1. By a Petition dated 10th August 2026 and filed in this Court on the same day, the Petitioners Fredrick Ramogo and Tirous Omondi invoking Articles 1, 2(1) & (2), 3(1), 10(2), 159(1), 165(3)(d) and 258(1) of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010 instituted these proceedings seeking constitutional remedies against the Respondents. The Petition is verified by the verifying affidavit of Fredrick Ramogo sworn on 10th August 2026.
2. The essence of the Petitioners' grievance centers on the actions taken by the 1st, 2 nd and 3rd Respondents following communications dated 5th June 2026 and 28th July 2026. Vide those letters, the 3rd Respondent on the instructions and resolutions of the 1st Respondent notified the 3rd and 4th Interested Parties that the 2nd Interested Party Mr. George Nyingiro was unlawfully occupying the office of County Executive Committee Member (CECM) for Finance and Economic Planning. The Respondents further requested the financial institutions and regulatory bodies not to honor financial instruments or requisitions signed or executed by the 2nd Interested Party. Additionally, the 1st Respondent initiated impeachment proceedings under Section 40 of the County Governments Act, 2012 to remove the 2nd Interested Party from office.
3. The Petitioners contend that the 1st Respondent lacks constitutional authority to declare an executive appointment or action unlawful, asserting that such adjudicative power is reserved exclusively to the High Court under Article 165(3)(d) of the Constitution. They further argue that the principle of separation of powers was infringed by the Assembly’s resolutions and that an acting appointee cannot legally be subjected to impeachment proceedings.
4. Consequently, the Petitioners seek the following primary reliefs:
a) A Declaration that the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Respondents do not have such powers to declare the legality or otherwise of an executive action as such powers is constitutionally a preserve of the courts of law thus impugned resolutions as notified to the Interested Parties are irregular, unlawful and unconstitutional and therefore, invalid, null and void ab initio.
b) A declaration that the motion for removal of the 2nd Interested Party from office by impeachment having been grounded on the resolutions of the 1st Respondent declaring the actions of the governor as illegal is unconstitutional illegal null and void.
c) A Declaration that the 1st Respondent cannot by way of impeachment remove from office a person occupying the office of County Executive Committee Member in an acting capacity.
d) An order quashing the resolutions of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Respondents declaring that the 2nd Interested Party is unlawfully in office.
e) An order quashing any resolution by the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Respondents seeking to remove from office the 2nd Interested Party by way of impeachment.
f) Any other appropriate relief this Honourable Court may deem just to grant.
5. The Respondents filed a replying affidavit sworn by Erick Ogenga, the Clerk of the Siaya County Assembly on 17th August 2026 wherein he averred interalia; that pursuant to nomination and subsequent approval by the 1st Respondent on 26th October 2022, the 2nd Interested Party was appointed as the substantive County Executive Committee Member for Roads, Public Works, Energy and Transport as per the annexed copy of appointment letter marked as "EO-1"; that on 11th October 2024, the 1st Interested Party appointed the 2nd Interested Party as the acting County Executive Committee Member for Finance and Economic Planning following the resignation of the CEC for Finance and Economic Planning as per the annexed copy of appointment letter marked "EO-2"; that It was a term of the aforesaid appointment that the 2nd Interested Party was to continue to hold the current substantive position as the County Executive Committee Member Roads, Public Works, Energy and Transport; that the aforesaid appointment did not contrary to Section 64(2) of the County Government Act specify the duration for which the 2nd Interested Party was to act as the County Executive Committee Member, Finance and Economic Planning; that upon the expiry of the 2nd Interested Party's contract as the CECM, Road Public Works, Energy and Transport, the 1st Interested Party sought and obtained the 1st Respondent's approval for a one-month extension of the tenure of the 2nd Interested Party and other County Executive Committee members as per the annexed copy of letter marked "EO-3" ; that the 2nd Interested Party did during the extended period continue to serve as the Acting County Executive Committee Member for Finance and Economic Planning; that the 1st Interested Party did submit vide a letter dated 31st March 2026 and addressed to the 2nd Respondent, the names of persons nominated to various positions of the County Executive Committee for vetting and approval by the 1st Respondent. Amongst the names was that of the 2nd Interested Party who had been nominated to the position of County Executive Committee Member of Finance and Economic Planning; that upon vetting, the 1st Respondent rejected the 1st Interested Party's nomination of the 2nd Interested Party as County Executive Committee Member of Finance and Economic Planning; that notwithstanding the rejection of the 2nd Interested Party's nomination as the County Executive Committee Member for Finance and Economic Planning, the 1st Interested Party vide a letter dated 29th May 2026 purported to extend the 2nd Interested Party's appointment as the County Executive Committee Member for Finance and Economic Planning for a further period of 2 months without obtaining the mandatory approval of the 1st Respondent as provided for under Article 179(2)(b) of the Constitution as read together with Section 30(2)(d) of the County Government Act and Section 4 of the Public Appointments (County Assemblies Approval) Act as per the annexed copy of letter marked "EO-5"; that despite the 2nd Interested Party's contract as the substantive CECM for Road, Public Works, Energy and Transport and Acting CECM for Finance and Economic Planning having ended on 31st March 2026, the 2nd Interested Party continued to act as the CECM for Finance and Economic Planning without a substantive appointment letter contrary to Section 67 of the County Government Act; that the aforesaid extension of appointment was also done despite the rejection of the 2nd Interested Party's nomination as the CECM for Finance and Economic Planning and the expiration of his contract as the CECM for Roads, Public Works, Energy and Transport on which his appointment as CECM for Finance and Economic Planning was hinged; that based on the aforesaid extension of appointment of the 2nd Interested Party as the County Executive Committee Member of Finance and Economic Planning, the deponent pursuant to the resolution of the 1st Respondent did write to the 4th Interested Party vide a letter dated 5th June 2026 informing him of the said illegal appointment and requesting that they do not inter alia approve any financial transactions approved and or executed by the 2nd Interested Party as per the annexed copy of letter marked "EO-6 "; that Pursuant to the resolution of the 1st Respondent, the deponent also wrote to the 3rd Interested Party and the Clerk Senate of Kenya informing them of the continuous illegal and unlawful occupation of the office of the County Executive Committee Member, Finance and Economic Planning by the 2nd Interested Party as per the annexed copies of letters marked "EO-7"; that vide a letter dated 16th June 2026, pursuant to the resolution of the 1st Respondent, the deponent wrote to the Commission on Administration of Justice (Office of the Ombudsman) seeking an advisory opinion on the series of alleged irregular appointments made within the County Government of Siaya amongst them, the appointment of the 2nd Interested Party as the CECM Finance and Economic Planning without the approval of the 1st Respondent as per the annexed copy of letter marked "EO-8" ; that the Commission on Administration of Justice (Office of the Ombudsman) in its advisory opinion dated 5th August 2026 found that the purported extension of the 2nd Interested Party's appointment vide letter dated 29th May 2026 is null and void ab initio and incapable of conferring any lawful authority and that his continued occupation of office after 31st March 2026 was unlawful and contrary to the County Governments Act, the Public Appointments (County Assemblies Approval) Act and the Leadership and Integrity Act as per the annexed advisory report marked "EO-9 "; that the Commission on Administration of Justice (Office of the Ombudsman) recommended in respect of the 2nd Interested Party, that where the competent constitutional organs determine that the established conduct amounts to gross misconduct, abuse of office or a gross violation of the Constitution, the applicable constitutional and statutory removal mechanisms may be invoked; that It is based on the aforesaid recommendation of the Commission on Administration of Justice (Office of the Ombudsman) coupled with the 1st Interested Party's letter dated 30th July 2026, which without the approval of the 1st Respondent extended the contract of the 2nd Interested Party for a further 2 months that led to the commencement of his removal from office in compliance with Section 40 of the County Government Act as per the annexed letter marked "EO-10" ; that the decision to impeach the 2nd Interested Party from holding the office of the CECM for Finance and Economic Planning is not actuated by malice as alleged in paragraphs 25, 26, 27 and 28 of the Petition but is grounded in Section 35(3) of the Leadership and Integrity Act and supported by the advisory opinion of the Commission on Administration of Justice (Office of the Ombudsman); that the impeachment mentioned earlier is based on Section 40 of the County Governments Act which outlines the process for removing a member of the Executive Committee from office. This process is detailed and involves investigations by the select committee of the 1st Respondent. The CECM has the right to appear and be represented during these investigations. If the allegations are unsubstantiated, no further action is taken. However if the allegations are substantiated, the 1st Respondent must approve a resolution to dismiss the CECM by a majority vote; that contrary to the petitioners' allegations at paragraphs 31 and 32 of the Petition, the decision of the 1st Respondent of declaring that the continued performance by the 2nd Interested Party of the functions of the office of CEC Member for Finance and Economic Planning to be unlawful was based on its constitutional oversight role of the County Executive Committee Members provided for under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Kenya; that based on the foregoing, the prayers sought in the instant petition are in utter contravention of Articles 185(3) and 179(2)(b) of the Constitution read together with Section 30(2)(d) and 40 of the County Government Act, Section 4 of the Public Appointments (County Assemblies Approval) Act and Section 35(3) of the Leadership and Integrity Act as the same intends to not only curtail the 1st Respondent's oversight and approval roles in the appointments of the County Executive Committee Members but also to interfere with the doctrine of separation of powers.
6. The 1st 2nd and 5th Interested parties filed grounds of opposition dated 17th August 2026 setting out the following grounds; that the 1st Interested Party in exercise of lawful mandate appoints members of the County Executive Committee; that the 2nd Interested Party was appointed in an acting capacity to discharge the functions of the County Executive Committee Member responsible for Finance and Economic Planning pursuant to the powers vested in the Governor under Article 179 of the Constitution and Section 30(2) (d) of the County Governments Act.; that the 1st Interested Party in the lawful exercise of the powers vested in the office of the Governor under Section 31(a) of the County Governments Act is entitled to dismiss and/or revoke the appointment of the 2nd Interested Party; that in exercise of that power, the 1st Interested Party revoked the appointment of the 2nd Interested Party as the Acting County Executive Committee Member for Finance and Economic Planning effective 14th August 2026; that the Petition is in substance an attempt to challenge the decision of the Respondents concerning the continued occupation of office by the 2nd Interested Party in an acting capacity. The legal authority for such continued occupation had been withdrawn by the 1st Interested Party as evidenced in the letter dated 14th August 2026 referenced above.; that the Petition is founded upon or seeks to challenge a constitutional process being the intended removal from office by way of impeachment of the 2nd Interested Party; that the process of impeachment and removal from office is a constitutionally sanctioned accountability mechanism and a sui generis process vested in the Respondent; that the Court of Appeal in Martin Nyaga Wambora vs County Assembly of Embu & 6 Others, Civil Appeal No. 194 of 2015 affirmed the constitutional and political character of the impeachment process; that the jurisdiction of the Court in relation to an impeachment process is limited to interrogating compliance with the Constitution and the law including allegations of violation of constitutional rights and does not extend to substituting the Court's determination for that of the constitutional organ vested with the mandate to undertake the impeachment.; that the Supreme Court has expressly held in Mike Sonko Mbuvi Gideon Kioko vs Clerk, Nairobi City County Assembly & 11 Others SC Petition No. 11 (E008) of 2022 that impeachment falls within the exclusive constitutional sphere of the legislative arm and that the Court's role is confined to determining whether constitutional rights have been violated and whether the prescribed procedure has been followed, without constituting itself as either of those organs; that they urge the Honourable Court not to determine the substantive merits of matters pending before the County Assembly as to do will be an affront to the doctrine of separation of powers and the constitutional architecture of devolved government; that the County Assembly's oversight mandate does not however confer upon it an unfettered power to declare an executive decision unlawful or to usurp the Governor's expressly conferred statutory powers under Section 31 of the County Governments Act; that the determination of the legality, constitutionality or validity of executive action is ultimately a judicial function falling within the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 165 of the Constitution and the County Assembly cannot by virtue of its oversight mandate exercise judicial power; that the Honourable Court is urged to make a just and fair determination of the matter.
7. The petition was canvassed by way of written submissions. I have however noted that at the time of writing this judgement only the 1st 2nd and 5th interested party and the Petitioners had duly complied.
8. The Petitioners cited Articles 1(3), 2(1), 2(2) and 165(3)(d) of the Constitution. They submitted that sovereign power is delegated distinctively among State organs and that all organs are strictly bound by the Constitution. Under Article 165(3)(d), the determination of whether any act done under the authority of the Constitution or law is inconsistent with the Constitution is the exclusive domain of the High Court.
9. They further argued that while Article 185(3) grants the County Assembly oversight over the County Executive, this oversight role must respect the principle of separation of powers and does not extend to declaring executive actions illegal or void. Citing Article 2(2), they emphasized that no organ may claim or exercise state authority except as expressly authorized by the Constitution.
10. The Petitioners acknowledged that as of the date of filing the submissions, the 1st Interested Party had already revoked the 2nd Interested Party's acting appointment effective 14th August 2026 thereby terminating his authority to discharge those functions.
11. However, they urged the Court to interrogate the propriety of the impeachment proceedings initiated by the County Assembly. They submitted that because the impeachment motion was fundamentally predicated on the Assembly's initial unconstitutional resolution declaring the executive action void, the resulting impeachment process was itself anchored on illegality and rendered improper.
12. The Petitioners respectfully urged the Court to find in their favor and grant the orders sought in the Petition.
13. The 1st, 2nd and 5th Interested Parties submitted that the Petition challenges the Respondent’s decision to initiate a motion for the removal by impeachment of the 2nd Interested Party while also seeking to quash letters addressed to the 3rd and 4th Interested Parties. They pointed out that after the Petition was filed the 1st Interested Party exercising his lawful authority as Governor revoked the 2nd Interested Party’s appointment as the County Executive Committee Member (CECM) for Finance and Economic Planning with effect from 14th August 2026. As a result, the 2nd Interested Party ceased to hold office rendering the Petition’s premise that he continues to hold office as a matter of right untenable. They emphasized that under the constitutional framework of devolved governance, the County Executive and County Assembly hold distinct mandates and the Court's role is strictly supervisory to ensure each organ stays within its lawful mandate rather than substituting its own functions for theirs.
14. The Interested Parties contended that Articles 179(2) and (6) of the Constitution designate the Governor as the chief executive of the County with full responsibility for the functioning of the County Executive. This power is further anchored in Sections 30(2)(d) and 31 of the County Governments Act empowering the Governor to appoint and dismiss a CECM. Citing County Government of Nyeri & Another v. Cecilia Wangechi Ndungu [2015] KECA 1011 (KLR) they noted that the Court of Appeal recognized two distinct avenues for removing a CECM: Section 40 (initiated by the Assembly) and Section 31(a) (an independent executive power exercised by the Governor). Consequently, ongoing Assembly proceedings do not suspend or extinguish the Governor’s statutory power and the 1st Interested Party acted lawfully both in appointing and subsequently revoking the appointment of the 2nd Interested Party.
15. Addressing whether the County Assembly can declare an executive decision illegal, the Interested Parties submitted that oversight powers do not confer judicial authority. Citing Articles 2(2) and 159 of the Constitution, they asserted that judicial authority is vested exclusively in the Courts and established tribunals. Thus, the County Assembly cannot under the guise of oversight arrogate to itself the authority to make final determinations on the legality or constitutionality of executive actions.
16. Regarding judicial interference in impeachment processes, the Interested Parties relied on Martin Nyaga Wambora v. County Assembly of Embu & 37 Others [2015] KECA 137 (KLR) and Justus Kariuki Mate & Another v. Martin Nyaga Wambora & Another [2017] KESC 1 (KLR) to argue that impeachment is a sui generis constitutionally structured accountability process. They stressed that while courts retain supervisory jurisdiction, the doctrine of separation of powers demands judicial restraint when legislative processes are actively underway. Referencing Mike Sonko Mbuvi Gideon Kioko & Another v. Clerk, Nairobi City County Assembly & 9 Others [2021] KEHC 13091 (KLR), they noted that judicial intervention or an order quashing ongoing proceedings should only occur where a clear violation of fundamental rights, excess of jurisdiction or failure to meet legal thresholds is established. They concluded by urging the Court to dismiss the Petition or refrain from determining matters constitutionally reserved for the Assembly.
17. Having carefully considered the Petition, the replying affidavit and the submissions tendered, I find the issue for determination is whether the Petition has merit .
18. Article 258(1) of the Constitution provides that every person has the right to institute court proceedings claiming the Constitution has been contravened. However, this right is not absolute.
19. In Mumo Matemo v Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance & 5 Others [2013] eKLR, the Court of Appeal endorsed the view that the standard guide for locus standi must remain the command in Article 258 of the Constitution. However, the Court cautioned that a person who moves the court for judicial redress in cases of this kind must not act for personal gain or private profit, political motivation or other unspecified consideration
20. In Ferdinand Ndung'u Waititu v Benson Riitho Mureithi & 2 Others [2018] KECA 493 (KLR), the Court of Appeal emphasized that a petitioner must demonstrate a genuine interest and that the petition is not frivolous or vexatious
21. In Simon Wachira Kagiri v County Assembly of Nyeri & 2 Others Petition 7 of 2013, the High Court at Nyeri held that for the court to interfere with decisions of a County Assembly, the petitioner had to demonstrate that the action attacked the very fabric of the Constitution. The issue had to traverse beyond just personal rights and liberties of the petitioner.
22. The Petitioners are not employees of the County Government. They are not the 2nd Interested Party whose appointment is in question. They are not members of the County Assembly whose resolutions are challenged. They have not demonstrated any direct or special interest in the matter. The real parties affected (the Governor and the 2nd Interested Party) are before the Court and have not raised any objection. The Petitioners have not demonstrated any special interest in the subject matter. They have not shown that they will suffer any particular harm or prejudice if the reliefs sought are not granted. Their claim to be acting in the public interest is not supported by any evidence that they have a genuine interest in the matter. Indeed, the Petitioners did not provide an iota of evidence that they are acting in the interest of the public or that they have an interest which has been infringed upon by the Respondents. The conduct of the Petitioners appeared to indicate that they are acting at the behest of the 2 nd Interested Party herein, who is the individual now faced with an impeachment by the County Assembly. Iam satisfied that the Petitioners have no locus standi to present the present petition. Further, it is noted that the 2 nd Interested Party is the one to face the impeachment and hence the one who ought to have filed the petition as he has a huge interest at stake worth protecting and not the Petitioners herein. It is clear that the Petitioners herein are proxies of the 2 nd interested party.
23. The Petitioners are seeking to challenge actions that are clearly within the constitutional mandate of the County Assembly. The County Assembly's resolution was based on the constitutional and statutory provisions that require appointments to the County Executive Committee to be approved by the County Assembly. The Petitioners have not demonstrated any constitutional violation that would justify the intervention of this Court. The Petitioners are essentially seeking to curtail the constitutional oversight powers of the County Assembly. This Court cannot countenance a situation where ordinary citizens can use the court process to interfere with the legitimate exercise of constitutional powers by other state organs.
24. The Court therefore finds and holds that the Petitioners lack locus standi to bring this Petition.
25. Article 179(2)(b) of the Constitution provides that CEC Members are appointed by the Governor with the approval of the County Assembly. This is not a mere formality but a substantive constitutional safeguard.
26. Article 185(3) of the Constitution empowers the County Assembly to exercise oversight over the County Executive Committee.
27. The power to remove a member of the County Executive Committee from office under Section 40 of the County Government Act is a statutory power exercisable by the County Assembly. The power is not limited to substantive office holders but extends to all members of the County Executive Committee, including those serving in an acting capacity.
28. Section 4 of the Public Appointments (County Assemblies Approval) Act 2017 provides in mandatory terms: "An appointment under the Constitution or any other law for which the approval of a County Assembly is required shall not be made unless the appointment is approved by the relevant County Assembly."
29. In Simon Wachira Kagiri v County Assembly of Nyeri & 2 Others (supra), the Court held that the County Assembly Committee on Appointments had the opportunity to interview the petitioner and in the absence of any material to show that they acted in excess of their jurisdiction or took into account issues that they ought not to have taken into account could not be faulted.
30. In Ababu Namwamba v Attorney General & Others [2016] eKLR, the Court held that while the court may not interfere with the exercise of the mandate of selection of committee members in a County Assembly, the court would be failing in its duty if it did not step in to determine whether what is purported to be done is in accordance with the Constitution.
31. The County Assembly's decision was based on clear constitutional and statutory provisions; Article 179(2)(b), Section 4, Public Appointments (County Assemblies Approval) Act and Section 67, County Government Act.
32. The Court therefore finds and holds that the County Assembly has constitutional and statutory powers to approve appointments to the County Executive Committee and to exercise oversight over the County Executive Committee.
33. The Petitioners argue that the County Assembly usurped judicial power by declaring the appointment unlawful. The principle of separation of powers does not mean the branches operate in isolation. The Constitution establishes a system of checks and balances.
34. The County Assembly was not making a binding judicial determination. It was exercising its constitutional oversight powers. The Court retains the power to review the County Assembly's actions.
35. In Samuel Kamau (SK) Macharia v KCB Ltd & another [2012] eKLR , the Supreme Court stated that a court of law can only exercise jurisdiction as conferred on it by law. It cannot arrogate to itself jurisdiction exceeding that which is conferred upon it by law.
36. It is my view that the County Assembly exercised its constitutional mandate not judicial power. The County Assembly did not violate the separation of powers. It exercised its constitutional oversight mandate.
37. The Petitioners contend that a person in an acting capacity cannot be impeached. Section 40 of the County Government Act provides for removal of a member of the County Executive Committee. The Act does not distinguish between substantive and acting members.
38. Article 185(3) empowers the County Assembly to summon any county executive committee member for oversight and accountability. The principle of accountability applies to all public officers. The Leadership and Integrity Act, 2012 applies to all state officers, whether acting or substantive.
39. An acting CEC Member can be removed from office. The law does not immunize acting officers from accountability.
40. The factual matrix is clear: the 2nd Interested Party's contract expired on 31st March 2026. His nomination for substantive appointment was rejected on 29th April 2026. The office upon which his acting appointment was anchored (Roads and Public Works) was substantively filled on 13th May 2026.
41. Section 67 of the County Government Act provides: "No appointment or assignment of a duty in a county public service shall be valid unless it is evidenced in writing."
42. Section 64(2) of the County Government Act requires acting appointments to be for a specified period. The initial acting appointment was indefinite and the purported extension was unlawful.
43. The Commission on Administrative Justice in its advisory opinion dated 5th August 2026 found the purported extension null and void ab initio.
44. It is my finding that the 2nd Interested Party was unlawfully holding office after 31st March 2026. The purported extension of his appointment by letter dated 29th May 2026 was null and void ab initio. The Governor purported to extend his appointment on 29th May 2026 without County Assembly approval.
45. It is noted vide the assertions of the 1 st 2 nd and 5 th Interested parties that the 1 st Interested Party has subsequently revoked the appointment of the 2 nd Interested Party vide a letter dated 14 th August 2026. This thereby defeats the Petitioners Petition as their action has been arrested on their tracks. Clearly the basis of the Petition has been whitewashed by the said revocation and thus the Petition has been rendered an academic exercise. It is instructive that the Petitioners did not see the need to withdraw the petition once the 1 st Interested party wrote the letter dated 14 th August 2026 revoking the acting appointment capacity of the 2 nd Interested Party. This would not have compelled the parties and the court proceeding further in this matter.
46. For the reasons set out above, it is my finding that the Petition dated 10th August 2026 is devoid of merit and is hereby dis
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2. The essence of the Petitioners' grievance centers on the actions taken by the 1st, 2 nd and 3rd Respondents following communications dated 5th June 2026 and 28th July 2026. Vide those letters, the 3rd Respondent on the instructions and resolutions of the 1st Respondent notified the 3rd and 4th Interested Parties that the 2nd Interested Party Mr. George Nyingiro was unlawfully occupying the office of County Executive Committee Member (CECM) for Finance and Economic Planning. The Respondents further requested the financial institutions and regulatory bodies not to honor financial instruments or requisitions signed or executed by the 2nd Interested Party. Additionally, the 1st Respondent initiated impeachment proceedings under Section 40 of the County Governments Act, 2012 to remove the 2nd Interested Party from office.
3. The Petitioners contend that the 1st Respondent lacks constitutional authority to declare an executive appointment or action unlawful, asserting that such adjudicative power is reserved exclusively to the High Court under Article 165(3)(d) of the Constitution. They further argue that the principle of separation of powers was infringed by the Assembly’s resolutions and that an acting appointee cannot legally be subjected to impeachment proceedings.
4. Consequently, the Petitioners seek the following primary reliefs:
a) A Declaration that the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Respondents do not have such powers to declare the legality or otherwise of an executive action as such powers is constitutionally a preserve of the courts of law thus impugned resolutions as notified to the Interested Parties are irregular, unlawful and unconstitutional and therefore, invalid, null and void ab initio.
b) A declaration that the motion for removal of the 2nd Interested Party from office by impeachment having been grounded on the resolutions of the 1st Respondent declaring the actions of the governor as illegal is unconstitutional illegal null and void.
c) A Declaration that the 1st Respondent cannot by way of impeachment remove from office a person occupying the office of County Executive Committee Member in an acting capacity.
d) An order quashing the resolutions of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Respondents declaring that the 2nd Interested Party is unlawfully in office.
e) An order quashing any resolution by the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Respondents seeking to remove from office the 2nd Interested Party by way of impeachment.
f) Any other appropriate relief this Honourable Court may deem just to grant.
5. The Respondents filed a replying affidavit sworn by Erick Ogenga, the Clerk of the Siaya County Assembly on 17th August 2026 wherein he averred interalia; that pursuant to nomination and subsequent approval by the 1st Respondent on 26th October 2022, the 2nd Interested Party was appointed as the substantive County Executive Committee Member for Roads, Public Works, Energy and Transport as per the annexed copy of appointment letter marked as "EO-1"; that on 11th October 2024, the 1st Interested Party appointed the 2nd Interested Party as the acting County Executive Committee Member for Finance and Economic Planning following the resignation of the CEC for Finance and Economic Planning as per the annexed copy of appointment letter marked "EO-2"; that It was a term of the aforesaid appointment that the 2nd Interested Party was to continue to hold the current substantive position as the County Executive Committee Member Roads, Public Works, Energy and Transport; that the aforesaid appointment did not contrary to Section 64(2) of the County Government Act specify the duration for which the 2nd Interested Party was to act as the County Executive Committee Member, Finance and Economic Planning; that upon the expiry of the 2nd Interested Party's contract as the CECM, Road Public Works, Energy and Transport, the 1st Interested Party sought and obtained the 1st Respondent's approval for a one-month extension of the tenure of the 2nd Interested Party and other County Executive Committee members as per the annexed copy of letter marked "EO-3" ; that the 2nd Interested Party did during the extended period continue to serve as the Acting County Executive Committee Member for Finance and Economic Planning; that the 1st Interested Party did submit vide a letter dated 31st March 2026 and addressed to the 2nd Respondent, the names of persons nominated to various positions of the County Executive Committee for vetting and approval by the 1st Respondent. Amongst the names was that of the 2nd Interested Party who had been nominated to the position of County Executive Committee Member of Finance and Economic Planning; that upon vetting, the 1st Respondent rejected the 1st Interested Party's nomination of the 2nd Interested Party as County Executive Committee Member of Finance and Economic Planning; that notwithstanding the rejection of the 2nd Interested Party's nomination as the County Executive Committee Member for Finance and Economic Planning, the 1st Interested Party vide a letter dated 29th May 2026 purported to extend the 2nd Interested Party's appointment as the County Executive Committee Member for Finance and Economic Planning for a further period of 2 months without obtaining the mandatory approval of the 1st Respondent as provided for under Article 179(2)(b) of the Constitution as read together with Section 30(2)(d) of the County Government Act and Section 4 of the Public Appointments (County Assemblies Approval) Act as per the annexed copy of letter marked "EO-5"; that despite the 2nd Interested Party's contract as the substantive CECM for Road, Public Works, Energy and Transport and Acting CECM for Finance and Economic Planning having ended on 31st March 2026, the 2nd Interested Party continued to act as the CECM for Finance and Economic Planning without a substantive appointment letter contrary to Section 67 of the County Government Act; that the aforesaid extension of appointment was also done despite the rejection of the 2nd Interested Party's nomination as the CECM for Finance and Economic Planning and the expiration of his contract as the CECM for Roads, Public Works, Energy and Transport on which his appointment as CECM for Finance and Economic Planning was hinged; that based on the aforesaid extension of appointment of the 2nd Interested Party as the County Executive Committee Member of Finance and Economic Planning, the deponent pursuant to the resolution of the 1st Respondent did write to the 4th Interested Party vide a letter dated 5th June 2026 informing him of the said illegal appointment and requesting that they do not inter alia approve any financial transactions approved and or executed by the 2nd Interested Party as per the annexed copy of letter marked "EO-6 "; that Pursuant to the resolution of the 1st Respondent, the deponent also wrote to the 3rd Interested Party and the Clerk Senate of Kenya informing them of the continuous illegal and unlawful occupation of the office of the County Executive Committee Member, Finance and Economic Planning by the 2nd Interested Party as per the annexed copies of letters marked "EO-7"; that vide a letter dated 16th June 2026, pursuant to the resolution of the 1st Respondent, the deponent wrote to the Commission on Administration of Justice (Office of the Ombudsman) seeking an advisory opinion on the series of alleged irregular appointments made within the County Government of Siaya amongst them, the appointment of the 2nd Interested Party as the CECM Finance and Economic Planning without the approval of the 1st Respondent as per the annexed copy of letter marked "EO-8" ; that the Commission on Administration of Justice (Office of the Ombudsman) in its advisory opinion dated 5th August 2026 found that the purported extension of the 2nd Interested Party's appointment vide letter dated 29th May 2026 is null and void ab initio and incapable of conferring any lawful authority and that his continued occupation of office after 31st March 2026 was unlawful and contrary to the County Governments Act, the Public Appointments (County Assemblies Approval) Act and the Leadership and Integrity Act as per the annexed advisory report marked "EO-9 "; that the Commission on Administration of Justice (Office of the Ombudsman) recommended in respect of the 2nd Interested Party, that where the competent constitutional organs determine that the established conduct amounts to gross misconduct, abuse of office or a gross violation of the Constitution, the applicable constitutional and statutory removal mechanisms may be invoked; that It is based on the aforesaid recommendation of the Commission on Administration of Justice (Office of the Ombudsman) coupled with the 1st Interested Party's letter dated 30th July 2026, which without the approval of the 1st Respondent extended the contract of the 2nd Interested Party for a further 2 months that led to the commencement of his removal from office in compliance with Section 40 of the County Government Act as per the annexed letter marked "EO-10" ; that the decision to impeach the 2nd Interested Party from holding the office of the CECM for Finance and Economic Planning is not actuated by malice as alleged in paragraphs 25, 26, 27 and 28 of the Petition but is grounded in Section 35(3) of the Leadership and Integrity Act and supported by the advisory opinion of the Commission on Administration of Justice (Office of the Ombudsman); that the impeachment mentioned earlier is based on Section 40 of the County Governments Act which outlines the process for removing a member of the Executive Committee from office. This process is detailed and involves investigations by the select committee of the 1st Respondent. The CECM has the right to appear and be represented during these investigations. If the allegations are unsubstantiated, no further action is taken. However if the allegations are substantiated, the 1st Respondent must approve a resolution to dismiss the CECM by a majority vote; that contrary to the petitioners' allegations at paragraphs 31 and 32 of the Petition, the decision of the 1st Respondent of declaring that the continued performance by the 2nd Interested Party of the functions of the office of CEC Member for Finance and Economic Planning to be unlawful was based on its constitutional oversight role of the County Executive Committee Members provided for under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Kenya; that based on the foregoing, the prayers sought in the instant petition are in utter contravention of Articles 185(3) and 179(2)(b) of the Constitution read together with Section 30(2)(d) and 40 of the County Government Act, Section 4 of the Public Appointments (County Assemblies Approval) Act and Section 35(3) of the Leadership and Integrity Act as the same intends to not only curtail the 1st Respondent's oversight and approval roles in the appointments of the County Executive Committee Members but also to interfere with the doctrine of separation of powers.
6. The 1st 2nd and 5th Interested parties filed grounds of opposition dated 17th August 2026 setting out the following grounds; that the 1st Interested Party in exercise of lawful mandate appoints members of the County Executive Committee; that the 2nd Interested Party was appointed in an acting capacity to discharge the functions of the County Executive Committee Member responsible for Finance and Economic Planning pursuant to the powers vested in the Governor under Article 179 of the Constitution and Section 30(2) (d) of the County Governments Act.; that the 1st Interested Party in the lawful exercise of the powers vested in the office of the Governor under Section 31(a) of the County Governments Act is entitled to dismiss and/or revoke the appointment of the 2nd Interested Party; that in exercise of that power, the 1st Interested Party revoked the appointment of the 2nd Interested Party as the Acting County Executive Committee Member for Finance and Economic Planning effective 14th August 2026; that the Petition is in substance an attempt to challenge the decision of the Respondents concerning the continued occupation of office by the 2nd Interested Party in an acting capacity. The legal authority for such continued occupation had been withdrawn by the 1st Interested Party as evidenced in the letter dated 14th August 2026 referenced above.; that the Petition is founded upon or seeks to challenge a constitutional process being the intended removal from office by way of impeachment of the 2nd Interested Party; that the process of impeachment and removal from office is a constitutionally sanctioned accountability mechanism and a sui generis process vested in the Respondent; that the Court of Appeal in Martin Nyaga Wambora vs County Assembly of Embu & 6 Others, Civil Appeal No. 194 of 2015 affirmed the constitutional and political character of the impeachment process; that the jurisdiction of the Court in relation to an impeachment process is limited to interrogating compliance with the Constitution and the law including allegations of violation of constitutional rights and does not extend to substituting the Court's determination for that of the constitutional organ vested with the mandate to undertake the impeachment.; that the Supreme Court has expressly held in Mike Sonko Mbuvi Gideon Kioko vs Clerk, Nairobi City County Assembly & 11 Others SC Petition No. 11 (E008) of 2022 that impeachment falls within the exclusive constitutional sphere of the legislative arm and that the Court's role is confined to determining whether constitutional rights have been violated and whether the prescribed procedure has been followed, without constituting itself as either of those organs; that they urge the Honourable Court not to determine the substantive merits of matters pending before the County Assembly as to do will be an affront to the doctrine of separation of powers and the constitutional architecture of devolved government; that the County Assembly's oversight mandate does not however confer upon it an unfettered power to declare an executive decision unlawful or to usurp the Governor's expressly conferred statutory powers under Section 31 of the County Governments Act; that the determination of the legality, constitutionality or validity of executive action is ultimately a judicial function falling within the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 165 of the Constitution and the County Assembly cannot by virtue of its oversight mandate exercise judicial power; that the Honourable Court is urged to make a just and fair determination of the matter.
7. The petition was canvassed by way of written submissions. I have however noted that at the time of writing this judgement only the 1st 2nd and 5th interested party and the Petitioners had duly complied.
8. The Petitioners cited Articles 1(3), 2(1), 2(2) and 165(3)(d) of the Constitution. They submitted that sovereign power is delegated distinctively among State organs and that all organs are strictly bound by the Constitution. Under Article 165(3)(d), the determination of whether any act done under the authority of the Constitution or law is inconsistent with the Constitution is the exclusive domain of the High Court.
9. They further argued that while Article 185(3) grants the County Assembly oversight over the County Executive, this oversight role must respect the principle of separation of powers and does not extend to declaring executive actions illegal or void. Citing Article 2(2), they emphasized that no organ may claim or exercise state authority except as expressly authorized by the Constitution.
10. The Petitioners acknowledged that as of the date of filing the submissions, the 1st Interested Party had already revoked the 2nd Interested Party's acting appointment effective 14th August 2026 thereby terminating his authority to discharge those functions.
11. However, they urged the Court to interrogate the propriety of the impeachment proceedings initiated by the County Assembly. They submitted that because the impeachment motion was fundamentally predicated on the Assembly's initial unconstitutional resolution declaring the executive action void, the resulting impeachment process was itself anchored on illegality and rendered improper.
12. The Petitioners respectfully urged the Court to find in their favor and grant the orders sought in the Petition.
13. The 1st, 2nd and 5th Interested Parties submitted that the Petition challenges the Respondent’s decision to initiate a motion for the removal by impeachment of the 2nd Interested Party while also seeking to quash letters addressed to the 3rd and 4th Interested Parties. They pointed out that after the Petition was filed the 1st Interested Party exercising his lawful authority as Governor revoked the 2nd Interested Party’s appointment as the County Executive Committee Member (CECM) for Finance and Economic Planning with effect from 14th August 2026. As a result, the 2nd Interested Party ceased to hold office rendering the Petition’s premise that he continues to hold office as a matter of right untenable. They emphasized that under the constitutional framework of devolved governance, the County Executive and County Assembly hold distinct mandates and the Court's role is strictly supervisory to ensure each organ stays within its lawful mandate rather than substituting its own functions for theirs.
14. The Interested Parties contended that Articles 179(2) and (6) of the Constitution designate the Governor as the chief executive of the County with full responsibility for the functioning of the County Executive. This power is further anchored in Sections 30(2)(d) and 31 of the County Governments Act empowering the Governor to appoint and dismiss a CECM. Citing County Government of Nyeri & Another v. Cecilia Wangechi Ndungu [2015] KECA 1011 (KLR) they noted that the Court of Appeal recognized two distinct avenues for removing a CECM: Section 40 (initiated by the Assembly) and Section 31(a) (an independent executive power exercised by the Governor). Consequently, ongoing Assembly proceedings do not suspend or extinguish the Governor’s statutory power and the 1st Interested Party acted lawfully both in appointing and subsequently revoking the appointment of the 2nd Interested Party.
15. Addressing whether the County Assembly can declare an executive decision illegal, the Interested Parties submitted that oversight powers do not confer judicial authority. Citing Articles 2(2) and 159 of the Constitution, they asserted that judicial authority is vested exclusively in the Courts and established tribunals. Thus, the County Assembly cannot under the guise of oversight arrogate to itself the authority to make final determinations on the legality or constitutionality of executive actions.
16. Regarding judicial interference in impeachment processes, the Interested Parties relied on Martin Nyaga Wambora v. County Assembly of Embu & 37 Others [2015] KECA 137 (KLR) and Justus Kariuki Mate & Another v. Martin Nyaga Wambora & Another [2017] KESC 1 (KLR) to argue that impeachment is a sui generis constitutionally structured accountability process. They stressed that while courts retain supervisory jurisdiction, the doctrine of separation of powers demands judicial restraint when legislative processes are actively underway. Referencing Mike Sonko Mbuvi Gideon Kioko & Another v. Clerk, Nairobi City County Assembly & 9 Others [2021] KEHC 13091 (KLR), they noted that judicial intervention or an order quashing ongoing proceedings should only occur where a clear violation of fundamental rights, excess of jurisdiction or failure to meet legal thresholds is established. They concluded by urging the Court to dismiss the Petition or refrain from determining matters constitutionally reserved for the Assembly.
17. Having carefully considered the Petition, the replying affidavit and the submissions tendered, I find the issue for determination is whether the Petition has merit .
18. Article 258(1) of the Constitution provides that every person has the right to institute court proceedings claiming the Constitution has been contravened. However, this right is not absolute.
19. In Mumo Matemo v Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance & 5 Others [2013] eKLR, the Court of Appeal endorsed the view that the standard guide for locus standi must remain the command in Article 258 of the Constitution. However, the Court cautioned that a person who moves the court for judicial redress in cases of this kind must not act for personal gain or private profit, political motivation or other unspecified consideration
20. In Ferdinand Ndung'u Waititu v Benson Riitho Mureithi & 2 Others [2018] KECA 493 (KLR), the Court of Appeal emphasized that a petitioner must demonstrate a genuine interest and that the petition is not frivolous or vexatious
21. In Simon Wachira Kagiri v County Assembly of Nyeri & 2 Others Petition 7 of 2013, the High Court at Nyeri held that for the court to interfere with decisions of a County Assembly, the petitioner had to demonstrate that the action attacked the very fabric of the Constitution. The issue had to traverse beyond just personal rights and liberties of the petitioner.
22. The Petitioners are not employees of the County Government. They are not the 2nd Interested Party whose appointment is in question. They are not members of the County Assembly whose resolutions are challenged. They have not demonstrated any direct or special interest in the matter. The real parties affected (the Governor and the 2nd Interested Party) are before the Court and have not raised any objection. The Petitioners have not demonstrated any special interest in the subject matter. They have not shown that they will suffer any particular harm or prejudice if the reliefs sought are not granted. Their claim to be acting in the public interest is not supported by any evidence that they have a genuine interest in the matter. Indeed, the Petitioners did not provide an iota of evidence that they are acting in the interest of the public or that they have an interest which has been infringed upon by the Respondents. The conduct of the Petitioners appeared to indicate that they are acting at the behest of the 2 nd Interested Party herein, who is the individual now faced with an impeachment by the County Assembly. Iam satisfied that the Petitioners have no locus standi to present the present petition. Further, it is noted that the 2 nd Interested Party is the one to face the impeachment and hence the one who ought to have filed the petition as he has a huge interest at stake worth protecting and not the Petitioners herein. It is clear that the Petitioners herein are proxies of the 2 nd interested party.
23. The Petitioners are seeking to challenge actions that are clearly within the constitutional mandate of the County Assembly. The County Assembly's resolution was based on the constitutional and statutory provisions that require appointments to the County Executive Committee to be approved by the County Assembly. The Petitioners have not demonstrated any constitutional violation that would justify the intervention of this Court. The Petitioners are essentially seeking to curtail the constitutional oversight powers of the County Assembly. This Court cannot countenance a situation where ordinary citizens can use the court process to interfere with the legitimate exercise of constitutional powers by other state organs.
24. The Court therefore finds and holds that the Petitioners lack locus standi to bring this Petition.
25. Article 179(2)(b) of the Constitution provides that CEC Members are appointed by the Governor with the approval of the County Assembly. This is not a mere formality but a substantive constitutional safeguard.
26. Article 185(3) of the Constitution empowers the County Assembly to exercise oversight over the County Executive Committee.
27. The power to remove a member of the County Executive Committee from office under Section 40 of the County Government Act is a statutory power exercisable by the County Assembly. The power is not limited to substantive office holders but extends to all members of the County Executive Committee, including those serving in an acting capacity.
28. Section 4 of the Public Appointments (County Assemblies Approval) Act 2017 provides in mandatory terms: "An appointment under the Constitution or any other law for which the approval of a County Assembly is required shall not be made unless the appointment is approved by the relevant County Assembly."
29. In Simon Wachira Kagiri v County Assembly of Nyeri & 2 Others (supra), the Court held that the County Assembly Committee on Appointments had the opportunity to interview the petitioner and in the absence of any material to show that they acted in excess of their jurisdiction or took into account issues that they ought not to have taken into account could not be faulted.
30. In Ababu Namwamba v Attorney General & Others [2016] eKLR, the Court held that while the court may not interfere with the exercise of the mandate of selection of committee members in a County Assembly, the court would be failing in its duty if it did not step in to determine whether what is purported to be done is in accordance with the Constitution.
31. The County Assembly's decision was based on clear constitutional and statutory provisions; Article 179(2)(b), Section 4, Public Appointments (County Assemblies Approval) Act and Section 67, County Government Act.
32. The Court therefore finds and holds that the County Assembly has constitutional and statutory powers to approve appointments to the County Executive Committee and to exercise oversight over the County Executive Committee.
33. The Petitioners argue that the County Assembly usurped judicial power by declaring the appointment unlawful. The principle of separation of powers does not mean the branches operate in isolation. The Constitution establishes a system of checks and balances.
34. The County Assembly was not making a binding judicial determination. It was exercising its constitutional oversight powers. The Court retains the power to review the County Assembly's actions.
35. In Samuel Kamau (SK) Macharia v KCB Ltd & another [2012] eKLR , the Supreme Court stated that a court of law can only exercise jurisdiction as conferred on it by law. It cannot arrogate to itself jurisdiction exceeding that which is conferred upon it by law.
36. It is my view that the County Assembly exercised its constitutional mandate not judicial power. The County Assembly did not violate the separation of powers. It exercised its constitutional oversight mandate.
37. The Petitioners contend that a person in an acting capacity cannot be impeached. Section 40 of the County Government Act provides for removal of a member of the County Executive Committee. The Act does not distinguish between substantive and acting members.
38. Article 185(3) empowers the County Assembly to summon any county executive committee member for oversight and accountability. The principle of accountability applies to all public officers. The Leadership and Integrity Act, 2012 applies to all state officers, whether acting or substantive.
39. An acting CEC Member can be removed from office. The law does not immunize acting officers from accountability.
40. The factual matrix is clear: the 2nd Interested Party's contract expired on 31st March 2026. His nomination for substantive appointment was rejected on 29th April 2026. The office upon which his acting appointment was anchored (Roads and Public Works) was substantively filled on 13th May 2026.
41. Section 67 of the County Government Act provides: "No appointment or assignment of a duty in a county public service shall be valid unless it is evidenced in writing."
42. Section 64(2) of the County Government Act requires acting appointments to be for a specified period. The initial acting appointment was indefinite and the purported extension was unlawful.
43. The Commission on Administrative Justice in its advisory opinion dated 5th August 2026 found the purported extension null and void ab initio.
44. It is my finding that the 2nd Interested Party was unlawfully holding office after 31st March 2026. The purported extension of his appointment by letter dated 29th May 2026 was null and void ab initio. The Governor purported to extend his appointment on 29th May 2026 without County Assembly approval.
45. It is noted vide the assertions of the 1 st 2 nd and 5 th Interested parties that the 1 st Interested Party has subsequently revoked the appointment of the 2 nd Interested Party vide a letter dated 14 th August 2026. This thereby defeats the Petitioners Petition as their action has been arrested on their tracks. Clearly the basis of the Petition has been whitewashed by the said revocation and thus the Petition has been rendered an academic exercise. It is instructive that the Petitioners did not see the need to withdraw the petition once the 1 st Interested party wrote the letter dated 14 th August 2026 revoking the acting appointment capacity of the 2 nd Interested Party. This would not have compelled the parties and the court proceeding further in this matter.
46. For the reasons set out above, it is my finding that the Petition dated 10th August 2026 is devoid of merit and is hereby dis
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