(Being an appeal from the original conviction and sentence by Hon. N. Wairimu in Sexual Offences Case No. 027 of 2024 of the Migori SPM Court)
1. The Appellant was charged with the offence of incest contrary to section 20(1) of the Sexual Offences Act No. 3 of 2006. He equally faced an alternative charge of committing an indecent act with a child contrary to section 11(1) of the Sexual Offences Act.
2. The particulars of the offence were that on 27 th April, 2024, at around 1000hrs at Light Village, Central Kamagambo Location Uriri Sub-County in Migori County, within the Republic of Kenya, the appellant willfully and unlawfully caused his penis to penetrate the vagina of of A.O a female aged 13 years who was in his knowledge, his daughter.
3. The Appellant pleaded guilty, convicted on his own plea and sentenced to 30 years imprisonment. He was aggrieved with the judgment after which he instituted the present appeal.
4. He filed his undated written submissions while those of the Respondent are dated 20 th November,2025. The Judgment herein is based on the written submissions which both parties relied upon in their entirety.
5. The Appellant submitted that he had been initially charged with the offence of defilement contrary to Section 8(1) as read with Section 8(3) of the Sexual Offences Act No. 3 of 2006. He pleaded guilty to the charge and was consequently convicted and sentenced to serve 30 years imprisonment. He contended that the sentence imposed was harsh and excessive, particularly in light of him pleading guilty, his mitigation and the fact that he was a first offender.
6. He further submitted that although the trial court record appears to show that the plea-taking procedure was followed, he was not accorded an opportunity to explain, dispute, or add relevant facts after the prosecution outlined the facts of the case. It was therefore argued that the plea was defective.
7. The Appellant further submitted that his plea was obtained through deception. He argued that following his arrest, he was taken into custody and was never informed that the offence carried a severe penalty. He contended that had he been informed of the consequences of pleading guilty and the severity of the sentence attached to the offence, he would not have entered a plea of guilty. He submitted that the trial court ought to have explained the consequences attendant to a plea of guilty in a serious offence.
8. He further argued that his constitutional right to information and a fair trial under Article 50(2)(b), (c) and (j) of the Constitution was violated. He submitted that witness statements ought to have been supplied to him before plea taking to enable him understand the charge and prepare his defence. He contended that the failure to supply the witness statements until after the close of the prosecution case occasioned a miscarriage of justice.
9. The Appellant further submitted that he was denied his right to legal representation at State expense contrary to Article 50(2)(g) and (h) of the Constitution. He argued that the trial court failed to record whether he had been informed of that right and his response thereto. In support of that argument, he relied on Republic VS Karisa Chengo and 2 others (2017) eKLR and Albunus Mwasia Mutua VS R Criminal Appeal No. 12 of 2014 . He submitted that he was not informed of the complexity of the case or the consequences of proceeding without legal representation and therefore could not be said to have validly waived that right.
10. The Appellant further relied on Willam Oongo Arunda (hitherto referred to as Parick Oduor Ochieng) vs Rep (Criminal Appeal No. 49 of 2020 (2022) KECA 23 (KLR) , wherein it was held that the need for legal representation arises where substantial injustice may occur because of the seriousness or complexity of the charge or the inability of the accused person to effectively participate in the proceedings. The Appellant submitted that given the nature of the offence and the consequences of a plea of guilty, the trial court ought to have informed him of his right to legal representation. He argued that had he been represented by counsel, the prejudice suffered would not have occurred.
11. The Appellant maintained that the proceedings demonstrated the prejudice occasioned to him and urged the court to find that the sentence imposed was harsh and excessive and to consider ordering a retrial.
12. In support of his prayer for a retrial, the Appellant relied on Ahmedi Ali Dharamisi Sumar Vs Rep (1964) E.A 481 , Fatehaji Manji vs republic (1966) E.A 343 , and Jackson Mutunga Matheka Vs Republic (2015) eKLR , wherein the following passage was cited:
“................ retrial will only be ordered when the original trial was illegal or defective. It will not be ordered where the conviction is set aside because of insufficient evidence for the purpose of enabling the prosecution fill up gaps in its evidence at the first trial, even where a conviction is vitiated by a mistake of the trial court for which the prosecution is not to blame, it does not necessarily follow that a retrial should be ordered and circumstances and order for retrial should only be made where the interest of justice required it and not ordered, each case must depend on particular facts and circumstances and not ordered where it is likely to cause an injustice to the accused.”
13. On sentence, the Appellant submitted that the complainant, was aged 13 years and pointed out Section 8(3) of the Sexual Offences Act, which provides:
“A person who commits an offence of defilement with a child between the age of twelve and fifteen years is liable upon conviction to imprisonment for a term of not less than 20 years.”
14. The Appellant argued that since the complainant was not below eleven years of age, the learned trial magistrate erred in sentencing him to 30 years imprisonment. He maintained that the sentence imposed was not supported by Section 8(3) of the Sexual Offences Act and was therefore harsh and excessive.
15. The Appellant accordingly urged the court to set aside the sentence, order his release, or in the alternative order a retrial.
16. The Respondent on the hand, submitted that the Appellant pleaded guilty to the main charge on his own volition when he took plea on 2 nd May, 2024 and was convicted and sentenced to 30 years in prison. On whether or not the sentence meted by the trial court was harsh, Counsel submitted that the sentence was sufficient given the circumstances of the case. They relied on the case of Kimani Gacheru vs. Republic [2002] eKLR where the court stated that:
“….sentence is a matter that rests in the discretion of the trial court depending on the facts of each case. On appeal, the appellate court will not interfere with the sentence unless, that sentence is manifestly excessive in the circumstances of the case , or that the trial court overlooked some material factor….even if the appellate court feels that the sentence is heavy …these alone are not sufficient grounds for interfering with the discretion of the trial court on sentence unless anyone of the matters already stated is shown to exist.”
17. This being the first appellate court, this Court will re-evaluate and analyse the evidence adduced in the trial court for this court to come up with an independent conclusion. In doing so, this court bears in mind that, unlike the trial court, it did not have the opportunity of observing the demeanour of the witnesses as they testified. See Okeno vs. Republic [1972] E.A 32.
18. The Appellant was not represented during appeal. This court has carefully considered the Petition of appeal, and grounds of appeal, Appellant’s written submissions as well as those of the Respondent, the proceedings before the trial court and the judgment and comes up with three issues for determination; w whether or not the absence of legal representation guaranteed under Article 50(2)(h) of the Constitution prejudiced the Appellant’s trial; whether or not the plea was equivocal or not ; and whether the sentence was lawful .
19. On the first issue on whether the trial court violated Article 50 , as stated, the Appellant was charged with the offence of incest and defilement of a 13-year-old child. A perusal of the proceedings show that the Appellant was not informed by the trial court of his right to legal representation of his choice.
20. The trial court’s record shows that the Appellant was first arraigned in court on 02/05/2024. The charge was read to him in a language he understood (Swahili) and pleaded guilty.
21. The undisputed fact is that the Appellant was not represented by Counsel during the trial. The court record does not indicate that the Appellant was informed of his right to be represented by an advocate. The Appellant did not ask to be provided with one. He proceeded to take plea and tendered his mitigation. This demonstrates that he understood what was happening. In view of this, this Court is satisfied that failure to inform the Appellant of his right to Counsel under Article 50 (2) (g) of the Constitution did not prejudice the Appellant in this case.
22. On whether the plea was equivocal or not , Section 207 of the Criminal Procedure Code prescribes the procedure for taking a plea. The substance of the charge must be stated to the accused in a language he understands and he must be asked whether he admits or denies it. Where the accused admits the charge, his own words should be recorded as nearly as possible before the court proceeds to conviction and sentence, unless there is sufficient cause to the contrary.
23. The appellant contended that his plea of guilty was equivocal. The applicable principles guiding this were authoritatively stated in Adan v Republic [1973] EA 445 , where the Court of Appeal held that:
(i) the charge and every essential ingredient of the offence must be explained to the accused in a language he understands;
(ii) the accused's own words must be recorded and, if they amount to an admission, a plea of guilty entered;
(iii) the prosecution must immediately state the facts and the accused be afforded an opportunity to dispute, explain or add to them;
(iv) if the accused disputes the facts or raises any question as to his guilt, a plea of not guilty must be entered; and
(v) only where there is no change of plea should a conviction be recorded, followed by mitigation and sentence.
24. Section 348 of the Criminal Procedure Code provides that:
"No appeal shall be allowed in the case of an accused person who has pleaded guilty and has been convicted on that plea by a subordinate court, except as to the extent or legality of the sentence."
25. Further, in Alexander Lukoye Malika v Republic [2015] eKLR , the Court of Appeal held:
" A court may only interfere with a situation where an accused person has pleaded guilty to a charge where the plea is imperfect, ambiguous or unfinished... where an accused person pleaded guilty as a result of mistake or misapprehension of the facts... where the charge... disclosed no offence known to law... [or] where upon admitted facts the appellant could not in law have been convicted of the offence charged."
26. The charge and its ingredients were explained to the Appellant in a language he understood (Swahili). He responded, "Ni ukweli", which was recorded. The prosecution thereafter outlined the facts, upon which the appellant again admitted their truth by repeating, "Ni ukweli" . At no stage did he dispute the facts, raise a defence or suggest any misunderstanding. The record shows full compliance with both section 207 of the Criminal Procedure Code and the principles set out in Adan v Republic (supra). The procedure was followed.
27. None of those exceptions arises in this case. The charge under section 20(1) of the Sexual Offences Act disclosed a known offence. The Appellant admitted both the charge and the facts without qualification. There is no indication of mistake, ambiguity or misapprehension. His mitigation, in which he sought to be pardoned and stated that he had personal problems and handicapped, further demonstrates that he appreciated the consequences of his plea.
28. Consequently, this court finds no merit in the contention that the plea was equivocal. The appellant understood both the charge and the facts supporting it and he voluntarily admitted them.
29. On sentence, section 20 (1) of the Sexual offences Act provides that:
“20 (1). Any male person who commits an indecent act or an act which causes penetration with a female person who is to his knowledge his daughter, granddaughter, sister, mother, niece, aunt or grandmother is guilty of an offence termed incest and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years:
Provided that, if it is alleged in the information or charge and proved that the female person is under the age of eighteen years, the accused person shall be liable to imprisonment for life and it shall be immaterial that the act which causes penetration or the indecent act was obtained with the consent of the female person.”
30. The provision to section 20 (1) provides that accused person who has been convicted of an offence of incest where the victim is under 18 years; “Shall be liable to imprisonment for life” . The provision in my considered opinion does not give a mandatory sentence but rather gives a maximum sentence. This is so because the words “shall be liable” do not, in their ordinary sense require the imposition of the stated penalty but merely expresses stated penalty which may be imposed at the discretion of the court.
31. In the “Muruatetu Case”, the Supreme Court outlined the following guidelines as being applicable when the Court is giving consideration to sentencing;“ (a)age of the offender; (b)being a first offender; (c)whether the offender pleaded guilty; (d)character and record of the offender; (e)commission of the offence in response to gender-based violence; (f)remorsefulness of the offender; (g)the possibility of reform and social re-adaption of the offender; and (h)any other factor that the Court considers relevant.”
32. The objectives of sentencing should be considered in totality. In this regard, section 20 of the Sexual Offences Act gives room for the exercise of judicial discretion.
33. In addition, it should also be pointed out that incest overlaps with defilement, where minors are involved. The perpetrator would essentially have committed two offences. He would have had sexual connection within forbidden relationships, and he would have defiled a minor. The penalty, where a minor is involved, would be stiffer, to punish the offender for the two offences, incest, and defilement .
34. This court takes into consideration that a n appellate court will interfere with sentence only where the trial court acted on wrong principles, overlooked a material factor, considered irrelevant matters or imposed a manifestly excessive sentence.
35. I have considered the record and note that the trial court took the appellant's mitigation into account. However, the trial court failed to give sufficient weight to the fact that he pleaded guilty at the earliest opportunity, accepted responsibility and saved valuable judicial time. He was also a first offender, and the record discloses no aggravating circumstances justifying a severe sentence.
36. Although the offence is undoubtedly serious, the sentence of thirty (30) years' imprisonment was, in the circumstances, manifestly excessive. The interests of justice will be adequately served by a lesser sentence taking into consideration the totality of the circumstances in this case and the objectives of sentencing.
37. Accordingly, the appeal against sentence partially succeeds. The sentence of thirty (30) years' imprisonment is substituted with a sentence of ten (10) years' imprisonment, to run from 30 th April 2024, being the date of the appellant's arrest, pursuant to section 333(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code.
38. Orders accordingly.
DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED VIRTUALLY AT NAIROBI ON THIS 16 TH DAY OF JULY, 2026
Judgment delivered virtually in the presence of:
N/A for the Respondent
Gedion Okachi- Appellant
Susan Nzioka – Court Assistant
1. The Appellant was charged with the offence of incest contrary to section 20(1) of the Sexual Offences Act No. 3 of 2006. He equally faced an alternative charge of committing an indecent act with a child contrary to section 11(1) of the Sexual Offences Act.
2. The particulars of the offence were that on 27 th April, 2024, at around 1000hrs at Light Village, Central Kamagambo Location Uriri Sub-County in Migori County, within the Republic of Kenya, the appellant willfully and unlawfully caused his penis to penetrate the vagina of of A.O a female aged 13 years who was in his knowledge, his daughter.
3. The Appellant pleaded guilty, convicted on his own plea and sentenced to 30 years imprisonment. He was aggrieved with the judgment after which he instituted the present appeal.
4. He filed his undated written submissions while those of the Respondent are dated 20 th November,2025. The Judgment herein is based on the written submissions which both parties relied upon in their entirety.
5. The Appellant submitted that he had been initially charged with the offence of defilement contrary to Section 8(1) as read with Section 8(3) of the Sexual Offences Act No. 3 of 2006. He pleaded guilty to the charge and was consequently convicted and sentenced to serve 30 years imprisonment. He contended that the sentence imposed was harsh and excessive, particularly in light of him pleading guilty, his mitigation and the fact that he was a first offender.
6. He further submitted that although the trial court record appears to show that the plea-taking procedure was followed, he was not accorded an opportunity to explain, dispute, or add relevant facts after the prosecution outlined the facts of the case. It was therefore argued that the plea was defective.
7. The Appellant further submitted that his plea was obtained through deception. He argued that following his arrest, he was taken into custody and was never informed that the offence carried a severe penalty. He contended that had he been informed of the consequences of pleading guilty and the severity of the sentence attached to the offence, he would not have entered a plea of guilty. He submitted that the trial court ought to have explained the consequences attendant to a plea of guilty in a serious offence.
8. He further argued that his constitutional right to information and a fair trial under Article 50(2)(b), (c) and (j) of the Constitution was violated. He submitted that witness statements ought to have been supplied to him before plea taking to enable him understand the charge and prepare his defence. He contended that the failure to supply the witness statements until after the close of the prosecution case occasioned a miscarriage of justice.
9. The Appellant further submitted that he was denied his right to legal representation at State expense contrary to Article 50(2)(g) and (h) of the Constitution. He argued that the trial court failed to record whether he had been informed of that right and his response thereto. In support of that argument, he relied on Republic VS Karisa Chengo and 2 others (2017) eKLR and Albunus Mwasia Mutua VS R Criminal Appeal No. 12 of 2014 . He submitted that he was not informed of the complexity of the case or the consequences of proceeding without legal representation and therefore could not be said to have validly waived that right.
10. The Appellant further relied on Willam Oongo Arunda (hitherto referred to as Parick Oduor Ochieng) vs Rep (Criminal Appeal No. 49 of 2020 (2022) KECA 23 (KLR) , wherein it was held that the need for legal representation arises where substantial injustice may occur because of the seriousness or complexity of the charge or the inability of the accused person to effectively participate in the proceedings. The Appellant submitted that given the nature of the offence and the consequences of a plea of guilty, the trial court ought to have informed him of his right to legal representation. He argued that had he been represented by counsel, the prejudice suffered would not have occurred.
11. The Appellant maintained that the proceedings demonstrated the prejudice occasioned to him and urged the court to find that the sentence imposed was harsh and excessive and to consider ordering a retrial.
12. In support of his prayer for a retrial, the Appellant relied on Ahmedi Ali Dharamisi Sumar Vs Rep (1964) E.A 481 , Fatehaji Manji vs republic (1966) E.A 343 , and Jackson Mutunga Matheka Vs Republic (2015) eKLR , wherein the following passage was cited:
“................ retrial will only be ordered when the original trial was illegal or defective. It will not be ordered where the conviction is set aside because of insufficient evidence for the purpose of enabling the prosecution fill up gaps in its evidence at the first trial, even where a conviction is vitiated by a mistake of the trial court for which the prosecution is not to blame, it does not necessarily follow that a retrial should be ordered and circumstances and order for retrial should only be made where the interest of justice required it and not ordered, each case must depend on particular facts and circumstances and not ordered where it is likely to cause an injustice to the accused.”
13. On sentence, the Appellant submitted that the complainant, was aged 13 years and pointed out Section 8(3) of the Sexual Offences Act, which provides:
“A person who commits an offence of defilement with a child between the age of twelve and fifteen years is liable upon conviction to imprisonment for a term of not less than 20 years.”
14. The Appellant argued that since the complainant was not below eleven years of age, the learned trial magistrate erred in sentencing him to 30 years imprisonment. He maintained that the sentence imposed was not supported by Section 8(3) of the Sexual Offences Act and was therefore harsh and excessive.
15. The Appellant accordingly urged the court to set aside the sentence, order his release, or in the alternative order a retrial.
16. The Respondent on the hand, submitted that the Appellant pleaded guilty to the main charge on his own volition when he took plea on 2 nd May, 2024 and was convicted and sentenced to 30 years in prison. On whether or not the sentence meted by the trial court was harsh, Counsel submitted that the sentence was sufficient given the circumstances of the case. They relied on the case of Kimani Gacheru vs. Republic [2002] eKLR where the court stated that:
“….sentence is a matter that rests in the discretion of the trial court depending on the facts of each case. On appeal, the appellate court will not interfere with the sentence unless, that sentence is manifestly excessive in the circumstances of the case , or that the trial court overlooked some material factor….even if the appellate court feels that the sentence is heavy …these alone are not sufficient grounds for interfering with the discretion of the trial court on sentence unless anyone of the matters already stated is shown to exist.”
17. This being the first appellate court, this Court will re-evaluate and analyse the evidence adduced in the trial court for this court to come up with an independent conclusion. In doing so, this court bears in mind that, unlike the trial court, it did not have the opportunity of observing the demeanour of the witnesses as they testified. See Okeno vs. Republic [1972] E.A 32.
18. The Appellant was not represented during appeal. This court has carefully considered the Petition of appeal, and grounds of appeal, Appellant’s written submissions as well as those of the Respondent, the proceedings before the trial court and the judgment and comes up with three issues for determination; w whether or not the absence of legal representation guaranteed under Article 50(2)(h) of the Constitution prejudiced the Appellant’s trial; whether or not the plea was equivocal or not ; and whether the sentence was lawful .
19. On the first issue on whether the trial court violated Article 50 , as stated, the Appellant was charged with the offence of incest and defilement of a 13-year-old child. A perusal of the proceedings show that the Appellant was not informed by the trial court of his right to legal representation of his choice.
20. The trial court’s record shows that the Appellant was first arraigned in court on 02/05/2024. The charge was read to him in a language he understood (Swahili) and pleaded guilty.
21. The undisputed fact is that the Appellant was not represented by Counsel during the trial. The court record does not indicate that the Appellant was informed of his right to be represented by an advocate. The Appellant did not ask to be provided with one. He proceeded to take plea and tendered his mitigation. This demonstrates that he understood what was happening. In view of this, this Court is satisfied that failure to inform the Appellant of his right to Counsel under Article 50 (2) (g) of the Constitution did not prejudice the Appellant in this case.
22. On whether the plea was equivocal or not , Section 207 of the Criminal Procedure Code prescribes the procedure for taking a plea. The substance of the charge must be stated to the accused in a language he understands and he must be asked whether he admits or denies it. Where the accused admits the charge, his own words should be recorded as nearly as possible before the court proceeds to conviction and sentence, unless there is sufficient cause to the contrary.
23. The appellant contended that his plea of guilty was equivocal. The applicable principles guiding this were authoritatively stated in Adan v Republic [1973] EA 445 , where the Court of Appeal held that:
(i) the charge and every essential ingredient of the offence must be explained to the accused in a language he understands;
(ii) the accused's own words must be recorded and, if they amount to an admission, a plea of guilty entered;
(iii) the prosecution must immediately state the facts and the accused be afforded an opportunity to dispute, explain or add to them;
(iv) if the accused disputes the facts or raises any question as to his guilt, a plea of not guilty must be entered; and
(v) only where there is no change of plea should a conviction be recorded, followed by mitigation and sentence.
24. Section 348 of the Criminal Procedure Code provides that:
"No appeal shall be allowed in the case of an accused person who has pleaded guilty and has been convicted on that plea by a subordinate court, except as to the extent or legality of the sentence."
25. Further, in Alexander Lukoye Malika v Republic [2015] eKLR , the Court of Appeal held:
" A court may only interfere with a situation where an accused person has pleaded guilty to a charge where the plea is imperfect, ambiguous or unfinished... where an accused person pleaded guilty as a result of mistake or misapprehension of the facts... where the charge... disclosed no offence known to law... [or] where upon admitted facts the appellant could not in law have been convicted of the offence charged."
26. The charge and its ingredients were explained to the Appellant in a language he understood (Swahili). He responded, "Ni ukweli", which was recorded. The prosecution thereafter outlined the facts, upon which the appellant again admitted their truth by repeating, "Ni ukweli" . At no stage did he dispute the facts, raise a defence or suggest any misunderstanding. The record shows full compliance with both section 207 of the Criminal Procedure Code and the principles set out in Adan v Republic (supra). The procedure was followed.
27. None of those exceptions arises in this case. The charge under section 20(1) of the Sexual Offences Act disclosed a known offence. The Appellant admitted both the charge and the facts without qualification. There is no indication of mistake, ambiguity or misapprehension. His mitigation, in which he sought to be pardoned and stated that he had personal problems and handicapped, further demonstrates that he appreciated the consequences of his plea.
28. Consequently, this court finds no merit in the contention that the plea was equivocal. The appellant understood both the charge and the facts supporting it and he voluntarily admitted them.
29. On sentence, section 20 (1) of the Sexual offences Act provides that:
“20 (1). Any male person who commits an indecent act or an act which causes penetration with a female person who is to his knowledge his daughter, granddaughter, sister, mother, niece, aunt or grandmother is guilty of an offence termed incest and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years:
Provided that, if it is alleged in the information or charge and proved that the female person is under the age of eighteen years, the accused person shall be liable to imprisonment for life and it shall be immaterial that the act which causes penetration or the indecent act was obtained with the consent of the female person.”
30. The provision to section 20 (1) provides that accused person who has been convicted of an offence of incest where the victim is under 18 years; “Shall be liable to imprisonment for life” . The provision in my considered opinion does not give a mandatory sentence but rather gives a maximum sentence. This is so because the words “shall be liable” do not, in their ordinary sense require the imposition of the stated penalty but merely expresses stated penalty which may be imposed at the discretion of the court.
31. In the “Muruatetu Case”, the Supreme Court outlined the following guidelines as being applicable when the Court is giving consideration to sentencing;“ (a)age of the offender; (b)being a first offender; (c)whether the offender pleaded guilty; (d)character and record of the offender; (e)commission of the offence in response to gender-based violence; (f)remorsefulness of the offender; (g)the possibility of reform and social re-adaption of the offender; and (h)any other factor that the Court considers relevant.”
32. The objectives of sentencing should be considered in totality. In this regard, section 20 of the Sexual Offences Act gives room for the exercise of judicial discretion.
33. In addition, it should also be pointed out that incest overlaps with defilement, where minors are involved. The perpetrator would essentially have committed two offences. He would have had sexual connection within forbidden relationships, and he would have defiled a minor. The penalty, where a minor is involved, would be stiffer, to punish the offender for the two offences, incest, and defilement .
34. This court takes into consideration that a n appellate court will interfere with sentence only where the trial court acted on wrong principles, overlooked a material factor, considered irrelevant matters or imposed a manifestly excessive sentence.
35. I have considered the record and note that the trial court took the appellant's mitigation into account. However, the trial court failed to give sufficient weight to the fact that he pleaded guilty at the earliest opportunity, accepted responsibility and saved valuable judicial time. He was also a first offender, and the record discloses no aggravating circumstances justifying a severe sentence.
36. Although the offence is undoubtedly serious, the sentence of thirty (30) years' imprisonment was, in the circumstances, manifestly excessive. The interests of justice will be adequately served by a lesser sentence taking into consideration the totality of the circumstances in this case and the objectives of sentencing.
37. Accordingly, the appeal against sentence partially succeeds. The sentence of thirty (30) years' imprisonment is substituted with a sentence of ten (10) years' imprisonment, to run from 30 th April 2024, being the date of the appellant's arrest, pursuant to section 333(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code.
38. Orders accordingly.
DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED VIRTUALLY AT NAIROBI ON THIS 16 TH DAY OF JULY, 2026
Judgment delivered virtually in the presence of:
N/A for the Respondent
Gedion Okachi- Appellant
Susan Nzioka – Court Assistant