for the Appellant
Ms. Khisa for the Respondent
Irene Celang'at - Court Assistant