1. The petitioner commenced proceedings through a Petition and Notice of Motion dated 16th March 2026, supported by affidavits sworn on 16th March, 30th March, and 12th May 2026. He challenges the 1st respondent’s directive of 10th March 2026 placing Trident Insurance Company Ltd, Corporate Insurance Company Ltd, and KUSCCO Mutual Assurance Ltd under statutory management and advising policyholders to seek alternative covers.
2. He seeks conservatory orders restraining the 1st respondent from treating pre 10 March 2026 policies as invalid, orders compelling the Inspector General to recognise those policies, declarations affirming their continued validity, and compensation for alleged constitutional violations.
3. The petitioner asserts that the directive was arbitrary and unconstitutional, violating property rights, economic and social rights, consumer rights, and fair administrative action. He states he held a valid Trident policy (No. 010/070/767875/2023) yet received no individualized notice explaining the abrupt cancellation.
4. He narrates that on 13th March 2026, police officers harassed him for allegedly driving without valid insurance, forcing him to plead for leniency and purchase temporary cover. He argues this demonstrates the immediate legal exposure created by the directive.
5. The petitioner contends that the 1st respondent lacked contractual capacity to invalidate private insurance contracts, and breached its statutory duty by allowing insurers to collect premiums despite long standing weaknesses.
6. He argues that section 67C(2)(i) must be exercised within constitutional bounds, and that statutory management does not automatically cancel existing contracts. He relies on Citadel General Assurance Co. v Lloyds Bank Canada [1997] 3 SCR 805 to assert that premiums constitute trust funds held for policyholders.
7. The petitioner maintains that the public notices were not safeguards but instruments of exposure, and that cancellation of operating licences without individualized notice violated Article 47. He argues that a public notice cannot extinguish specific property rights.
8. He asserts that the 1st respondent knew of the insurers’ weaknesses for years but failed to provide structured transition, contrary to section 3A(1)(ha) of the Insurance Act.
9. He invokes vested rights, arguing that having paid premiums and received a certificate valid until 18 October 2026, he possessed a constitutionally protected property interest.
10. The petitioner alleges confiscation of premiums without indemnity, violates Article 40, and rejects the argument of frustration by operation of law, asserting that the regulator acted belatedly and abruptly.
11. He argues that judicial recognition of the policies would shield policyholders from police harassment and compel the statutory manager to honour contracts. He contends that the directive violated legitimate expectation, and that section 19 cannot justify leaving citizens without mandatory insurance. He argues that the Policyholders Compensation Fund is an end stage remedy and cannot cure immediate exposure to arrest or loss of indemnity.
12. He faults the 1st respondent for failing to distinguish operational capital from policyholder premiums, asserting that reliance on the Insurance (Capital Adequacy) Guidelines, 2017cannot supersede constitutional protections.
13. He states that the public perceived the notices as invalidating policies, and that judicial precedents cited by the 1st respondent are distinguishable. He relies on Mrao Ltd v First American Bank of Kenya Ltd [2003] KLR to assert a prima facie case.
14. The 1st respondent, through affidavits sworn on 26 March and 5 May 2026, asserts that statutory management was lawfully invoked under section 67C(2)(i) due to persistent weaknesses in the insurers’ solvency, governance, capital adequacy, reinsurance arrangements, and risk management.
15. It explains that statutory management suspends ordinary management, cancels operating licences, and bars entry into new contracts. Public notices were issued to inform policyholders and prevent exposure. The 1st respondent argues that individualized notice was impractical and early disclosure would have triggered a destabilizing run on assets, harming policyholders. It cites statutory safeguards including moratoriums and compensation through the Policyholders Compensation Fund under section 179 and section 179(2A)(a).
16. It rejects the petitioner’s claim of deprivation of property, asserting that contracts were frustrated by insolvency, not cancelled arbitrarily. Policyholders become creditors entitled to lodge claims with statutory managers or liquidators. The respondent argues that recognising policies from insolvent insurers would be unsafe and contrary to public interest, exposing accident victims to uncompensated losses.
17. It highlights years of supervisory engagement, directives to recapitalize, and opportunities for remediation. It cites Law Society of Kenya v Insurance Regulatory Authority & 3 others; Kiki Investments Ltd & 2 others (Interested Parties) [2022] KEHC 11091 (KLR) affirming the constitutionality of section 67C.
18. It asserts that it acted lawfully, in good faith, and within its mandate to protect policyholders and the public. It argues that the petitioner has not challenged the legality of statutory provisions nor shown that statutory criteria were unmet. It contends that freezing statutory management powers would contravene section 19 and undermine regulatory oversight. It adds that police enforce the Traffic Act read with the Insurance (Motor Vehicle Third Party Risks) Act. It argues that section 45 applies only to long term insurance, and that premiums are actuarially determined sums covering claims, management expenses, commissions, and shareholder profit, not trust funds.
19. It notes that compliance reports are regularly published, and that reliance on Muinde & another v IRA & 2 others; KBU 400 A & 2 others (Interested Parties) [2022] KEHC 568 (KLR) is misplaced because the judgment was stayed by the Court of Appeal in Insurance Regulatory Authority v Muinde & 3 others [2023] KECA 422 (KLR).
20. Finally, argues that the petition fails the Anarita Karimi Njeru v Republic [1979] eKLR precision test, reaffirmed in Mumo Matemu v Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance [2013] eKLR , and cites decisions upholding statutory management, including Misc. Application No. 238 of 2017 – Godfrey Kiptum v BlueShield Insurance Company Ltd & Others and JR Misc. Application No. E043 of 2026 – Republic v IRA, Policyholders Compensation Fund, Trident Insurance Co. Ltd (Interested Party), Ex parte Emmanuel Oriedo Makanga & Andrew Makaku Mulogoli .
21. It asserts that granting the orders would prejudice public interest, citing Re Xplico Insurance Company Limited (Under Statutory Management) [2026] KEHC 4143 (KLR) , and notes that the Insurance Appeals Tribunal Misc. Application No. 2 of 2026 – Trident Insurance Company Ltd v IRA upheld statutory management as lawful and reasonable.
22. The 2nd and 3rd respondents oppose the petition through grounds of opposition dated 30th March 2026, asserting that the petitioner has not demonstrated any illegal action or omission attributable to them. They argue that no evidence shows the Inspector General instructed officers based on the public notices, and that alternative forums such as the **Independent Policing Oversight Authority** exist for complaints against police conduct. They maintain that the material before the Court discloses no basis for interim orders against them and urge dismissal of the petition and application with costs.
ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION
23. The Petition herein is hinged on the Public Notice issued by the Ist respondent on 10th March 2026 notifying the Public that Trident Insurance Company Limited, Corporate Insurance Company Limited and KUSCCO Mutual Assurance Limited had been placed under statutory management. There were 3 separate but identical notices. I reproduce the one that relates to Trident Insurance Company Limited for ease of reference.
PUBLIC NOTICE
TRIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED- PLACEMENT UNDER STATUTORY MANAGEMENT
1. The Insurance Regulatory Authority has with effect from 10 th March 2026, placed Trident Insurance Company Limited under Statutory Management as per Section 67C(2)(i) of the Insurance Act.
2. The Authority has appointed the Policy Holders Compensation Fund (PCF) as the Statutory Manager for Trident Insurance Company Limited.
3. Trident Insurance Company Limited is not authorised to enter into any new insurance contracts from 11 th March 2026
4. The Insurer’s existing Policyholders are advised to immediately seek alternative covers from other licensed insurers to ensure that there is no unnecessary exposure.
5. The Policyholders Compensation Fund will compensate the affected claimants as provided for under the Insurance Act, Cap 487 Laws of Kenya.
COMMISSIONER OF INSURANCE
10 th March 2026
24. The statutory mandate of the 1 st respondent to place insurance companies under management pursuant to Section 67C of the Act has been affirmed by the Court in the case of Law Society of Kenya v Insurance Regulatory Authority & 3 others; Kiki Investments Ltd & 2 others (Interested Parties) [2022] KEHC 11091 (KLR) where the Court declared-
[117] In my view, the impugned provisions are necessary in the interest of the public to uphold sound regulation in the insurance sector. It is my humble finding therefore that Section 67C (2)(i),67C(3) and 67C(10) of the Insurance Act are constitutional and do not violate Articles 35, 40, 46, 47, 48 and 50(1) of the Constitution.
25. Therefore the question that properly falls for determination is not the constitutionality of Section 67C of the Insurance Act or any of its related provisions. Rather, it is whether the Commissioner exercised the statutory mandate conferred by that section in a manner consistent with the Constitution. Before the Court can interrogate that substantive question, it must first address the preliminary and foundational issues raised by the respondents concerning the competence of the Petition and the jurisdiction of this Court. These issues are not peripheral; they go to the very authority of the Court to entertain the matter and must therefore be resolved at the outset. The issues for determination can therefore be framed as follows-
1aa Whether the petition meets the threshold for a constitutional petition?
1ab Whether the petition offends the doctrine of exhaustion?
1ac Arising from (a) and ( b) above whether the rights of the Petitioner were violated as alleged?
1ad What are the consequential orders?
a) Whether the petition meets the threshold for a constitutional petition?
26. Rule 10 of the Constitution of Kenya (Protection of Rights and Fundamental Freedoms) Practice and Procedure Rules, 2013 prescribes the Form that a Petition must take, setting out the requirement for specificity and precision. This test was first articulated in the precedent setting case of Anarita Karimi Njeru vs Republic [1979] eKLR as follows:
We would, however, again stress that if a person is seeking redress from the High Court on a matter which involves a reference to the Constitution, it is important (if only to ensure that justice is done to his case) that he should set out with a reasonable degree of precision that of which he complains, the provisions said to be infringed, and the manner in which they are alleged to be infringed.
27. The Supreme Court expounded further in Communications Commission of Kenya & 5 others v Royal Media Services Limited & 5 others [2014] eKLR as follows:
“[349] …. Although Article 22(1) of the Constitution gives every person the right to initiate proceedings claiming that a fundamental right or freedom has been denied, violated or infringed or threatened, a party invoking this Article has to show the rights said to be infringed, as well as the basis of his or her grievance. This principle emerges clearly from the High Court decision in Anarita Karimi Njeru v. Republic, (1979) KLR 154: the necessity of a link between the aggrieved party, the provisions of the Constitution alleged to have been contravened, and the manifestation of contravention or infringement. Such a principle plays a positive role, as a foundation of conviction and good faith, in engaging the constitutional process of dispute settlement…”
28. In Mumo Matemu v Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance & 5 others [2013] eKLR the Court of Appeal in affirming the decision in Anarita stated;
“…The principle in Anarita Karimi Njeru (supra) that established the rule that requires reasonable precision in framing of issues in constitutional petitions is an extension of this principle. What Jessel, M.R said in 1876 in the case of Thorp v Holdsworth (1876) 3 Ch. D. 637 at 639 holds true today:
The whole object of pleadings is to bring the parties to an issue, and the meaning of the rules…was to prevent the issue being enlarged, which would prevent either party from knowing when the cause came on for trial, what the real point to be discussed and decided was. In fact, the whole meaning of the system is to narrow the parties to define issues, and thereby diminish expense and delay, especially as regards the amount of testimony required on either side at the hearing.
29. What can be gleaned from the foregoing is that, in the realm of constitutional adjudication, the requirement of precision in pleadings is not a mere technical formality; it is a substantive safeguard that anchors both procedural fairness and judicial efficiency. This doctrinal requirement ensures that the respondent is placed on clear notice of the specific allegations to be met, thereby enabling a meaningful and well prepared response. Equally, precision equips the Court with the clarity necessary to isolate the constitutional questions for determination, to assess the alleged violation with analytical rigor, and to craft appropriate relief.
30. Far from being a rigid procedural hurdle, the precision doctrine embodies the essence of due process: it preserves the integrity of constitutional litigation, prevents the dilution of constitutional jurisdiction through vague or generalized claims, and ultimately upholds the rule of law by ensuring that constitutional petitions are adjudicated on a coherent and intelligible record.
31. The Petition herein alleges infringement of rights under Articles 40 (2) (a, 40(3) (Property), 43 (1) (e) ( Economic and Social rights), 46 (1) (c) & (d) ( Consumer Rights), & 47 (1) & (2) ( Fair Administrative Action) of the Constitution Of Kenya, 2010, occasioned by the public notice that purported to cancel policy that he held with Trident Insurance Company Limited.
32. On the 1 st issue, I find therefore that the Petition meets the threshold test and is therefore competent for determination on merits.
b) Whether the petition offends the doctrine of exhaustion?
33. The doctrine of exhaustion ensures that disputes entrusted by statute to specialized bodies are first addressed within those forums, thereby preserving institutional competence, promoting orderly dispute resolution, and preventing the premature invocation of constitutional jurisdiction. The doctrine safeguards judicial economy and protects the Court from being transformed into a tribunal of first instance in matters where alternative remedies are both available and adequate. It demands that constitutional intervention is reserved for exceptional circumstances, such as where the statutory forum lacks jurisdiction, the remedy is ineffective, or the matter raises pure constitutional questions. It is a principled gatekeeping tool that strengthens the integrity, coherence, and efficiency of Kenya’s adjudicatory system.
34. The Supreme Court in Sammy Ndung’u Waity v Independent Electoral & Boundaries Commission & 3 Others [2019] eKLR, stated:
[63].Where the Constitution or the law, consciously confers jurisdiction to resolve a dispute, on an organ other than a court of law, it is imperative that such dispute resolution mechanism, be exhausted before approaching the latter. Were it not so, parties would bide their time, overlooking the recognized forums, and later springing a complainant the courts. Such a scenario would be a clear recipe for forum shopping, an undertaking that must never be allowed to fester in the administration of justice. We are fortified in this regard, by the persuasive authority by the Court of Appeal, in Geoffrey Muthinja Kabiru & 2 others; [2015] eKLR; wherein the Appellate Court observed:
“It is imperative that where a dispute resolution mechanism exists outside the Courts, the same be exhausted before the jurisdiction of the Courts be invoked. Courts ought to be fora of last resort and not the first port of call the moment a storm brews… The exhaustion doctrine is a sound one and serves the purpose of ensuring that there is a postponement of judicial consideration of matters to ensure that a party is first of all diligent in the protection of his own interest within the mechanisms in place for resolution outside the courts.”
35. The doctrine of exhaustion was comprehensively dealt with by a 5-Judge Bench in Ramogi & 3 others v Attorney General & 4 others; Muslims for Human Rights & 2 others (Interested Parties) [2020] KEHC 10266 (KLR). The Court stated as follows:
The question of exhaustion of administrative remedies arises when a litigant, aggrieved by an agency's action, seeks redress from a Court of law on an action without pursuing available remedies before the agency itself. The exhaustion doctrine serves the purpose of ensuring that there is a postponement of judicial consideration of matters to ensure that a party is, first of all, diligent in the protection of his own interest within the mechanisms in place for resolution outside the Courts. This encourages alternative dispute resolution mechanisms in line with Article 159 of the Constitution …
36. The Court went further to discuss the exceptions and pronounced: -
[62]. In the instant case, the Petitioners allege violation of their fundamental rights. Where a suit primarily seeks to enforce fundamental rights and freedoms and it is demonstrated that the claimed constitutional violations are not mere “bootstraps” or merely framed in Bill of Rights language as a pretext to gain entry to the Court, it is not barred by the doctrine of exhaustion. This is especially so because the enforcement of fundamental rights or freedoms is a question which can only be determined by the High Court.
37. The Court of Appeal whilst upholding the decision of the High Court in Kenya Ports Authority v Ramogi & 8 others [2019] KECA 305 (KLR) pronounced as follows: -
[23]. The jurisdiction of the High Court is derived from Article 165 (3) and (6) of the Constitution. Accordingly, the High Court has unlimited original jurisdiction in criminal and civil matters, including determination of a question of enforcement of the bill of rights and interpretation of the Constitution encompassing determination of any matter relating to the Constitutional relationship between the different levels of government.
[24]. At the High Court, we note that the learned Judges dealt with this matter under the question framed as follows: Is the court barred from considering the suit at present by virtue of Article 189 of the Constitution and sections 33 and 34 of Inter-Governmental Relations Act of 2012 (IGRA)? The parties have advanced similar arguments as before the learned Judges of the High Court. The High Court went further than just looking at the ruling by Ogola J. They also took into account the doctrine of exhaustion as enunciated in Republic vs.
[25] Independent Election and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) ex parte National Super Alliance (NASA) Kenya & 6 Others [2017] eKLR. They applied a dual pronged approach before concluding that the dispute was not an inter-governmental dispute under IGRA. First, they considered that the test for determining the matter as an inter-governmental dispute for purposes of application of IGRA was not simply to look at who the parties to the dispute were, but the nature of the claim in question and; secondly, they considered that the claimed Constitutional violations seeking to be enforced are not mere “bootstraps.” We have keenly addressed our minds to the learned Judges’ decision and are satisfied that they stayed within the expected contours and properly directed themselves. Once they determined that the dispute was not inter-governmental in nature, we do not think it is necessary to consider whether the petitioners had exhausted their legal avenue. Jurisdiction by the High Court under Article 165 (5) of the Constitution became automatic. And in our view, it could not be ousted or substituted.
38. The substratum of the Petition is that, through the impugned notice, the 1st respondent erred in directing policyholders of the affected insurers to “take out alternative covers from other licensed insurers to ensure that there is no unnecessary exposure.” The practical import of this communication was to render existing policies invalid, notwithstanding that they had been duly issued and premiums paid. The Petitioner avers that this directive had immediate and adverse consequences, as evidenced by the incident in which police officers stopped him and advised that he did not have valid insurance cover, thereby exposing him to criminal sanction and economic loss.
39. In response, the respondents contend that the Petitioner has mischaracterized the dispute. In their view, the matter is purely regulatory in nature and falls squarely within the statutory framework of the Insurance Act. They argue that the Petitioner ought to have invoked and exhausted the appellate procedure set out under Section 173 of the Act, which provides for recourse to the Insurance Appeals Tribunal, before approaching this Court. The Petitioner, however, maintains that the impugned directive occasioned a violation of a bouquet of constitutional rights, including the right to property under Article 40, the right to fair administrative action under Article 47, consumer rights under Article 46, and economic and social rights under Article 43.
40. I am persuaded by the reasoning of the High Court in Ramogi & 3 Others v Attorney General & 4 Others (supra) , where the Court observed that statutory dispute resolution mechanisms cannot be construed in a rigid or overly restrictive manner so as to oust this Court’s constitutional jurisdiction. The Court further held that although the doctrine of exhaustion is an important organizing principle, it is not applicable where the nature of the grievance and the public interest involved justify direct recourse to the High Court.
41. The same situation obtains in the present matter. The 1st respondent, while exercising its statutory mandate to place an insurer under statutory management, proceeded, through the impugned notice, to invalidate existing policies, thereby exposing policyholders to criminal sanction and economic loss and implicating the Petitioner’s constitutional rights. In these circumstances, and given the broad public interest in the stability of the insurance sector and the protection of consumers, the exhaustion doctrine cannot be applied mechanistically to bar the Court’s jurisdiction .
c) Arising from (a) and ( b) above whether the rights of the Petitioner were violated as alleged?
42. The next issue that arises for determination is whether the rights of the Petitioner were violated as alleged. One of the primary innovations of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010, consistent with global trends, is the recognition and protection of consumer rights. The history of the insurance industry in Kenya is plagued by the collapse and winding up of companies that left insured persons exposed and without recourse. The amendments to the Insurance Act were therefore introduced as safeguards whose overall intention is to protect the consumer. It would be inimical both to the Constitution and to the Act if their implementation were to leave insured persons in no better position than they were prior to the amendments and the promulgation of the Constitution.
43. Indeed, Article 259 of the Constitution provides that the Constitution shall be interpreted in a manner that promotes its purposes, values and principles; advances the rule of law and the human rights and fundamental freedoms in the Bill of Rights; permits the development of the law; and contributes to good governance.
44. The framing of the Act is deliberate in the first instance, the insurer’s management is suspended and a statutory manager is appointed. The purpose of statutory management is to protect policyholders and stabilize the insurer; it does not extinguish existing contracts. This is readily inferred from the role of the statutory manager, which includes, inter alia, “to assume the management, control and conduct of the affairs and business of an insurer and to exercise all the powers of the insurer to the exclusion of its Board of Directors, including use of its corporate seal” (Section 67C(2)(i)).
45. In addition, the Act provides that the statutory manager shall, within twelve months from the date of appointment, prepare and submit to the Commissioner a report on the financial position and management of the insurer with recommendations as to whether the insurer is capable of being revived or should be liquidated (Section 67C(6)).
46. A literal reading of the relevant provisions, therefore discloses that under Section 67C(2)(i), the provision under which the impugned notice was issued, the Commissioner was limited to appointing a statutory manager to take over the running of the insurance company for purposes of stabilization. It is only at the end of the twelve month period that the manager advises whether the insurer can be revived or should be placed under liquidation.
47. The Commissioner therefore stepped outside the statutory parameters, and in doing so his action triggered non compliance with both Article 46 and Article 47 of the Constitution. The failure to comply with Article 47, by failing to inform affected parties, failing to afford them an opportunity to be heard, and failing to give reasons for the decision, negatively impacted the consumer rights of not only the Petitioner but all those who were holding policies with the insurer.
48. The Petition therefore succeeds and pursuant to Article 23 of the Constitution, the following orders will issue;
a. A Declaration hereby issues that the Insurance Policies issued by TRIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY LTD, KUSCCO MUTUAL ASSURANCE LTD and COPRPORATE INSURANCE COMPANY LTD held by the policyholders as of 10th day of March 2026 remain valid subsisting and legally binding contracts of Insurance until a decision is made under S67C (7) of the Insurance Act.
b. A Declaration hereby issues that the Directive issued by the 1st Respondent on 10th day of March 2026 contravened the Petitioner's Consumer rights and right to fair administrative action.
c. An order of certiorari is hereby issued removing into this Court for purposes of quashing, and is hereby quashing, the notice dated 10th March 2026 issued by the 1st Respondent, to the extent that it purported to nullify or invalidate insurance policies that were lawfully in existence at the time of the placement of the insurers under statutory management.
d. Consequent to Order (a), (b) and (c) it follows that the policies issued by the insurer before the 10 th March 2026 are valid for purposes of The Insurance (Motor Vehicles Third Party Risks) (Certificate of Insurance) Rules until a decision is made under S67C (7) of the Insurance Act.
e. Each party will bear their costs.
DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED VIRTUALLY AT NAIROBI this 17 th September 2026
2. He seeks conservatory orders restraining the 1st respondent from treating pre 10 March 2026 policies as invalid, orders compelling the Inspector General to recognise those policies, declarations affirming their continued validity, and compensation for alleged constitutional violations.
3. The petitioner asserts that the directive was arbitrary and unconstitutional, violating property rights, economic and social rights, consumer rights, and fair administrative action. He states he held a valid Trident policy (No. 010/070/767875/2023) yet received no individualized notice explaining the abrupt cancellation.
4. He narrates that on 13th March 2026, police officers harassed him for allegedly driving without valid insurance, forcing him to plead for leniency and purchase temporary cover. He argues this demonstrates the immediate legal exposure created by the directive.
5. The petitioner contends that the 1st respondent lacked contractual capacity to invalidate private insurance contracts, and breached its statutory duty by allowing insurers to collect premiums despite long standing weaknesses.
6. He argues that section 67C(2)(i) must be exercised within constitutional bounds, and that statutory management does not automatically cancel existing contracts. He relies on Citadel General Assurance Co. v Lloyds Bank Canada [1997] 3 SCR 805 to assert that premiums constitute trust funds held for policyholders.
7. The petitioner maintains that the public notices were not safeguards but instruments of exposure, and that cancellation of operating licences without individualized notice violated Article 47. He argues that a public notice cannot extinguish specific property rights.
8. He asserts that the 1st respondent knew of the insurers’ weaknesses for years but failed to provide structured transition, contrary to section 3A(1)(ha) of the Insurance Act.
9. He invokes vested rights, arguing that having paid premiums and received a certificate valid until 18 October 2026, he possessed a constitutionally protected property interest.
10. The petitioner alleges confiscation of premiums without indemnity, violates Article 40, and rejects the argument of frustration by operation of law, asserting that the regulator acted belatedly and abruptly.
11. He argues that judicial recognition of the policies would shield policyholders from police harassment and compel the statutory manager to honour contracts. He contends that the directive violated legitimate expectation, and that section 19 cannot justify leaving citizens without mandatory insurance. He argues that the Policyholders Compensation Fund is an end stage remedy and cannot cure immediate exposure to arrest or loss of indemnity.
12. He faults the 1st respondent for failing to distinguish operational capital from policyholder premiums, asserting that reliance on the Insurance (Capital Adequacy) Guidelines, 2017cannot supersede constitutional protections.
13. He states that the public perceived the notices as invalidating policies, and that judicial precedents cited by the 1st respondent are distinguishable. He relies on Mrao Ltd v First American Bank of Kenya Ltd [2003] KLR to assert a prima facie case.
14. The 1st respondent, through affidavits sworn on 26 March and 5 May 2026, asserts that statutory management was lawfully invoked under section 67C(2)(i) due to persistent weaknesses in the insurers’ solvency, governance, capital adequacy, reinsurance arrangements, and risk management.
15. It explains that statutory management suspends ordinary management, cancels operating licences, and bars entry into new contracts. Public notices were issued to inform policyholders and prevent exposure. The 1st respondent argues that individualized notice was impractical and early disclosure would have triggered a destabilizing run on assets, harming policyholders. It cites statutory safeguards including moratoriums and compensation through the Policyholders Compensation Fund under section 179 and section 179(2A)(a).
16. It rejects the petitioner’s claim of deprivation of property, asserting that contracts were frustrated by insolvency, not cancelled arbitrarily. Policyholders become creditors entitled to lodge claims with statutory managers or liquidators. The respondent argues that recognising policies from insolvent insurers would be unsafe and contrary to public interest, exposing accident victims to uncompensated losses.
17. It highlights years of supervisory engagement, directives to recapitalize, and opportunities for remediation. It cites Law Society of Kenya v Insurance Regulatory Authority & 3 others; Kiki Investments Ltd & 2 others (Interested Parties) [2022] KEHC 11091 (KLR) affirming the constitutionality of section 67C.
18. It asserts that it acted lawfully, in good faith, and within its mandate to protect policyholders and the public. It argues that the petitioner has not challenged the legality of statutory provisions nor shown that statutory criteria were unmet. It contends that freezing statutory management powers would contravene section 19 and undermine regulatory oversight. It adds that police enforce the Traffic Act read with the Insurance (Motor Vehicle Third Party Risks) Act. It argues that section 45 applies only to long term insurance, and that premiums are actuarially determined sums covering claims, management expenses, commissions, and shareholder profit, not trust funds.
19. It notes that compliance reports are regularly published, and that reliance on Muinde & another v IRA & 2 others; KBU 400 A & 2 others (Interested Parties) [2022] KEHC 568 (KLR) is misplaced because the judgment was stayed by the Court of Appeal in Insurance Regulatory Authority v Muinde & 3 others [2023] KECA 422 (KLR).
20. Finally, argues that the petition fails the Anarita Karimi Njeru v Republic [1979] eKLR precision test, reaffirmed in Mumo Matemu v Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance [2013] eKLR , and cites decisions upholding statutory management, including Misc. Application No. 238 of 2017 – Godfrey Kiptum v BlueShield Insurance Company Ltd & Others and JR Misc. Application No. E043 of 2026 – Republic v IRA, Policyholders Compensation Fund, Trident Insurance Co. Ltd (Interested Party), Ex parte Emmanuel Oriedo Makanga & Andrew Makaku Mulogoli .
21. It asserts that granting the orders would prejudice public interest, citing Re Xplico Insurance Company Limited (Under Statutory Management) [2026] KEHC 4143 (KLR) , and notes that the Insurance Appeals Tribunal Misc. Application No. 2 of 2026 – Trident Insurance Company Ltd v IRA upheld statutory management as lawful and reasonable.
22. The 2nd and 3rd respondents oppose the petition through grounds of opposition dated 30th March 2026, asserting that the petitioner has not demonstrated any illegal action or omission attributable to them. They argue that no evidence shows the Inspector General instructed officers based on the public notices, and that alternative forums such as the **Independent Policing Oversight Authority** exist for complaints against police conduct. They maintain that the material before the Court discloses no basis for interim orders against them and urge dismissal of the petition and application with costs.
ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION
23. The Petition herein is hinged on the Public Notice issued by the Ist respondent on 10th March 2026 notifying the Public that Trident Insurance Company Limited, Corporate Insurance Company Limited and KUSCCO Mutual Assurance Limited had been placed under statutory management. There were 3 separate but identical notices. I reproduce the one that relates to Trident Insurance Company Limited for ease of reference.
PUBLIC NOTICE
TRIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED- PLACEMENT UNDER STATUTORY MANAGEMENT
1. The Insurance Regulatory Authority has with effect from 10 th March 2026, placed Trident Insurance Company Limited under Statutory Management as per Section 67C(2)(i) of the Insurance Act.
2. The Authority has appointed the Policy Holders Compensation Fund (PCF) as the Statutory Manager for Trident Insurance Company Limited.
3. Trident Insurance Company Limited is not authorised to enter into any new insurance contracts from 11 th March 2026
4. The Insurer’s existing Policyholders are advised to immediately seek alternative covers from other licensed insurers to ensure that there is no unnecessary exposure.
5. The Policyholders Compensation Fund will compensate the affected claimants as provided for under the Insurance Act, Cap 487 Laws of Kenya.
COMMISSIONER OF INSURANCE
10 th March 2026
24. The statutory mandate of the 1 st respondent to place insurance companies under management pursuant to Section 67C of the Act has been affirmed by the Court in the case of Law Society of Kenya v Insurance Regulatory Authority & 3 others; Kiki Investments Ltd & 2 others (Interested Parties) [2022] KEHC 11091 (KLR) where the Court declared-
[117] In my view, the impugned provisions are necessary in the interest of the public to uphold sound regulation in the insurance sector. It is my humble finding therefore that Section 67C (2)(i),67C(3) and 67C(10) of the Insurance Act are constitutional and do not violate Articles 35, 40, 46, 47, 48 and 50(1) of the Constitution.
25. Therefore the question that properly falls for determination is not the constitutionality of Section 67C of the Insurance Act or any of its related provisions. Rather, it is whether the Commissioner exercised the statutory mandate conferred by that section in a manner consistent with the Constitution. Before the Court can interrogate that substantive question, it must first address the preliminary and foundational issues raised by the respondents concerning the competence of the Petition and the jurisdiction of this Court. These issues are not peripheral; they go to the very authority of the Court to entertain the matter and must therefore be resolved at the outset. The issues for determination can therefore be framed as follows-
1aa Whether the petition meets the threshold for a constitutional petition?
1ab Whether the petition offends the doctrine of exhaustion?
1ac Arising from (a) and ( b) above whether the rights of the Petitioner were violated as alleged?
1ad What are the consequential orders?
a) Whether the petition meets the threshold for a constitutional petition?
26. Rule 10 of the Constitution of Kenya (Protection of Rights and Fundamental Freedoms) Practice and Procedure Rules, 2013 prescribes the Form that a Petition must take, setting out the requirement for specificity and precision. This test was first articulated in the precedent setting case of Anarita Karimi Njeru vs Republic [1979] eKLR as follows:
We would, however, again stress that if a person is seeking redress from the High Court on a matter which involves a reference to the Constitution, it is important (if only to ensure that justice is done to his case) that he should set out with a reasonable degree of precision that of which he complains, the provisions said to be infringed, and the manner in which they are alleged to be infringed.
27. The Supreme Court expounded further in Communications Commission of Kenya & 5 others v Royal Media Services Limited & 5 others [2014] eKLR as follows:
“[349] …. Although Article 22(1) of the Constitution gives every person the right to initiate proceedings claiming that a fundamental right or freedom has been denied, violated or infringed or threatened, a party invoking this Article has to show the rights said to be infringed, as well as the basis of his or her grievance. This principle emerges clearly from the High Court decision in Anarita Karimi Njeru v. Republic, (1979) KLR 154: the necessity of a link between the aggrieved party, the provisions of the Constitution alleged to have been contravened, and the manifestation of contravention or infringement. Such a principle plays a positive role, as a foundation of conviction and good faith, in engaging the constitutional process of dispute settlement…”
28. In Mumo Matemu v Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance & 5 others [2013] eKLR the Court of Appeal in affirming the decision in Anarita stated;
“…The principle in Anarita Karimi Njeru (supra) that established the rule that requires reasonable precision in framing of issues in constitutional petitions is an extension of this principle. What Jessel, M.R said in 1876 in the case of Thorp v Holdsworth (1876) 3 Ch. D. 637 at 639 holds true today:
The whole object of pleadings is to bring the parties to an issue, and the meaning of the rules…was to prevent the issue being enlarged, which would prevent either party from knowing when the cause came on for trial, what the real point to be discussed and decided was. In fact, the whole meaning of the system is to narrow the parties to define issues, and thereby diminish expense and delay, especially as regards the amount of testimony required on either side at the hearing.
29. What can be gleaned from the foregoing is that, in the realm of constitutional adjudication, the requirement of precision in pleadings is not a mere technical formality; it is a substantive safeguard that anchors both procedural fairness and judicial efficiency. This doctrinal requirement ensures that the respondent is placed on clear notice of the specific allegations to be met, thereby enabling a meaningful and well prepared response. Equally, precision equips the Court with the clarity necessary to isolate the constitutional questions for determination, to assess the alleged violation with analytical rigor, and to craft appropriate relief.
30. Far from being a rigid procedural hurdle, the precision doctrine embodies the essence of due process: it preserves the integrity of constitutional litigation, prevents the dilution of constitutional jurisdiction through vague or generalized claims, and ultimately upholds the rule of law by ensuring that constitutional petitions are adjudicated on a coherent and intelligible record.
31. The Petition herein alleges infringement of rights under Articles 40 (2) (a, 40(3) (Property), 43 (1) (e) ( Economic and Social rights), 46 (1) (c) & (d) ( Consumer Rights), & 47 (1) & (2) ( Fair Administrative Action) of the Constitution Of Kenya, 2010, occasioned by the public notice that purported to cancel policy that he held with Trident Insurance Company Limited.
32. On the 1 st issue, I find therefore that the Petition meets the threshold test and is therefore competent for determination on merits.
b) Whether the petition offends the doctrine of exhaustion?
33. The doctrine of exhaustion ensures that disputes entrusted by statute to specialized bodies are first addressed within those forums, thereby preserving institutional competence, promoting orderly dispute resolution, and preventing the premature invocation of constitutional jurisdiction. The doctrine safeguards judicial economy and protects the Court from being transformed into a tribunal of first instance in matters where alternative remedies are both available and adequate. It demands that constitutional intervention is reserved for exceptional circumstances, such as where the statutory forum lacks jurisdiction, the remedy is ineffective, or the matter raises pure constitutional questions. It is a principled gatekeeping tool that strengthens the integrity, coherence, and efficiency of Kenya’s adjudicatory system.
34. The Supreme Court in Sammy Ndung’u Waity v Independent Electoral & Boundaries Commission & 3 Others [2019] eKLR, stated:
[63].Where the Constitution or the law, consciously confers jurisdiction to resolve a dispute, on an organ other than a court of law, it is imperative that such dispute resolution mechanism, be exhausted before approaching the latter. Were it not so, parties would bide their time, overlooking the recognized forums, and later springing a complainant the courts. Such a scenario would be a clear recipe for forum shopping, an undertaking that must never be allowed to fester in the administration of justice. We are fortified in this regard, by the persuasive authority by the Court of Appeal, in Geoffrey Muthinja Kabiru & 2 others; [2015] eKLR; wherein the Appellate Court observed:
“It is imperative that where a dispute resolution mechanism exists outside the Courts, the same be exhausted before the jurisdiction of the Courts be invoked. Courts ought to be fora of last resort and not the first port of call the moment a storm brews… The exhaustion doctrine is a sound one and serves the purpose of ensuring that there is a postponement of judicial consideration of matters to ensure that a party is first of all diligent in the protection of his own interest within the mechanisms in place for resolution outside the courts.”
35. The doctrine of exhaustion was comprehensively dealt with by a 5-Judge Bench in Ramogi & 3 others v Attorney General & 4 others; Muslims for Human Rights & 2 others (Interested Parties) [2020] KEHC 10266 (KLR). The Court stated as follows:
The question of exhaustion of administrative remedies arises when a litigant, aggrieved by an agency's action, seeks redress from a Court of law on an action without pursuing available remedies before the agency itself. The exhaustion doctrine serves the purpose of ensuring that there is a postponement of judicial consideration of matters to ensure that a party is, first of all, diligent in the protection of his own interest within the mechanisms in place for resolution outside the Courts. This encourages alternative dispute resolution mechanisms in line with Article 159 of the Constitution …
36. The Court went further to discuss the exceptions and pronounced: -
[62]. In the instant case, the Petitioners allege violation of their fundamental rights. Where a suit primarily seeks to enforce fundamental rights and freedoms and it is demonstrated that the claimed constitutional violations are not mere “bootstraps” or merely framed in Bill of Rights language as a pretext to gain entry to the Court, it is not barred by the doctrine of exhaustion. This is especially so because the enforcement of fundamental rights or freedoms is a question which can only be determined by the High Court.
37. The Court of Appeal whilst upholding the decision of the High Court in Kenya Ports Authority v Ramogi & 8 others [2019] KECA 305 (KLR) pronounced as follows: -
[23]. The jurisdiction of the High Court is derived from Article 165 (3) and (6) of the Constitution. Accordingly, the High Court has unlimited original jurisdiction in criminal and civil matters, including determination of a question of enforcement of the bill of rights and interpretation of the Constitution encompassing determination of any matter relating to the Constitutional relationship between the different levels of government.
[24]. At the High Court, we note that the learned Judges dealt with this matter under the question framed as follows: Is the court barred from considering the suit at present by virtue of Article 189 of the Constitution and sections 33 and 34 of Inter-Governmental Relations Act of 2012 (IGRA)? The parties have advanced similar arguments as before the learned Judges of the High Court. The High Court went further than just looking at the ruling by Ogola J. They also took into account the doctrine of exhaustion as enunciated in Republic vs.
[25] Independent Election and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) ex parte National Super Alliance (NASA) Kenya & 6 Others [2017] eKLR. They applied a dual pronged approach before concluding that the dispute was not an inter-governmental dispute under IGRA. First, they considered that the test for determining the matter as an inter-governmental dispute for purposes of application of IGRA was not simply to look at who the parties to the dispute were, but the nature of the claim in question and; secondly, they considered that the claimed Constitutional violations seeking to be enforced are not mere “bootstraps.” We have keenly addressed our minds to the learned Judges’ decision and are satisfied that they stayed within the expected contours and properly directed themselves. Once they determined that the dispute was not inter-governmental in nature, we do not think it is necessary to consider whether the petitioners had exhausted their legal avenue. Jurisdiction by the High Court under Article 165 (5) of the Constitution became automatic. And in our view, it could not be ousted or substituted.
38. The substratum of the Petition is that, through the impugned notice, the 1st respondent erred in directing policyholders of the affected insurers to “take out alternative covers from other licensed insurers to ensure that there is no unnecessary exposure.” The practical import of this communication was to render existing policies invalid, notwithstanding that they had been duly issued and premiums paid. The Petitioner avers that this directive had immediate and adverse consequences, as evidenced by the incident in which police officers stopped him and advised that he did not have valid insurance cover, thereby exposing him to criminal sanction and economic loss.
39. In response, the respondents contend that the Petitioner has mischaracterized the dispute. In their view, the matter is purely regulatory in nature and falls squarely within the statutory framework of the Insurance Act. They argue that the Petitioner ought to have invoked and exhausted the appellate procedure set out under Section 173 of the Act, which provides for recourse to the Insurance Appeals Tribunal, before approaching this Court. The Petitioner, however, maintains that the impugned directive occasioned a violation of a bouquet of constitutional rights, including the right to property under Article 40, the right to fair administrative action under Article 47, consumer rights under Article 46, and economic and social rights under Article 43.
40. I am persuaded by the reasoning of the High Court in Ramogi & 3 Others v Attorney General & 4 Others (supra) , where the Court observed that statutory dispute resolution mechanisms cannot be construed in a rigid or overly restrictive manner so as to oust this Court’s constitutional jurisdiction. The Court further held that although the doctrine of exhaustion is an important organizing principle, it is not applicable where the nature of the grievance and the public interest involved justify direct recourse to the High Court.
41. The same situation obtains in the present matter. The 1st respondent, while exercising its statutory mandate to place an insurer under statutory management, proceeded, through the impugned notice, to invalidate existing policies, thereby exposing policyholders to criminal sanction and economic loss and implicating the Petitioner’s constitutional rights. In these circumstances, and given the broad public interest in the stability of the insurance sector and the protection of consumers, the exhaustion doctrine cannot be applied mechanistically to bar the Court’s jurisdiction .
c) Arising from (a) and ( b) above whether the rights of the Petitioner were violated as alleged?
42. The next issue that arises for determination is whether the rights of the Petitioner were violated as alleged. One of the primary innovations of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010, consistent with global trends, is the recognition and protection of consumer rights. The history of the insurance industry in Kenya is plagued by the collapse and winding up of companies that left insured persons exposed and without recourse. The amendments to the Insurance Act were therefore introduced as safeguards whose overall intention is to protect the consumer. It would be inimical both to the Constitution and to the Act if their implementation were to leave insured persons in no better position than they were prior to the amendments and the promulgation of the Constitution.
43. Indeed, Article 259 of the Constitution provides that the Constitution shall be interpreted in a manner that promotes its purposes, values and principles; advances the rule of law and the human rights and fundamental freedoms in the Bill of Rights; permits the development of the law; and contributes to good governance.
44. The framing of the Act is deliberate in the first instance, the insurer’s management is suspended and a statutory manager is appointed. The purpose of statutory management is to protect policyholders and stabilize the insurer; it does not extinguish existing contracts. This is readily inferred from the role of the statutory manager, which includes, inter alia, “to assume the management, control and conduct of the affairs and business of an insurer and to exercise all the powers of the insurer to the exclusion of its Board of Directors, including use of its corporate seal” (Section 67C(2)(i)).
45. In addition, the Act provides that the statutory manager shall, within twelve months from the date of appointment, prepare and submit to the Commissioner a report on the financial position and management of the insurer with recommendations as to whether the insurer is capable of being revived or should be liquidated (Section 67C(6)).
46. A literal reading of the relevant provisions, therefore discloses that under Section 67C(2)(i), the provision under which the impugned notice was issued, the Commissioner was limited to appointing a statutory manager to take over the running of the insurance company for purposes of stabilization. It is only at the end of the twelve month period that the manager advises whether the insurer can be revived or should be placed under liquidation.
47. The Commissioner therefore stepped outside the statutory parameters, and in doing so his action triggered non compliance with both Article 46 and Article 47 of the Constitution. The failure to comply with Article 47, by failing to inform affected parties, failing to afford them an opportunity to be heard, and failing to give reasons for the decision, negatively impacted the consumer rights of not only the Petitioner but all those who were holding policies with the insurer.
48. The Petition therefore succeeds and pursuant to Article 23 of the Constitution, the following orders will issue;
a. A Declaration hereby issues that the Insurance Policies issued by TRIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY LTD, KUSCCO MUTUAL ASSURANCE LTD and COPRPORATE INSURANCE COMPANY LTD held by the policyholders as of 10th day of March 2026 remain valid subsisting and legally binding contracts of Insurance until a decision is made under S67C (7) of the Insurance Act.
b. A Declaration hereby issues that the Directive issued by the 1st Respondent on 10th day of March 2026 contravened the Petitioner's Consumer rights and right to fair administrative action.
c. An order of certiorari is hereby issued removing into this Court for purposes of quashing, and is hereby quashing, the notice dated 10th March 2026 issued by the 1st Respondent, to the extent that it purported to nullify or invalidate insurance policies that were lawfully in existence at the time of the placement of the insurers under statutory management.
d. Consequent to Order (a), (b) and (c) it follows that the policies issued by the insurer before the 10 th March 2026 are valid for purposes of The Insurance (Motor Vehicles Third Party Risks) (Certificate of Insurance) Rules until a decision is made under S67C (7) of the Insurance Act.
e. Each party will bear their costs.
DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED VIRTUALLY AT NAIROBI this 17 th September 2026