[Appeal from the judgment of Hon. D.K. Kuto SPM, delivered on 13 August 2025 in Mavoko CM’s Court, ELC Case No. 36 of 2020 (Esther Wanjiru Kiarie v. Fredrick Kamau & 4 Others]
1. To give some background for the appeal, it is helpful to understand the dispute previously addressed in the trial court and now before this court as a first appeal. In the lower court, by a plaint dated 10 August 2020, the appellant contended that, upon payment of the registration and monthly subscription fees, she had been a registered member of Ngunjigu Building Co. (“Ngujigu”) in 1983.
2. By dint of such membership, Ngunjigu allocated three parcels of land to her, being Mavoko Municipality Block 14/69, 71 and 73 (“suit properties”), via letters of allotment dated 18 December 1995. She stated she built residential houses on the latter two, which were violently demolished by the 1st respondent on 16 May 2010.
3. On 6 December 2019, she applied to the 5th respondent for the processing of title documents, to no avail, only to discover that the 5th respondent had issued title documents to the 3rd respondent, who had transferred them to the 2nd and/or 4th respondents.
4. She termed their actions illegal and sought reliefs in the form of a permanent injunction restraining the respondents from dealing in any manner whatsoever with the suit properties, and mandatory orders compelling the 5th respondent to deregister and/or expunge the register, parcel files, index, presentation books and/or records at the land registry in Machakos or at the Central Registry in Nairobi, and to register her name as the registered owner of the suit properties. She also sought the costs of the suit.
5. The respondents did not file a defence, except the 4th, who filed a defence dated 9 April 2021. In it, she asserted that she was a stranger to most of the assertions contained in the plaint and put the appellant to strict proof. She asserted she purchased one of the suit properties (then plot no. 14/73) from Ngunjigu, which was at the brink of liquidating its assets in October 2006. She stated she paid the consideration and the requisite survey fees. She informed the court that some of the documents the appellant relied upon to assert ownership had long been withdrawn. She asserted that the appellant was never issued a share certificate for any property other than Mavoko Municipality Block 14/69, as she was in default of making payments on the other two suit properties. She averred that she had always kept possession since the purchase in 2006. She therefore urged the trial court to dismiss the suit.
6. Subsequently, the matter was heard with the appellant and the 4th respondent respectively testifying and relying on witness statements, oral testimonies, and documents. The matter was subsequently reserved for judgment, whereby the learned trial magistrate entered judgment as sought in the plaint against the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 5th respondents, as they had not entered an appearance. Concerning the appellant’s case against the 4th respondent, he found that the appellant had not satisfied the required standard of proof and was satisfied with her explanation of the root of her title. Consequently, he dismissed the appellant’s case against the 4th respondent.
7. It is this latter outcome that the appellant was aggrieved by, hence she filed a memorandum of appeal dated 11 September 2025, in which she challenged the impugned judgment on 6 grounds, asserting that the learned trial magistrate erred in law and fact in the following respects:
a. Failing to find that the appellant is the bona fide owner of land parcel no. Mavoko Municipality Block 14/73.
b. Failing to find that the 4th respondent had no valid root of title for the land parcel no. Mavoko Municipality Block 14/73, contrary to Section 3(3) of the Law of Contract Act and Section 37 of the Land Registration Act.
c. Holding that the winding up process by which the 4th respondent purchased LR no Mavoko Municipality Block 14/73 was valid contrary to Sections 414 and 416 of the Insolvency Act or Sections 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 272, 273, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282 and 283 of the repealed Companies Act.
d. Holding that the appellant did not obtain an allocation letter and/or a share certificate of ownership.
e. Failing to apply compelling and binding judicial authorities cited in the appellant's submissions dated and filed on 24th March 2025.
f. Failing to hold that the purported meeting held on 6th September 2006 was invalid as the same was not convened by a Kenya Gazette Notice contrary to Section 414 of the Insolvency Act or Sections 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 272, 273, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282 and 283 of the repealed Companies Act (Chapter 486 of the Laws of Kenya).
8. Accordingly, the appellant urged this court to grant the appeal, overturn the impugned judgment and substitute it with an order granting the reliefs sought in the plaint against the 4th respondent, and award the costs of the appeal.
9. However, before moving further, it is paramount to address preliminary issues that arose in the grounds of appeal. Foremost, and having considered the impugned judgment and guided by the Court of Appeal decision of Kenya Hotels Ltd vs. Oriental Commercial Bank Ltd (Formerly known as The Delphis Bank Limited) [2019] eKLR, which held that grounds of appeal must arise from issues that were sufficiently pleaded, canvassed, raised or succinctly made issues at the trial, this court finds that grounds (c) and (g), are new issues introduced on appeal, as the learned trial magistrate never made such holdings. These grounds are hereby struck out.
10. As a matter of fact, regarding ground (c), the trial magistrate, in his obiter dictum, properly stated that the winding-up proceedings had not been challenged in court. Concerning ground (e), the appellant has properly abandoned it in her submissions, as she has appreciated that submissions are mere arguments. We now deal with the substantive grounds for determination.
11. As this is a first appeal, the authority of this court is outlined in Order 42 Rule 32 of the Civil Procedure Rules. Additionally, as an appellate court, this court will not interfere with the impugned judgment unless it is satisfied that the learned trial magistrate misdirected himself and thereby reached an incorrect decision, exercising his discretion wrongly and causing injustice through such erroneous exercise of discretion. The role of an appellate court was aptly described in the decision of Nguruman Limited v Nielsen & 2 others [2014] KECA 606 (KLR), thus: -
Before adverting to the origin of the dispute it is appropriate to reiterate that before this Court can interfere with the exercise of a discretion of a judge, it must be shown that the judge has either erred in principle in his approach or has left out of account factors he ought to have considered or has taken into account some factors that he should not have considered or that his decision was wholly wrong, or that the decision was so aberrant that no reasonable judge, aware of his duty to act judicially could have reached it. These are the words of Sir Charles Newbold, P. expressed in this often-cited Mbogo & Another V. Shah [1968] EA 98 decision as follows:
“…….a Court of Appeal should not interfere with the exercise of the discretion of a judge unless it is satisfied that the judge in exercising his discretion has misdirected himself in some matter and as a result has arrived at a wrong decision, or unless it is manifest from the case as a whole that the judge has been clearly wrong in the exercise of his discretion and that as a result there has been misjustice.”
12. About the matter at hand, this court has carefully reviewed the records, the impugned judgment, and the submissions filed by Ms. Achola Jaoko & Co. Advocates for the appellant, dated 22 January 2026, and by Ms. Stanley Henry Advocates for the 4th respondent, dated 8 May 2026. It is the considered view of this court that the grounds of appeal can be effectively evaluated by examining the following grounds: (a) whether the appellant’s ground of illegality was pleaded and particularised to the required standards, (b) whether she proved her case to the required standards and (c) whether the 4th respondent discharged the root of her title. These issues will be handled together.
13. Apropos these issues, the pertinent legal framework for protection and impeachment of title documents over land is found in our Article 40 (1) and (6) of the Constitution. These provisions restrict legal protection to property that has been lawfully acquired and owned. According to these Sub-Articles, every person has the right, whether individually or in association with others, to acquire and own property within Kenya.
14. Statutorily, Sections 24 and 25 of the Land Registration Act recognise the registered owner as the absolute owner of the land and provide protection under Section 24. Section 26(1) thereof provides for the sanctity and indefeasibility of title to immovable property, which subsists only in the absence of fraud, misrepresentation or other unlawful conduct in its acquisition. In the instant case, the appellant, in paragraph 10 of her plaint, stated that she sought to impeach the suit properties on the grounds that the respondents illegally and unlawfully purported to alienate, transfer, dispossess and/or interfere with her ownership of the suit properties.
15. The Black's Law Dictionary, 11th Edn, page 896, defines illegality as an act forbidden by law or the state of not being legally authorised, while, from the same dictionary at page 1850, it is evident that unlawfulness is a synonym of the term illegality. Now, having looked at the plaint, it is this court’s finding that the way this particular paragraph 10 was drawn was in such a general manner that it contravened the provisions of Order 2 Rule 4 of the Civil Procedure Rules, as the acts of illegality and unlawfulness were not particularised to the required standards, as they were very general in nature.
16. Suffice it to say, what were these alleged illegal acts of purported alienation and transfer? What acts constituted an attempt to dispossess or interfere with ownership? Who among the respondents did which particular illegal act and on which property? To this court’s mind, it behooved the appellant to plead and particularise illegality to the required standards, but she did not. On this basis alone, the appellant’s case was for dismissal. This court associates itself with a similar finding made in Bruce Joseph Bockle v Coquero Limited [2014] KECA 682 (KLR), where the court held that;
“The point being made here is this, that the appellant was expected to build a structure showing that his case was about fraud, illegalities and misrepresentation by way of pleading. He was to construct a prima facie case of fraud or illegality. The trial court would only have allowed him to pursue that line of defence after he had presented a prima facie case of fraud or illegality…A general allegation of fraud or illegality and misrepresentation as was the case here was not sufficient to infer liability on the part of those who are said to have committed it.”
17. It is trite law that acts such as fraud and illegality cannot be inferred from the facts, and it is apparent that the learned trial magistrate did exactly that and, thereafter, upon inferring acts of illegality from the evidence, dismissed the appellant’s case. Essentially, this is the gist of the appeal.
18. To substantiate the claim of ownership over Mavoko Municipality Block 14/73, the appellant submitted a list of members from Ngunjigu showing plot no. 14/73, measuring 0.0135 ha, had been allocated to her. This signed list is dated 15 October 2002. Additionally, she presented several receipts evidencing payments made to the Ngunjigu towards registration, shares, land rates, survey fees, and share certificates, all between 1983 and 2005. Considering the chronological sequence of these receipts, which do not specify the particular parcel for which the payments were made, it is evident that ultimately ownership of a parcel of land from Ngunjigu was acquired by payment for the share certificate, valued at Kshs. 3,000/- as per the last receipt dated 20 October 2005. The appellant testified that this share certificate was for Mavoko Municipality Block 14/69.
19. Crucially, she also submitted a subdivision approval scheme from the Commissioner of Lands, dated 18 December 1995, which required her to provide a formal written acceptance of the special conditions and to remit the prescribed fee for conveyancing, registration, and stamp duty in connection with the processing of the lease for plot No. 14/73, a subdivision of L.R. Nos. 7340/44 and 45, which had yet to be surrendered.
20. Nonetheless, there was no record demonstrating that such acceptance was made or that the payment was effected. Following this absence of payment for the share certificate for plot No. 14/73 to Ngunjigu, and the failure to make the imperative payments and acceptance to the Commissioner of Lands, it was not tenable for the title deed for the then plot No. 14/73, later known as Mavoko Municipality Block 14/73, to be issued to her, as her rights to such land had not crystallised. Therefore, this court concurs with the learned trial magistrate's conclusions that the appellant did not prove her ownership over Mavoko Municipality Block 14/73.
21. Respecting the root of the title, which was also addressed by the learned trial magistrate, from the evidence, the 4th respondent tendered minutes from an annual general meeting (AGM) of Ngunjigu that took place on 2 September 2006. These minutes demonstrated that Ngunjigu was experiencing financial difficulties because members had not completed payments for their plots. The attendee members unanimously agreed to voluntarily wind up the entity and sell the unpaid-for plots, which were to be sold at Kshs. 36,000 each, plus survey fees of Kshs. 4,000, with the proceeds to be used to settle outstanding debts. One of the listed defaulters was the appellant, who was in arrears for several plots, including plot No. 14/73.
22. One of the purchasers was the 4th respondent, who paid Kshs. 37,800/- as evidenced by the receipts. Ngunjigu has never complained that she has never settled the amounts due. A share certificate was issued to her on 30 November 2006 for plot No. 14/73. Additionally, the Commissioner of Lands issued a subdivision scheme approval letter dated 26 November 2006, which required the payment of requisite fees and acceptance. Although these payments were made, the acceptance was not presented to the trial court. Ultimately, the property in question, Mavoko Municipality Block 14/73, was registered in the 4th respondent’s name. Analogous to the trial magistrate, this court is satisfied that the 4th respondent discharged the burden of proof regarding her root of title. Accordingly, the court finds that the learned trial magistrate was correct in dismissing the appellant’s case.
23. Therefore, for the above reasons and findings, the appeal is dismissed, and this court upholds the orders issued in the judgment rendered on 13 August 2025. Since it is trite law that costs follow the event, the 4th respondent, who participated in these proceedings, shall have the costs of this appeal.
Judgment accordingly.
Delivered and Dated at Machakos this 22nd day of September, 2026.
HON. A. Y. KOROSS
JUDGE
22.09.2026
Judgment delivered virtually through Microsoft Teams Video Conferencing Platform
In the presence of;
Ms. Kanja Court Assistant.
Mr. Jaoko for the appellant.
Mr. Gachuna for the 4th respondent.
1. To give some background for the appeal, it is helpful to understand the dispute previously addressed in the trial court and now before this court as a first appeal. In the lower court, by a plaint dated 10 August 2020, the appellant contended that, upon payment of the registration and monthly subscription fees, she had been a registered member of Ngunjigu Building Co. (“Ngujigu”) in 1983.
2. By dint of such membership, Ngunjigu allocated three parcels of land to her, being Mavoko Municipality Block 14/69, 71 and 73 (“suit properties”), via letters of allotment dated 18 December 1995. She stated she built residential houses on the latter two, which were violently demolished by the 1st respondent on 16 May 2010.
3. On 6 December 2019, she applied to the 5th respondent for the processing of title documents, to no avail, only to discover that the 5th respondent had issued title documents to the 3rd respondent, who had transferred them to the 2nd and/or 4th respondents.
4. She termed their actions illegal and sought reliefs in the form of a permanent injunction restraining the respondents from dealing in any manner whatsoever with the suit properties, and mandatory orders compelling the 5th respondent to deregister and/or expunge the register, parcel files, index, presentation books and/or records at the land registry in Machakos or at the Central Registry in Nairobi, and to register her name as the registered owner of the suit properties. She also sought the costs of the suit.
5. The respondents did not file a defence, except the 4th, who filed a defence dated 9 April 2021. In it, she asserted that she was a stranger to most of the assertions contained in the plaint and put the appellant to strict proof. She asserted she purchased one of the suit properties (then plot no. 14/73) from Ngunjigu, which was at the brink of liquidating its assets in October 2006. She stated she paid the consideration and the requisite survey fees. She informed the court that some of the documents the appellant relied upon to assert ownership had long been withdrawn. She asserted that the appellant was never issued a share certificate for any property other than Mavoko Municipality Block 14/69, as she was in default of making payments on the other two suit properties. She averred that she had always kept possession since the purchase in 2006. She therefore urged the trial court to dismiss the suit.
6. Subsequently, the matter was heard with the appellant and the 4th respondent respectively testifying and relying on witness statements, oral testimonies, and documents. The matter was subsequently reserved for judgment, whereby the learned trial magistrate entered judgment as sought in the plaint against the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 5th respondents, as they had not entered an appearance. Concerning the appellant’s case against the 4th respondent, he found that the appellant had not satisfied the required standard of proof and was satisfied with her explanation of the root of her title. Consequently, he dismissed the appellant’s case against the 4th respondent.
7. It is this latter outcome that the appellant was aggrieved by, hence she filed a memorandum of appeal dated 11 September 2025, in which she challenged the impugned judgment on 6 grounds, asserting that the learned trial magistrate erred in law and fact in the following respects:
a. Failing to find that the appellant is the bona fide owner of land parcel no. Mavoko Municipality Block 14/73.
b. Failing to find that the 4th respondent had no valid root of title for the land parcel no. Mavoko Municipality Block 14/73, contrary to Section 3(3) of the Law of Contract Act and Section 37 of the Land Registration Act.
c. Holding that the winding up process by which the 4th respondent purchased LR no Mavoko Municipality Block 14/73 was valid contrary to Sections 414 and 416 of the Insolvency Act or Sections 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 272, 273, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282 and 283 of the repealed Companies Act.
d. Holding that the appellant did not obtain an allocation letter and/or a share certificate of ownership.
e. Failing to apply compelling and binding judicial authorities cited in the appellant's submissions dated and filed on 24th March 2025.
f. Failing to hold that the purported meeting held on 6th September 2006 was invalid as the same was not convened by a Kenya Gazette Notice contrary to Section 414 of the Insolvency Act or Sections 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 272, 273, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282 and 283 of the repealed Companies Act (Chapter 486 of the Laws of Kenya).
8. Accordingly, the appellant urged this court to grant the appeal, overturn the impugned judgment and substitute it with an order granting the reliefs sought in the plaint against the 4th respondent, and award the costs of the appeal.
9. However, before moving further, it is paramount to address preliminary issues that arose in the grounds of appeal. Foremost, and having considered the impugned judgment and guided by the Court of Appeal decision of Kenya Hotels Ltd vs. Oriental Commercial Bank Ltd (Formerly known as The Delphis Bank Limited) [2019] eKLR, which held that grounds of appeal must arise from issues that were sufficiently pleaded, canvassed, raised or succinctly made issues at the trial, this court finds that grounds (c) and (g), are new issues introduced on appeal, as the learned trial magistrate never made such holdings. These grounds are hereby struck out.
10. As a matter of fact, regarding ground (c), the trial magistrate, in his obiter dictum, properly stated that the winding-up proceedings had not been challenged in court. Concerning ground (e), the appellant has properly abandoned it in her submissions, as she has appreciated that submissions are mere arguments. We now deal with the substantive grounds for determination.
11. As this is a first appeal, the authority of this court is outlined in Order 42 Rule 32 of the Civil Procedure Rules. Additionally, as an appellate court, this court will not interfere with the impugned judgment unless it is satisfied that the learned trial magistrate misdirected himself and thereby reached an incorrect decision, exercising his discretion wrongly and causing injustice through such erroneous exercise of discretion. The role of an appellate court was aptly described in the decision of Nguruman Limited v Nielsen & 2 others [2014] KECA 606 (KLR), thus: -
Before adverting to the origin of the dispute it is appropriate to reiterate that before this Court can interfere with the exercise of a discretion of a judge, it must be shown that the judge has either erred in principle in his approach or has left out of account factors he ought to have considered or has taken into account some factors that he should not have considered or that his decision was wholly wrong, or that the decision was so aberrant that no reasonable judge, aware of his duty to act judicially could have reached it. These are the words of Sir Charles Newbold, P. expressed in this often-cited Mbogo & Another V. Shah [1968] EA 98 decision as follows:
“…….a Court of Appeal should not interfere with the exercise of the discretion of a judge unless it is satisfied that the judge in exercising his discretion has misdirected himself in some matter and as a result has arrived at a wrong decision, or unless it is manifest from the case as a whole that the judge has been clearly wrong in the exercise of his discretion and that as a result there has been misjustice.”
12. About the matter at hand, this court has carefully reviewed the records, the impugned judgment, and the submissions filed by Ms. Achola Jaoko & Co. Advocates for the appellant, dated 22 January 2026, and by Ms. Stanley Henry Advocates for the 4th respondent, dated 8 May 2026. It is the considered view of this court that the grounds of appeal can be effectively evaluated by examining the following grounds: (a) whether the appellant’s ground of illegality was pleaded and particularised to the required standards, (b) whether she proved her case to the required standards and (c) whether the 4th respondent discharged the root of her title. These issues will be handled together.
13. Apropos these issues, the pertinent legal framework for protection and impeachment of title documents over land is found in our Article 40 (1) and (6) of the Constitution. These provisions restrict legal protection to property that has been lawfully acquired and owned. According to these Sub-Articles, every person has the right, whether individually or in association with others, to acquire and own property within Kenya.
14. Statutorily, Sections 24 and 25 of the Land Registration Act recognise the registered owner as the absolute owner of the land and provide protection under Section 24. Section 26(1) thereof provides for the sanctity and indefeasibility of title to immovable property, which subsists only in the absence of fraud, misrepresentation or other unlawful conduct in its acquisition. In the instant case, the appellant, in paragraph 10 of her plaint, stated that she sought to impeach the suit properties on the grounds that the respondents illegally and unlawfully purported to alienate, transfer, dispossess and/or interfere with her ownership of the suit properties.
15. The Black's Law Dictionary, 11th Edn, page 896, defines illegality as an act forbidden by law or the state of not being legally authorised, while, from the same dictionary at page 1850, it is evident that unlawfulness is a synonym of the term illegality. Now, having looked at the plaint, it is this court’s finding that the way this particular paragraph 10 was drawn was in such a general manner that it contravened the provisions of Order 2 Rule 4 of the Civil Procedure Rules, as the acts of illegality and unlawfulness were not particularised to the required standards, as they were very general in nature.
16. Suffice it to say, what were these alleged illegal acts of purported alienation and transfer? What acts constituted an attempt to dispossess or interfere with ownership? Who among the respondents did which particular illegal act and on which property? To this court’s mind, it behooved the appellant to plead and particularise illegality to the required standards, but she did not. On this basis alone, the appellant’s case was for dismissal. This court associates itself with a similar finding made in Bruce Joseph Bockle v Coquero Limited [2014] KECA 682 (KLR), where the court held that;
“The point being made here is this, that the appellant was expected to build a structure showing that his case was about fraud, illegalities and misrepresentation by way of pleading. He was to construct a prima facie case of fraud or illegality. The trial court would only have allowed him to pursue that line of defence after he had presented a prima facie case of fraud or illegality…A general allegation of fraud or illegality and misrepresentation as was the case here was not sufficient to infer liability on the part of those who are said to have committed it.”
17. It is trite law that acts such as fraud and illegality cannot be inferred from the facts, and it is apparent that the learned trial magistrate did exactly that and, thereafter, upon inferring acts of illegality from the evidence, dismissed the appellant’s case. Essentially, this is the gist of the appeal.
18. To substantiate the claim of ownership over Mavoko Municipality Block 14/73, the appellant submitted a list of members from Ngunjigu showing plot no. 14/73, measuring 0.0135 ha, had been allocated to her. This signed list is dated 15 October 2002. Additionally, she presented several receipts evidencing payments made to the Ngunjigu towards registration, shares, land rates, survey fees, and share certificates, all between 1983 and 2005. Considering the chronological sequence of these receipts, which do not specify the particular parcel for which the payments were made, it is evident that ultimately ownership of a parcel of land from Ngunjigu was acquired by payment for the share certificate, valued at Kshs. 3,000/- as per the last receipt dated 20 October 2005. The appellant testified that this share certificate was for Mavoko Municipality Block 14/69.
19. Crucially, she also submitted a subdivision approval scheme from the Commissioner of Lands, dated 18 December 1995, which required her to provide a formal written acceptance of the special conditions and to remit the prescribed fee for conveyancing, registration, and stamp duty in connection with the processing of the lease for plot No. 14/73, a subdivision of L.R. Nos. 7340/44 and 45, which had yet to be surrendered.
20. Nonetheless, there was no record demonstrating that such acceptance was made or that the payment was effected. Following this absence of payment for the share certificate for plot No. 14/73 to Ngunjigu, and the failure to make the imperative payments and acceptance to the Commissioner of Lands, it was not tenable for the title deed for the then plot No. 14/73, later known as Mavoko Municipality Block 14/73, to be issued to her, as her rights to such land had not crystallised. Therefore, this court concurs with the learned trial magistrate's conclusions that the appellant did not prove her ownership over Mavoko Municipality Block 14/73.
21. Respecting the root of the title, which was also addressed by the learned trial magistrate, from the evidence, the 4th respondent tendered minutes from an annual general meeting (AGM) of Ngunjigu that took place on 2 September 2006. These minutes demonstrated that Ngunjigu was experiencing financial difficulties because members had not completed payments for their plots. The attendee members unanimously agreed to voluntarily wind up the entity and sell the unpaid-for plots, which were to be sold at Kshs. 36,000 each, plus survey fees of Kshs. 4,000, with the proceeds to be used to settle outstanding debts. One of the listed defaulters was the appellant, who was in arrears for several plots, including plot No. 14/73.
22. One of the purchasers was the 4th respondent, who paid Kshs. 37,800/- as evidenced by the receipts. Ngunjigu has never complained that she has never settled the amounts due. A share certificate was issued to her on 30 November 2006 for plot No. 14/73. Additionally, the Commissioner of Lands issued a subdivision scheme approval letter dated 26 November 2006, which required the payment of requisite fees and acceptance. Although these payments were made, the acceptance was not presented to the trial court. Ultimately, the property in question, Mavoko Municipality Block 14/73, was registered in the 4th respondent’s name. Analogous to the trial magistrate, this court is satisfied that the 4th respondent discharged the burden of proof regarding her root of title. Accordingly, the court finds that the learned trial magistrate was correct in dismissing the appellant’s case.
23. Therefore, for the above reasons and findings, the appeal is dismissed, and this court upholds the orders issued in the judgment rendered on 13 August 2025. Since it is trite law that costs follow the event, the 4th respondent, who participated in these proceedings, shall have the costs of this appeal.
Judgment accordingly.
Delivered and Dated at Machakos this 22nd day of September, 2026.
HON. A. Y. KOROSS
JUDGE
22.09.2026
Judgment delivered virtually through Microsoft Teams Video Conferencing Platform
In the presence of;
Ms. Kanja Court Assistant.
Mr. Jaoko for the appellant.
Mr. Gachuna for the 4th respondent.