1. Before court for determination is the Applicant’s Chamber Summons Application dated 28.05.2026, expressed to be brought under Rule 11(2) of the Advocates (Remuneration) Order. It is based on the grounds on the face of it and supported by the affidavit of Muguro Irungu, Advocate, and seeks the following orders:
i) Spent…
ii) That leave be granted to the Applicant to file its reference out of time
iii) That the entire decision of the taxing master issued on the 27th April 2026 be set aside
iv) That this Honourable court moves to tax the bill and or move the bill to another taxing master for assessment.
v) That costs of this application be provided for.
2. The Applicant avers that through a judgment delivered on 27.04.2026, the Small Claims court (SCC) in SCCCOMM No. E98381 of 2025 awarded the it costs of Kshs.5,000/-.
3. Subsequent to the delivery of the said judgment and award of costs, the Applicant filed an application for review before the SCC on the believe that the costs awarded reflected an error apparent on the face of the record.
4. The review application was dismissed summarily on the 15.05.2026. The Applicant’s contention was that the costs awarded were way too minimal and not commensurate to the work done and neither do they dignify the profession of an advocate.
5. Thereafter, the Applicant filed a Notice of Objection dated 28.05.2026 seeking an explanation on the costs awarded.
6. It is the Applicant’s position that whereas the taxing master has discretion to award costs, that discretion must be exercised judiciously.
7. The Applicant therefore urged this court to grant the prayers sought in the interest of justice
8. The Respondent opposed the Application through the Replying Affidavit sworn by the Isaac Chege, the Ag.CEO, on 17.06.2026. It is his averment that the procedure for challenging a decision on costs or taxation is expressly provided for under Paragraph 11 of the Advocates Remuneration Order (ARO) and parties are bound to strictly comply with the same.
9. The Respondent avers that under Paragraph 11(1) of the ARO, any party dissatisfied with the decision of a taxing officer is required within fourteen (14) days of the decision to issue a written Notice of Objection to the taxing officer specifying the items objected to.
10. The deponent further avers that the judgment giving rise to the present proceedings was delivered on 27.04.2026 and the Applicant was therefore required to lodge a Notice of Objection on or before 11th May 2026 if indeed it intended to challenge the award on costs.
11. The Respondent avers that the purported Notice of Objection dated 28.05.2026 is therefore incurably defective, invalid and incapable of founding a competent reference before this Honourable Court.
12. In addition, the Respondent states that the Applicant has failed to establish any legal or factual basis warranting the setting aside, variation or disturbance of the award on costs.
13. The Respondent further avers that the present application is devoid of merit, constitutes an abuse of the Court process and ought to be dismissed with costs.
14. The Application was canvased orally by Counsel on record for the parties on 18.06.2026.
15. Learned Counsel for the Applicant placed reliance on the following Authorities to urge that courts have discretion to enlarge time for a party to file a reference out of time: Solomon Mwinzi Mwau-v-Westend Butchery Ltd,Misc E250 of 2025 and Kangemi Rumwe Women Group –v- Agwara and Mutegi Advocates, Misc E258 of 2024.
16. The Applicant has maintained that sufficient reasons have been given to explain the delay in filing the reference out of time and that the delay in question is not so unreasonable as to prejudice the Respondent. That more importantly, the delay is neither intentional nor malicious.
17. The Applicant has equally maintained that under Schedule VII (Party & Party Bill of Costs) the minimum costs that can be awarded is Kshs.45,000. An award of Kshs.5,000 is low and not commensurate to work done by Counsel.
18. On his part, Counsel for the Respondent reiterated that Paragraph 11(1) of the Advocates Remuneration Order provides that a party dissatisfied by a decision of the taxing officer is required to write on specific items opposed to the taxing officer.
19. The Respondent states that the Applicant adopted an unknown procedure which is wanting and as such the Application has no basis.
20. The Respondent has maintained that costs are discretionary on the part of the taxing officer and urged that the application be dismissed.
Analysis and Determination
21. I have considered the Chamber Summons’ Application, the grounds relied upon; the facts deponed to in the supporting affidavit and Replying affidavit in opposition and the competing oral submissions by learned Counsel on record and the cited authorities.
22. It is clear that the prayers sought are for extension and or enlargement of time for filing a reference against the award of costs by the Adjudicator in SCCCOMM/E98381/2025 and further that the costs of ksh.5000/- awarded be set aside and costs be re-assessed by this court or matter remitted for taxation by a different taxing master.
23. The discretionary power of the court in enlarging time required for filing a reference is provided for under Paragraph 11(4) of the Advocates Remuneration Order. The entirety of Paragraph 11 reads as follows:
“(1) Should any party object to the decision of the taxing officer, he may within fourteen days after the decision give notice in writing to the taxing officer of the items of taxation to which he objects.
(2) The taxing officer shall forthwith record and forward to the objector the reasons for his decision on those items and the objector may within fourteen days from the receipt of the reasons apply to a judge by Chamber Summons, which shall be served on all the parties concerned, setting out the grounds of his objection.
(3) Any person aggrieved by the decision of the judge upon any objection referred to such judge under subparagraph (2) may, with the leave of the judge but not otherwise, appeal to the Court of Appeal.
(4) The High Court shall have power in its discretion by order to enlarge the time fixed by subparagraph (1) or subparagraph (2) far the taking of any step; application for such an order may be made by chamber summons upon giving to every other interested party not less than three clear days’ notice in writing or as the Court may direct, and may be so made notwithstanding that the time sought to be enlarged may have already expired.
24. It is settled that whether or not to grant an extension of time lies with the discretion of the court. In Leo Sila Mutiso v Rose Hellen Wangari Mwangi, (Civil Application No Nai 255 of 1997) (unreported), the Court expressed itself thus:
“It is now well settled that the decision whether or not to extend the time for appealing is essentially discretionary. It is also well settled that in general the matters which this court takes into account in deciding whether to grant an extension of time are: first, the length of the delay: secondly, the reason for the delay: thirdly (possibly), the chances of the appeal succeeding if the application is granted: and, fourthly, the degree of prejudice to the respondent if the application is granted.”
25. Further to the foregoing, it is settled that a reference is by and large an appeal, against a decision rendered by a taxing officer. Consequently, the general principles governing the enlargement or extension of time for filing an appeal would apply here. The said principles were laid out by the Supreme Court in the case of Salat v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission & 7 others [2014] KESC 12 (KLR) as follows;
“1. Extension of time is not a right of any party. It is an equitable remedy that is only available to a deserving party at the discretion of the court;
2. A party who seeks for extension of time has the burden of laying a basis to the satisfaction of the court;
3. Whether the court should exercise the discretion to extend time, is a consideration to be made on a case- to-case basis;
4. Whether there is a reasonable reason for the delay. The delay should be explained to the satisfaction of the court;
5. Whether there will be any prejudice suffered by the Respondent if the extension is granted;
6. Whether the application has been brought without undue delay.
7. ......”
26. On the period of delay, the legal principle is that both the duration and explanation of delay are key considerations in determining whether to extend time. This position was reaffirmed by the Court of Appeal in Patrick Wanyonyi Khaemba v Teachers Service Commission & 2 Others [2019] eKLR where it was held that:
“The law does not set out any minimum or maximum period of delay. All it states is that any delay should be explained, hence a plausible and satisfactory explanation for delay is the key that unlocks the court’s flow of discretionary favour. There have to be valid and clear reasons, upon which discretion can be favourably exercisable……”
27. That said, it is apparent that the instant Application was filed on or about the 28th May, 2026.The Small Claim Court’s judgment that awarded costs subject of this application was delivered on 27.04.2026. The delay, while it is clearly out of the prescribed time of 14 days to file a reference, cannot be described to be inordinate.
28. I have likewise considered the reasons given by the Applicant to explain the said delay in filing a reference, alongside the opposing averments by the Respondent.
29. Upon perusal of the record, it is apparent that the Applicant filed an application for review of the awarded costs before the trial court. The application dated 11.05.2026, was filed ostensibly for reasons that there was an error apparent on the face of the record.
30. The Applicant therefore chose the option to pursue a review of the lower court decision on costs as opposed to filing a Notice of Objection and preferring a reference in the manner provided for under paragraph 11 of the Advocates Remuneration Order.
31. In addition to explaining the reasons for the delay in filing a reference out of time, the Applicant must also satisfy the court that extension of time if granted, will not prejudice the Respondent. In this case no such prejudice has been exhibited to exist.
32. On whether the intended reference raises arguable grounds or issues, the Court of Appeal in Vishva Stone Suppliers Company Limited v RSR Stone [2006] Limited [2020] KECA 361 (KLR) stated that “an arguable appeal need not (be one that will) succeed so long as it raises a bona fide issue for determination by the Court.” The Court proceeded to lay emphasis on the right of appeal in the following manner:
“Turning to the request to allow the applicant to exercise his now undoubted constitutionally underpinned right of appeal, the position is crystalized in the case of Richard Ncharpi Leiyagu vs. IEBC & 2 Others (supra); Mbaki & Others vs. Macharia & Another [2005] 2EA 206; and the Tanzanian case of Abbas Sherally & Another vs. Abdul Fazaiboy, Civil Application No. 33 of 2003; for the holding inter alia that:
(i) the right to a hearing is not only constitutionally entrenched but it is also the corner stone of the Rule of law;
(ii) the right to be heard is a valued right; and
(iii) that the right of a party to be heard before adverse action or decision is taken against such a party is so basic that a decision which is arrived at in violation of it will be nullified, even if the same decision would have been reached had the party been heard, because, the violation is considered to be a breach of natural justice;…”
33. From a reading of the supporting affidavit to this application and the attachments thereto, it is clear that the Applicant is challenging the decision of the Adjudicator on the basis that he erred by allegedly failing to apply the ordinary scale; by failing to apply the appropriate Schedule; and by arriving at an inordinately low figure as costs, among others. In my view, this would ordinarily constitute a bona fide issue for determination.
34. The above notwithstanding, the court notes that the proceedings subject of this application emanates from the Small Claims Court.
35. Section 32 of the Small Claims Court Act, mandates that the Small Claims court must aim to resolve disputes quickly and cheaply. The SCC is about cost effectiveness and affordability of justice. In the strict sense and while fully aware that the SCC has no own Remuneration order, the issue of costs would not ordinarily be subjected to scale under schedule VII of the Advocates Remuneration Order(ARO). Costs are therefore left to the discretion of the Adjudicator to determine in the manner provided for under the Act.
36. Section.33 of the Small Claims Court Act, deals with costs of proceedings before that Court. It states as follows:
33 (1) The Court may award costs to the successful party in any proceedings.
(2) In any other case parties shall bear their respective costs of the proceedings.
(3) Without prejudice to subsections (1) and (2), the Court may award to a successful party disbursements incurred on account of the proceedings.
(4) Except as provided in subsection (2), costs other than disbursements, shall not be granted to or awarded against any party to any proceedings before a Court.
37. The Small Claims Court Rules further provide guidance on recovery of costs under Section 33 above. It states as follows:
Rules 37. ‘In assessing costs recoverable under section 33(1) of the Act, the Court shall be guided by the Second Schedule to these Rules’
38. In addition, Section 38 of the Small Claims Court Act, 2016, provides that any person aggrieved by a final decree or order of the Small Claims Court may appeal directly to the High Court
39. From the foregoing it would appear the Applicant adopted the wrong procedure to challenge the discretionary costs awarded by the Adjudicator.
40. And assuming that filing a review Application before the Adjudicator was the right thing to do, then the outcome of that application becomes relevant in progressing the Applicant’s dissatisfaction with the assessed costs.
41. The question that must arise is: If the Small Claims Court (SCC) in exercise of its judicial discretion disallowed the application to review costs, what would be the remedy for a dissatisfied party? Noting the outcome of the review application, the only available avenue for the Applicant was to appeal that ruling. Adopting the current procedure to seek extension of time and orders to set aside the Adjudicator’s order on the award of costs would only serve to circumvent the outcome of the SCC ruling on the review application.
42. In the foregoing I find no reason to discuss in this ruling the merits or otherwise of the intended reference. The question on whether the sum of ksh.5,000/- awarded by the Adjudicator in exercise of his judicial discretion can only be challenged on appeal upon dismissal of the application for review.
43. In addition, and as explained above the procedure to challenge the award of costs by the Small Claims Court has not properly been invoked.
44. In the upshot I make a finding that the Chamber Summons Application dated 28th May, 2026 is without merit and the same is dismissed with costs to the Respondent.
DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED AT NAIROBI THIS 2ND DAY OF JULY 2026, VIRTUALLY THROUGH THE TEAMS MICROSOFT PLATFORM.
KENNEDY KANDET
JUDGE
IN THE PRESENCE OF:
IRUNGU FOR THE APPLICANT
NO APPEARANCE FOR THE RESPONDENT
COURT ASSISTANT: AGGREY OC
i) Spent…
ii) That leave be granted to the Applicant to file its reference out of time
iii) That the entire decision of the taxing master issued on the 27th April 2026 be set aside
iv) That this Honourable court moves to tax the bill and or move the bill to another taxing master for assessment.
v) That costs of this application be provided for.
2. The Applicant avers that through a judgment delivered on 27.04.2026, the Small Claims court (SCC) in SCCCOMM No. E98381 of 2025 awarded the it costs of Kshs.5,000/-.
3. Subsequent to the delivery of the said judgment and award of costs, the Applicant filed an application for review before the SCC on the believe that the costs awarded reflected an error apparent on the face of the record.
4. The review application was dismissed summarily on the 15.05.2026. The Applicant’s contention was that the costs awarded were way too minimal and not commensurate to the work done and neither do they dignify the profession of an advocate.
5. Thereafter, the Applicant filed a Notice of Objection dated 28.05.2026 seeking an explanation on the costs awarded.
6. It is the Applicant’s position that whereas the taxing master has discretion to award costs, that discretion must be exercised judiciously.
7. The Applicant therefore urged this court to grant the prayers sought in the interest of justice
8. The Respondent opposed the Application through the Replying Affidavit sworn by the Isaac Chege, the Ag.CEO, on 17.06.2026. It is his averment that the procedure for challenging a decision on costs or taxation is expressly provided for under Paragraph 11 of the Advocates Remuneration Order (ARO) and parties are bound to strictly comply with the same.
9. The Respondent avers that under Paragraph 11(1) of the ARO, any party dissatisfied with the decision of a taxing officer is required within fourteen (14) days of the decision to issue a written Notice of Objection to the taxing officer specifying the items objected to.
10. The deponent further avers that the judgment giving rise to the present proceedings was delivered on 27.04.2026 and the Applicant was therefore required to lodge a Notice of Objection on or before 11th May 2026 if indeed it intended to challenge the award on costs.
11. The Respondent avers that the purported Notice of Objection dated 28.05.2026 is therefore incurably defective, invalid and incapable of founding a competent reference before this Honourable Court.
12. In addition, the Respondent states that the Applicant has failed to establish any legal or factual basis warranting the setting aside, variation or disturbance of the award on costs.
13. The Respondent further avers that the present application is devoid of merit, constitutes an abuse of the Court process and ought to be dismissed with costs.
14. The Application was canvased orally by Counsel on record for the parties on 18.06.2026.
15. Learned Counsel for the Applicant placed reliance on the following Authorities to urge that courts have discretion to enlarge time for a party to file a reference out of time: Solomon Mwinzi Mwau-v-Westend Butchery Ltd,Misc E250 of 2025 and Kangemi Rumwe Women Group –v- Agwara and Mutegi Advocates, Misc E258 of 2024.
16. The Applicant has maintained that sufficient reasons have been given to explain the delay in filing the reference out of time and that the delay in question is not so unreasonable as to prejudice the Respondent. That more importantly, the delay is neither intentional nor malicious.
17. The Applicant has equally maintained that under Schedule VII (Party & Party Bill of Costs) the minimum costs that can be awarded is Kshs.45,000. An award of Kshs.5,000 is low and not commensurate to work done by Counsel.
18. On his part, Counsel for the Respondent reiterated that Paragraph 11(1) of the Advocates Remuneration Order provides that a party dissatisfied by a decision of the taxing officer is required to write on specific items opposed to the taxing officer.
19. The Respondent states that the Applicant adopted an unknown procedure which is wanting and as such the Application has no basis.
20. The Respondent has maintained that costs are discretionary on the part of the taxing officer and urged that the application be dismissed.
Analysis and Determination
21. I have considered the Chamber Summons’ Application, the grounds relied upon; the facts deponed to in the supporting affidavit and Replying affidavit in opposition and the competing oral submissions by learned Counsel on record and the cited authorities.
22. It is clear that the prayers sought are for extension and or enlargement of time for filing a reference against the award of costs by the Adjudicator in SCCCOMM/E98381/2025 and further that the costs of ksh.5000/- awarded be set aside and costs be re-assessed by this court or matter remitted for taxation by a different taxing master.
23. The discretionary power of the court in enlarging time required for filing a reference is provided for under Paragraph 11(4) of the Advocates Remuneration Order. The entirety of Paragraph 11 reads as follows:
“(1) Should any party object to the decision of the taxing officer, he may within fourteen days after the decision give notice in writing to the taxing officer of the items of taxation to which he objects.
(2) The taxing officer shall forthwith record and forward to the objector the reasons for his decision on those items and the objector may within fourteen days from the receipt of the reasons apply to a judge by Chamber Summons, which shall be served on all the parties concerned, setting out the grounds of his objection.
(3) Any person aggrieved by the decision of the judge upon any objection referred to such judge under subparagraph (2) may, with the leave of the judge but not otherwise, appeal to the Court of Appeal.
(4) The High Court shall have power in its discretion by order to enlarge the time fixed by subparagraph (1) or subparagraph (2) far the taking of any step; application for such an order may be made by chamber summons upon giving to every other interested party not less than three clear days’ notice in writing or as the Court may direct, and may be so made notwithstanding that the time sought to be enlarged may have already expired.
24. It is settled that whether or not to grant an extension of time lies with the discretion of the court. In Leo Sila Mutiso v Rose Hellen Wangari Mwangi, (Civil Application No Nai 255 of 1997) (unreported), the Court expressed itself thus:
“It is now well settled that the decision whether or not to extend the time for appealing is essentially discretionary. It is also well settled that in general the matters which this court takes into account in deciding whether to grant an extension of time are: first, the length of the delay: secondly, the reason for the delay: thirdly (possibly), the chances of the appeal succeeding if the application is granted: and, fourthly, the degree of prejudice to the respondent if the application is granted.”
25. Further to the foregoing, it is settled that a reference is by and large an appeal, against a decision rendered by a taxing officer. Consequently, the general principles governing the enlargement or extension of time for filing an appeal would apply here. The said principles were laid out by the Supreme Court in the case of Salat v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission & 7 others [2014] KESC 12 (KLR) as follows;
“1. Extension of time is not a right of any party. It is an equitable remedy that is only available to a deserving party at the discretion of the court;
2. A party who seeks for extension of time has the burden of laying a basis to the satisfaction of the court;
3. Whether the court should exercise the discretion to extend time, is a consideration to be made on a case- to-case basis;
4. Whether there is a reasonable reason for the delay. The delay should be explained to the satisfaction of the court;
5. Whether there will be any prejudice suffered by the Respondent if the extension is granted;
6. Whether the application has been brought without undue delay.
7. ......”
26. On the period of delay, the legal principle is that both the duration and explanation of delay are key considerations in determining whether to extend time. This position was reaffirmed by the Court of Appeal in Patrick Wanyonyi Khaemba v Teachers Service Commission & 2 Others [2019] eKLR where it was held that:
“The law does not set out any minimum or maximum period of delay. All it states is that any delay should be explained, hence a plausible and satisfactory explanation for delay is the key that unlocks the court’s flow of discretionary favour. There have to be valid and clear reasons, upon which discretion can be favourably exercisable……”
27. That said, it is apparent that the instant Application was filed on or about the 28th May, 2026.The Small Claim Court’s judgment that awarded costs subject of this application was delivered on 27.04.2026. The delay, while it is clearly out of the prescribed time of 14 days to file a reference, cannot be described to be inordinate.
28. I have likewise considered the reasons given by the Applicant to explain the said delay in filing a reference, alongside the opposing averments by the Respondent.
29. Upon perusal of the record, it is apparent that the Applicant filed an application for review of the awarded costs before the trial court. The application dated 11.05.2026, was filed ostensibly for reasons that there was an error apparent on the face of the record.
30. The Applicant therefore chose the option to pursue a review of the lower court decision on costs as opposed to filing a Notice of Objection and preferring a reference in the manner provided for under paragraph 11 of the Advocates Remuneration Order.
31. In addition to explaining the reasons for the delay in filing a reference out of time, the Applicant must also satisfy the court that extension of time if granted, will not prejudice the Respondent. In this case no such prejudice has been exhibited to exist.
32. On whether the intended reference raises arguable grounds or issues, the Court of Appeal in Vishva Stone Suppliers Company Limited v RSR Stone [2006] Limited [2020] KECA 361 (KLR) stated that “an arguable appeal need not (be one that will) succeed so long as it raises a bona fide issue for determination by the Court.” The Court proceeded to lay emphasis on the right of appeal in the following manner:
“Turning to the request to allow the applicant to exercise his now undoubted constitutionally underpinned right of appeal, the position is crystalized in the case of Richard Ncharpi Leiyagu vs. IEBC & 2 Others (supra); Mbaki & Others vs. Macharia & Another [2005] 2EA 206; and the Tanzanian case of Abbas Sherally & Another vs. Abdul Fazaiboy, Civil Application No. 33 of 2003; for the holding inter alia that:
(i) the right to a hearing is not only constitutionally entrenched but it is also the corner stone of the Rule of law;
(ii) the right to be heard is a valued right; and
(iii) that the right of a party to be heard before adverse action or decision is taken against such a party is so basic that a decision which is arrived at in violation of it will be nullified, even if the same decision would have been reached had the party been heard, because, the violation is considered to be a breach of natural justice;…”
33. From a reading of the supporting affidavit to this application and the attachments thereto, it is clear that the Applicant is challenging the decision of the Adjudicator on the basis that he erred by allegedly failing to apply the ordinary scale; by failing to apply the appropriate Schedule; and by arriving at an inordinately low figure as costs, among others. In my view, this would ordinarily constitute a bona fide issue for determination.
34. The above notwithstanding, the court notes that the proceedings subject of this application emanates from the Small Claims Court.
35. Section 32 of the Small Claims Court Act, mandates that the Small Claims court must aim to resolve disputes quickly and cheaply. The SCC is about cost effectiveness and affordability of justice. In the strict sense and while fully aware that the SCC has no own Remuneration order, the issue of costs would not ordinarily be subjected to scale under schedule VII of the Advocates Remuneration Order(ARO). Costs are therefore left to the discretion of the Adjudicator to determine in the manner provided for under the Act.
36. Section.33 of the Small Claims Court Act, deals with costs of proceedings before that Court. It states as follows:
33 (1) The Court may award costs to the successful party in any proceedings.
(2) In any other case parties shall bear their respective costs of the proceedings.
(3) Without prejudice to subsections (1) and (2), the Court may award to a successful party disbursements incurred on account of the proceedings.
(4) Except as provided in subsection (2), costs other than disbursements, shall not be granted to or awarded against any party to any proceedings before a Court.
37. The Small Claims Court Rules further provide guidance on recovery of costs under Section 33 above. It states as follows:
Rules 37. ‘In assessing costs recoverable under section 33(1) of the Act, the Court shall be guided by the Second Schedule to these Rules’
38. In addition, Section 38 of the Small Claims Court Act, 2016, provides that any person aggrieved by a final decree or order of the Small Claims Court may appeal directly to the High Court
39. From the foregoing it would appear the Applicant adopted the wrong procedure to challenge the discretionary costs awarded by the Adjudicator.
40. And assuming that filing a review Application before the Adjudicator was the right thing to do, then the outcome of that application becomes relevant in progressing the Applicant’s dissatisfaction with the assessed costs.
41. The question that must arise is: If the Small Claims Court (SCC) in exercise of its judicial discretion disallowed the application to review costs, what would be the remedy for a dissatisfied party? Noting the outcome of the review application, the only available avenue for the Applicant was to appeal that ruling. Adopting the current procedure to seek extension of time and orders to set aside the Adjudicator’s order on the award of costs would only serve to circumvent the outcome of the SCC ruling on the review application.
42. In the foregoing I find no reason to discuss in this ruling the merits or otherwise of the intended reference. The question on whether the sum of ksh.5,000/- awarded by the Adjudicator in exercise of his judicial discretion can only be challenged on appeal upon dismissal of the application for review.
43. In addition, and as explained above the procedure to challenge the award of costs by the Small Claims Court has not properly been invoked.
44. In the upshot I make a finding that the Chamber Summons Application dated 28th May, 2026 is without merit and the same is dismissed with costs to the Respondent.
DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED AT NAIROBI THIS 2ND DAY OF JULY 2026, VIRTUALLY THROUGH THE TEAMS MICROSOFT PLATFORM.
KENNEDY KANDET
JUDGE
IN THE PRESENCE OF:
IRUNGU FOR THE APPLICANT
NO APPEARANCE FOR THE RESPONDENT
COURT ASSISTANT: AGGREY OC