Skip to content
JudgmentCUP OF JOE LIMITED VS TEA BOARD OF KENYA AND PRINCIPAL SECRETARY STATE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE21 min read

CUP OF JOE LIMITED VS TEA BOARD OF KENYA AND PRINCIPAL SECRETARY STATE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

High Court at Milimani High Court · · R. E. Aburili

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA AT NAIROBI

JUDICIAL REVIEW DIVISION

JUDICIAL REVIEW APPLICATION NO. E363 OF 2025

CUP OF JOE LIMITED…………………...……………………APPLICANT

VERSUS

TEA BOARD OF KENYA……………………………….1 ST RESPONDENT

THE PRINCIPAL SECRETARY STATE DEPARTMENT

FOR AGRICULTURE…………………………………...2 ND RESPONDENT

AND

EAST AFRICA TEA TRADE ASSOCIATION……INTERESTED PARTY

JUDGMENT

1. This Judgment determines the Originating Motion dated 18 th November, 2025 brought under the provisions of Articles 22, 23 and 47 of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010; Sections 2, 4, 7, 9(4), 11 of the Fair Administrative Actions Act and Rules 11, 13 and 14 of the Fair Administrative Actions Rules,2024.

2. The applicant seeks the following orders:

a. (spent) This application be certified urgent and be heard on priority basis in the first instance;

b. (spent) Pending hearing and determination of this application inter partes, a conservatory order do issue suspending the implementation of the Letter from the 2 nd Respondent dated 18 th July 2025 reference no. MOALF/LCD/9/29/1 and the Letter from the 1 st Respondent dated 28 th August 2025 reference no. TBK/RLS/1;

c. (spent) Pending hearing and determination of this application inter partes, an order be and is hereby issued lifting the ban and allowing the applicant herein to participate in all the trade platforms, auctions and logistical systems administered by the Respondents;

d. (spent) Pending hearing and determination of this application inter partes, a conservatory order does issue suspending the implementation of the Letter from the 1 st Interested Party dated 11 th August 2025;

e. Under Article 23 of the Constitution, the Court does grant the following or other appropriate judicial review reliefs:

i. A declaration that the decision communicated by the 2 nd Respondent dated 18 th July 2025 vide a Letter reference no. MOALF/LCD/9/29/1 offends Article 10, 27, 47 and 50 of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010 and Section 65 (c) of the Tea Act and is therefore invalid.

ii. A declaration that the decision communicated by the 1 st Respondent dated 28 th August 2025 vide a Letter reference no. TBK/RLS/1 offends Article 10, 27, 47 and 50 of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010 and Section 65 (c) of the Tea Act and is therefore invalid.

iii. An Order of Prohibition restraining the Respondents and Interested Party from enforcing the decisions of 18 th July 2025 and 28 th August 2025 and of reference no. MOALF/LCD/9/29/1 and TBK/RLS/1 respectively.

iv. An Order of Certiorari bringing to this Court and quashing the Respondents’ decisions of 18 th July 2025 and 28 th August 2025 and of reference no. MOALF/LCD/9/29/1 and TBK/RLS/1 respectively.

v. An Order of Mandamus does issue compelling the Respondents to issue the Applicant with a renewed certificate of registration for the year 2024/2025 in strict compliance with section 41 of the Tea Act.

vi. An Order of Mandamus does issue compelling the 1 st Respondent to conduct a fresh Compliance Inspection and allow the Applicant to lodge an application for renewal of certificate of registration for the year 2025/2026.

3. The originating Motion is predicated on the grounds on the face of the application and supported by the annexed affidavit sworn by Joseph Kamau Kiminda on 18 th November, 2025.

4. The applicant’s case is that on 8 th May 2023, the Chief Executive Officer of the 1 st Respondent issued a circular vide a Letter referenced as Ref: TBK/RLS/1 to all Tea Industry Chain Players including but not limited to Tea importers and Exporters notifying them to apply for renewal of their licenses and/or registration certificates.

5. That on 6 th June 2024, pursuant to the aforesaid notice, the Applicant initiated its application for renewal of its certificate of registration via the portal: https://imis.teaboard.or.ke as directed by the 1 st Respondent and paid the applicable fee of Kes. 10,000. Later, on 19 th June 2024, a Compliance Inspection was conducted by the 1 st Respondent as a prerequisite to the renewal of the certificate of registration. That the Applicant was found to be fully compliant and was graded 100% compliant.

6. That on 18 th January 2025, the Applicant wrote a letter to the 1 st Respondent decrying a significant obstacle in getting its shipment permits approvals as a result of a deferral of its certificate of registration renewal application.

7. Additionally, that on 23 rd July 2025, the Chief Executive Officer of the 1 st Respondent wrote a Letter to the Managing Director of the Applicant notifying him of alleged Trade malpractices which allegedly involve the Applicant buying and exporting Tea without a valid registration certificate, and alleged trade malpractices with Ms. Debshe E Sabz Gostar a company based in Iran. The Applicant was consequently invited for a meeting at the 1 st Respondent’s Offices on 8 th August 2025.

8. It is stated that during the aforesaid meeting, the Applicant was made aware of a Letter dated 18 th July 2025 from the 2 nd Respondent; a Letter referenced Ref: MOALF/LCD/9/29/1 to the Chief Executive Officer of the 1 st Respondent where he was being directed to cancel Tea Trade Licenses for the Applicant on alleged Tea Trade irregularities conducted between Kenya and the Islamic Republic of Iran by the Applicant.

9. According to the applicant, the said Tea Trade irregularities between the Applicant and the government of the Islamic republic of Iran are said to be grossly unfounded. It is asserted that in Judicial Review Application No. E051 of 2021: Republic versus Commissioner General Kenya Revenue Authority & 2 others Ex parte Cup of Joe Limited , Justice John Mativo (as he then was) on an Application for Review of the decision of the Respondents’ declining to release the consignment held at the Regional Logistics Centre at Changamwe quashed the decision holding that the decision violated the ex parte applicant’s right to fair administrative action. This consignment, according to the applicant, forms the basis of the Letter by the 2 nd Respondent dated 18 th July 2025 directing the 1 st Respondent to cancel the certificate of registration of the Applicant herein as a tea buyer/ exporter/importer hence the letter dated 28 th July 2025 issued by the 2 nd respondent cancelling the applicant’s registration certificate.

10. Further, that on 15 th August 2025, the Chief Executive Officer of the 1 st Respondent wrote a Letter to the Managing Director of the Applicant forwarding a summary of issues discussed at the hearing with the ad hoc committee on 8 th August 2025, after which the Applicant was granted 7 days to respond to the said issues.

11. That on 21 st August 2025, the Applicant wrote a Letter to the Chief Executive Officer of the 1 st Respondent and the Chief Executive Officer of the 1 st Interested Party responding to the summary of issues raised against the Applicant.

12. That on 28 th August 2025, the Chief Executive Officer of the 1 st Respondent wrote a Letter to the Managing Director of the Applicant notifying it of the Board’s decision to revoke its certificate of registration for breach of the provisions of the Tea Act. This alleged decision was communicated to the Applicant on 7 th November 2025.

13. The Applicant laments that the 1 st Respondent never issued the Applicant with written reasons why it refused to issue it with the 2024/2025 certificate of registration which it purported to be revoking in the first place. This, according to the Applicant, was despite the clear provisions of Section 65 of the Tea Act that give a time limit of sixty days, within which the Board ought to communicate its decision on an enforcement action initiated on its own motion.

14. The Applicant asserts that the 1 st Respondent’s purported meeting on 8 th August 2025 with the Applicant was inconsequential since the 2 nd Respondent by fiat had issued it with an irregular, unprocedural and unlawful directive to revoke the Applicant’s certificate of registration without according the Applicant a fair hearing as stipulated under Article 50 of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010.

15. It is averred that the 2 nd Respondent pursuant to Section 7 of the Tea Act is a member of the 1 st Respondent, hence by already issuing a directive to the 1 st Respondent, the meeting Board was grossly impartial.

16. The Applicant therefore challenges the decision of the Respondents for infringing on its economic rights as well as right to Fair Administrative Action and right to fair hearing. The Applicant claims that it has been subjected to a grossly flawed and irregular process and has been unlawfully denied a registration certificate for the year 2024/2025 despite being fully compliant with the stipulations under the Tea Act.

17. The Applicant contends that the decision by the Respondents impinges on its right to fair administrative action under Article 47 of the Constitution as it was never furnished with the reasons for denial of renewal of its tea buying and export registration certificate which is supposed to be issued by the 1 st Respondent, contrary to Section 41 of the Tea Act.

18. The Applicant claims that it was never furnished with the alleged complaint against it leading to denial of renewal of its tea buying and export registration certificate contrary to section 62-68 of the Tea Act.

19. It also claims that it was never furnished with authenticated laboratory test samples showing that the tea it imported and exported was of low grade as communicated in the letter by the Respondents.

20. The Applicant asserts that the said decision by the Respondents exposes the Applicant to imminent closure, interruption and disruption of business operations, loss of contracts, and immense reputational damage.

21. It contends that Kenya is the third world’s largest exporter of tea, and the world’s leading exporter of black tea. Disruption of legitimate exporters like the Applicant has immeasurable economic effects such as reduced export volumes, reduced export tonnage, loss of foreign exchange earnings, weakening of forex inflows, reduced auction and trade settlement revenues and erosion of investor confidence. Therefore, that the respondents’ action will plunge the country into economic loss, reputational loss, market displacement, policy credibility erosion and loss of foreign exchange and rural livelihoods.

22. It avers that State power exercised brutely and unlawfully creates a systemic risk, and not merely an individual risk. Kenya’s Tea Industry Market is founded on predictability, regulatory integrity, and buyer confidence. Arbitrary cancellation and opaque enforcement actions create investor uncertainty, reduced confidence among international commodity buyers and market volatility due to regulatory unpredictability. That this damages the country’s position against rising competitors such as Sri Lanka, India and Vietnam and that it also leads to disruption of strategic Trade relations and loss of preferential bilateral access. Loss of major buyer portfolios have a ripple effect in Kenya’s performance in the international market.

23. Further, that State power unlawfully exercised also has a ripple effect on smallholder economy. Over 650,000 small-scale farmers depend on tea income. A disrupted supply chain results in reduced farm gate prices, delayed payments through private buyers and processors, low bonus dividends and increased rural poverty and potential social unrest and that the Respondents’ actions affect livelihoods beyond the Applicant.

24. The respondents filed separate replying affidavits vehemently opposing the originating Motion and the applicant was granted leave of court to file a further affidavit to counter the assertions and all the parties filed written submissions to canvass the Originating Motion and this court has considered all the issues discussed in those submissions, together with the authorities supplied, whether constitutional, statutory or judicial pronouncements supplied to this Court.

25. The parties also framed issues for determination. I however find only one main issue for determination and that is, whether this Court exercising judicial Review Jurisdiction is the right court for the judicial review reliefs sought.

26. This issue, I am aware, is being raised by this Court sua sponte. Sua Sponte or suo motu is a Latin term meaning "of one's own will." Sua sponte refers to action taken by the court without the prompting of the parties, and if the court becomes aware that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a case, it may raise the issue sua sponte and dismiss the lawsuit even though the litigants did not present the issue for consideration.

27. It follows that the issue of jurisdiction must be attended to at the onset of the suit and the court may, on its own motion, examine whether it has jurisdiction to hear and determine the suit and should it find that it has no jurisdiction, it must down its tools and say no more. This is o, considering that the Court is deemed to know the law and jurisdictional issues being pure points of law, parties ought to first be satisfied that the subject matter of the dispute is one that falls within jurisdiction of the Court before initiating those proceedings. On the other hand, the Court must be satisfied that it has jurisdiction to entertain the dispute before delving into the merits thereof.

28. In Bakery Confectionery Food Manufacturing & Allied Workers Union (K) v Wrigley Company (East Africa) Limited & another (Civil Appeal 459 of 2019) [2025] KECA 2021 (KLR) (28 November 2025) (Judgment) the Court of Appeal quite recently acknowledged that the Court on its own motion can raise the question of its jurisdiction and deal with it immediately. The Court of Appeal stated as follows at paragraph 44 of the Judgment:

“44. Limitation is a classic preliminary point. Once a party, or thecourt on its own motion, raises a question of jurisdiction, itmust be addressed immediately since any decision madewithout jurisdiction is liable to be set aside ex debito justitiae. As this Court affirmed in the well-known decision of Owners ofthe Motor Vessel “Lillian S” v Caltex Oil (Kenya) Ltd [1989] eKLR, jurisdiction is everything, and where a court lacks it, it must down its tools.”

29. In the Owners of Motor Vessel “Lilian S” v Caltex Oil K. Ltd, the Court of Appeal stated as follows at paragraph 7:

“7 . A question of jurisdiction once raised by a party or by a court on its own motion must be decided forthwith on the evidence before the court. It was immaterial whether the evidence was scanty or limited. Scanty or limited facts constituted the evidence before the court. A party who failed to question the jurisdiction of a court may not be heard to raise the issue after the matter was heard and determined. There were no grounds as to why a question of jurisdiction could not be raised during the proceedings. As soon as that was done, the court should hear and dispose of that issue without further ado.”

30. In Barclays Bank of Kenya vs Pyritic Guards Limited [2015] eKLR , the Court of Appeal stated that:

“It is also trite law that a point of law can be raised at any stage, even though not raised before the court of first instance. The Court can also on its own motion raise a point of law at any point and make a determination based on the same even where such point has not been canvassed by the parties. The learned judge did not therefore do anything outrageous by raising the issue of non-compliance with Regulation 79 of Table A of the Companies Act and acting on it.” (Emphasis added)

[37] It is, therefore a basic rule of procedure that jurisdiction must exist when the proceedings are initiated. Because the question of jurisdiction is so fundamental, a limitation on the authority of the court, it can be raised at any stage of the proceedings by any party or even by the court suo motu. As a matter of practice, this Court has a duty of jurisdictional inquiry to satisfy itself that it is properly seized of any matter before it.

[38] It is a settled legal proposition that conferment of jurisdiction is a legislative function and it can only be conferred by the Constitution or statute. It cannot be conferred by judicial craft. See Samuel Kamau Macharia & Another v Kenya commercial Bank & 2 Others, SC Application No. 2 of 2011; [2012] eKLR. Nor can parties, by consent confer on a court power it does not have.”

31. In the Matter of Advisory Opinions of the Court under Article 163 of the Constitution (Constitutional Application No. 2 of 2011 at para. 30), the Supreme Court stated:

“...a court may not arrogate to itself jurisdiction through the craft of interpretation or by way of endeavors to discern or interpret the intentions of Parliament, where the legislation is clear and there is no ambiguity.”

32. In Samuel Kamau Macharia & Another vs. Kenya Commercial Bank & 2 Others, Supreme Court Civil Appeal (Application) No. 2 of 2011, the Supreme Court rendered itself as follows regarding a Court’s jurisdiction:

“A court’s jurisdiction flows from either the Constitution or legislation or both. Thus, a court of law can only exercise jurisdiction as conferred by the Constitution or other written law. It cannot arrogate itself jurisdiction exceeding that which is conferred upon it by law. Where the Constitution exhaustively provides for the jurisdiction of a court of law, the court must operate within the constitutional limits. It cannot expand its jurisdiction through judicial craft or innovation.”

33. In Karisa Chengo & 2 Others –vs- Republic (Criminal Appeal No.s 44, 45 and 76 of 2014 (2015) EKLR, the Court of Appeal had this to say on the question of jurisdiction:-

“However, before that, we should reiterate that jurisdiction is a fundamental principle in the dispensation of justice. The Supreme Court in the recent decision of Re the Matter of Interim Independent Electoral Commission stated that:-

“Assumption of jurisdiction by the courts is a subject regulated by the Constitution, by statute law and by principles laid down in judicial precedent. The classical decision in this regard is the Owners of Motor Vessel “Lilian S” –vs- Caltex Oil (Kenya) Ltd (1989) KLR 1, which bears the following passage (Nyarangi J.A. at Paragraph 14): I think that it is reasonably plain that a question of jurisdiction ought to be raised at the earliest opportunity and the court seized of the matter is then obliged to decide the issue right away on the material before it. Jurisdiction is everything. Without it, a court has no power to make one more step. (30) The Lilian ‘S’ Case establishes that jurisdiction flows from the law, and the recipient court may not arrogate to itself jurisdiction through the craft of interpretation or by way of endeavors to discern or interpret the intentions of Parliament, where the wording of Legislation is clear and there is no ambiguity. In the case of the Supreme Court, their respective jurisdictions are donated by the Constitution.”

34. In the instant case, the applicant seeks for various judicial review orders under Article 23 of the Constitution namely:

i. A declaration that the decision communicated by the 2nd Respondent dated 18th July 2025 vide a Letter reference no. MOALF/LCD/9/29/1 offends Article 10, 27, 47 and 50 of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010 and Section 65 (c) of the Tea Act and is therefore invalid.

ii. A declaration that the decision communicated by the 1st Respondent dated 28th August 2025 vide a Letter reference no. TBK/RLS/1 offends Article 10, 27, 47 and 50 of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010 and Section 65 (c) of the Tea Act and is therefore invalid.

iii. An Order of Prohibition restraining the Respondents and Interested Party from enforcing the decisions of 18th July 2025 and 28th August 2025 and of reference no. MOALF/LCD/9/29/1 and TBK/RLS/1 respectively.

iv. An Order of Certiorari bringing to this Court and quashing the Respondents’ decisions of 18th July 2025 and 28th August 2025 and of reference no. MOALF/LCD/9/29/1 and TBK/RLS/1 respectively.

v. An Order of Mandamus does issue compelling the Respondents to issue the Applicant with a renewed certificate of registration for the year 2024/2025 in strict compliance with section 41 of the Tea Act.

vi. An Order of Mandamus does issue compelling the 1st Respondent to conduct a fresh Compliance Inspection and allow the Applicant to lodge an application for renewal of certificate of registration for the year 2025/2026 .

35. The Applicant has cited several provisions of the Constitution, the Fair Administrative Action Act and the Tea Act, which provisions were allegedly violated by the respondents in their communication to the Applicant vide the two impugned letters of 18 th July 2025 and 28 th August 2025, delivered to the Applicant on 7 th November, 2025.

36. The applicant’s main complaint is that the respondents revoked its registration certificate for the 2024/2025 and that it had not been enabled to apply for renewal of the 2025/2026 registration certificate.

37. Part VIII of the Tea Act deals with– COMPLAINTS AND INVESTIGATION PROCEDURE.

38. Section 62 concerns Complaint and investigation against a licensee and it stipulates as follows:

(1)A person who is aggrieved by or is likely to be aggrieved by the contravention of any provision of this Act by a licensee may file a complaint requesting the Board to enforce the provisions of this Act against that licensee.

(2)The complainant shall, in the complaint,—

(a)cite the specific provisions of this Act that the licensee has contravened or is likely to contravene;

(b)state the facts relating to the alleged contravention or likely contravention; and

(c)attach any documents relevant to the complaint.

(3) The Board shall provide a written response to the complainant within fifteen days of receipt of a complaint.

(4)The Board may by written notification to the complainant, extend the review of the complaint by up to thirty days where it determines that a complaint raises—

(a)a novel issue whose disposition requires the Board to consider an issue that it has not previously addressed; or

(b)a complex issue whose disposition requires the Board to obtain significant factual information to resolve a difficult legal, factual or policy issue.

(5)The Board may dismiss a complaint if—

(a)the complainant fails to show that it has been injured, or is likely to be injured as a direct result of the alleged contravention of the provisions of this Act as cited in the complaint;

(b)the factual allegations in the complaint are unsupported or are without merit;

(c)the factual allegations in the complaint, even if proven to be true, do not constitute a contravention of this Act or the regulations made thereunder; or(d)it concludes that the exercise of its enforcement discretion would not be appropriate.

(6)Where the Board dismisses a complaint, it shall notify the complainant and provide a written explanation.

(7)Where the Board admits a complaint, it shall issue a written notification to the licensee complained of and the complainant indicating—(

a)the specific provisions of this Act that the licensee has been alleged to contravene; and(b)reasonable details of the alleged facts constituting the contravention.

(8)A licensee that is the subject of a complaint shall, within fifteen days of receipt of the notification from the Board, submit a response providing the basis on which it disputes the allegations of contravention.

(9)The Board shall, subject to section 68 on confidentiality, provide copies of all documents filed by each party to the other party.(10)The Board may—

(a)allow the filing of additional responses by the parties;

(b)upon application and for good reasons, extend time for the filing of any documents or replies by the parties to the complaint;

(c)request the complainant or the licensee complained of to submit additional information at any time during the course of the enforcement proceedings; or

(d)direct an independent audit or appropriate investigation of the operations and books of account of a licensee to obtain information relevant to the complaint.

39. Section 63 is on withdrawal of complaint and the section provides:

(1)A complainant may, at any time and with reasons, withdraw its complaint in writing addressed to the Board and the licensee complained of.

(2)The withdrawal of a complaint shall not preclude the Board from taking enforcement action on its own motion in the public interest.

40. On the other hand, section 64 is on d ecision on a complaint and it provides as follows:

(1) The Board shall issue its decision on a complaint within sixty days of receiving all necessary information.

(2) Where necessary, the Board may, by written notice to the parties and before the expiry of the sixty-day review period, extend the time and specify the date by which it shall issue its decision.

41. Further, section 65 is on e nforcement action and it states:

(1) Where the Board intends to commence an enforcement action against a licensee on its own motion, the Board shall—

(a)notify the licensee and clearly indicate the specific provisions of this Act the licensee is alleged to have contravened;

(b)allow the licensee at least fifteen days to respond in writing with a clear statement, supported by documents, affidavits, or other relevant materials, providing the basis on which the licensee disputes the allegation; and

(c)issue its decision within sixty days of receiving all necessary information.

(2) Where necessary, the Board may, by written notice to the licensee and before the expiry of the sixty-day review period, extend the time and specify the date by which it shall issue its decision.

42. Section 66 provides for Interim directive as follows:

(1) At any time during an enforcement proceeding, the Board may issue an interim directive to a licensee to cease and desist from any specified conduct.

(2)In determining whether to issue an interim directive the Board shall consider whether—

(a)there is prima facie evidence that the licensee has contravened the provision of this Act;

(b)continuation of the licensee's conduct is likely to cause serious harm to other licensees, consumers or the general public;

(c)the potential harm of allowing the licensee to continue its conduct outweighs the burden on the licensee of ceasing the conduct; and

(d)issuance of the interim directive is in the public interest.

34. On Enforcement measures , section 67 provides that:

(1) Where the Board determines that a licensee has contravened any provision of this Act, the Board may take such enforcement measures as it considers appropriate, including—

(a)issuing a written warning to the licensee;

(b)directing the licensee to cease engaging in conduct that is, or if continued will constitute, a contravention of any provision of this Act;

(c)directing the licensee to take specific remedial action;

(d)declaring any agreement or contract void;

(e)imposing a financial penalty relative to the period that the breach persists; or

(f) suspension or cancellation of the licence issued under this Act.

(2)A person aggrieved by the decision of the Board under this section may appeal to the High Court.

43. According to the applicant, the respondents did not comply with the above provisions in their decision to revoke its registration certificate as a licensee and that no written reasons were given for their decision which is impugned herein hence the provisions of the Tea Act was violated. The provisions that I have reproduced above concern complaints against a licensee and the determination by the 1 st respondent together with enforcement process.

44. Under section 67 (2), the Act is clear that (2)A person aggrieved by the decision of the Board under this section may appeal to the High Court.

45. A reading of the letters complained of issued on 18 th July and 28 th August 2025 shows that the respondents gave reasons for such revocation of the registration certificate of the applicant as a tea buyer/ exporter/importer, which revocation followed a meeting on 8/8/2025 and correspondence, and vide the letters 23 rd July and 15 th August, 2025, the 1 st respondent supplied the applicant with a comprehensive list of issues raised against the applicant, upon which the applicant responded vide its letter of 21 st August 2025.

46. As to the adequacy of the reasons contained in the said correspondence culminating in the revocation of the certificate of registration or the refusal to allow the applicant to access the online portal for application for renewal of the license, is not for this Court to determine and hence, the appeal mechanism provided for under section 67(2) of the Tea Act. I say so, considering that Part IX – MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS of the Tea Act at section 69 provides for Arbitration of disputes and the section provides that: A party who is not satisfied with the decision of the Board may, within thirty days, appeal to a Court of competent jurisdiction.

47. Further, under PART III of the Act on Regulatory Provisions and under section 39, the Act sets out the considerations for licensing . Section 40 is on conditions of a license while section 41 on applications for renewal of a license. At section 42, the Act provides for situations that may lead to revocation of a license, in the opinion of the Board.

48. Ultimately, Section 44 of the Tea Act provides for Appeals to the High Court by an applicant for or holder of a licence who is aggrieved by a decision of the Board in respect of the grant, refusal, renewal, variation or revocation, the conditi
[...truncated]

Details

Delivered
Court rank
High Court

Related decisions

Published for information only — not legal advice. Check the official record before relying on this text. Talk to an advocate