1. The applicant vide an Amended Notice of Motion dated 24th April 2026 and further amended on 29th April 2026, in CRJR. Case No. E035 of 2026 moved this court to quash proceedings conducted by the Honorable Dolphina Alego in Nairobi MCCR/E1137/2023.
2. The applicant complained that the learned Honorable magistrate proceeded to hear the matter yet she had been transferred to the employmet and labour relations court thus in the applicant’s view she had ceased to exercise jurisdiction over criminal matters.
3. The applicant further contended that HON Lucas Onyina, Chief Magistrate Nairobi Chief Magistrates’ Court, 1 st Respondent erroneously allocated the matter to Honorable Dolphina Alego without jurisdiction and by dint of his action removed the matter from the Honorable Rose Ndombi, Senior Principal Magistrate who had already assumed jurisdiction over the matter following the transfer of the Honorable Dolphina Alego.
Applicant's Submissions
4. In support of the Amended Notice of Motion dated 24th April 2026 and further amended on 29th April 2026, in CRJR. Case No. E035 of 2026, Nairobi, the Applicant opened his submissions with the Supreme Court's holding in Muruatetu & another v Republic; Katiba Institute & 5 others (Amicus Curiae) [2017] KESC 2 (KLR), which stated that the right to fair trial "was one of the cornerstones of a just and democratic society, without which the rule of law and public faith in the justice system would inevitably collapse."
5. By way of background, the Applicant, Davis Nathan Chelogoi, is the 1st Accused in Nairobi MCCR/E1137/2023 alongside the 2nd Interested Party, Andrew Aseri Kirungu.
6. The applicant narrated that his recusal motion against the 2nd Respondent, Hon. Dolphina Alego, filed on 21st October 2025, was summarily dismissed without a hearing, prompting review before Hon. Muteti, J. in HCCR No. E145 of 2025.
7. That a decision was rendered on 20th January 2026 and at paragraphs 86–88 the court found that "the trial magistrate did not hear the parties on the formal application for recusal and simply went on to do a Ruling on the matter," that that omission "was an irregularity that would not pass the test of the provisions of Article 50 of the Constitution," and that "the legitimate expectation on the part of the applicant would be that, upon filing of the application there would have been a hearing."
8. At paragraph 90, the Court held that "the application partially succeeds only to allow the same magistrate to reopen the recusal application for hearing should the applicant so desire."
9. Turning to the merits, on the question of the High Court's jurisdiction to entertain judicial review in criminal proceedings, the Applicant relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Communications Commission of Kenya v Royal Media Services Limited [2014] eKLR, which held at paragraph 355 that "the Constitution of 2010 has elevated the process of judicial review to a pedestal that transcends the technicalities of common law."
10. At paragraph 339, the same Court held that Article 23(3) grants the High Court power to grant appropriate relief including "a declaration of rights," "an injunction," "a conservatory order," "a declaration of invalidity of any law, an order for compensation, and an order for judicial review.
11. At paragraph 404, the Court further held that a breach of Article 47 attracts remedies in Judicial Review especially where an aggrieved person had cause to expect that the attendant aspects of fair administrative action would be adhered to, and that the court can quash any decision arrived at un-procedurally or unfairly but reserves itself no right to engage in the administrative duties of the body in question and the court went further to hold that the court must remain a court.
12. The Applicant further relied on Margaret Nyaruai Theuri v National Police Service Commission [2016] KEELRC 1024 (KLR), where Ongaya, J. held that under the constitutional provisions and in particular Articles 22 and 23, every person is entitled to seek judicial review orders.
13. The Court also considered the provisions of Article 159(2)(d) that justice should be administered without undue regard to procedural technicalities and concluded by holding that dismissing a case solely upon the manner she titled her pleadings would amount to unreasonable regard to a procedural technicalities.
14. The applicant further cited Muhura v Teachers Service Commission [2015] KEELRC 717 (KLR), where the Court held that it is possible for a litigant to apply for and pray for both compensatory relief and orders of judicial review in the same pleading and that the barrier or ridge or valley between judicial review proceedings and the ordinary actions as they were had been collapsed by the Constitution of Kenya, 2010.
15. Reliance was further placed on Kenya Human Rights Commission v Non-Governmental Organizations Co-ordination Board [2016] KEHC 5405 (KLR), where Onguto, J. held that a person whose interests and rights are likely to be affected by an administrative action has a reasonable expectation that they will be given a hearing before any adverse action is taken citing Ridge v Baldwin [1964] AC 40 and Halsbury's Laws of England for the audi alteram partem rule being a fundamental principle of justice.
16. The Court concluded that the court, effectively has a duty to look into not only the merits and legality of the decision made... but also the process and procedure adopted.
17. The applicant thus urged this court to look into not only the decision of the 1 st respondent committing the matter for trial before the Hon. Dolphina Alego SPM but also the propriety of the orders and quash the resultant proceedings.
18. The Applicant further invoked the Court of Appeal's decision in Suchan Investment Limited v Ministry of National Heritage & Culture & 3 others [2016] KECA 729 (KLR), where the court held that the law on judicial review of administrative action is now to be found not exclusively in common law but in the principles of Article 47 of the Constitution as read with the Fair Administrative Action Act of 2015.
19. The applicant further urged that Section 7(2)(l) of the Fair Administrative Action Act provides for proportionality as a ground for statutory judicial review such that the consideration of proportionality is an indication of the shift towards merit consideration in statutory judicial review applications.
20. The applicant also urged the court to consider granting a prohibition to stop further proceedings before the Hon Alego Dolphina SPM.
21. The applicant cited Republic v Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission & 2 others [2009] KECA 387 (KLR) where the court held that a prohibiting order can issue against a Magistrate in respect of criminal proceeding pending in court if... the magistrate is acting without or in excess of jurisdiction or that accused will be denied due process.
22. According to the applicant the Hon Alego SPM was acting without jurisdiction thus this court ought to stop the Hon. Magistrate from any further conduct of the matter.
23. He further quoted Lord Diplock in Attorney General v Ryan (1980) 2 All ER 608 where the court held;- “It has long been settled law that a decision affecting the legal rights of an individual which is arrived at by procedure which offends against the principles of natural justice is outside the jurisdiction of the decision-making authority."
24. On non-compliance with section 367 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the Applicant cited Mbaki & others v Macharia & another (2005) 2 EA 206, where the Court of Appeal held that the right to be heard is a valued right, and that "it would offend all notions of justice if the rights of a party were to be prejudiced or affected without the party being afforded an opportunity to be heard."
25. He relied further on Republic v Isaac Theuri Githae & Another [2007] KECA 388 (KLR), where the Court held that "the injunction against trying the accused person concerned is not against the Attorney General, but the trial court, and that order was amenable to judicial review, concluding there that there was no basis for holding that the magistrate was improperly made a respondent in this matter.
26. He also invoked Onyango v Attorney General (1986–1989) EA 456, where Nyarangi, JA held that ;- the principle of natural justice applies where ordinary people would reasonably expect those making decisions which will affect others to act fairly, and further that a decision in breach of the rules of natural justice is not cured by holding that the decision would otherwise have been right. If the principle of natural justice is violated, it matters not that the same decision would have been arrived at.
27. On the propriety of a stay of proceedings, the Applicant relied on R (H) v Ashworth Special Hospital Authority (2003) 1 WLR 12, where Dyson LJ held that the essential effect of a stay of proceedings is to suspend them, such that where the inferior court or administrative body has not yet made a final decision, then the effect of the stay will be to prevent the taking of the steps that are required for the decision to be made.
28. He further cited Ng'eny v Attorney General & another [2001] KEHC 746 (KLR ), where Kassanga Mulwa, J. held that in such a case it would be against all common sense not to grant a stay of the criminal proceedings to await the outcome of the application in the High Court, and that "the grant of leave granted in this application shall operate as a stay.
29. The applicant also relied on Republic v Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission & 2 others [2009] KECA 387 (KLR), which held that “if I do not grant a stay and the appeal were to succeed the applicant would have undergone an expensive trial which could result in his being sent to prison and thus denying him his liberty."
30. He further cited Kuria & 3 Others v Attorney General [2002] 2 KLR 69, which held that "the Court has power and indeed the duty to prohibit the continuation of the criminal prosecution if extraneous matters divorced from the goals of justice guide their instigation, and that a stay... should be granted where compelling an accused to stand trial would violate the fundamental principles of justice which underlie the society's sense of fair play and decency and/or where the proceedings are oppressive or vexatious."
31. On the revisionary jurisdiction, the applicant cited Joseph Nduvi Mbuvi v Republic [2019] KEHC 9895 (KLR) , where Odunga, J. held that "the object of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court is to enable the High Court... to correct manifest irregularities or illegalities and give appropriate directions on the manner in which the trial... should be proceeded with."
32. On the question of jurisdiction following the 2nd Respondent's transfer, the Applicant placed central reliance on the Court of Appeal's decision in Chengo & 2 others v Republic [2015] KECA 756 (KLR ), which held that "the law envisages that the judges of the two specialized courts should be different from judges of the High Court in terms of experience and specialization," and asked rhetorically, "can it be said that justice would be served to an appellant when a judge whose only flair is either in ELRC or ELC is suddenly empaneled by the Chief Justice to hear a criminal appeal?" The Court further held that "having been so appointed by the President, the Chief Justice or indeed any other entity cannot lawfully move him to hear matters reserved for the High Court," adding that "the converse is again true, judges appointed to the High Court and ELRC have no constitutional and statutory mandate to deal with ELC matters."
33. He also relied on Guantai v Chief Magistrate, Nairobi [2007] KECA 496 (KLR), which held that "the prosecution... would be oppressive and vexatious and would amount to an abuse of the process of the Court," and that "the learned trial Judge had inherent power and duty to intervene but he did not take the appropriate judicial action."
34. The same decision cited Stanley Munga Githunguri v Republic [1985] KLR 91 for the proposition that "if the prosecution amounts to an abuse of the process of the court and is oppressive and vexatious the Judge has the power to intervene," and that "the High Court has an inherent power and a duty to secure fair treatment for all persons who are brought before the court."
35. In conclusion, the Applicant submitted that, for the reasons set out, his application dated 24th April 2026, as amended on 29th April 2026, is fully merited and ought to be allowed as prayed, with costs.
The 1st, 2nd and 4th Respondents Submissions
36. The 1st, 2nd and 4th Respondents, through State Counsel Hussein Idris of the Attorney General Chambers, submitted in opposition to the Applicant Davis Nathan Chelogoi's Amended Chamber Summons dated 29th April 2026, contending at the outset that the same had been filed without leave of court and in flagrant breach of Order 53 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010.
37. By way of background, the Respondents narrated that the Applicant is the 1st Accused in Nairobi MCCR/E1137/2023, charged with conspiracy to defraud, forcible detainer, and forgery alongside the 2nd Interested Party, Andrew Aseri Kirungu.
38. The trial had commenced before the 2nd Respondent, Chief Magistrate Dolphina Atieno Alego, and by the time of her transfer to the Employment and Labour Relations Court, all nineteen prosecution witnesses had testified, 136 documentary exhibits had been produced, and the defence hearing had begun before the Applicant was stood down upon filing a recusal application.
39. That recusal application was dismissed, prompting the Applicant to move the High Court in HCCRREV/E145/2025, this court, in a Ruling delivered on 20th January 2026, found a breach of the spirit of Article 50 for failure to hear the recusal application, granted liberty to reopen it, but directed that the hearing "SHALL however proceed before the learned trial magistrate",
40. The respondents contend that the Ruling remains un-appealed, unvaried, and binding. Following the 2nd Respondent's transfer, the file passed briefly before the 1st Interested Party, Rose Ndombi, SPM, under a transitional arrangement, before the 1st Respondent, Chief Magistrate Lucas Onyina, held ex parte proceedings on 22nd January 2026 in the Applicant's absence and directed reallocation to the 2nd Respondent.
41. On 14th April 2026, the 1st Respondent issued a considered Ruling, applying section 200 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the Court of Appeal decisions in Eric Omondi alias Gor v Republic [2007] KECA 298 (KLR) and Abdi Adan Mohamed v Republic [2017] eKLR, together with the Chief Justice's Internal Memo of 10th July 2024, directing that the matter proceed before the 2nd Respondent to conclusion. Hearing dates were then fixed for 28th and 29th April 2026; the defence case closed on the former date, while the impugned Amended Chamber Summons was filed on the latter, without leave.
42. On the threshold procedural point, the Respondents relied on Mukisa Biscuit Manufacturing Co. Ltd v West End Distributors Ltd [1969] EA 696 for the proposition that jurisdictional defects may be raised at any stage. Walking through the architecture of Order 53 and Order 8 of the Civil Procedure Rules, they argued that the Applicant, having filed an original Chamber Summons on 24th April 2026, could not thereafter file a substantially transformed "Amended" Chamber Summons on 29th April 2026 — introducing the Attorney General as a party, expanding reliefs, adding new constitutional grounds, and invoking the Fair Administrative Action Act — without leave to amend and without a supporting affidavit, rendering it verified only in relation to the original document and thus incurably defective.
43. For this they cited Republic v Public Procurement Administrative Review Board Ex parte Cosmopolitan Strategies Ltd & 2 Others [2014] eKLR, and a string of authorities holding that amendment without leave is a nullity, including Mohamed Ahmed Jama v Kenya National Shipping Line Ltd & 2 Others [2012] eKLR (citing Wickham v D & G Murray (Commercial) Ltd [1957] 1 QB 234), Patel v Patel & Another [2013] eKLR, National Industrial Properties Ltd v Cassman Wajcman & 3 Others [2018] eKLR, Republic v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission & Another Ex parte Coalition for Reforms and Democracy [2011] eKLR, Jasbir Singh Rai v Tarlochan Singh Rai & 2 Others [2013] eKLR, and Okeyo v Okeyo [2018] eKLR.
44. The Respondents further submitted that the application had been filed in the wrong division of the High Court, despite being styled under the Criminal Division, when its own heading, reliefs, and invocation of Order 53 marked it as a judicial review matter properly belonging in the Judicial Review Division, relying on In Re Interim Independent Electoral Commission [2011] eKLR.
45. The respondents also argued misjoinder, contending that the 1st and 2nd Respondents, as judicial officers, could not be sued in their personal capacities for judicial acts, invoking the doctrine of judicial immunity under section 8 of the Judicature Act and Article 160(5) of the Constitution, and quoting Mativo, J. in Republic v RO Mbogo & Another; Alfred Ndemo Nyakundi (Interested Party) Ex parte Diana Mutheu & Another [2020] KEHC 8482 (KLR), who held that such allegations, "if well founded can be argued as grounds of appeal or grounds for recusal but not as grounds to sue the judicial officer in his personal capacity, and that such a suit "is an affront to the judicial immunity granted to judicial officers."
46. The respondents proceeding without prejudice to the preliminary objections, addressed the merits and argued that the impugned acts allocation and reallocation of the file, fixing of hearing dates, and handling of the recusal application were quintessentially judicial rather than administrative, and therefore not amenable to judicial review or the Fair Administrative Action Act, citing Kiage, JA in Judicial Service Commission v Mbalu Mutava & Another [2015] eKLR for the proposition that the High Court's supervisory jurisdiction "is not, and has never been, an avenue for re-arguing the merits of interlocutory decisions made by subordinate courts in the exercise of their judicial authority," alongside Republic v Director of Public Prosecutions & Another Ex parte Patrick Ogola [2016] eKLR, Owners of Motor Vessel "Lillian S" v Caltex Oil (Kenya) Ltd [1989] KLR 327, and Republic v Kenya National Examinations Council & Another Ex parte Gathenju High School & 9 Others [2015] eKLR.
47. On jurisdiction following transfer, the Respondents relied on Eric Omondi alias Gor v Republic [2007] KECA 298 (KLR ), citing Raphael v R [1969] EA 544, and on the Court of Appeal's holding in Abdi Adan Mohamed v Republic [2017] eKLR that "even where the trial magistrate has been transferred, arrangements ought to be made for him or her to return to the former station to complete the trial, unless in cases where only a few witnesses had testified".
48. The respondents argued that the principle applied squarely given the stage at which the proceedings had reached. They distinguished the Applicant's reliance on Chengo & 2 Others v Republic [2015] KECA 756 (KLR) as concerning an ELC Judge's appellate jurisdiction rather than a magistrate's general criminal jurisdiction, and pointed to the binding character of the Chief Justice's Internal Memo of 10th July 2024 issued under Article 161(2) of the Constitution.
49. On exhaustion of remedies, the Respondents invoked Owners of Motor Vessel "Lillian S" v Caltex Oil (Kenya) Ltd [1989] KLR 327 and Speaker of the Senate & Another v Attorney General & 4 Others [2013] eKLR, alongside Law Society of Kenya v Kenya Revenue Authority & 2 Others [2017] eKLR, arguing that the Applicant had failed to exhaust his recusal application, revisional remedies under sections 348, 354, 357, 362 and 364 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and appellate remedies under sections 348 and 382.
50. On abuse of process, the Respondents catalogued no fewer than eight parallel proceedings instituted by the Applicant on the same subject matter, including one, CRJR/E060/2025, dis missed by Angote, J. on 5th March 2026, a fact they said the Applicant had deliberately suppressed.
51. The respondents relied on the test formulated in Satya Bhama Gandhi v Director of Public Prosecutions & 3 Others [2018] KEHC 6100 (KLR), which identifies as abusive, among other things, instituting a multiplicity of actions on the same subject matter, against the same opponent, on the same issues and instituting different actions between the same parties simultaneously in different courts even though on different grounds, together with Jasbir Singh Rai v Tarlochan Singh Rai & 2 Others [2013] eKLR, Republic v Kenya Revenue Authority Ex parte Yala Trading [2001] 1 EA 197, and Republic v Public Procurement Administrative Review Board & Another Ex parte Utumishi & 3 Others [2015] eKLR, characterising the application as a disguised attempt to secure a magistrate of the Applicant's choosing.
52. The respondents further argued that the Applicant lacked an arguable case for leave, since the proceedings sought to be stayed had already concluded, invoking Matiba v Attorney General, Nairobi HCMA No. 790 of 1993, Republic v Land Dispute Tribunal Court Central Division & Another Ex parte Nzioka [2006] 1 EA 321, and Adan Abdullahi Kadiye & Another v Ex parte Yussuf Muhumed Abdi [2015] KEHC 2900 (KLR), which held that where the decision sought to be quashed has been implemented , leave ought not to operate as a stay since… there may be nothing remaining to be stayed, as well as George Philip M Wekulo v The Law Society of Kenya & Another, Kakamega HCMISCA No. 29 of 2005.
53. They also disputed the existence of any consent order allegedly made by the 1st Interested Party on 21st January 2026, relying on Republic v Registrar of Societies ex parte Justus Nyangaya & 3 Others [2005] KEHC 1854 (KLR) for the proposition that jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent.
54. On the allegations of bias, collusion, and bad faith, the Respondents submitted these were unsubstantiated and speculative, relying on Aokact Investment Ltd v Cooper Motors [2014] eKLR and Tatechad Ltd v Pannel [2001] 2 EA 49, which held that allegations of bias against a judicial officer must be substantiated by clear and convincing evidence… bias is a serious allegation, and the threshold for sustaining it is high.
55. Finally, invoking Article 159(2)(d) of the Constitution and Republic v Karoney & 8 Others Ex parte Kones [2015] eKLR, the respondents argued that the public interest and the rights of the 2nd Interested Party as complainant favoured allowing the concluded criminal trial to proceed to judgment without further delay.
56. In conclusion, the Respondents prayed that the Amended Chamber Summons be struck out as a nullity for want of leave, or in the alternative dismissed on its merits, that the unsubstantiated allegations of bias and collusion against the 1st and 2nd Respondents be struck out, and that costs be awarded to the 1st, 2nd and 4th Respondents jointly and severally.
2nd Interested Party's Submissions
57. The 2nd Interested Party opened his submissions by characterising the application as misconceived, misleading, and "full of half-truths with non-disclosure of material facts and misrepresentation of the courts record and material facts," submitting that it is an abuse of the court process and fails to meet the settled threshold for the grant of leave and stay under Order 53 of the Civil Procedure Rules and the Law Reform Act.
58. He noted that the Applicant seeks to halt an advanced criminal trial in which nineteen prosecution witnesses had testified, both accused persons had testified, and the defence case had closed with over 136 exhibits produced, such that the matter is now pending submissions and judgment, describing the application as an attempt to derail a concluded proceeding under the guise of judicial review.
59. The 2 nd Interested party posed the questions;- whether a competent judicial review application is properly before the Court absent grant of leave; whether the Applicant has satisfied the threshold for grant of leave and for leave to operate as a stay; whether the Applicant has demonstrated prejudice not addressable through ordinary appellate or revisionary mechanisms; and whether the application constitutes abuse of process and forum shopping.
60. On the first issue, the 2nd Interested Party submitted that no substantive judicial review application is before the Court, only an application for leave. He relied on Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) v National Super Alliance (NASA) Kenya & 6 others [2017] eKLR, which held that "judicial review in Kenya has Constitutional underpinning in Articles 22 and 23 as read with Article 47 of the Constitution and as operationalized through the provisions of the Fair Administrative Action Act," and that "the fusion of common law judicial review remedies into the constitutional and statutory review remedies imply that Kenya has one and not two mutually exclusive systems for judicial review.
61. A party is at liberty to choose the common law Order 53 or constitutional and statutory review procedure. It is not fatal to adopt either or both." The Court there found that the original application before it, though grounded on Order 53, also cited constitutional articles, and held that "this correctly reflects the fusion of constitutional and common law judicial review in Kenya as one system for judicial review."
62. The 2nd Interested Party submitted that because the Applicant had moved by chamber summons under Order 53 and sections 8 and 9 of the Law Reform Act, leave remained a mandatory requirement, associating himself with Chigiti, J. in Mboroki v Local Authorities Pension Trust [2026] KEHC 3884 (KLR), which in turn cited Bhojwani & another v Director of Public Prosecutions & another [2025] KEHC 16305 (KLR), holding that with the enactment of the Fair Administrative Action (Judicial Review Procedure) Rules, 2024 a new legal regime now exists giving full effect to Article 47 of the Constitution and the Fair Administrative Action Act, 2015, under which an Applicant alleging that their right to fair administrative action has been violated, denied, or threatened may directly institute judicial review proceedings without the necessity of first seeking leave of the Court. However, Chigiti, J. observed that "in the instant suit the Applicant moved the court under the Fair Administrative Action Act, 2015 but through a Notice of Motion. This places the Application under the Procedures of Order 53 of the Civil Procedure Rules where leave is a mandatory requirement, further noting that in that case the Applicant... did not invoke the provisions of The Fair Administrative Action Act.
63. On that basis, the 2nd Interested Party submitted that only the Applicant's prayer for leave, including that such leave operate as a stay, is properly before the Court, and that absent leave, no substantive judicial review application exists before the Court, and the Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain or determine any further substantive relief sought by the Applicant.
64. On the threshold for leave, reliance was placed on Matiba v Attorney General, Nairobi H.C. Misc. Application No. 790 of 1993 (Bosire, Mbogholi-Msagha & Oguk, JJ), explaining that leave exists to exclude frivolous or vexatious applications, and on Republic v Land Dispute Tribunal Court Central Division and Another Ex parte Nzioka [2006] 1 EA 321, where Nyamu, J. held that leave should be granted, if on the material available the court considers, without going into the matter in depth, that there is an arguable case for granting leave and that leave stage is a filter whose purpose is to weed out hopeless cases at the earliest possible time, thus saving the pressure on court and needless expenses for the applicant by allowing malicious and futile claims to be weeded out or eliminate so as to prevent public bodies being paralysed for months because of pending court action which might turn out to be unmeritorious.
65. The 2nd Interested Party argued that the Applicant had failed to establish an arguable case, contending that the Applicant's case rested on an incomplete and misleading presentation of facts, having failed to disclose that the 2nd Respondent had already been transferred and the file reallocated to the 1st Interested Party before the ruling of 20th January 2026, and that the subordinate court was thereafter bound to give effect to that ruling pursuant to Article 165(6) of the Constitution.
66. The 2 nd interested party further submitted that the issues raised were not new, having been substantially canvassed before the 1st Respondent through oral applications on 26th and 31st March and 9th April 2026, culminating in a reasoned ruling on 14th April 2026 that expressly addressed all the issues currently being raised before this honourable court.
67. The 2 nd interested party disputed the characterisation of the 1st Respondent as sitting on appeal over the 1st Interested Party's directions, noting that the file was initially reallocated to the 1st Interested Party through an administrative case-management process without the involvement of the litigants, and that on 21st January 2026 the court merely directed that proceedings be typed and fixed a mention date. No substantive hearing took place and no judicial determination was made affecting the rights or obligations of the parties.
68. Further, he submitted that the Applicant's complaint therefore amounts to dissatisfa
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2. The applicant complained that the learned Honorable magistrate proceeded to hear the matter yet she had been transferred to the employmet and labour relations court thus in the applicant’s view she had ceased to exercise jurisdiction over criminal matters.
3. The applicant further contended that HON Lucas Onyina, Chief Magistrate Nairobi Chief Magistrates’ Court, 1 st Respondent erroneously allocated the matter to Honorable Dolphina Alego without jurisdiction and by dint of his action removed the matter from the Honorable Rose Ndombi, Senior Principal Magistrate who had already assumed jurisdiction over the matter following the transfer of the Honorable Dolphina Alego.
Applicant's Submissions
4. In support of the Amended Notice of Motion dated 24th April 2026 and further amended on 29th April 2026, in CRJR. Case No. E035 of 2026, Nairobi, the Applicant opened his submissions with the Supreme Court's holding in Muruatetu & another v Republic; Katiba Institute & 5 others (Amicus Curiae) [2017] KESC 2 (KLR), which stated that the right to fair trial "was one of the cornerstones of a just and democratic society, without which the rule of law and public faith in the justice system would inevitably collapse."
5. By way of background, the Applicant, Davis Nathan Chelogoi, is the 1st Accused in Nairobi MCCR/E1137/2023 alongside the 2nd Interested Party, Andrew Aseri Kirungu.
6. The applicant narrated that his recusal motion against the 2nd Respondent, Hon. Dolphina Alego, filed on 21st October 2025, was summarily dismissed without a hearing, prompting review before Hon. Muteti, J. in HCCR No. E145 of 2025.
7. That a decision was rendered on 20th January 2026 and at paragraphs 86–88 the court found that "the trial magistrate did not hear the parties on the formal application for recusal and simply went on to do a Ruling on the matter," that that omission "was an irregularity that would not pass the test of the provisions of Article 50 of the Constitution," and that "the legitimate expectation on the part of the applicant would be that, upon filing of the application there would have been a hearing."
8. At paragraph 90, the Court held that "the application partially succeeds only to allow the same magistrate to reopen the recusal application for hearing should the applicant so desire."
9. Turning to the merits, on the question of the High Court's jurisdiction to entertain judicial review in criminal proceedings, the Applicant relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Communications Commission of Kenya v Royal Media Services Limited [2014] eKLR, which held at paragraph 355 that "the Constitution of 2010 has elevated the process of judicial review to a pedestal that transcends the technicalities of common law."
10. At paragraph 339, the same Court held that Article 23(3) grants the High Court power to grant appropriate relief including "a declaration of rights," "an injunction," "a conservatory order," "a declaration of invalidity of any law, an order for compensation, and an order for judicial review.
11. At paragraph 404, the Court further held that a breach of Article 47 attracts remedies in Judicial Review especially where an aggrieved person had cause to expect that the attendant aspects of fair administrative action would be adhered to, and that the court can quash any decision arrived at un-procedurally or unfairly but reserves itself no right to engage in the administrative duties of the body in question and the court went further to hold that the court must remain a court.
12. The Applicant further relied on Margaret Nyaruai Theuri v National Police Service Commission [2016] KEELRC 1024 (KLR), where Ongaya, J. held that under the constitutional provisions and in particular Articles 22 and 23, every person is entitled to seek judicial review orders.
13. The Court also considered the provisions of Article 159(2)(d) that justice should be administered without undue regard to procedural technicalities and concluded by holding that dismissing a case solely upon the manner she titled her pleadings would amount to unreasonable regard to a procedural technicalities.
14. The applicant further cited Muhura v Teachers Service Commission [2015] KEELRC 717 (KLR), where the Court held that it is possible for a litigant to apply for and pray for both compensatory relief and orders of judicial review in the same pleading and that the barrier or ridge or valley between judicial review proceedings and the ordinary actions as they were had been collapsed by the Constitution of Kenya, 2010.
15. Reliance was further placed on Kenya Human Rights Commission v Non-Governmental Organizations Co-ordination Board [2016] KEHC 5405 (KLR), where Onguto, J. held that a person whose interests and rights are likely to be affected by an administrative action has a reasonable expectation that they will be given a hearing before any adverse action is taken citing Ridge v Baldwin [1964] AC 40 and Halsbury's Laws of England for the audi alteram partem rule being a fundamental principle of justice.
16. The Court concluded that the court, effectively has a duty to look into not only the merits and legality of the decision made... but also the process and procedure adopted.
17. The applicant thus urged this court to look into not only the decision of the 1 st respondent committing the matter for trial before the Hon. Dolphina Alego SPM but also the propriety of the orders and quash the resultant proceedings.
18. The Applicant further invoked the Court of Appeal's decision in Suchan Investment Limited v Ministry of National Heritage & Culture & 3 others [2016] KECA 729 (KLR), where the court held that the law on judicial review of administrative action is now to be found not exclusively in common law but in the principles of Article 47 of the Constitution as read with the Fair Administrative Action Act of 2015.
19. The applicant further urged that Section 7(2)(l) of the Fair Administrative Action Act provides for proportionality as a ground for statutory judicial review such that the consideration of proportionality is an indication of the shift towards merit consideration in statutory judicial review applications.
20. The applicant also urged the court to consider granting a prohibition to stop further proceedings before the Hon Alego Dolphina SPM.
21. The applicant cited Republic v Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission & 2 others [2009] KECA 387 (KLR) where the court held that a prohibiting order can issue against a Magistrate in respect of criminal proceeding pending in court if... the magistrate is acting without or in excess of jurisdiction or that accused will be denied due process.
22. According to the applicant the Hon Alego SPM was acting without jurisdiction thus this court ought to stop the Hon. Magistrate from any further conduct of the matter.
23. He further quoted Lord Diplock in Attorney General v Ryan (1980) 2 All ER 608 where the court held;- “It has long been settled law that a decision affecting the legal rights of an individual which is arrived at by procedure which offends against the principles of natural justice is outside the jurisdiction of the decision-making authority."
24. On non-compliance with section 367 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the Applicant cited Mbaki & others v Macharia & another (2005) 2 EA 206, where the Court of Appeal held that the right to be heard is a valued right, and that "it would offend all notions of justice if the rights of a party were to be prejudiced or affected without the party being afforded an opportunity to be heard."
25. He relied further on Republic v Isaac Theuri Githae & Another [2007] KECA 388 (KLR), where the Court held that "the injunction against trying the accused person concerned is not against the Attorney General, but the trial court, and that order was amenable to judicial review, concluding there that there was no basis for holding that the magistrate was improperly made a respondent in this matter.
26. He also invoked Onyango v Attorney General (1986–1989) EA 456, where Nyarangi, JA held that ;- the principle of natural justice applies where ordinary people would reasonably expect those making decisions which will affect others to act fairly, and further that a decision in breach of the rules of natural justice is not cured by holding that the decision would otherwise have been right. If the principle of natural justice is violated, it matters not that the same decision would have been arrived at.
27. On the propriety of a stay of proceedings, the Applicant relied on R (H) v Ashworth Special Hospital Authority (2003) 1 WLR 12, where Dyson LJ held that the essential effect of a stay of proceedings is to suspend them, such that where the inferior court or administrative body has not yet made a final decision, then the effect of the stay will be to prevent the taking of the steps that are required for the decision to be made.
28. He further cited Ng'eny v Attorney General & another [2001] KEHC 746 (KLR ), where Kassanga Mulwa, J. held that in such a case it would be against all common sense not to grant a stay of the criminal proceedings to await the outcome of the application in the High Court, and that "the grant of leave granted in this application shall operate as a stay.
29. The applicant also relied on Republic v Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission & 2 others [2009] KECA 387 (KLR), which held that “if I do not grant a stay and the appeal were to succeed the applicant would have undergone an expensive trial which could result in his being sent to prison and thus denying him his liberty."
30. He further cited Kuria & 3 Others v Attorney General [2002] 2 KLR 69, which held that "the Court has power and indeed the duty to prohibit the continuation of the criminal prosecution if extraneous matters divorced from the goals of justice guide their instigation, and that a stay... should be granted where compelling an accused to stand trial would violate the fundamental principles of justice which underlie the society's sense of fair play and decency and/or where the proceedings are oppressive or vexatious."
31. On the revisionary jurisdiction, the applicant cited Joseph Nduvi Mbuvi v Republic [2019] KEHC 9895 (KLR) , where Odunga, J. held that "the object of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court is to enable the High Court... to correct manifest irregularities or illegalities and give appropriate directions on the manner in which the trial... should be proceeded with."
32. On the question of jurisdiction following the 2nd Respondent's transfer, the Applicant placed central reliance on the Court of Appeal's decision in Chengo & 2 others v Republic [2015] KECA 756 (KLR ), which held that "the law envisages that the judges of the two specialized courts should be different from judges of the High Court in terms of experience and specialization," and asked rhetorically, "can it be said that justice would be served to an appellant when a judge whose only flair is either in ELRC or ELC is suddenly empaneled by the Chief Justice to hear a criminal appeal?" The Court further held that "having been so appointed by the President, the Chief Justice or indeed any other entity cannot lawfully move him to hear matters reserved for the High Court," adding that "the converse is again true, judges appointed to the High Court and ELRC have no constitutional and statutory mandate to deal with ELC matters."
33. He also relied on Guantai v Chief Magistrate, Nairobi [2007] KECA 496 (KLR), which held that "the prosecution... would be oppressive and vexatious and would amount to an abuse of the process of the Court," and that "the learned trial Judge had inherent power and duty to intervene but he did not take the appropriate judicial action."
34. The same decision cited Stanley Munga Githunguri v Republic [1985] KLR 91 for the proposition that "if the prosecution amounts to an abuse of the process of the court and is oppressive and vexatious the Judge has the power to intervene," and that "the High Court has an inherent power and a duty to secure fair treatment for all persons who are brought before the court."
35. In conclusion, the Applicant submitted that, for the reasons set out, his application dated 24th April 2026, as amended on 29th April 2026, is fully merited and ought to be allowed as prayed, with costs.
The 1st, 2nd and 4th Respondents Submissions
36. The 1st, 2nd and 4th Respondents, through State Counsel Hussein Idris of the Attorney General Chambers, submitted in opposition to the Applicant Davis Nathan Chelogoi's Amended Chamber Summons dated 29th April 2026, contending at the outset that the same had been filed without leave of court and in flagrant breach of Order 53 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010.
37. By way of background, the Respondents narrated that the Applicant is the 1st Accused in Nairobi MCCR/E1137/2023, charged with conspiracy to defraud, forcible detainer, and forgery alongside the 2nd Interested Party, Andrew Aseri Kirungu.
38. The trial had commenced before the 2nd Respondent, Chief Magistrate Dolphina Atieno Alego, and by the time of her transfer to the Employment and Labour Relations Court, all nineteen prosecution witnesses had testified, 136 documentary exhibits had been produced, and the defence hearing had begun before the Applicant was stood down upon filing a recusal application.
39. That recusal application was dismissed, prompting the Applicant to move the High Court in HCCRREV/E145/2025, this court, in a Ruling delivered on 20th January 2026, found a breach of the spirit of Article 50 for failure to hear the recusal application, granted liberty to reopen it, but directed that the hearing "SHALL however proceed before the learned trial magistrate",
40. The respondents contend that the Ruling remains un-appealed, unvaried, and binding. Following the 2nd Respondent's transfer, the file passed briefly before the 1st Interested Party, Rose Ndombi, SPM, under a transitional arrangement, before the 1st Respondent, Chief Magistrate Lucas Onyina, held ex parte proceedings on 22nd January 2026 in the Applicant's absence and directed reallocation to the 2nd Respondent.
41. On 14th April 2026, the 1st Respondent issued a considered Ruling, applying section 200 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the Court of Appeal decisions in Eric Omondi alias Gor v Republic [2007] KECA 298 (KLR) and Abdi Adan Mohamed v Republic [2017] eKLR, together with the Chief Justice's Internal Memo of 10th July 2024, directing that the matter proceed before the 2nd Respondent to conclusion. Hearing dates were then fixed for 28th and 29th April 2026; the defence case closed on the former date, while the impugned Amended Chamber Summons was filed on the latter, without leave.
42. On the threshold procedural point, the Respondents relied on Mukisa Biscuit Manufacturing Co. Ltd v West End Distributors Ltd [1969] EA 696 for the proposition that jurisdictional defects may be raised at any stage. Walking through the architecture of Order 53 and Order 8 of the Civil Procedure Rules, they argued that the Applicant, having filed an original Chamber Summons on 24th April 2026, could not thereafter file a substantially transformed "Amended" Chamber Summons on 29th April 2026 — introducing the Attorney General as a party, expanding reliefs, adding new constitutional grounds, and invoking the Fair Administrative Action Act — without leave to amend and without a supporting affidavit, rendering it verified only in relation to the original document and thus incurably defective.
43. For this they cited Republic v Public Procurement Administrative Review Board Ex parte Cosmopolitan Strategies Ltd & 2 Others [2014] eKLR, and a string of authorities holding that amendment without leave is a nullity, including Mohamed Ahmed Jama v Kenya National Shipping Line Ltd & 2 Others [2012] eKLR (citing Wickham v D & G Murray (Commercial) Ltd [1957] 1 QB 234), Patel v Patel & Another [2013] eKLR, National Industrial Properties Ltd v Cassman Wajcman & 3 Others [2018] eKLR, Republic v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission & Another Ex parte Coalition for Reforms and Democracy [2011] eKLR, Jasbir Singh Rai v Tarlochan Singh Rai & 2 Others [2013] eKLR, and Okeyo v Okeyo [2018] eKLR.
44. The Respondents further submitted that the application had been filed in the wrong division of the High Court, despite being styled under the Criminal Division, when its own heading, reliefs, and invocation of Order 53 marked it as a judicial review matter properly belonging in the Judicial Review Division, relying on In Re Interim Independent Electoral Commission [2011] eKLR.
45. The respondents also argued misjoinder, contending that the 1st and 2nd Respondents, as judicial officers, could not be sued in their personal capacities for judicial acts, invoking the doctrine of judicial immunity under section 8 of the Judicature Act and Article 160(5) of the Constitution, and quoting Mativo, J. in Republic v RO Mbogo & Another; Alfred Ndemo Nyakundi (Interested Party) Ex parte Diana Mutheu & Another [2020] KEHC 8482 (KLR), who held that such allegations, "if well founded can be argued as grounds of appeal or grounds for recusal but not as grounds to sue the judicial officer in his personal capacity, and that such a suit "is an affront to the judicial immunity granted to judicial officers."
46. The respondents proceeding without prejudice to the preliminary objections, addressed the merits and argued that the impugned acts allocation and reallocation of the file, fixing of hearing dates, and handling of the recusal application were quintessentially judicial rather than administrative, and therefore not amenable to judicial review or the Fair Administrative Action Act, citing Kiage, JA in Judicial Service Commission v Mbalu Mutava & Another [2015] eKLR for the proposition that the High Court's supervisory jurisdiction "is not, and has never been, an avenue for re-arguing the merits of interlocutory decisions made by subordinate courts in the exercise of their judicial authority," alongside Republic v Director of Public Prosecutions & Another Ex parte Patrick Ogola [2016] eKLR, Owners of Motor Vessel "Lillian S" v Caltex Oil (Kenya) Ltd [1989] KLR 327, and Republic v Kenya National Examinations Council & Another Ex parte Gathenju High School & 9 Others [2015] eKLR.
47. On jurisdiction following transfer, the Respondents relied on Eric Omondi alias Gor v Republic [2007] KECA 298 (KLR ), citing Raphael v R [1969] EA 544, and on the Court of Appeal's holding in Abdi Adan Mohamed v Republic [2017] eKLR that "even where the trial magistrate has been transferred, arrangements ought to be made for him or her to return to the former station to complete the trial, unless in cases where only a few witnesses had testified".
48. The respondents argued that the principle applied squarely given the stage at which the proceedings had reached. They distinguished the Applicant's reliance on Chengo & 2 Others v Republic [2015] KECA 756 (KLR) as concerning an ELC Judge's appellate jurisdiction rather than a magistrate's general criminal jurisdiction, and pointed to the binding character of the Chief Justice's Internal Memo of 10th July 2024 issued under Article 161(2) of the Constitution.
49. On exhaustion of remedies, the Respondents invoked Owners of Motor Vessel "Lillian S" v Caltex Oil (Kenya) Ltd [1989] KLR 327 and Speaker of the Senate & Another v Attorney General & 4 Others [2013] eKLR, alongside Law Society of Kenya v Kenya Revenue Authority & 2 Others [2017] eKLR, arguing that the Applicant had failed to exhaust his recusal application, revisional remedies under sections 348, 354, 357, 362 and 364 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and appellate remedies under sections 348 and 382.
50. On abuse of process, the Respondents catalogued no fewer than eight parallel proceedings instituted by the Applicant on the same subject matter, including one, CRJR/E060/2025, dis missed by Angote, J. on 5th March 2026, a fact they said the Applicant had deliberately suppressed.
51. The respondents relied on the test formulated in Satya Bhama Gandhi v Director of Public Prosecutions & 3 Others [2018] KEHC 6100 (KLR), which identifies as abusive, among other things, instituting a multiplicity of actions on the same subject matter, against the same opponent, on the same issues and instituting different actions between the same parties simultaneously in different courts even though on different grounds, together with Jasbir Singh Rai v Tarlochan Singh Rai & 2 Others [2013] eKLR, Republic v Kenya Revenue Authority Ex parte Yala Trading [2001] 1 EA 197, and Republic v Public Procurement Administrative Review Board & Another Ex parte Utumishi & 3 Others [2015] eKLR, characterising the application as a disguised attempt to secure a magistrate of the Applicant's choosing.
52. The respondents further argued that the Applicant lacked an arguable case for leave, since the proceedings sought to be stayed had already concluded, invoking Matiba v Attorney General, Nairobi HCMA No. 790 of 1993, Republic v Land Dispute Tribunal Court Central Division & Another Ex parte Nzioka [2006] 1 EA 321, and Adan Abdullahi Kadiye & Another v Ex parte Yussuf Muhumed Abdi [2015] KEHC 2900 (KLR), which held that where the decision sought to be quashed has been implemented , leave ought not to operate as a stay since… there may be nothing remaining to be stayed, as well as George Philip M Wekulo v The Law Society of Kenya & Another, Kakamega HCMISCA No. 29 of 2005.
53. They also disputed the existence of any consent order allegedly made by the 1st Interested Party on 21st January 2026, relying on Republic v Registrar of Societies ex parte Justus Nyangaya & 3 Others [2005] KEHC 1854 (KLR) for the proposition that jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent.
54. On the allegations of bias, collusion, and bad faith, the Respondents submitted these were unsubstantiated and speculative, relying on Aokact Investment Ltd v Cooper Motors [2014] eKLR and Tatechad Ltd v Pannel [2001] 2 EA 49, which held that allegations of bias against a judicial officer must be substantiated by clear and convincing evidence… bias is a serious allegation, and the threshold for sustaining it is high.
55. Finally, invoking Article 159(2)(d) of the Constitution and Republic v Karoney & 8 Others Ex parte Kones [2015] eKLR, the respondents argued that the public interest and the rights of the 2nd Interested Party as complainant favoured allowing the concluded criminal trial to proceed to judgment without further delay.
56. In conclusion, the Respondents prayed that the Amended Chamber Summons be struck out as a nullity for want of leave, or in the alternative dismissed on its merits, that the unsubstantiated allegations of bias and collusion against the 1st and 2nd Respondents be struck out, and that costs be awarded to the 1st, 2nd and 4th Respondents jointly and severally.
2nd Interested Party's Submissions
57. The 2nd Interested Party opened his submissions by characterising the application as misconceived, misleading, and "full of half-truths with non-disclosure of material facts and misrepresentation of the courts record and material facts," submitting that it is an abuse of the court process and fails to meet the settled threshold for the grant of leave and stay under Order 53 of the Civil Procedure Rules and the Law Reform Act.
58. He noted that the Applicant seeks to halt an advanced criminal trial in which nineteen prosecution witnesses had testified, both accused persons had testified, and the defence case had closed with over 136 exhibits produced, such that the matter is now pending submissions and judgment, describing the application as an attempt to derail a concluded proceeding under the guise of judicial review.
59. The 2 nd Interested party posed the questions;- whether a competent judicial review application is properly before the Court absent grant of leave; whether the Applicant has satisfied the threshold for grant of leave and for leave to operate as a stay; whether the Applicant has demonstrated prejudice not addressable through ordinary appellate or revisionary mechanisms; and whether the application constitutes abuse of process and forum shopping.
60. On the first issue, the 2nd Interested Party submitted that no substantive judicial review application is before the Court, only an application for leave. He relied on Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) v National Super Alliance (NASA) Kenya & 6 others [2017] eKLR, which held that "judicial review in Kenya has Constitutional underpinning in Articles 22 and 23 as read with Article 47 of the Constitution and as operationalized through the provisions of the Fair Administrative Action Act," and that "the fusion of common law judicial review remedies into the constitutional and statutory review remedies imply that Kenya has one and not two mutually exclusive systems for judicial review.
61. A party is at liberty to choose the common law Order 53 or constitutional and statutory review procedure. It is not fatal to adopt either or both." The Court there found that the original application before it, though grounded on Order 53, also cited constitutional articles, and held that "this correctly reflects the fusion of constitutional and common law judicial review in Kenya as one system for judicial review."
62. The 2nd Interested Party submitted that because the Applicant had moved by chamber summons under Order 53 and sections 8 and 9 of the Law Reform Act, leave remained a mandatory requirement, associating himself with Chigiti, J. in Mboroki v Local Authorities Pension Trust [2026] KEHC 3884 (KLR), which in turn cited Bhojwani & another v Director of Public Prosecutions & another [2025] KEHC 16305 (KLR), holding that with the enactment of the Fair Administrative Action (Judicial Review Procedure) Rules, 2024 a new legal regime now exists giving full effect to Article 47 of the Constitution and the Fair Administrative Action Act, 2015, under which an Applicant alleging that their right to fair administrative action has been violated, denied, or threatened may directly institute judicial review proceedings without the necessity of first seeking leave of the Court. However, Chigiti, J. observed that "in the instant suit the Applicant moved the court under the Fair Administrative Action Act, 2015 but through a Notice of Motion. This places the Application under the Procedures of Order 53 of the Civil Procedure Rules where leave is a mandatory requirement, further noting that in that case the Applicant... did not invoke the provisions of The Fair Administrative Action Act.
63. On that basis, the 2nd Interested Party submitted that only the Applicant's prayer for leave, including that such leave operate as a stay, is properly before the Court, and that absent leave, no substantive judicial review application exists before the Court, and the Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain or determine any further substantive relief sought by the Applicant.
64. On the threshold for leave, reliance was placed on Matiba v Attorney General, Nairobi H.C. Misc. Application No. 790 of 1993 (Bosire, Mbogholi-Msagha & Oguk, JJ), explaining that leave exists to exclude frivolous or vexatious applications, and on Republic v Land Dispute Tribunal Court Central Division and Another Ex parte Nzioka [2006] 1 EA 321, where Nyamu, J. held that leave should be granted, if on the material available the court considers, without going into the matter in depth, that there is an arguable case for granting leave and that leave stage is a filter whose purpose is to weed out hopeless cases at the earliest possible time, thus saving the pressure on court and needless expenses for the applicant by allowing malicious and futile claims to be weeded out or eliminate so as to prevent public bodies being paralysed for months because of pending court action which might turn out to be unmeritorious.
65. The 2nd Interested Party argued that the Applicant had failed to establish an arguable case, contending that the Applicant's case rested on an incomplete and misleading presentation of facts, having failed to disclose that the 2nd Respondent had already been transferred and the file reallocated to the 1st Interested Party before the ruling of 20th January 2026, and that the subordinate court was thereafter bound to give effect to that ruling pursuant to Article 165(6) of the Constitution.
66. The 2 nd interested party further submitted that the issues raised were not new, having been substantially canvassed before the 1st Respondent through oral applications on 26th and 31st March and 9th April 2026, culminating in a reasoned ruling on 14th April 2026 that expressly addressed all the issues currently being raised before this honourable court.
67. The 2 nd interested party disputed the characterisation of the 1st Respondent as sitting on appeal over the 1st Interested Party's directions, noting that the file was initially reallocated to the 1st Interested Party through an administrative case-management process without the involvement of the litigants, and that on 21st January 2026 the court merely directed that proceedings be typed and fixed a mention date. No substantive hearing took place and no judicial determination was made affecting the rights or obligations of the parties.
68. Further, he submitted that the Applicant's complaint therefore amounts to dissatisfa
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